The
International Handbook
of Sociology
The
International Handbook
of Sociology

Edited by
Stella R. Quah and Arnaud Sales

SAGE Publications
London • Thousand Oaks • New Delhi
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Foreword

Alberto Martinelli

This book is the first attempt in years to provide a balanced and well-informed assessment of the state of the art of sociology in many of its most important specialized fields. A first, distinctive character of the volume is the choice to focus on specialized fields instead of general theories. It is a wise choice since, while the leading theorists are well known in the profession as a whole, the bulk of the sociological community is made of specialists who, although less widely known, often have a greater impact on the public discourse, on education, and on policy-oriented decision making. A second, related, distinctive character is that the 23 chapters are written by experts in the respective fields who are also leaders of research committees of the International Sociological Association (ISA), with two positive consequences which we do not find in most handbooks of sociology: the book guarantees a more international coverage of the various fields (although sociologists from the non-Western world are still under-represented) and it provides a comprehensive review of the contributions to each specialized field by scholars belonging to different competitive schools. As President of the International Sociological Association, I am glad to add that this book also shows ISA’s vitality and its growing importance and legitimation in the world sociological community.

The picture of sociology at the dawn of the 21st century which emerges from the volume is a picture of continuities and breakthroughs in research findings, cooperation and conflict among competing paradigms, achievements in theory and method, and unresolved problems. Major continuities are the ongoing concern with a core of perennial questions of inquiry, such as social order, conflict and change, the meanings of social action, power and legitimacy, inequality and social reproduction, and the reinterpretation of the classics, such as Weber, Marx, Durkheim, Simmel, Pareto among others, as sources of theoretical inspiration, although with the awareness that their analyses are historically bounded.

The common heritage — made of continuing research questions and influences of the classics — did not amount, however, to a core, widely shared, disciplinary paradigm. Actually, the multiplicity of paradigms and theoretical approaches clearly appears as a basic distinctive character of contemporary sociology. For most
sociologists this is perceived as an advantage. Antony Giddens remarks that “the fact that there is no single theoretical approach which dominates the whole of sociology” demonstrates that “the jostling of rival theoretical approaches and theories is an expression of the vitality of the sociological enterprise”. And Raymond Boudon argues that “sociology is in crisis when it pretends to have reached the conditions of a ‘normal science’ and to be led by a unique paradigm”. Not all sociologists are indeed convinced of this advantage, given the fact that some of them prefer to turn to the rational action paradigm of economics; but most seem persuaded that the subject matter of sociology requires a plurality of conceptual perspectives and methods of investigation and that alternative theoretical approaches can be tested with regard to the analysis of specific phenomena.

I think that the advantages and disadvantages of having a core paradigm for a discipline tend to balance each other. The case of economics is illuminating in this respect. In economics alternative approaches do exist, but they do not challenge the core paradigm, which is based on the combined assumptions of rational maximizing behavior, market equilibrium, and stable preferences. This ‘creative simplification’ of human action has brought undeniable theoretical achievements, which are exemplified in Leon Walras’ general equilibrium model as a response to the question of the efficient functioning of a market economy made of millions of individual decisions. But it has also fostered limitations in the number and type of hypotheses which can be derived from the paradigm, as well as apories and difficulties in the empirical validation of the theoretical hypotheses; and it has constrained the ‘imagination’ of scholars in providing interpretations of emerging economic processes.

The reverse seems true for sociology: the freedom from paradigmatic ‘dogma’ has been paid at the cost of more precarious accumulation of knowledge, greater ambivalence, bitter paradigmatic fights which often amount to a waste of intellectual energies. And it has prevented widely accepted solutions to central theoretical questions. A similar question to that of the economists’ relation between rational individual actors and general market equilibrium is at the heart of the sociological inquiry: it is the question of the relationship between structure and agency, with the strictly related ones of the micro-macro links, and of the relation between causal and interpretative methodologies. But there is no theoretical solution to these questions, which could parallel Walras’ general equilibrium model. The preference which most sociologists seem to share for multiple paradigms could, then, be as well a ‘forced preference’, since major attempts to provide a unifying paradigm, from Talcott Parsons to James Coleman to Anthony Giddens, have not lasted or have not been accepted by the majority of scholars. Failures may be due to the fact that the features of ‘homo sociologicus’ are different from those of ‘homo economicus’, and do not allow the creative simplification of the iper-rationalist assumption, or to the fact that core theoretical questions have to be rephrased and/ or most adequate responses must be worked out.

In this situation, however, most sociologists working in specialized fields have not been ‘paralyzed’ by the absence of a unified grand theory, but have proceeded along the most viable paths of Robert Merton’s “middle–range theories”, Arthur Stinchcombe’s “toolkit of analytical instruments” and Jon Elster’s concept of
“mechanisms”. As the latter author argues, “there should be a shift in emphasis in social sciences from theories to mechanisms”, i.e. “small and medium-sized descriptions of ways in which things happen. A mechanism is a little causal story, recognizable from one context to another. A theory has greater pretensions: it is supposed to tell you which mechanisms operate in which situation…Generalizations should take the form of mechanisms, not theories”. This approach, which is close to Weber’s and Simmel’s attitude toward sociology, seems particularly valid for sociological research in specialized areas. In fact, in these situations, the analyst-interpreter will extract from the toolkit those tools, models, mechanisms, that he considers relevant, will adapt them to the concrete research questions, and will verify the correspondence on the basis of the available data and methods.

The continuing work of many sociologists along those lines in specialized fields, as this volume shows, explains why the difficulties in general theory construction have not prevented significant sociological advances in recent years; advances which can be summarized in: methodological advances, better knowledge in specialized fields, and greater consensus of most sociologists on the basic tensions of their work.

Knowledge achievements in specialized fields are well documented in the 23 chapters (and they could be equally easily shown in those areas which are not covered in the volume, such as those of economic sociology), and they are related to the reasonable adoption of the toolkit approach I have discussed.

Methodological advances are also effectively shown in several chapters. They are related to the development of the computer, and range from improved multivariate analysis to graph theory and network analysis, from more extensive comparative research to more rigorous methods of recording and analyzing micro interactional data. Besides, as Smelser points out in a recent work, there is a significant convergence in sociological methodology in the trend toward multi-method analysis with a loss of importance of the qualitative-quantitative contrast and a growing acknowledgment of the bounded applicability of a given methodology.

Positive changes have also taken place in the mode of sociological debate, which have improved from that of destructive attacks aiming at annihilating rivals to constructive critical analysis, with some attempts to bridge contending paradigms and building larger theoretical syntheses. Finally, a growing consensus has developed among most sociologists about the basic tensions of our work, such as the necessary linkage between theory and method and between understanding and explanation.

And there is a growing awareness of both the tension between the universal and the particular, and the tension between involvement and disengagement. In this last respect, sociologists seem increasingly aware of the need to try to combine the search for universality with the respect for specific identities, cultures and languages, and to avoid that legitimate specific cultural and political commitments of individual sociologists prevent a more important and general commitment of the sociological community to collectively validated truth and to knowledge-based public discourse.

Alberto Martinelli
President
International Sociological Association
PART I

Introduction
Of Consensus, Tensions and Sociology at the Dawn of the 21st Century

Stella R. Quah and Arnaud Sales

After more than a century of intellectual growth and geographical expansion, the dawn of the next millennium is a fitting crossroad for the global community of sociologists to review the state of the art in their discipline. This volume provides state-of-the-art reviews of classical and more recent areas of sociological specialization from an international perspective. The scope of this collaborative study is not exhaustive but the twenty-two areas reviewed are evidence of the expanse of current intellectual and scientific advances in sociology.

We discuss two contextual aspects of our study in this introductory chapter: the general trends in the discipline as a whole; and the manifestation of these trends in the various areas of sociology. We conclude the chapter by highlighting the main contributions from the twenty-two sociological areas of research discussed in this volume.

A. General Changes in the Discipline

Of the constant and numerous changes undergone by sociology as a vibrant field of knowledge, three deserve special attention. These are: changes in the scale or unit of analysis; the main trends in sociological discourse; and the main tensions in the work of sociologists.

A.1. Globalization and Change in Scale

Adding to their focus on the social actor, communities and institutions, sociologists are also turning their attention towards the ‘human’ or ‘world’ society surpassing national borders. The concept of human society (Sztompka, 1993) or world society has been proposed with the aim to reach a macro-sociological level of analysis (Wallerstein, 1974; Ritzer, 1981). This inclination towards a wider range of units of sociological analysis has been brought about by a myriad of worldwide
phenomena including the intensification of transnational flows of activity in all areas of social life, the various powerful forms of hierarchical integration of large world regions, and the accentuation of interdependence among nations and regions of the world. This new perspective of addressing social phenomena at a global scale introduces a number of challenging questions about new agents, new relationships and new institutions involved in the adaptation of national societies, social groups and the individual into a global society which is itself highly diversified.

A.2. Main Trends in Sociological Discourse

Among the major theoretical concerns of contemporary sociology figure three compelling and unresolved issues. One of these three compelling issues is the nature of social agency with the strong debate involving supporters of three seemingly opposed principles: instrumental rationality, morality and emotion. The second issue being debated is the nature of social structure with the discussion centered on randomness versus coherence and asymmetry versus equilibrium. The third unresolved issue is the cogency of methodological approaches with two opposite camps defending the interpretive approach versus the causal approach. These three issues have been acknowledged as major bones of contention by contemporary sociologists (for example, Alexander and Colomy, 1992: 34–35; Giddens, 1993; Archer, 1998). Most of the work published over the past two decades dealing with the above questions on the nature of and links between agency, structure and method, has been produced in North America and Western Europe. A review of the best known contributions to that work reveals four main trends in the style of current discourse among sociologists today.

A.2.a. Continued Inspiration by the Classics

The first trend takes the form of a return to the past for guidance and contrast. This can be seen by authors from a wide range of theoretical perspectives, including those who reject what they perceive as a flawed past. The large number of citations from the work of Max Weber, Emile Durkheim and Karl Marx by authors published in the second half of the 1990s suggests that we are approaching the 21st century, undoubtedly standing “on the shoulders of giants,” to borrow Merton’s famous book title (1965). Moreover, during the past two decades an intense search for philosophical affiliations has been made by several theorists who thereby renewed the strained links between sociology and philosophy. For example, when advocates of the hermeneutic approach look to the past, their citations of the classics tend to converge on philosophers such as Hegel, Bergson, Husserl, Dewey, Lukacs, Heidegger, Dilthey, Schutz or Gadamer.

This rereading of and reference to founders is not simply a chant of old mantras or the habitual invocation of 19th-century thinkers who functioned in a very different societal context (Coleman, 1990: xv). This trend is the response to a need to anchor
theoretical reflection in the larger social science traditions, such as those identified by Collins (1994), namely, the Conflict, Rational/Utilitarian, Durkheimian and Micro-interactionist traditions. These sociological traditions, kept alive by and through the work of widely influential sociologists and other social scientists, strengthen the foundations of the discipline. Looking to the past for inspiration or as a point of reference in the attempt to build something “new” is an almost intuitive tendency and a necessary condition for sociologists, irrespective of their own theoretical persuasion.

A.2.b. Multiplicity and Coexistence of Paradigms and Theoretical Approaches

In his editorial introduction to the Handbook of Sociology, a comprehensive review of the discipline in the United States, Neil Smelser (1988: 10) stated that “moments of consensus” have never existed “in the brief history of sociology.” However, we beg to differ to a certain extent as the second trend we observe in sociological discourse today is one of moderate consensus on a dual intellectual concern. That dual concern is the recognition of the multiplicity of paradigms or major theoretical approaches in sociology and the acceptance of the right of dissenting paradigms to coexist. This near-consensus is a sign of greater maturity of the discipline. Without putting aside their theoretical or methodological rivalries, sociologists are more inclined today than ever before, to recognize that theoretical perspectives that are different from their own may also contribute to the wealth of the discipline. Following the example of Raymond Aron (1967), scholars such as Habermas (1984), Giddens (1993), Collins (1994), Ritzer (1988, 1992a) and Alexander (1987; 1995) have made important contributions to the discipline. Their considerable efforts have provided useful ‘maps’ of the various intellectual trends and their subject matter. The mapping of the sociological domain (of which specialized areas are examined in the substantial chapters of this volume) has facilitated recognition of the multiplicity and coexistence of competing paradigms and of the corresponding diversity of theories and methods within paradigms. The discussion of the contributions of these paradigms is particularly fruitful because it facilitates the identification of conceptual gaps and the integration of different theoretical perspectives. One of the best illustrations of this is, without a doubt, the Micro-Macro debate.

The paradigmatic multiplicity that characterizes sociology is due largely to the scale, scope and depth of its subject matter. It is impossible to tackle an area of research of this magnitude without defining levels (Gurvitch, 1958), or spaces of social analysis, or “paradigm spaces” (Wiley, 1988). A particular paradigm would prove more appropriate for analysis in one space than another (Ritzer, 1992a). As several chapters of this volume show (for example the chapter on ethnicity by Inglis and the chapter on urban sociology by Walton), paradigms can also be identified in relation to areas of specialization. This plurality of perspectives, suggests Kay Erikson (1997: 10–11), leads to the view of sociology as a “special kind of disciplinary territory [which is] unique [because] so many different methods and epistemological stances and ways of looking out at the world meet there.”
Yet, the presence of a multiplicity of paradigms and theoretical approaches in the discipline does not preclude the rise and fall of predominant paradigms over time. Paradigms lose their predominance to other systems of theory when they become inadequate and unable to respond to newly emerging issues in the social world, or to the theoretical concerns of new generations of researchers. Three pertinent examples of this process are Marxist theory, rational choice theory, and feminist theory.

In his analysis of specialized sociological research at the beginning of the 1980s, Tom Bottomore (Bottomore et al., 1982: 31) observed that the predominant trend in the 1960s and 1970s was the growing influence of Marxist theory. He noted that once Marxist theory would enter “into the mainstream of sociological thought and controversy,” it would be subject to the same debates as other sociological theories, for example and particularly, the agency-structure debate. He was right. Despite their importance in European sociology and their penetration in American sociology at the time (which gave rise to over-optimistic predictions of conceptual hegemony) Marxist theories lost their influence very quickly in the 1980s, while one of the central theoretical meta-narratives—the transition to socialism—was overturned with the Soviet Union’s traumatic demise and the subsequent struggle towards capitalism of the former members of the USSR.

Simultaneously, the Rational Choice theory sought to revitalize the individualistic tradition developing often beyond the boundaries of sociology (mostly within the new political economy and new institutional economics as explained in Chapter 3 by Voss and Abraham). Rational choice theory has still not acquired dominant status in sociology, despite the dedicated efforts of its proponents (Coleman, 1990). Yet, its sphere of influence is quite extensive as it was the conceptual frame of reference for neo-liberal public policies in the 1980s and 1990s (see Greffe, 1994; Collins, 1994). At another point of the sociological spectrum, feminist thought took a predominant place in the 1980s and 1990s, as a fight against sexual oppression (see Chapter 4 by Reddock). Feminist thought challenged “both the content and the frameworks of discourse disciplines and institutions to present a feminist alternative” (Murray and Tulloch, 1997: 4).

These three examples show that, contrary to popular belief predominant in the 1970s, a main theoretical approach or paradigm does not usually replace another in a revolutionary and permanent fashion. The relative depletion of seemingly predominant theoretical frameworks usually takes place over time, not infrequently taking up to two decades.

A.2.c. Impact of Structural Conditions and Changes

The third main trend is the recognition (still incipient but likely to become robust given its obvious sociological nature) that the rise and fall of sociological paradigms, theories and methodological approaches is influenced by the changing context of socio-economic, political and cultural conditions. Indeed, theoretical perspectives, controversies and discords do not derive solely from research strategies but from major social, economic and political developments such as the Great Depression,
the Second World War, the radical movements and social unrest of the 1960s and 1970s, the Vietnam War, and the Women’s Movement. Large-scale developments such as these have played a role — some believe an important role (Wiley, 1990; Touraine, 1998) in the ups and downs of theoretical schools and methodological approaches in sociology, and in a manner similar to that observed in the natural sciences (Cohen, 1985). The social sciences in turn, through criticism and reformulation of societal goals and means, have influenced to various degrees the values, culture, economic and social policies of a given period in some countries (Touraine, 1998: 124). The mutual influence of structural conditions and research strategies is conveyed well by the assertion that theories are both “value impregnated” and “value impregnating” (Bhaskar, 1980; Bottomore et al., 1982).

The impact of structural conditions (historical events and socio-economic and political changes) on developments in the discipline over the past six decades has also been felt in two ways: first, the alterations in the structures of opportunity available to sociologists (e.g., jobs, research grants, educational policies regulating university funds); and second, sociologists’ realization of the inadequacy of the discipline in anticipating macro social developments. Contrasting the progression of 20th-century social history with sociologists’ debates on what to study and how to study it, it is evident that none of the theories and conceptual approaches vehemently debated over the past forty years offers the definitive answer (Ritzer, 1992a; Beck, 1992; Beck et al., 1994; Alexander, 1988; Eichler, 1998; Touraine, 1998). As Margaret Archer suggests, we need to “inject a greater modesty in our undertakings” (1998: 14) and proceed by improving what we have and seeking new conceptual and methodological perspectives. Some observers are of the opinion that the proliferation of specialized fields in the social sciences constitutes an obstacle to the holistic view that they feel is needed in times of rapid change. Masini offers interesting views on this problem in this volume’s chapter on “Futures Research and Sociological Analysis.”

A.2.d. The Mode of Debate

The fourth trend observed in sociology has to do with the mode of debate over the subject matter and the progress of the discipline. Max Weber once said that societies are made of struggles and consensus. Sociology is not immune to this as there are many conflicts within the discipline. Some scholars’ strong determination to impose their perspectives on others has been termed “symbolic violence” by Pierre Bourdieu himself not a stranger to controversy. As discussed earlier, many distinguished sociologists acknowledge the presence of multiple paradigms and conceptual approaches and consider the dissension with regard to paradigms and approaches as a legitimate outcome of open scholarly debate. For Antony Giddens, “the fact that there is no single theoretical approach which dominates the whole of sociology” demonstrates that “the jostling of rival theoretical approaches and theories is an expression of the vitality of the sociological enterprise” and it “rescues us from dogma” (1989: 715). Norbert Wiley concurs that “there is no dominant orthodoxy or even a hint of one — no hegemonic theory, no mandatory method,
no ideological straightjacket and no ruling clique.” In his opinion, “it is a healthy condition for social theory” (1990: 392). Still, there are sociologists who believe that there should be only one reigning paradigm or theory, and who take on the intellectual debate as if it were a combat to victory, to be attained by annihilating the contender (cf., Laclau, 1975, on the famous Miliband-Poulantzas debate in the 1970s on the capitalist State; and the writings of some committed defenders of Foucault’s perspective).

The harsh attacks among some of the contending groups in different domains continued in the 1980s and 1990s, leading distinguished moderate scholars to express their dismay (Wiley, 1990; Ritzer, 1992a; Smelser, 1998). Given the theoretical and frequently also political commitments of sociologists, conflicts cannot be avoided in the discipline. However, it is detrimental to all concerned when such conflicts go beyond the limits of constructive critical analysis and become personal affront or undermine the work dynamics of teaching and research settings.

Interestingly enough, the possibility and the significance of victory in this debate remain elusive. The contentious discourses address fundamentally different philosophical and theoretical perspectives on the nature of agency, structure and the accumulation of knowledge. The latter involves arguments on the viability of research and on methodological approaches. To illustrate: the loudest voices come from those engaged in the “positivist – antipositivist” debate on the accumulation of knowledge. Ritzer sees three differing positions in this debate: the “positivistic model”; the “post-positivistic model”; and the “hermeneutic model” but no apparent solution; he advocates more and careful “metatheory” analysis (1992a: 9 and 18–20).

Neil Smelser (1998) explains the situation in terms of ‘ambivalence’. He observes that while scientific rationality is accepted by sociologists committed to sociology “as science” the main opposition lies in “a certain anti-rationality” deriving from “strands of thought such as neo-Marxism, critical theory, varieties of phenomenology, some parts of feminist and gender studies, cultural studies, and post-modernism” (1998: 2). “At the same time”, he adds, “representatives of these approaches themselves appeal to reason and logic and occasionally marshal empirical data to press their perspectives” (1998: 3). Smelser proposes that the ongoing debate, its persistence and the absence of closure spring out of ambivalence: “There is almost no facet of our existence as sociologists about which we do not show ambivalence and its derivative, dividing into groups of advocacy and counter-advocacy” (1998: 10). But even such a collective ambivalence may be enriching. The positive side of a plurality of “sociological visions” welcomed by Erikson (1997) is also seen as “more a strength than a weakness” by Bryant and Becker (1990: 6) when their proponents are able to apply different conceptualizations and methodologies in the search for “different kinds of solution.”

A.3. Tensions in the Work of Sociologists

The everyday work of sociologists is naturally affected by tensions evolving from the four macro trends discussed above. While the debates over paradigms and theoretical perspectives take formal shape primarily in the publications of
sociologists as authors, the scope of sociology as a science is also expanding and writing is only one aspect of sociological activity. Other aspects of the work of sociologists include activities such as research, consultancy and teaching. Three main tensions in sociological work deserve special attention.

A.3.a. Specialization versus Amalgamation

As it is illustrated in the subsequent chapters of this volume, practically nothing escapes sociological analysis today. The number of areas of specialization has increased significantly. The diversity and dynamics of social activity, the progressive accumulation of knowledge, the shift in perspectives, the complexity of social systems, in addition to the increase in the number of researchers and the professionalization of academic sociology, are occurrences associated with the identification of new social issues and the creation of areas of specialization within the discipline.

It is within this framework that we find the first tension in the work of sociologists: that of specialization (the proliferation of research fields in sociology) versus amalgamation. Over the past two decades, in particular, new branches of sociological inquiry have sprung up from the traditional areas of the discipline to address specific areas of investigation. One illustration of this trend is the increasing number of research committees or networks that have been formed within various national sociological associations, and within the International Sociological Association (see American Sociological Association, 1998; International Sociological Association, 1998).

At the same time, there has been a strong reaction from some sociologists (and other social scientists) who are suspicious of the very notion of specialization within the discipline, and who even consider disciplinary divisions within the social sciences as a “fragmentation of knowledge” (see Gulbenkian Commission, 1996) and the redundancy of research subjects and findings (Wallerstein, 1991; 1997). In Wallerstein’s opinion, this tendency “to burrow inward instead of exploding outward” will eventually lead to an impasse. He proposes that the social sciences should be reconstructed in an open perspective whereby sociology would be better integrated, even amalgamated, with other social sciences. Mattei Dogan offers his views on the ‘fragmentation’ within the discipline in this volume’s Chapter 2 “The Moving Frontier of the Social Sciences” and we will refer to them in more detail later on. Irrespective of individual positions on this debate, the opposite pressures to specialize and to amalgamate coexist in sociology. Illustrations of this coexistence are found in theoretical developments, in research, and in the management of sociological work.

A.3.a. (i) On Theory

Concerning theory, efforts to strengthen sociology’s unifying core are evident in the theoretical developments of the past fifteen years. Among the most significant advances
in modern sociological theory affecting the entire discipline and all its specialized areas are: the analysis of the relation between structure and social action at the heart of the debate on social agency (Giddens, 1984; Touraine, 1984; Archer, 1996; Sztompka, 1993); and the exploration of micro-macro links (see, among others, Alexander, Giesen, Münch and Smelser, 1987; Coleman, 1990; Smelser, 1997).

A.3.a. (ii) On Research

Concerning research, while investigation in its specialized fields continues to grow, the status of sociology as the science of social totality is also affirmed through research carried out on a wide variety of themes including the world economy (Wallerstein, 1974; 1980; 1989) and globalization (Albrow, 1996; Robertson, 1992). Additional illustrations are offered by research on societal transitions and the sequences of social transformations. These studies announce in a metanarrative fashion several transitions: from industrial to post-industrial society (Touraine, 1969); from Fordism (Aglieta, 1979) to informational capitalism (Castells, 1989, 1996); from the modernity debate to the questioning of the substantivist perspective of transition in favor of an epistemology centered on the deconstruction of knowledge in the post-modern age (Lyotard, 1979; Giddens, 1989, 1990, 1991; Lash, 1990; Sales, 1991; Touraine, 1992; Hall, Held, Hubert and Thompson, 1996). Moreover, the universal dimension of gender fostered by feminist sociologists has laid claim to a specific and original approach (see Reddock’s chapter in this volume; Murray and Tulloch, 1997).

A.3.a. (iii) On the Management of Sociological Work

The coexistence of the contrasting pressures to specialize and amalgamate is also found in the management of sociological work. Most sociologists are familiar with work situations where these pressures are manifested but two points raised about the case of social scientists by the authors of the Gulbenkian Report (Gulbenkian Commission, 1996) fit very well our argument about the tension between specialization and amalgamation within sociology. On the one hand, scholars and administrators have different motivations: “While social scientists, because of the internal pressures generated by their intellectual dilemmas, are seeking to expand the number and variety of pedagogical and research structures, administrators are looking for ways to economize and therefore to consolidate” (Gulbenkian Commission, 1996: 96). On the other hand, there is the unavoidable political dimension of the dilemma between specialization and amalgamation: “different communities of social scientists find themselves in different political situations” whether at the national or university level “and these differences affect their interests and the degree to which they will favor or strongly opposed administrative reorganization” (Gulbenkian Commission, 1996: 97).

The position taken by sociologists (individually or collectively) on whether sociology is specializing too much or not enough and on whether amalgamation
of sub-fields is desirable or should be avoided, is thus determined by both their intellectual concerns as well as their ‘political’ situation (their position and commitments in the realm of power and authority within their organizations). Given that these are two basic components of the situation of sociologists, sociologists will continue to feel the presence of and the tension between the two pressures, to specialize and to amalgamate. It is unlikely to be otherwise because, as Randall Collins put it succinctly, the process of knowledge creation is intrinsically dynamic and defeats administrative boundaries: “Major advances in research or theory tend to pull followers after them, who institutionalize themselves in turn for a while ... if only until the next big round of discovery” (Collins, 1998: 2).

A.3.b. Involvement versus Disengagement

The second tension in the work of sociologists is that of involvement versus disengagement. Sociologists work routinely under the expectation — self-generated or manifested by others — of and interest in the contributions of applied sociology to the analysis of social problems. The prerequisite to this endeavor is the continued effort to improve theoretical perspectives that guide applied and specialized sociology. At the same time, proponents of disengagement call upon sociologists to immerse themselves in philosophical discourse on issues such as the nature of self and knowledge; and to disengage from or reject the preoccupation with social problems which they deemed as prosaic and distracting activities.

The most recent illustration of this tension between involvement and disengagement is the symposia on “A Window to the Discipline” in Contemporary Sociology (1998), particularly the contributions by Randall Collins (1998) and Joey Sprague (1998). Although this tension appears frequently in the working lives of sociologists, Risman and Tomaskovic-Devey rightly emphasize the logical connection between theory and applied sociology: “The best kind of sociological activism is ... to create knowledge to facilitate public discourse” (1998: 1).

A.3.c. Causal versus Interpretative Methodologies

The third tension found in the work of sociologists is that between causal versus interpretive methodologies. The past two decades have witnessed outstanding improvement in the sophistication of data collection and data analysis techniques due in no small measure to the use of computerization. Accompanying these techniques is the growing interest among sociologists in explanation and a focus on ‘the burden of proof’ or empirical evidence as the test of theoretical propositions. Concurrently, others promote the narrative interpretation of texts and the rejection of the burden of proof in favor of deconstruction of texts and engagement in humanistic and literary discourse.

The interpretative and causal approaches to sociological analysis are commonly perceived as irreconcilable. However, there have been some efforts
to integrate them based, for example, on a somewhat bipolar conceptualization of society. A recent attempt is that of Michael Burawoy. He proposes that sociology’s “disciplinary calling” is to reject “scientific monotheism in favor of a duality of scientific models that portends a mutually enriching, reciprocal engagement of positive and reflexive science” (Burawoy, 1998: 12). His is a work in progress that is compelling and challenging. The debate goes on.

Tensions or contradictions are manifestations of ambivalence in Smelser’s (1998: 4–5) sense and they prompt the social actor for a response, however temporary. Agreeing with Smelser (1998: 5) that ambivalence is pervasive, one may expect tensions and contradictions to be a constant feature in sociology. None of the tensions can be resolved by edict, so to speak. These tensions take place at the level of sociologists’ everyday life and thus, they are handled, as best as possible by the individual actor responding according to his or her perceived life circumstances and job conditions.

B. Consensus and Tensions in the non-Western Sphere of Sociology

The preceding discussion on the main trends in sociological discourse and the tensions faced by sociologists is based on the analysis of the work of sociologists in North America and Western Europe. What are the implications of those trends and tensions for sociologists working outside North America and Western Europe?

Aware as we are of the pitfalls of classifications, for the sake of clarity we find it necessary at this juncture to introduce a distinction between two spheres of sociological activity, the ‘Western’ and the ‘non-Western’ spheres. The Western sphere refers to sociologists working in North America, Europe, Australia and New Zealand. The non-Western sphere covers the highly heterogeneous collectivity of sociologists working in the geographical expanse outside North America and Western Europe.

Historically, sociology developed in Europe and North America, often reflecting the issues, cultural models, modes of access, production and diffusion of knowledge of Western countries or countries where Western intellectual traditions predominate (e.g., the United States, most of Europe, Canada, Australia and New Zealand). Like most branches of knowledge, sociology has steadily expanded world-wide from the time it became “a self-conscious community” in Collins’ (1998: 2) words, in mid-19th century. Its geographical expansion accelerated significantly after the Second World War. Today, sociological communities are found in practically every country of the world. Still, their research concerns are rarely included in the typical discourse produced by the ‘Western’ sphere of the discipline.

The overall intellectual orientation of sociologists in the non-Western sphere leans towards the West. Among the reasons for their ‘Western’ orientation are the postgraduate training in Western sphere universities of most (if not all) senior sociologists and the current technological advances that facilitate significantly the exchange of ideas among intellectuals and scholars across the globe (Quah, 1993c, 1995). It is not surprising then that the trends and tensions undergone by
sociologists in the Western sphere capture the attention of their non-Western sphere counterparts (cf., Kumar and Raja, 1981; Quah, 1997; Santos, 1998; Gonzalez Casanova, 1998).

However, despite their ‘Western’ intellectual orientation and their awareness of developments in the West, sociologists in the non-Western sphere are affected differently by the trends and tensions faced in the Western sphere. This is mainly because sociologists in Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa work under a different and compelling combination of socio-economic, cultural, political and historical conditions that influence their life and career choices, opportunities and priorities (Quah, 1993a: 15–20). A caveat is in order. The task of discerning the trends in the non-Western sphere of sociology is complicated by its complexity, the extensive range of countries, languages and low accessibility of publications. A further obstacle is the presence of a ‘silent majority’ of practicing sociologists whose opinions are not known outside their local area of activity because they publish infrequently or not at all (Quah, 1993b). With this qualification in mind, let us examine briefly whether the four main trends discussed in the preceding pages are observed among sociologists in the non-Western sphere.

B.1. Trends

Concerning the first trend on continued inspiration by the classics, there are indications that, like their Western sphere colleagues, sociologists in the non-Western sphere also look to the classics for guidance or as frames of reference in their work (e.g., Cho and Lee, 1993; Ibrahim, 1997; Islam and Islam, 1997; Quah, 1997; Schwery, 1997; Mukherjee, 1998; Santos, 1998). On the other hand, the second trend towards near consensus on the multiplicity and coexistence of paradigms is less clear in the non-Western sphere of sociology. There is awareness of the multiplicity of sociological paradigms and theories. But, in contrast to such concordance, Quah (1998) estimates based on published literature that consensus is lacking on the right of dissenting paradigms to coexist as will be elaborated on the fourth trend on the mode of debate.

The third trend discussed earlier is on the recognition of the impact of structural conditions and changes on the prospects of sociological paradigms, theories and methodologies. This recognition is evident in the published work of many sociologists in the non-Western sphere. But more than just being aware of differing paradigms, the latter are eager to call attention to and to document the impact of socio-economic, political and historical differences of their work settings on their research methodologies and conceptual assumptions (cf., Lee, 1998; Briceño-Leon and Sonntag, 1998).

About the fourth trend on the mode of debate, the same aggressive tendency found in the Western sphere is also present in the non-Western sphere of sociology. It is not difficult to find sociologists in the non-Western sphere who echo belligerent Western voices seeking to annihilate the opposition in debates on the accumulation of knowledge, the nature of and links between agency and structure,
and the cogency of methodological approaches. Interestingly, non-Western sphere sociologists involved in these debates and supporting the hermeneutic perspective, usually emphasize the need to shun Western intellectual influences and favor instead the formation of ‘indigenous sociologies’ as discussed elsewhere (Quah, 1993b). A probable reason for this seemingly contradictory position is their belief that hermeneutic models of discourse do not convey ‘Western’ or ‘foreign’ cultural values. The Western origins of hermeneutic and interpretive models are overlooked. In sum, more effort is needed to foster the right of multiple paradigms to coexist and, correspondingly, the practice of constructive critical analysis in sociology both in the Western and non-Western spheres of the discipline.

B.2. Tensions

The tensions observed in the Western sphere of sociology between specialization and amalgamation, involvement and disengagement, and causal versus interpretive methodologies, are also present in the work of sociologists in the non-Western sphere. However, the latter’s structural, cultural and historical conditions modify the relevance and outcomes of those tensions in the daily work of sociologists. They are typically employed in organizations such as universities, the civil service, non-government agencies, and private-sector companies. Their work as employees in these type of organizations is delimited by, among other things, bureaucratic regulations, problem-oriented job assignments, and budget restrictions. Margaret Archer’s (1998) frank response to the suggestion that social scientists as intellectuals should dedicate themselves to philosophical discourse and grand narratives is particularly relevant here. Archer states:

We work behind the iron bars of accountability, appraisal and evaluation to teaching and research priorities which are administratively defined and cash driven. ... In other words, the question of ‘who pays?’ cannot be dissociated from those of ‘who cares?’ and ‘what do they care about?’... Who is going to pay the bill, for we are an increasingly expensive ‘class’ to keep? (Archer, 1998: 10).

Although directed to the situation in the West today, Archer’s comment is particularly appropriate for sociologists working in economically strapped countries within the non-Western sphere. Economic problems are part of the larger picture of low or slow economic development, together with unemployment, crises of political legitimacy, housing shortages, crime, illness, transportation, and other nation-wide problems. Consequently, sociologists are typically expected by their employers to be specialized in one or more areas of the discipline, to focus on problem-solving and/or to make their research relevant to policy formulation and evaluation. In response, sociologists are inclined to resolve the three tensions of sociology in these countries by conforming to the contextual pressures towards specialization instead of amalgamation, involvement rather than disengagement, and causal analysis in place of hermeneutic models.
C. Contributions of and Recent Advances in Specialized Areas of Sociology

The chapters in this volume discuss two important common threads running across the specialized areas of sociology. They are the importance of the link between theory and empirical research; and advances in sociological methodology.

C.1. Specialization and the Link between Theory and Empirical Research

The multiplicity of theoretical systems and the trend toward specialization have their critics. However, it is in the study of specialized areas in sociology where empirical research and theory become connected through the description, interpretation, explanation and possibly prediction of social phenomena. Theorists strive to analyze and develop major intellectual traditions in sociology while seeking to resolve theoretical problems at the heart of the discipline. Specialists, in turn, put the main theoretical systems to the test in their analyses of specific social phenomena. John Walton (Chapter 14) gives a good illustration of this process, with regard to the rise of the critical and interdisciplinary political economy paradigm in urban sociology and the corresponding decline of the Chicago School paradigm of social organization. As Walton explains, the shift came about from the earlier paradigm’s inability to explain the international urban crisis of growing inequalities and social unrest. This process of linking theory and empirical research is an important contribution in all the specialized areas discussed in this volume.

By tackling substantive issues in their research, the systematic work of specialized sociologists can also lead to the development of new theories. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: xx), for example, propose that “we have more to gain by confronting new objects than by getting involved in theoretical polemic which only feed self-engendered and too often empty metadiscourses about concepts treated as intellectual totems.” A less radical version of the same point on the importance of pursuing new conceptual and research frontiers or using the “sociological eye” as Collins (1998) put it, has been expressed by sociologists from different orientations (cf., Mennell, 1990; Wiley, 1990; Bulmer, 1990; Archer, 1991). Specific examples of efforts made in the direction of conceptual advances in specialized areas of sociology are discussed in various chapters of this volume.

C.2. Methodological Advances

Specialized sociology also offers a conducive setting for qualitative and quantitative methodological innovations often arising from new conceptual perspectives. More importantly for the present discussion is the fact that the polarity between quantitative and qualitative methodologies is one of our discipline’s most enduring myths. Researchers typically defend their chosen methodological approach as the only or best suitable to their subject matter. Yet, the majority of us would agree that both quantitative and qualitative methodological approaches
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contribute substantially to our understanding of the social world and that their benefits are enhanced when used in combination.

In his comprehensive review of methodological achievements in the Western sphere of sociology over the past twenty-five years, Peter Abell (1990: 96–97) points to the crucial role played by the invention and development of the computer. He identifies six major methodological achievements and developments in both qualitative and quantitative approaches in sociology. They are: (1) the developing of multivariate causal modeling, including path analysis; (2) “the use of contextual variables and ecological correlation and inference”; (3) “techniques derived from graph and di-graph theory and network analysis”; (4) “the development of production system and generative models”; (5) “a more rigorous framework for comparative research”; and (6) “the development of reliable methods of recording and analyzing micro interactional data” particularly ethnomethodology and conversational analysis. Abell concludes his analysis by joining the appeal voiced by other sociologists on the need to integrate methods and theory if sociology is to advance as a discipline (1990: 110). He also makes a forceful call for the combination of quantitative and qualitative methodologies or “triangulation” (1990: 95).

Understandably, there are some areas of specialization where methodological advances are crucial. Specialized research areas such as demography and social stratification, which deal with large data bases, are today enriched by the methodological innovations in multivariate causal modeling. Dudley Poston (Chapter 13) draws attention to the progress made in demography thanks to the use of Hierarchical Linear Modeling, as well as the Survival Models which are currently applied in other fields of specialization. Don Treiman and Harry Ganzeloom (Chapter 6) report on the progress made possible in stratification research by Logistic Regression and Multinomial Logistic Regression which combines the advantages of the quantitative and qualitative methods, and also by new research designs allowing estimations of micro-macro effects.

As indicated earlier, the benefits of applying a diversity of methodological approaches is well recognized. There are areas of specialization that use qualitative and quantitative methods separately to study different dimensions of their subject matter. Examples of this practice are found in medical sociology (Chapter 20 by William Cockerham), mental health research (Chapter 21 by R.K. Price et al.) and sociology of the family (Chapter 8 by Barbara Settles) among other areas of specialization. In these areas of sociological inquiry qualitative, ethnographic and exploratory methods including analyses of textual data, images or films, are commonly applied in the study of interpersonal or dyad relations and small group phenomena. Recently developed methodological tools such as the Nudist software package facilitate the systematization of textual data analysis.

At the same time, analyses of trends in attitudes, beliefs and practices in entire communities are undertaken employing survey and other techniques and large representative samples. These type of studies use quantitative methodologies and typically involve multivariate analysis and/or address macro-level phenomena such as the analysis of health and illness patterns, health services utilization, community health, marriage and divorce trends, parenthood patterns, and the like. Other
specialized areas venture into triangulation. William Michelson and Willem Van Vliet (Chapter 15) report this development in the sociology of housing. As triangulation is the combination of qualitative and quantitative methodologies, it enables researchers to go beyond the traditional opposition of these approaches which is often the source of conflicts sometimes more deeply rooted than paradigmatic differences.

Yet another vital aspect of international specialized sociology is comparative research. As the chapters of this volume demonstrate, comparative research is conducted in practically all specialized fields and at various levels. Comparative studies may involve distinct units of analysis within the same geographical region, or from regions within the same country, or may be cross-national studies, or any number of creative combinations of these and other levels of comparison.

An additional interesting facet of comparative research is that it has served as the unintended vehicle for the incipient collaboration between sociologists in the Western and non-Western spheres of the discipline. Although a mode of analysis akin to sociological thought was conducted by the Tunisian scholar Abdel Rahman Ibn-Khaldun in the 14th century (Ritzer, 1992b: 8) and sociology was first taught at Tokyo Imperial University in 1881 (Kosaka, 1994), the growth of the discipline in countries outside the Western sphere only began in the 1950s (Quah, 1995). Not surprisingly, then, the presence of non-Western sphere sociologists as authors in Western books and journals has been modest. They are most likely to be involved (typically but not always by invitation from their Western sphere counterparts) in cross-national and cross-cultural research projects. Their participation as sole authors or co-authors in refereed English, French and German publications on comparative research has increased significantly over the past decade. But the pace of this collaboration varies across specialized fields in sociology and remains modest.

In sum, today specialized fields in sociology play an indispensable role in the discipline. Specialized sociologists have furthered knowledge considerably on a multiplicity of phenomena, whether it is social stratification, artistic production, urban dynamics, ethnicity, health, religion, social movements and many others. While the leading general theorists are well known in the profession as a whole, their numbers are relatively small in relation to the number of specialized theorists and practitioners. The work of the specialists influence not only the restricted circle of the specialty, but also the larger public, particularly when their findings attract the attention of the media, always on the look out for new developments and discoveries. It is these advances that are highlighted in this volume.

D. The Contributions of this Volume

A review of major contributions and recent advances in specialized areas of sociology at the turn of the millennium is presented in the twenty-two substantial chapters of this volume. The specialized areas discussed are grouped into six themes: Conceptual Perspectives; Social and Cultural Differentiation; Changing Institutions and Collective Action; Demography, Cities and Housing; Art and
Leisure; and Social Problems. The chapters are written by experts in the respective fields who are also leaders of research committees of the International Sociological Association. Another important feature of this volume is the effort to cover developments in the discipline contributed from both the ‘Western’ and the ‘non-Western’ or international spheres of sociology. To this end, each chapter includes a comprehensive review of the literature covering work representative of the different and contesting schools of thought in the respective field of sociology. The authors analyze the progress and challenges in the particular field in a critical, but constructive manner addressing issues from a scholarly perspective.

The first theme on Conceptual Perspectives (Part II) presents four chapters dealing in turn with the conceptual discussion of the frontiers of sociology, rational choice, feminist theory and post-modernity in the context of sociology of religion. As indicated earlier with regard to the debate on the differentiation of sociology by areas of specialization, Chapter 2 “The Moving Frontier of the Social Sciences” by Mattei Dogan compares the processes of specialization in history, geography, political science, sociology and economics. Dogan underlines the dual process that characterizes the history of the sciences. First, formal disciplines are fragmented into specialties, then the specialties resulting from the initial fragmentation are recombined, that is, a hybridization of fragments or branches is formed, which either leads to the creation of a new independent field or a field claiming dual allegiance (e.g., political sociology). Indeed, the interdisciplinary circulation of concepts is a true indication of the porosity of the formal boundaries between the social sciences. Dogan argues that after enjoying “monodisciplinary” expansion up to the 1970s, sociology transgressed the boundaries of the other social sciences to infiltrate practically every domain. A similar development is found in economics. Several areas of specialization with economic connotations have developed into other disciplines (e.g., political economy). Dogan proposes that while monodisciplinary research plays an essential role in scientific progress, hybridization is particularly productive also: “the higher one goes up the ladder of innovations, the greater are the chances that the boundaries between formal disciplines will disappear.”

Chapter 3, “Rational Choice Theory in Sociology: A Survey,” by Thomas Voss and Martin Abraham, deals with a theoretical current whose visibility and influence has increased considerably over the last two decades in several specialized fields of the discipline. Voss and Abraham offer an excellent and comprehensive panorama of this theoretical system. They show the intellectual affiliations of rational choice theory, the formal model used to explain human conduct, and the embeddedness of this approach in general theoretical sociology. They review the progress achieved by the Rational Choice Theory at two levels: on the explanation of the emergence and effects of social norms; and on its application to substantive fields of research, for example, family, religious behavior and social movements.

Chapter 4, “Feminist Theory and Critical Reconceptualization in Sociology: The Challenge of the 1990s,” by Rhoda Reddock, reviews the emergence of feminist sociology and its contemporary epistemological challenges. The author argues that despite the large number of contributions in this field, its overall impact on the discipline is uncertain. Reddock discusses the difficulties encountered in
incorporating “Black feminist critique” into the mainstream, that is, White feminist theory, which may be seen as ethnocentric. Only recently has this major problem began to receive due attention in feminist theory. The author agrees with what she sees as the main tenet of feminist theory today namely, the need to apply re-conceptualized Marxist and socialists perspectives to the analysis of gender and the position of women in society. The historical and fundamental root of feminist scholarship is the argument that the “invisibility of women” in sociology constitutes a “structural weakness of the discipline.” More importantly, the emergence of the concept of “difference” first presented by Black feminists and later emphasized by post-structuralist philosophers, represents for the author one of the major contemporary challenges for mainstream feminist theory in the 1990s. Post-structuralism and post-modernism have had an impact on feminist theory and it is manifested primarily in the challenge against the legitimacy of categories such as “women,” “Black” and “women of color” and the subsequent deconstruction of these categories. The main methodological innovation in feminist research is the “feminist standpoint” which refers to “locations” from where feminists experience and understand the world. Reddock points out that this methodological tool is borrowed from W.E.B. DuBois’ concept of the “double consciousness” that he identified in the American Black community. She argues that, Third World feminist scholarship, with very few exceptions, is relatively unknown, while feminist scholarship from developed countries dominates. In addition to the theoretical dimension given prominence by the author, feminist studies also have a very important substantive dimension, which is not specifically dealt with in Chapter 4 but that may be identified through the literature cited.

Chapter 5 “The Challenge of Modernity/Post-modernity to the Classical Heritage in Sociology of Religion,” by Ivan Varga offers an interesting discussion of the influence of post-modernism in the sociological study of religion. He contends that the post-modern sense of crisis influences the process of “decomposition and recomposition” of religion. The influence of post-modernism is enhanced by several other factors including: socio-economic changes, such as the process of globalization and the incorporation of developing societies; political changes like the demise of the Soviet Empire which restored the freedom of conscience and religious beliefs; the decline in institutional religion; the growth and revitalization of religious movements; and the rise of fundamentalism. The conceptual distinction between religious practice and belief is presented as a new perspective in the study of religion. This trend is represented in work dealing with “diffused” religion and confirmed by empirical studies on the situation of “believing without belonging.” An additional interesting distinction is made between belief, or the notion of the sacred which may be held for its own sake, and the traditional role of institutionalized religion that influenced political preferences or voting behavior. One of the key contributions from current research in the field concerns the analysis of the assumed link between modernization and secularization.

Part III focuses on the theme of social and cultural differentiation and, without seeking to be exhaustive, it covers two particularly productive specialized research areas: social stratification and ethnicity. Both research areas are of great
significance in every society today, from small communities to nation-states. The study of ethnicity is in full re-emergence and effervescence nationally and internationally, given the current movement of populations around the globe, the myriad of local conflicts, nationalist movements, and even genocide, among other phenomena.

Chapter 6, “The Fourth Generation of Comparative Stratification Research,” by Donald Treiman and Harry Ganzeboom, traces the advances in social stratification research over the span of fifty years and identifies four generations or levels of development in the field. The first three generations progressed through a steady sophistication of data analysis techniques, but faced a concomitant narrowing of the substantial research focus. The fourth generation represents a significant improvement over its predecessors for three reasons: it provides a welcome return to “broad questions of early stratification research, in particular to the substantive conceptual investigation of how stratification outcomes of individuals are affected by their social environment”; the analysis is aided by new and improved statistical tools and procedures involving qualitative and quantitative methods; and there is a significant emphasis on comparative research, both cross-national and historical. One of the most interesting contributions of the field is the study of major social transformations of stratification systems. Applying historical and longitudinal analysis, stratification researchers analyzed changes in intergenerational mobility and in the positions of political and economic elites in Eastern European countries before and after the collapse of communism and in China before and after its selective opening to a market economy.

As Christine Inglis indicates in her analysis “The ’Rediscovery’ of Ethnicity” (Chapter 7) the field of ethnic, race and minority relations is much more marked by discontinuities than stratification research. Race has been for a long time one of the main criteria for classifications within and across societies. In contrast, the question of ethnicity and minority groups re-emerged in sociology as a major issue of intergroup relations during the 1970s. Since then, it has grown rapidly not only in terms of sophisticated middle-range theoretical frameworks and empirical research, but also with regard to problem-solving of practical issues for societies confronted with ethnic differences and potential ethnic conflict. The author stresses that during the first phase of sociological research, the ethnic phenomena was marginalized and associated with the existence of pre-modern forms of society. Assimilation was the dominant paradigm linked to the functionalist model, which was not questioned until the 1970s and 1980s. During this period of transition, class and state-centered approaches were complemented progressively by the new feminist perspectives, cultural studies and post-modernist approaches. The major research issues in the 1990s are racism and its relation to exclusion and citizenship. In opposition to the violence of ethnic conflicts, the author underscores the importance of valorizing the multicultural society perspective that proposes the recognition of cultural diversity within a democratic framework.

Part IV comprises Chapters 8 to 12 and discusses how rapid and profound social change questions and forces the recomposition of institutions and collective action and their proliferation into new forms. The family is one of those institutions. In Chapter 8, “Sociology of the Family: Global Advances and Challenges,” Barbara
Settles identifies three main themes in family sociology research. They are: the family’s adaptation to rapid social, political and economic changes; the problem of migration and consequent ethnic and national identities of families; and the political misuses of family studies and concepts in their application to legislation affecting the family. Settles suggests that among the conceptual challenges tackled by family sociologists are the fuzziness of cultural definitions of key concepts such as family and kinship, and various contentious and politically influenced visions of the meaning and value of the family in society. Additional examples of crucial conceptual tasks being confronted in the field are the perception of family boundaries in contemporary households and ‘family’ settings of divorced and separated parents, stepfamilies, absentee parents, single parent families, and other non-traditional family roles. Methodological innovations in family research are promoted by the strong impetus of comparative research and the need to use and adapt qualitative and quantitative approaches. The wealth of research publications, methodological approaches and theoretical perspectives, reflect the complexity and the current relevance of family sociology.

Richard Braungart and Margaret Braungart examine in Chapter 9 “International Political Sociology,” the establishment of political sociology as an international field of study and its development as a comparative research area. Political sociology, a strong interdisciplinary field, is challenged by large-scale transformations such as the post-Cold War, international equilibrium, the emergence of international regimes, and the discourse on public and private domains. In order to map out and present the current debates in the field, the authors identify two intensely disputed metahypotheses which have elicited much investigation: (a) “Economic development correlates with democracy”; and (b) “Political parties and ideological divisions supporting party differentiation and voter alignments have remained remarkably stable since the national revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries.” The authors argue that the political party system in the West has remained stable over time, but significant changes have occurred in society because of the growth of the middle class, the rising standard of living in several countries, and the formation of new social cleavages and inequalities. Class politics has been frequently displaced by cultural forms of politics, race, ethnicity, gender, generations and religion.

A more specialized area of research, the armed forces, is discussed by David Segal and Nehama Babin in Chapter 10 “Institutional Change in Armed Forces at the Dawning of the Twenty-first Century.” The authors observe the transition of the armed forces from the institutional model of the early Cold War period to an occupational military force specific to the late Cold War period that substituted conscription by voluntary forces, to the post-Cold War model toward which most Western countries are currently moving. Even though three major military interventions were carried out in the 1990s by international alliances, there has been a marked decline in defense expenditures and in the labor force. But the decline has been compensated by technical specialization and the use of sophisticated equipment. Re-orientations have also been observed in the vocation of armed forces when personnel is often deployed, with varying degrees of success, in humanitarian or peace-keeping missions. At the organizational level, the authors
note a slow transformation of armed-forces culture such as the integration of women and the multinational integration in certain army corps. Comparative research is very important in this specialized field of sociology. Based on cross-national research findings, the authors underscore the specificity of Latin American armed forces and highlight their transition toward a post-praetorian model.

A strong interest in “new” social movements developed in sociology since the beginning of the 1980s as Bert Klandermans explains in Chapter 11 “Social Movements: Trends and Turns.” Given the complexity of the social phenomena under study, this active field of specialization in sociology is characterized by strong competition among theoretical approaches. The weakening of the links between class and politics, the larger openness of democratic systems, and the de-differentiation processes specific to post-modern cultural streams have enabled non-institutional forms of action to develop in civil society, to be more easily recognized in political life, and to play a role in cultural transformations.

Klandermans discusses a conceptual approach to social movements based on four classical concepts (grievances, resources, opportunities and meaning) from theoretical perspectives that have dominated the field. The main challenge has been to understand why social movements emerge. However, new issues have been identified and analyzed in recent years. Among them are: the internationalization of social movement actions; the impact of political change (that is, political alignments and configuration of power) on the opportunities afforded by a given social movement; the process of protest policing given the rise of more subtle measures of control and the professionalization of the control of protest; and the impact of culture on the emergence of social movements and on the processes shaping culture in societies. These issues have given rise to very interesting research in the field and the proliferation of conceptual perspectives.

For Klandermans, and indeed for several authors, the social movements field of study is fragmented and it is time to formulate synthesizing theoretical frameworks.

In Chapter 12 “Late Modern Institutions and Collective Action,” Pierre Hamel, Henri Lustiger-Thaler and Louis Maheu focus on social movements and their institutionalization from a different angle, the structure-agency debate. Criticizing the institutional theories of collective action that see institutionalization as the end point of a social movement, the authors argue that institutions are dependent upon the reflexivity, subjectivity and diversity of agents that influence, modify and contest them. There is no longer a direct correspondence between systems and actors channeling conflicts towards social compromises as conceptualized by the traditional institutions paradigm. The authors propound that over the last decade, the sociology of social movements has given more attention to the dimensions of individuality and subjectivity as essential components of action. The actor is not an abstract representation in the movement but an acting agent participating in a network which appears as the result of the action itself.

Part V “Demography, Cities and Housing” covers three chapters on the dynamics of population flows and settlements. In Chapter 13 “Conceptual and Methodological Advances and Challenges in Demography,” Dudley Poston underscores that among the current challenges of the field of demography is the very definition of its scope and boundaries. While a general distinction is usually
made between formal or mathematical demography and social demography, there is no consensus on this distinction. With this backdrop, the author identifies three substantive research areas as the most promising in terms of their contribution to the state of knowledge in demography: the ‘proximate determinants’ paradigm; bio-demography; and male fertility studies. The most fruitful theoretical approach is, in Poston’s view, the ‘proximate determinants’ model of fertility explaining how various social, economic, geographic and other factors influence fertility via four principal and three secondary determinants. The field of demography operates within the paradigm of scientific analysis whereby theoretical models are tested empirically by means of standardized data on population characteristics. Poston identifies three useful efforts towards methodological innovations in demography: the application of ‘multilevel modeling’; the continuous preoccupation with the construction of indices and models to measure and explain phenomena; and the shift in attention from female to male fertility.

Urban sociology is yet another dynamic field of sociology today. In Chapter 14 “Urban Sociology,” John Walton reviews critically the developments in the field. He indicates that the classical social organization paradigm of the Chicago School gave way to the critical and interdisciplinary political economy paradigm in the 1980s because of the former’s inability to explain the international urban crisis of growing inequality and social unrest. The political economy paradigm has been the most vigorous and unifying paradigm in urban sociology for the past two decades. It proposes a ‘political economy of place’ based on socially constructed struggles in the market over alternative use of space. One of its most recent applications is the study of global cities and the process of globalization. The methodological approaches suitable for this paradigm are cross-national comparisons and the creative combination of macro-level analysis and case studies. Walton explains that the success of urban political economy with its densely developed theories of structural causation laid to rest earlier anecdotal (community study) and metaphorical (human ecology) treatments of the city. However, Walton argues that the political economy paradigm’s two main problems of overconfidence and ‘economism,’ have led to a re-assessment of its value. Although this paradigm had dominated urban sociology for the past two decades and had produced valuable results, by the mid-1990s, urban sociology was again in need of new direction. The search for a unique “urban object” has proven difficult and Walton stresses that no single formulation of the urban question has yet gained, nor is likely to gain, consensus. Still, the author asserts that in contrast to other subfields of sociology, the proliferation of efforts to define its subject has made urban sociology more coherent.

Following the inclination towards specialization among sociologists, it should come as no surprise that special attention has been given to housing. Today, the sociology of housing is recognized as an area distinct from urban sociology. The approaches of the two domains are different. In Chapter 15 “The Sociology of Housing,” William Michelson and Willem Van Vliet present a comprehensive assessment of the field. Significant angles for sociological research are applied to the study of housing for example, family and neighborhood interaction, social and economic stratification and discrimination, labor markets, national policies
and global investment patterns. Sociology plays two roles: sociology in housing research through the analysis of the impact of design on social interaction, and the effects of crowding; and sociology of housing research which is the analysis of the reciprocal links between housing research and economic, political, demographic and cultural variables. In terms of conceptual developments, the influence of a neo-Marxian perspective was prevalent in the 1970s, but waned in the 1980s. It was replaced by structural analysis which remains influential. The impact of the Weberian perspective can be seen in their structural analysis of professions involved in the production and design of housing for example architects, urban planners and developers. Multidisciplinary approaches, including sociology and psychology, are usually applied to the study of the housing needs and a typical example is the housing needs of the elderly, a theme of current significance. Standard methodological approaches (e.g., surveys, census data, documentary evidence) are now complemented with recent innovations such as methodological triangulation. Although the field began in the United States, it expanded to Europe in the 1970s and it has called the attention of sociologists in many other world regions since then. Today there is a serious emphasis on cross-national comparisons of the impact of macro-level variables on the provision and nature of housing.

Part VI on Art and Leisure comprises three areas of specialization each with a relatively smaller community of researchers, but dealing with important dimensions of social life: the sociology of art which Gurvitch (1958) called “sociology of works of civilization”; the study of the leisure society; and the study of tourism. In Chapter 16, “Sociology of the Art: New Stakes in a Post-Critical Time,” Antoine Hennion and Line Grenier argue that in taking art as an object, sociology has helped to shift the interest from the consideration of a few chefs-d’œuvre and genius painters to mainstream productions, professions, markets, and institutions. Two main perspectives have marked the development of the sociology of art. The first and most dominant is the critical perspective that insists on the determination of art by social factors, without actually taking into consideration the work of art and the aesthetic experience. From this perspective, art is “illusion” or a construction or, to use a religious metaphor, a question of belief. The second is the post-critical perspective that, although conceptually a continuation of the first, it is not hostile or indifferent to art. From this theoretical viewpoint, art is not a creation ex-nihilo. It requires mediations, that is, gestures, bodies, languages, institutions, and so on, but it is also a performance, and sometimes an event, as when something new happens in the experience of aesthetic pleasures. On these grounds, sociology attempts to understand the “collective action” and processes behind the production and consumption of art. One of the methodological innovations in this field is the study of the “careers” of works of art. Hennion and Grenier propose the post-critical perspective and the importance of developing the critical and more pragmatic aspect of the concept of mediation.

At the beginning of the 1960s it was predicted that the expansion of automation would lead to ‘the leisure society’ by the end of the century. Today, some sociologists advance in more dramatic terms that the end of work is at hand. However, as Gilles Pronovost writes in Chapter 17, “The Collapse of the Leisure
Society? New Challenges for the Sociology of Leisure,” the sociologists of leisure assert that neither position contributes to a significant understanding of current social changes. Taking a historical perspective, Pronovost shows that several intellectual influences have shaped the sociology of leisure. In the field’s early phase of development, the American anthropological perspective was influential through its emphasis on the relationship of leisure with culture, particularly mass culture. In Europe after the Second World War and up to the 1960s, popular education and the control of time outside work were at the center of grassroots practices and influenced the academic analysis of work and leisure. Dumazedier, the founder of sociology of leisure as an autonomous field of study, related leisure with cultural development and stressed its importance as a social space for the emergence of new values and educational dimensions. Sociologists in the field today recognize leisure as a distinct social phenomenon that has grown significantly both in participation and diversity. Aspects of life such as education, family life, work and time are all closely tied to leisure, which is itself changing with society. Pronovost argues that is time to rebuild the sociology of leisure, in particular by seeking to increase cooperation with other subfields of sociology. In accordance to the increasing importance of comparative research, Pronovost stresses the necessity of taking a critical distance from Western-centered conceptualizations of leisure.

Who would have thought four decades ago that the sociology of tourism would branch out of the sociology of leisure? We will see, however, that in practice, these domains can be relatively distinct in both approach and object specificity. Graham Dann in Chapter 18, “Theoretical Advances in the Sociological Treatment of Tourism” explains that although sociology of tourism began as a subfield of sociology of leisure, it follows now a multidisciplinary approach and applies several theoretical perspectives. Tourism is today a massive social phenomenon representing major transnational flows of visitors. The research themes that have furthered the evolution of the field, often within the framework of strong polemics, are: the study of the tourist system; the significance of the tourism phenomenon in a global and ‘commodified’ world; the tourist’s experience as a quest for authenticity or in response to the appeal of nostalgia; and host-guest interaction, among others. Dann emphasizes that tourism as a factor of social change has significant socio-cultural consequences requiring indigenous adjustments and a reflection on the tourist’s identity as an observer.

Part VII on Social Problems comprises five chapters covering alienation, the controversies of social engineering, physical health, mental health and futures studies. In Chapter 19, “Unravelling Alienation: From an Omen of Doom to a Celebration of Diversity,” Devorah Kalekin-Fishman shows that over the past four decades the study of alienation has undergone a transformation from a relatively unified concern with the threat that alienation represented to the stability of society to more refined perspectives and a wider variety of issues and approaches. She argues that although sociologists are concerned with theory their practical concern with alienation in everyday life (for example, dropping out of school, exposure to violence, aberrant behavior) does influence the agenda of sociological theory. Theoretical trends are diverse. There are traditional discussions
of the philosophical connections of the concept of alienation with the thought of Hegel, Nietzsche, Habermans and Beck; studies focusing on systemic alienation; and theoretical analyses of the association between alienation and anomie within different domains of social reality as suggested by Durkheim and Marx. Still, the author shows that one consistent thread in the sociology of alienation over the past decades was the persistence of Melvin Seeman’s conceptual formulations of five dimensions of alienation: powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, social isolation and self-estrangement. Since Seeman’s work, alienation theory has expanded in various directions including neo-liberalism, systems analysis, postmodernism, “new age” views and critical theory. The author herself theorizes alienation in neo-Marxist terms, but she recognizes the difficulty of arriving at a theory of alienation that would explain the human condition in all its complexity. Researchers in this field apply a variety of methodological approaches including both quantitative and qualitative techniques.

In Chapter 20 “Medical Sociology at the Millennium,” William Cockerham discusses the developments in medical (or health) sociology. In terms of the number of sociologists engaged in medical sociology research and on the volume of research output, this is one of the largest and most active fields in the discipline. The increasing worldwide recognition of the impact of social factors on health and of the health of populations on the overall well-being of society, foretell the continued growth of the field in the 21st century. A wide variety of theoretical perspectives are applied. The initial dominant theoretical approach was structural functionalism. But symbolic interactionism became a major contending approach in the 1960s influencing labeling theory and the study of mental illness. Symbolic interactionism remains an important theoretical orientation in qualitative studies in the 1990s; Weber is influential; and conflict theory is a leading conceptual perspective in studies of health care policy. There is no dominant theoretical orientation in medical sociology today. Cockerham argues that several themes are of concern to experts in the field, including the loss of power and autonomy of the medical profession, and the persistence of class inequalities in health matters to the point where health declines rather than improves with the passing of time in underprivileged communities. Among the new leading studies in the field to date are those which attempt to define the theoretical parameters of health lifestyles, to assess gender and cultural differences, and to specify the powerful role of education in lifestyle choices. A wide variety of methodological approaches are applied in medical sociology, from ethnomethodological and deconstruction studies to multivariable analyses using advanced statistical techniques. Comparative studies have been common in the field for the past two decades and have increased in importance with the advent of worldwide epidemics and the increasing significance of cultural differences in health-related behavior.

Mental health, a closely related but distinct field of specialization is discussed by R.K. Price, C.R. Pope, C.A. Green, and S.C. Kinney in Chapter 21 “Mental Health and Illness Research: Millennium and Beyond.” The authors describe the field of mental health as a vibrant area of multidisciplinary research bringing together the contributions of sociology, psychiatry, psychology, social work,
public health and anthropology. There is friction with regard to boundaries among the disciplines involved in this field. But the authors see its multi-disciplinary nature as a positive feature because no one discipline can provide sufficient expertise to explain the complex forces involved in mental illness. Such diversity explains the multiple conceptual perspectives and methodological approaches employed in mental health research. The authors favor a judicious combination of conceptual perspectives including positivism, ethnography and others as the best alternative in comparative and cross-cultural research. Still, they propose that cross-cultural psychiatry is a more suitable framework particularly in international comparative research. The cross-cultural approach has two basic schools which tend to converge: (a) the psychiatric epidemiology or “universalistic” approach which follows the biomedical model and seeks a standardized assessment of mental illness applicable to all countries; and (b) the “culturalist approach” or “new cross-cultural psychiatry” which emphasizes the importance of understanding culturally specific manifestations of psychiatric disorders not only from the perspective of biological factors but also as part of the culturally specific system of beliefs and practices. Research progress has been made especially in two topical areas: the mental health of children and adolescents; and mental health care utilization. The authors underscore the importance of applied and policy-oriented research.

Chapter 22 on “Recent Advances and Challenges in Sociotechnics” by Jon Alexander deals with the study of social manipulation, a theme that is still in the fragile stages of formation due to several ambiguities. The 20th century may be said to be characterized by the rise in intentional, planned and strategic actions implemented by States, enterprises and even certain social movements. For sociologists doing research on sociotechnics, these actions often derive from social engineering (SE), which has negative connotations in many circles. The author explains that social engineering arose in connection with state expansion, with extreme forms of totalitarian regimes. He suggests that we are now faced with subliminal social engineering based on high technology and cognitive psychology, which is used to overcome human resistance to change. The field of sociotechnics is not only critical and theoretical, but also practical. It is therefore important to distinguish between the study and the practice of social engineering. Professional and legitimate SE must be distinguished from “dark,” totalitarian SE. To illustrate the differences between these two kinds of SE, the authors highlight the successes and failures of two contemporary social engineering projects: the American “Help Wanted Campaign” of the 1990s, and the “Burundi National Reconciliation Campaign.”

Finally, Chapter 23, “Futures Research and Sociological Analysis,” by Eleonora Barbieri Masini addresses the question on the prospective and predictive capacity of sociology. We have underscored earlier the perhaps too severe criticism often made of the social sciences because they are rarely able to anticipate macro-social events or developments. This raises the question of the legitimacy of the social sciences, which requires reflection, clarification and commitment, for all sciences must be concerned about the future. Reviewing the developments in the area of futures research, Barbieri Masini makes reference
to Bertrand de Jouvenel’s remark that we can only conjecture the future, because there are many possible futures. Prospective studies are based on the understanding of the past and can only refer to a set of possible, probable and desirable futures (PPDF). Future studies originated from technological forecasting and progressively integrated the perspectives of the social sciences in a trans-disciplinary fashion to take into account social changes. Future studies have been very useful in understanding social changes, notably because they favor the opening up of disciplines whose boundaries are too often artificial. Correspondingly, many sociologists have played an important role in prospective studies. The author stresses that it is dangerous to look at a phenomenon from the perspective of only one particular branch of sociology, without considering perspectives from other contexts.

E. Concluding Remarks

Introducing the book in this chapter we have outlined what we see as the general changes in sociology in the form of consensus and tensions. We discussed the manifestations of these changes in the link between theory and empirical research and in methodological advances. And we highlighted the main contributions of the chapters in this volume. The prevailing idea throughout this discussion is that the subject matter of sociology requires a plurality of conceptual perspectives and methods of investigation. This, in turn, requires the constant creation and refinement of conceptual and methodological approaches. In the process, debates over agency, structure, knowledge accumulation and method, and the links that may or may not bind these phenomena will persist. But debate needs not be destructive. If the mode of sociological discourse among theoretical schools is constructive critical analysis instead of a combat aimed at the obliteration of a perceived enemy, the cacophony of voices heard in sociological debates will invigorate the discipline as we enter the new millennium.

A final and encouraging observation is the current effort at building bridges between what Alexander and Colomy (1992) call the “metaphysical” and “empirical” poles of the “scientific continuum” in sociological thought. Recent examples of these bridges are: Ward’s (1997) discussion on scientific knowledge from different conceptual perspectives; the application of functionalist and structuration theories to the analysis of the relationship between socialization and agency (Shilling, 1997); the typology on social integration and systems integration using Parsons’ and Habermans’ perspectives (Widegren, 1997); the analysis of social class from the perspective of structuration theory (Grusky and Sorensen, 1998); and Burawoy’s (1998) call for reciprocal engagement. It is this drive towards a fruitful dialogue among diverse schools of thought that represents the strength and promise of sociology in the 21st century.

We now invite the reader to enjoy the detailed discussions on specialized fields of sociology in the chapters that follow.
References


Of Consensus and Tensions in Sociology


Endnotes

1. There is consensus on two other concerns as underlined by Quah (1993b): the dedication to the study of social phenomena however defined; and consensus on the norm that sociological knowledge must be shared. Evidence on this point is the continuous and rapid growth of sociological publications.

2. The definition of “paradigm” in sociology is a subject of debate. The term is used to refer to major theoretical systems, problematics, frameworks of scientific theory, or even frames of meaning (Giddens, 1976: 142 ff.). See Ritzer (1981: 120) for a well-constructed and very useful definition of the notion of paradigm as applied to sociology.

3. This theoretical current is organized as a specific ISA research committee separate from the ISA Research Committee 16 on “Social Theory.”

4. The field of family sociology is among the most successful specialized areas in linking theory and research. The reader may refer to the following additional reviews of family sociology developments to complement the extensive bibliography provided by Settles: for an American perspective see Klein and White (1996). For an European perspective, see Bawin-Legros and Stassen (1996).
PART II

Conceptual Perspectives
2 The Moving Frontier of the Social Sciences

Mattei Dogan

The extraordinary development of all sciences during the last half of the century has brought with it multiple specializations and ramifications. Such a process is obvious in the natural sciences. In most universities “general chemistry” or “introduction to biology” are taught only to freshmen. Fragmentation of formal sciences continues from generation to generation. For instance, the alliance at the second generation between endocrinology and neurophysiology has given birth to neuro-endocrinology. Genetic biology and physical anthropology have combined their efforts to establish maps of prehistoric migrations. The genetic epistemology results from the hybridization of genetic-psychology and epistemology. Phonetics, which developed as a hybrid phonetic physiology is now oriented toward neuro-physiological phonetics, which is a hybridization at the fourth generation. Biochemistry, which was already a hybrid discipline, has given birth to a generation of cousins who do not know each other. They are so numerous that their congresses bring together thousands of specialists who, in most cases, have nothing to say to each other. They work in small groups. This process is more recent in the social sciences, but the fragmentation of disciplines that precedes a hybridization of fragments, is nevertheless visible.

A. The Old Nomenclature of the Social Sciences and its Recent Ramifications

In the social sciences, as in the natural sciences, the contours of formal disciplines are becoming artificial and arbitrary. Between disciplines there may be empty spaces. In this case the pioneers of science behave like colonizers of desert lands. But more often the territory is occupied by a neighboring discipline. Then we see a process of interaction between sub-fields, a hybridization of branches of disciplines.

According to the definition we adapt, one could count between eight and fourteen formal disciplines in the social sciences — certain institutions recognizing some sub-fields as full disciplines. If each of twelve principal social sciences are
crossed with all the others, we would in theory obtain a grid with 144 squares. Some squares would remain empty, but more than three-quarters of them would be filled by hybridized specialities enjoying some autonomy. These hybrid specialities branch out in turn, giving rise, at the second generation, to an even larger number of hybrids. A full inventory of all the existing combinations cannot be obtained by crossing the disciplines two by two, even at the level of the second generation, since some hybrid fields, among the most dynamic ones, are of multiple origin. This is true of cognitive science, environmental research and town planning.

In addition, hybrid fields like prehistory or protohistory which are partly rooted in the natural science do not appear in the 144-square grid, which is confined to recombinations of segments of the social sciences. The configuration of hybrid fields is changing constantly. Social psychology, political sociology, human ecology and political economy have long been recognized, whereas social psychiatry is still having to fight for acceptance. Some specialists in cognitive science announce that the good old psychology will soon exist no more as an independent discipline. Psychology “should ultimately be dissolved in a full-blown neuropsychology, which should show, somewhat as chemistry supplanted alchemy, the illusory and pre-scientific character of the categories of psychology” (Proust, 1991: 15). Which branch of linguistics is on the right path, structural linguistics or generative grammar? The structuralists criticize the historicism of comparative grammar and the generativists reject the presuppositions of the structuralists.

Seven disciplines straddle the social sciences and the natural sciences: anthropology, geography, psychology, demography, linguistics, archaeology and cognitive science. By virtue of this fact alone, each of these seven disciplines is fractured, and cohabitation of the two parts beneath the same disciplinary roof sometimes creates a problem.

Sociometric studies show that many specialists are more in touch with colleagues belonging officially to other disciplines than with colleagues in their own branch. The “invisible college” described by Robert Merton (1963), Diana Crane and other sociologists of science, is an eminently interdisciplinary institution because it ensures communication not only from one university to another, and across all national borders, but also and above all between specialists attached administratively to different disciplines. The networks of cross-disciplinary influence are such that they are obliterating the old classification of the social sciences. The borrowing and lending of concepts from one discipline or speciality to another demonstrates the permeability of the formal frontiers between the social sciences (Dogan and Pahre, 1990: 123–130).

B. The Diffusion of Concepts from one Discipline to Another

One of the most fruitful exchanges between disciplines is the borrowing of concepts. Let’s take political science as an example. An inventory of concepts, based on the International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, shows that until the 20th century three giants have generated an impressive number of concepts still used in political science: Aristotle, author of five concepts, and twenty-three
centuries later, Karl Marx with six concepts, and Max Weber with ten. Each of these giants are reinvindicated by several disciplines.

The 1930s saw an explosion of concepts with dissemination from one discipline to another. Sociology appears as the most productive discipline with twenty-one concepts adopted by political science. Anthropology, economics, psychology and law also offered significant concepts to political science, which has also borrowed concepts from biology, mathematics, statistics, theology, social psychology and game theory. Certain concepts are adopted by almost all social sciences. The word “role” comes from theatre, but Max Weber gave it a sociological meaning. From sociology the notion spread to psychology, social psychology, anthropology and political science. The word “revolution” was concocted by Copernicus, but it was applied for the first time to political events under Louis XIV. Later it was taken-up by historians and sociologists.

“Structure” appeared as early as 1858 in the writings of Herbert Spencer. Soon after it was used by Marx and Engels. A generation later was borrowed by Emile Durkheim, Alfred Radcliffe-Brown, George Murdock, and later became a key concept in the work of Claude Levi-Strauss. From sociology and anthropology, it made its way into political science. During this migration the concept was re-fashioned. Gestalt-Psychology for example underlines that the whole structure represents more than the addition of constituent elements. Statisticians, in their turn, have developed “latent structure”, between invisible variables. The concept experienced a new mutation when it was applied to pressure groups. The concept of ecology is also inter-disciplinary. Considered as a neologism in botany, it opened the way for animal ecology and human ecology. Imported into sociology by Durkheim it became the study of spatial distribution of social phenomena. Soon after it was extended to geography. Social ecology gained a new vigor with the computer (Dogan & Rokkan, 1974).

The migration of certain concepts is sometimes astonishing. “Value”, forged by economists, acquired a new meaning in psychology and social psychology: attitude, norm aspiration, etc. today it is an important concept in political science. “Socialization” spread also to several disciplines. Formed by psychologists, it was rapidly adopted in anthropology, particularly by Alfred Kroeber, Bronislaw Malinowski and Margaret Mead. Imported in political science by Charles Merriam, it is largely diffused today in the United States where several hundred political scientists claim that “socialization” is one of their main sub-field. “Inequality”, an old philosophical concept has become a tool of measurements in economics, sociology and political science. For some authors “inequality” has also a biological connotation (Sesardic, 1992). Even distant disciplines could benefit from the commerce of concepts. A good example is given by Jean Piaget (1970) in reference to the convergence between “entropy” in physics and the theory of information. “Entropy” has proved to be useful even in the codification of genetic information in D.N.A.

Borrowing a concept does not mean simply imitation. To become fruitful, it has to be intelligently sewn in a fertile field. In most cases concepts are not borrowed by an entire discipline, but by a sub-field, a fragment of the formal discipline, in a specialized domain.
The Moving Frontier of the Social Sciences

C. The Archipelago of Social Sciences

In the history of sciences a twofold process can be seen: on the one hand, a fragmentation of formal disciplines and, on the other, a recombination of the specialities resulting from fragmentation. The new hybrid field may become completely independent, like social psychology, or continue to claim a dual allegiance, like political geography. In the latter case, one may not be sure whether to place a work in the category of geography or of political science. The criterion could be the predominance of one or the other component or the formal affiliation of the author. Political anthropology is a branch of anthropology, but also a subfield of political science. Where does historical sociology end and where does social history begin? One may feel even more unsure when faced with a case of threefold recombination. As the relative proportions are not always obvious, it remains somewhat arbitrary where the essential affiliation may be said to lie, especially since the degree of kinship between disciplines varies greatly: sociology and social psychology are consanguineous, but geology and social geography are far less so, despite appearances.

Looking at four disciplines, we shall try to show in each case the process of specialization, its fragmentation and the recombination of the fragments by hybridization.

C.1. Varieties of History

History is no doubt the most heterogeneous discipline, dispersed in time and space. It is the most open discipline. Sooner or later, everything falls into the historian’s net. The dispute over the role and borders of history, which goes back to Durkheim, Simiand and Seignobos, does not seem to be over. Three generations later, history has been excluded from the social sciences under the authority of an international institution, UNESCO. History is not numbered among the so-called nomothetic sciences covered by the first volume published by UNESCO on “Main Trends in the Social and Human Sciences”. The historians do not appear to have reacted very vigorously to this affront. Indeed some historians have come to terms with it. Thus for Pierre Chaunu, “the progress of history in the last 50 years is the result of a series of marriages: with economics, then with demography, even with geography with ethnology, sociology and psychoanalysis. When all is said and done, the ‘new history’ sees itself as something like an auxiliary science of the other social sciences” (Chaunu, 1979: 5). And here we have the word “auxiliary”, which was previously such a sore point, used today by a great historian. This is clearly not the opinion of the Annales School (Annales, 1989: 1323), resolutely committed to interdisciplinarity: “History will progress only in the context of interdisciplinarity, and one of its tasks is to renew the bases of interdisciplinarity” (Le Goff, 1991: 4).

Provided that the focus is on the long time-span and the comparative approach, there is agreement between Durkheim and Braudel. Sixty years a part from each other, using different words, they say much the same thing: “History can be a
science only in so far as it compares, and there can be no explanation without comparison... Once it starts comparing, history becomes indistinct from sociology” (Durkheim in the first issue of l’Année Sociologique). Braudel, for his part, is just as accommodating: “Where the long time-span is concerned, the point is not simply that history and sociology tie in with each other and support each other but rather that they merge into one” (Braudel, 1960: 93). But here we are talking about only a part of history, that part which compares while considering the long time-span, for other fields of history have nothing or very little to do with sociology. Similarly, there are not many sociologists who do not need to have recourse to history for the purposes of the problem with which they are concerned. Durkheim and Braudel would have been more explicit if, instead of considering their discipline as a whole, they had referred clearly to their common territory which is now called comparative social history or historical sociology. Once it is accepted that history and sociology overlap in certain delimited areas, for instance in quantitative analyses (Scheuch, 1988) the long territorial dispute between history and sociology becomes a thing of the past. Only one sector of history is brought face to face with a sector of another discipline. Exchanges with economics have thus generated economic history, which is of interest only to some historians and some economists, in sufficiently large numbers however to provide material for several major journals.

Each human activity has its historian, who, in order to perform his task, has to hunt in other people’s lands. In the history of urbanization, for example, where he meets geographers, demographers, economists and sociologists, the historians can hoist his own flag. However, urban history is not an independent field, whereas economic history is well established.

History, in its turn, is helped by other disciplines, sometimes unexpectedly. One odd example is the contribution made by biology, or more precisely by one speciality of biology, haematology, to a particular sector of history, namely the study of the origin of ancient preliterate peoples. Blood is a historical record, for the characteristics of a person’s blood live on after his or her death in the blood of the descendants. As has been noted by Jean Bernard, “the geography of haemoglobin E and the geography of the monuments of Khmer art are virtually superimposable... The limits of the ancient Khmer empire were defined by archaeology. They can now be defined by haematology” (Bernard, 1983: 49). Haematology has been useful in the study of the migrations of the Vikings and the Ainu and in elucidating certain mysteries of the Andean high plateaux.

Numerous scholars from a dozen disciplines have inquired into the causes of the fall of the Roman Empire. One of the most important was not guessed at until 1924 and was demonstrated only in 1965 through the chemical analysis of bones, namely the lead poisoning of the Roman governing class over many generations (Gilfillan, 1965). The specialists in saturnism thus... poisoned Pareto’s theory of the circulation of elites! Moreover, many theories, in the social sciences and the natural sciences alike, suddenly die as the result of an interdisciplinary onslaught. I have deliberately chosen these two examples of recourse to the natural sciences by history, for within the field of the social sciences many examples of exchanges come to mind.
C.2. Geography as a Cross-Road

Large universities list 20 odd branches of geography. Its subdivisions involve relations with every discipline, from anthropology to zoology. These divisions have assumed such an importance that they obscure the old split between human geography and geology. So far-reaching is the fragmentation that we may well ask, along with Roger Brunet: “Does geography have its own specificity? What is its real contribution, does it have its own field or is it no more than a relic of a former division of labour, now superseded? Can the geographer be said to have an identity, and if so what does it consist of?” (Brunet, 1982: 402). Geography is flanked by numerous hybrid fields. On the side of demography we find geography of population: the Third World population explosion is giving considerable importance to this field, highlighted by the publications of the World Bank. One sector of political science, international relations, is directly linked to population geography. Economic geography is more important for geographers than for economists, since for the latter the spatial dimension is not central.

“Geographical factors” long attracted the attention of sociologists until the publication in 1924 of *Civilization and Climate* by the sociologist Ellsworth Huntington, severely criticized by Pitirim Sorokin. From that time on and for more than three decades, sociology, at least in the United States, severed all compromising links with geography. It is only recently, in the context of environmental and ecological research, that sociologists have again shown an interest in “geographical factors”, in particular, climate. The most fruitful collaboration between geography and sociology has been in the field of town planning. In the field of cartography, which is the prime technique of geographers, in recent times “meteorologists, geologists, geophysicists, geochemists, plant ecologists, and other scientists have been the major innovators and users” (Jones, 1979: 103). Satellite photography, which can cover areas measuring 100 km in diameter, has rekindled interest in certain aspects of old-style human geography and urban geography. As for the exchanges between geography and history, they are so well known, in the *Annales* tradition, that not a single word can usefully be added here.

C.3. Political Science: Eclecticism

Specialization in political science is shown by the variety of journals to which political scientists can have access for the purposes of documentation or publication. According to a recent survey (cf. Brunk, 1989) conducted in the major American libraries, there are some 500 academic journals of interest to political scientists, 80 per cent of them in English, only one-tenth of which can be considered to be “general”, the others being specialized (public administration, comparative politics, political institutions) or attached mainly to other formal disciplines, or devoted to a particular region of the world, like Latin America or Asia (area studies, which are pre-eminently interdisciplinary). Most political sciences consequently keep informed by means of specialized journals that do
not overlap much within the mother discipline, but that do however lead into fields connected with other disciplines.

In their preface to the *Handbook of Political Science*, Greenstein and Polsby (1975), the editors of this important work, confess their embarrassment at the “amorphous” character of the discipline. They acknowledge its far-reaching fragmentation, reflecting its diversity. The theoretical and methodological dispersion of the discipline is underlined by William Andrews: “political science had no necessary logic to its separate existence, that is, it had no distinctive methodology. It had no clearly-defined subject-matter that could not be encompassed within one or more of its sister disciplines. Its various parts could have survived simply as political history, political sociology, political geography, political philosophy and political psychology — subfields in other disciplines... Each of the other social science disciplines claims a piece of political science” (Andrews, 1988: 2).

Political science has undergone the beneficial influence of many sociologists (Parsons, Lazarsfeld, Adorno, Dahrendorf) and many economists (Downs, Arrows, Galbraith, Schumpeter, Morgenthau, Myrdal), not forgetting the philosophers (Popper, Friedrich, Habermas). In some fields political science and social history cannot be dissociated, both being often linked to economics. Structuro-functionalism, which for several decades dominated international comparative analysis, found inspiration in the theory of the anthropologist Malinowski, who showed that a cultural institution transferred to another culture may take on another meaning and fulfil a quite different function in the new context. Game theory, which has been adapted for the study of international conflicts, was formulated by the mathematician John von Neumann and the economist Oskar Morgenstern. The economist Herbert Simon borrowed from the psychologists the concept of limited rationality and drew from it a theory that is enjoying great success in American political science. The political scientists have borrowed not only theories but also methods. As Benson testifies, the bulk of the mathematical literature in political science is the work of outsiders, of people who do not identify themselves as researchers in political science, (Benson, 1963: 30).

To highlight the influence of the various disciplines on political science, Jean Laponce (1989) counted, for each 10 years over a period of 50 years, from 1935 to 1986, the number of references in the American Political Science Review to journals representing other disciplines. At the beginning of the period, law was the only discipline linked to political science. In the 1950s, there were more references to sociology journals than to law journals; mention began to be made of history and philosophy journals. In the 1970s, law journals were cited more rarely, history and philosophy journals to the same extent, references to sociology became frequent, and economics, psychology and mathematics journals made their appearance. In the 1980s economics and sociology became more prominent, as did psychology and mathematics (Laponce, 1983 and 1988). These trends lead Laponce to conclude that “In the last generation those political scientists published in one of the leading journals in the field, those thought by their peers to be creative and forward-looking, often appear to have had their heads turned sideways” (Laponce, 1988: 5). In another study Laponce analyzed import-export flows
between seven disciplines, using the same technique of footnote references in 12 journals, including six British ones. The most intense exchanges in political science occurred in 1975 with sociology and in 1981 with economics (Laponce, 1983: 450).

Many of those most renowned political scientists work on hybrid phenomena or problems: political clientelism (in relation with anthropology and social psychology); socialization (drawing on sociology and social anthropology), nationalism (inseparable from history and sociology), development (linked to 11 of the social sciences), and many others.

It is not just recently that political science has opened up. Today we can but confirm what was written yesterday: "Political science is an inveterate borrower. It may, in fact, be the great eclectic among the social sciences. The history of its growth and development is a history of selecting skills and ideas from the other social sciences" (Sarouf, 1965: 22). The title of Gabriel Almond’s (1990) book, published a quarter of a century later is, so to speak, a diagnosis: “A discipline divided, schools and sects in political science”. This book emphasizes the theoretical, ideological and methodological splits in the discipline.

C.4. The Dispersion of Sociology: a Discipline Without a Matrix

In the space of four decades sociology has experienced, first, a marked monodisciplinary expansion, then a marked dispersal beyond its boundaries. In the period just after the Second World War sociology was adopted as an official academic discipline in only a few countries, in particular the United States and Canada. In Europe, it had to start practically from scratch, especially in Germany and Italy. From 1955 on its growth was spectacular in several countries, particularly Scandinavia. In France, in 1950, the number of academics who could claim in their professional capacity to be sociologists was no doubt under two dozen: two university chairs, a few master’s degrees and a small number of researchers at the CNRS. Other academics, without being primarily sociologists (historians, psychologists, geographers, philosophers), contributed to the revival of sociology. Four decades later, the Who’s Who in Sociologie Française et Francophone contained some 1,500 names, including about 1,300 French, with 1,000 genuine sociologists and 300 related branches, among whom 500 lived in Paris — the biggest concentration of sociologists in the world. In the United States, the number of sociologists registered in the American Sociological Association doubled in the 1950s and doubled again in the 1960s.

Paradoxically, it was at the time when it was still modest in stature that sociology showed imperialist leanings. It would be easy to put forward a whole number of quotations in support of this assertion, but one will suffice. In 1962, at a time when sociology was not yet an independent discipline in Oxford and Cambridge and scarcely so in London, W.G. Runciman was claiming that if sociology was defined as the systematic study of collective human behaviour, the disciplines of economics, demography, criminology or politics should be considered to be branches of sociology (Runciman, 1962: 1). From 1970 on,
growth started to go hand in hand with a process of fragmentation, with the result that today, in the developed democracies, sociology is a heterogeneous, centrifugal discipline. Depending on how it is defined, there can be said to be between 35 and 40 sectoral sociologies, going in every direction.

The International Sociological Association is today organized into fifty-three research committees. Among these groups, one notices “sociological theory”, “concepts and terminology” or “methodology”, which attest of the persistence of remnants of sociology as a “pure” discipline. But with a few exceptions it is clear that most branches of sociology are “impure”, mixed with other species. There are fields of specialization in sociology focusing on diverse social phenomena for example, family (main traditional domain of demography); education (traditional domain of pedagogy); ethnic groups (traditional domain of ethnology); alienation (claimed by psychology); and health (medicine and epidemiology). There is no social activity that does not have its official sociologist. There are sociologies of work, migrations, organizations, imperialism, armies, arts, science, leisure, ageing and so on. Some sectors of sociology are proclaiming their autonomy, particularly political sociology, economic sociology, historical, religious, urban, juridical, comparative sociology. The sociologist who studies nationalism encounters the political scientist interested in international relations, the economist observing economic dependence or the inevitable historian. The rural sociologist communicates with specialists belonging administratively to other disciplines. The sociology of knowledge is the first cousin of the philosophy of science. It is legitimate to ask if there is still a discipline that we could call sociology without using an adjective? During the last decades, sociology has transgressed the frontiers of all other social sciences, infiltrating everywhere and expanding unmensurably, to such a degree that it has become a Tower of Babel.

As is pointed out by Neil Smelser in the introduction to his *Handbook of Sociology*, “the likelihood that sociology will be denotative of an identifiable field will be diminished; it is likely that commitment to the discipline in general will diminish, and that smaller groups will seek their interaction and identification in suborganizations that are inside or outside the American Sociological Association” (Smelser, 1988: 13). This is true, for instance, of urban sociology. There are now more experts and researchers in the field of town planning than in the whole of traditional sociology. It is true that these experts include representatives of urban sociology, but they are a minority in a mass of town planners from a wide array of disciplines: geography, economics, architecture, etc., who have cut the umbilical cord attacking them to the mother discipline. But the most heavily populated subdiscipline in the United States at the present time is the sociology of medicine where most of the research work is becoming bogged down in fields devoid of theoretical horizon.

As soon as the problem being addressed concerns society as a whole, cross-specialization becomes inevitable, so much so that it is often necessary to bring together a variety of specialists. Here is a description of the content of a book which, in its day, enjoyed some success: “Each contributor has been an articulator of diverse disciplines: Boulding spans economics, mathematics and sociology; Coleman relates mathematics and sociology; Etzioni, organizational sociology and international
relations; Kardiner, psychiatry and anthropology; Klausner, sociology and psychology; Levy, social theory and sinology; Pool, sociology and political science; Rapoport, biology, mathematics, philosophy, psychology and sociology; and Tiryakian, sociology and philosophy. They were chosen as men familiar with the problems of bridging disciplines, to build an image of a total society” (Klausner, 1967: xv). Replace the word “discipline” by “polyspeciality” and add a generous dose of history, and you will have a better idea of the real content of this book.

As it has matured and put out feelers in every direction, sociology has become aware of its excessive fragmentation and of its dispersal and has felt the need to come back to its centre, without yet succeeding. This process is described by Ralph Turner: “Sociology has gone through a cycle from emphasizing theory with little testable empirical basis to an atheoretical empiricism and back to the evaluation of research primarily for its relevance to grand theory” (Turner, 1991: 63).

D. The Consequences of Monodisciplinary Confinement: The Case of Economics

What happens if a discipline has a tendency to turn in on itself, if it does not open up enough, if its specialties do not hybridize, if it does not progress “in symbiosis with other social sciences”? In such cases, the neighbouring territories do not remain barren. The case of economics is a good example here. There are two ways of looking at economics. According to some its postulates are fruitful and its field clearly delimited. Others, more numerous however, think that economics is fundamentally divided between econometricians and theorists, who remain oblivious of one another. Between these two extremes there are more qualified positions which, while acknowledging the distinctive identity of economics and its theoretical and methodological foundations, stress its relative openness. But it should be recognized that economics lends itself far less than the other social sciences to interaction with other disciplines (this also being true of linguistics).

So deep do the divisions in economics seem to Michel Beaud that he writes that economists agree “neither about the subject on which they are working, nor about the methods, nor about the theoretical tools, nor about the goals of research” (Beaud, 1991: 157), concluding that “economics does not exist, nor does political economy. Instead, there is a very wide variety of tendentious discourses... the knowledge thus arrived at fits into a profoundly heterogeneous universe, structured by two galaxies, one predominantly axiomatic, the other dedicated to the effort to understand reality”. He considers that economics “suffers from the fact that its main advances — conceptualization, theorization, model building, mathematicization — have meant that it has become excessively cut off from the other social sciences”.

For Jacques Lesourne (1990), reporting on the World Econometrics Congress and the European Economic Association in 1990, economics has been “balkanized, broken up into a multitude of disciplines, each being organized around one or two journals”. The same remark can be made about the world congresses on
sociology, demography, psychology or history. The monetarist George Stigler objected to six econometricians (Tinbergen, Samuelson, Malinvaud and their predecessors, Moore, Frisch and Fisher) being described as the authors of “exceptional contributions” because, so he wrote, “econometrics has no unified core or methodology” and “has not yet had a major impact on economics” (Deutsch, Markovitz and Platt, 1986: 342). But three of these six economists have in the meantime won the Nobel prize, as has Stigler himself.

Three lists of major contributions to economics were compiled in 1982 at a symposium in Berlin. The first, prepared by W. Krelle, contained 30 names, the second, by Y. Timmergen, 36 names, and the third, by B. Fritsch and G. Kirchgässner, 44 names. In the first two lists, there were only two names that were the same (including Klein, Nobel prizewinner, and Krelle himself), and in the first and the third, there were only nine that were the same. The last two lists did not have one name in common (Deutsch, Markovitz and Platt, 1986: 350).

Such widely differing views about leading figures do not say much for the coherence of economics. This is also the opinion of the economist Kenneth Boulding, who speaks of economics as being “disorientated” comparing it with the story of the blind man and the elephant. The Nobel prizewinner Wasily Leontieff was not more indulgent: “Year after year, economic theorists produce mathematical models without being able to get any further towards understanding the structure and functioning of the real economic system” (quoted in Deutsch, Markovitz and Platt, 1986: 350).

Inspite of its internal division this discipline looks like an isolated island. In many countries large number of economists have locked themselves up in an ivory tower, and as a result whole areas have escaped their scrutiny. Their contribution to the problem of the development of the Third World, for instance, is rather modest when compared with the work of sociologists, political scientists, demographers and statisticians. This is particularly true in the United States, Latin America and India. Economics has had a somewhat condescending attitude towards political science, particularly in the United States and Canada. This has resulted in the development, side by side with it, and in competition with it, of a new corporate body, with an extremely active and large membership in the United States, England and Scandinavia: political economy, protected by only one of its parents, renamed through the revival of an old name from the French nomenclature of the sciences. Political economy is currently one of the main provinces of American political science, with a large output and renowned journals. It is one of the most popular sectors among PhD students in political science. Some eclectic economists denounce the reductionism advocated by other economists, particularly with reference to research on development: “development is reduced to economic development; this is reduced to growth; this in turn is reduced to investment, in other words to accumulation” (Sachs, 1991: 2). And Sachs quotes Myrdal who railed against economists who were in favour of unidisciplinary models.

Because of its theoretical isolation, economics has also forsaken economic history in which not only historians but also former economists have won renown, driven from the garden by their theorist colleagues. At a particular moment, economics reached a fork in the path: it could have chosen intellectual expansion,
The penetration of other disciplines, at the cost of heterogeneity and diversification, and at the risk of dispersal (a risk taken by sociology); it chose instead to remain unflinchingly pure, true to itself, thereby forfeiting vast territories. Yet many economists consider that the choice of purity, mathematical rigour and hermetic terminology was the right choice. But many other economists, including several Nobel prizewinners, have left economics in the sense that they are better known and more frequently cited in political science than in economics: Arrow, Downs, Herbert Simon, Hirschman, Buchanan, Tullock, Musgrave, Lindblom, Black, Bamoul, Davis, Rothenberg, Harsanyi, Mckean, Olson, etc. (cf. Mitchell, 1969: 103).

It is thus clear that self-sufficiency, to use a word familiar to economists, leads sooner or later to a shrinking of borders. But this does not mean general impoverishment, since the lands abandoned by the economists were soon cultivated by others. Those abandoned lands now have their own flags: management, political economy, development science, comparative study of Third World countries, economic and social history. The position of economics in the constellation of the social sciences today might have been more enviable if it had not withdrawn into itself. This situation is particularly surprising in that few classical sociologists have failed to assign a central place in their theories to the relationship between economy and society: from Marx, Sombart and Weber to Schumpeter, Polanyi and Parsons (cf. Martinelli and Smelser, 1990), not forgetting Pareto.

E. The Fusion of Specialities at the Highest Level

Monodisciplinary research plays an essential role in scientific progress. It would be ridiculous not to acknowledge it. But such an acknowledgement is not incompatible with a belief in the fruitfulness of hybridization, a belief that might be briefly formulated in the form of a theorem: in the social sciences there are fundamental questions and issues of lesser importance; the more important a problem is, the more complex are the causes; when the causes are many, there is a greater need for an interdisciplinary approach. Barring exceptions, it is not possible to inquire into the major phenomena of civilization within a strictly monodisciplinary framework. Only by taking up position at the crossroads of many branches of knowledge can one try to explain the collapse of democracy in the Weimar Republic, the implosion of the Soviet Union, the proliferation of giant cities in the Third World, the decline of England in the last 50 years, the phenomenal economic growth of Japan, the fall of the Roman Empire, the absence of a socialist party in the United States or how a child learns to speak.

Whenever a question of such magnitude is raised, one finds oneself at the intersection of numerous disciplines and specialities. In a library catalogue a book can be included in several sections at the same time, but the actual book can be placed only on one shelf. Where should librarians place Karl Wittfogel’s book on Oriental Despotism or Gunnar Myrdal’s The American Dilemma, Louis Dumont’s Homo Aequalis, Alfred Crosby’s Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe 900–1900, Alfred Kamarck’s The Tropics and Economic
Development, or Joseph Shumpeter’s *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*? Under economics, history, sociology, political science, geography or agronomy? In these major works, numerous subdisciplines, or rather numerous specialities, join hands. The analytical index to Paul Bairoch’s *De Jericho a Mexico, villes et économie dans l’histoire* or to Barrington Moore’s *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* may show 15 to 20 specialities. Many books, past and present, could be referred to here.

In the cumulative index to the seven volumes of the *Handbook of Political Science*, published in 1975 under the direction of F.I. Greenstein and N.W. Polsby, more than 3,500 authors were listed. Among those who are cited at least 12 times, about half can be considered to be scholars working in hybrid fields. Needless to say, the degree of hybridization varies greatly. Among the hundred or so major innovations listed by Karl Deutsch and his colleagues in their *Advances in the Social Sciences*, two-thirds lie at the intersection of various disciplines or specialities. The higher one goes up the ladder of innovations, the greater are the chances that the boundaries between formal disciplines will disappear.

**F. Concluding Remarks**

To sum up, scientific progress occurs largely through the fragmentation of disciplines and the recombination of specialities. During the last decades most scientific discoveries had been achieved at the frontiers of disciplines, at their interstices, at the cross-over points of specialities. A varied and complex network of hybrid fields comes into being, with the result that the old map of the social sciences is becoming barely recognizable. Most of those who specialize in these hybrid fields are seen at the periphery of the discipline in contact with other scholars, who are also transgressors of boundaries. As this crossing does not engage entire disciplines, but only marginal sectors, many creative scientists are marginalized in the noble sense of the word.

Because of the administrative divisions of universities, we are accustomed to traditional disciplines. It is time to admit, however, that it is by mixing of neighboring specialities that scientific progress is accomplished. This reconstitution is clearly apparent in actual research but does not need to be introduced into university education where monodisciplinarity still plays a very useful role in the transmission of learning: general knowledge must necessarily precede specialized knowledge.
The Moving Frontier of the Social Sciences

References

Rational Choice (RC) theory is quite a recent development in sociology. There are, however, important antecedents in the writings of early social scientists such as David Hume, Adam Smith and others. It is characteristic of their idea of social science that they wanted to explain social phenomena by using theoretical principles about individual behavior. That is, the Scottish Moralists tacitly used the idea of a methodologically individualist social science. Furthermore, the Scots introduced a number of very important heuristic ideas that are characteristic of RC models of today. The very idea of methodological individualism is due to social scientists mainly working outside sociology, as the Austrian School of Economics. The Austrians Menger, Schumpeter, Hayek and others emphasized and further elaborated many classic ideas and explicitly introduced methodological individualism. Methodological

3 Rational Choice Theory in Sociology: A Survey

Thomas Voss and Martin Abraham

Rational Choice (RC) is a proliferating research program in the social sciences. It is the dominant theoretical perspective in economics and an influential approach in political theory. In sociology, there is an increasing number of people working in this tradition, in particular among American and European sociologists. This chapter attempts to give a survey of some more recent developments focusing primarily — but not exclusively — on contributions by sociologists. The origins, antecedents and historical evolution of RC will be described very briefly in Section A. The particular model of man proposed by RC is topic of Section B. Section C will describe RC explanations of social norms. The emergence of social norms is not only one of the fundamental topics of general sociology. It is also a topic closely related to one of the most central questions in social theory more generally, viz. the so-called Hobbesian problem of social order. Section D will contain an overview of applications of RC in diverse fields of sociology. It will be shown that RC has in fact contributed to an understanding of numerous topics and has been influential in empirical research.

A. Rational Choice Theory: Antecedents and Origins

RC theory is quite a recent development in sociology. There are, however, important antecedents in the writings of early social scientists such as David Hume, Adam Smith and others. It is characteristic of their idea of social science that they wanted to explain social phenomena by using theoretical principles about individual behavior. That is, the Scottish Moralists tacitly used the idea of a methodologically individualist social science. Furthermore, the Scots introduced a number of very important heuristic ideas that are characteristic of RC models of today. The very idea of methodological individualism is due to social scientists mainly working outside sociology, as the Austrian School of Economics. The Austrians Menger, Schumpeter, Hayek and others emphasized and further elaborated many classic ideas and explicitly introduced methodological individualism. Methodological
individualism is the thesis or proposal that collective phenomena can or should be explained by using (nomological) assumptions about individual behavior. Max Weber’s individualism resembles the Austrian approach and was probably influential on the debate among philosophers of social science (in particular K.R. Popper, H. Albert and others) about individualism and collectivism in social science (cf. O’Neill, 1973; Vanberg, 1974; Opp, 1979b, 1988; Raub and Voss, 1981). Only after the late 1950s was this discussion and methodological individualism recognized again in sociology, primarily due to the contributions of George C. Homans. Homans’s social exchange theory is probably the first influential statement that sociology learned by using the theoretical principles of neoclassical economics.

One of the main heuristic ideas of the Scottish tradition1 is the assumption of a uniform human nature (cf. e.g. Hume quoted in Schneider, 1967: xxi-xxv and 44). This means, that there exist universal, general law-like (nomological) principles explaining human behavior. Substantively, these principles consist of at least three main statements. Humans act goal-directed and want to realize self-interested aims. However, actors do not always act selfish in a narrow sense. The principle of sympathy (advocated by Hume, A. Smith and others) says that human beings have a propensity to take the role of their interaction partners and, moreover, to choose actions that do not harm or that even please others. That is, there may be some degree of altruism with regard to some interaction partners, and dependent on certain conditions. The Humean tradition in general assumes altruism within the family. In addition, there is a basic need to receive social approval which can be derived from the principle of sympathy. Another statement proposed in the Scottish tradition is a principle about learning: Human actors systematically respond to rewards from their environment. Actions associated with rewards are chosen more frequently (cf. Halévy, 1972: 7–11; Schneider, 1967: xvi–xxi).

These behavioral principles should not be read to imply atomized, isolated actors. On the contrary, individuals are mutually interdependent. They would not be able to realize their goals without society. The social context that is constituted by other actors’ expectations and actions, by social norms and institutions systematically governs individuals’ restrictions on possible courses of action (cf. Albert, 1977). Institutions therefore provide or prevent incentives to individual action.

Another heuristic idea of enormous importance has been emphasized by A. Ferguson and A. Smith. In a well-known passage, Ferguson pointed out (quoted in Schneider, 1967: 109) that many collective phenomena, for example social institutions are “indeed the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design”. A. Smith’s famous metaphor of an “invisible hand” that leads actors to produce results they did not intend is another expression of this central idea: purposive individual action may generate results that are unintended or unanticipated. Moreover, some of the most important social institutions emerged as products of goal-directed actions by numerous people who did not necessarily have the intention to generate a spontaneous order.

The idea of a spontaneous social order is at the center of Austrian social thinking. Following Hume, Carl Menger mentioned human language, media of exchange (that is money in modern times) and social norms as further cases of spontaneous orders besides market equilibria. The idea of a spontaneous order has also been
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It is crucial in Friedrich A. Hayek’s approach to social theory and his individualistic conception of social evolution (e.g., Hayek, 1967; Vanberg, 1986; Kliemt, 1985). The same argument has been emphasized by Max Weber (1973) repeatedly in his methodological writings. Like the Austrians, Weber proposed an individualistic theoretical framework for sociology. Purposive rational action was a central building block of Weber’s theory (“Zweckrationalität”). The assumption of means-ends rationality should at least be treated as a starting point or ‘ideal type’ of sociological analysis, even in cases of action(s) and aggregate consequences that are apparently caused by other motives (such as ‘value rationality’). Weber’s methodological individualism is reflected in two aspects. First, Weber (1973: 439) argues that collective terms, i.e., predicates denoting social collectives like ‘state’, ‘feudalism’ etc., are always reconstructable and should always be reconstructed or defined by expressions using individualistic predicates. Second, there are no law-like generalizations about collective phenomena and their interrelations (Weber 1973: 558). It should therefore not be required of sociology to discover universal laws about societal evolution or other collective phenomena. Notice that this does not imply that there are no law-like universal statements on the level of individual behavior or action. In fact, one could not realize one of the most important goals of social science, according to Weber, namely to explain causally individual actions and their social outcomes, if one would deny the existence of laws of individual behavior.

The Scottish Moralists have not always been regarded as direct ancestors of sociology. On the contrary, it is characteristic of the beginnings of the discipline, in particular within the French tradition of Durkheim, to sharply demarcate sociology from economics and utilitarian social philosophy. For a long time, there seemed to be one consensual understanding among sociologists: utilitarian principles will never be sufficient to fully explain the emergence of social order. Durkheim (1893) argued, to most sociologists convincingly, that social order cannot be explained by recurring to self-interested rational individuals who are motivated to voluntarily exchange resources or services with each other and thereby generate a spontaneous (market) order, as had been emphasized by the Scots and by H. Spencer. Such a network of exchange relations and the respective bilateral contracts among self-interested actors would not be stable, if ‘society’ would not enforce those contracts. Contracts are enforced, according to Durkheim, basically by two mechanisms, the institution of contract law and internalized feelings of a moral obligation to deal fairly with one’s business partners. These two mechanisms seem to be inconsistent with the individualist conception of order. The Durkheimian normative solution of social order has dominated sociology for a long time, at least during the long period of functionalist supremacy in American and international sociology. It was only in the late 1950s that George Homans tried to revitalize the individualist tradition.

Homans’ (1958) programmatic essay on social behavior as exchange argued that social interactions and small group processes can be explained by principles adopted from elementary microeconomic theory. Blau’s (1964) comprehensive volume on social exchange theory contains an RC analysis of consultations among colleagues within a bureaucracy (see also Oberschall, 1979). Other important early contributions toward an RC analysis of social and political phenomena are due to John C. Harsanyi
In this work, Harsanyi uses game theoretical ideas to analyze social situations and social exchange systems in particular. Homans' later work (cf. 1961, 1964, 1974) attempted to advance so-called behavioral sociology (Hamblin and Kunkel 1977; Burgess and Bushell 1969). Similarly, Richard M. Emerson (1962, 1972, see also 1976) and others (Cook, 1987) tried to construct a theory of social exchange based on principles of operant psychology. That is, Homans and others for some time preferred the application of principles from behavioral learning theory to rational action theory. However, Homans' (1967) methodological advocacy of an explanatory individualist sociology is logically independent of the acceptance of behavioral theoretical propositions.

Another branch of social exchange theory is represented by James S. Coleman (1964b, 1966a, b, c, 1972, 1973, 1990). Coleman explicitly modeled social behavior as rational action. Adopting standard microeconomic principles of a Walrasian equilibrium analysis, Coleman conceptualized systems of collective decisions as markets. Rational self-interested actors in those systems control resources or events (e.g. rights to cast a vote) and have possibly heterogeneous interests over those events. If there is a complementarity of interests and control, rational actors will want to exchange control of events that are less important in terms of their interests for control of events more important to them. Coleman’s model predicts the resulting equilibrium distribution of control that results from the exchanges in the system. Coleman’s exchange model is closely related to some more recent approaches in economics called Public Choice (cf. Mueller, 1989 for a survey; and Buchanan and Tullock, 1962 for a classic contribution). Public Choice is a subdiscipline of economics that focuses on political, bureaucratic and other social institutions and their interrelations with economic markets. Contrary to traditional economics, Public Choice assumes that the state and actors in the political arena act rationally and in self-interest. The state is under quite general conditions not maximizing social welfare but consists of agents who attempt to maximize their private welfare under the constraints of certain institutional rules.

In addition to Public Choice, there are some other major developments in economics and the social sciences that have proved very important to the advancement of RC in sociology. The New Political Economy (Arrow, 1963; Downs, 1957; Olson, 1965; see also Riker and Ordeshook, 1973 and for more recent treatments Ordeshook, 1986, 1992) contributed to the explosion of RC scholarship that is typical for contemporary (U.S. American) political science. This body of work is also relevant to political sociology and to theoretical sociology more generally (see Lindenberg, 1985). The New Institutional Economics (for an informative and readable survey see Eggertsson, 1990) was particularly relevant to RC analyses of economic and other institutions. For example, work in economic history on the emergence and effects of property rights (North and Thomas, 1971; North, 1981, 1990) demonstrated the importance of social institutions and institutional change for macro societal change (modernization) and economic progress. Other work, following seminal contributions by Coase (1937), Simon (1982), Williamson (1975, 1985) and others shaped the direction of work in organizational and economic sociology (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1992 for an original and comprehensive survey from the perspective of management science and business economics).
B. Rational Choice: The Model of Man

Rational action generally means choosing among alternative courses of action in accordance with certain rationality postulates. RC theory explains human behavior by using rationality postulates that depend on features of the situational context faced by the actors. In the following we will mention three classes of rationality postulates that refer to different kinds of contexts. The postulates are mutually consistent and form a unified and general theory of rational behavior (cf. Harsanyi, 1977 for a fine explication of this theory).

B.1. The Basic Model: Restrictions and Preferences

The basic model of man RC uses is closely related to neoclassical economic theory. It is assumed — of course simplifying complexities of real social situations — that actors know for certain what the consequences of their actions will be. The general idea is that those actions are chosen which will have the best consequences in terms of the actor’s own aims. A second idea that seems trivial at a first glance is that not all courses of action will be realizable. That is, there are always restrictions on the set of actions an actor may choose from.

Intuitively, one could characterize rational behavior by pointing out two kinds of filter processes on the level of the individual (cf. Elster, 1984: 112–115). First, the set of action alternatives is reduced to a smaller subset of actions that are possible in a particular situation. Given restrictions on actors’ available resources such as time, income, budget, market prices of goods and so on, only particular (combinations of) actions will be objectively realizable. For example, in the system of consultations among colleagues (described by Blau 1964 and Homans 1958) in a bureaucracy, it is important to notice that individuals’ time is finite. A working day has about 10 hours which have to be allocated on the different activities; i.e. consultations of colleagues and the performance of job tasks. Therefore employees who help their colleagues will have to bear opportunity costs since the quantity of time available for performing their own working tasks is reduced. The idea that time is one of the most important restrictions on individuals’ choice is at the center of Gary S. Becker’s (1976) economic approach to sociology and can be shown to have a lot of non-trivial empirical consequences. More generally, restrictions include social structural conditions and institutional arrangements. Secondly, the set of opportunities (available actions) is evaluated in the light of an actor’s aims. That is, the actor forms preferences among alternatives. Rationality means that these preferences fulfill some consistency requirements (see Harsanyi, 1977: 27–31 or any modern textbook on microeconomics). If an actor’s preferences satisfy these rationality assumptions, her choice behavior can be described as maximization of an (ordinal) utility function. The second filter, so to speak, is this principle of optimization.

Notice that this approach should not be interpreted as a psychological theory of cognition, motivation and action. It is certainly simple and almost certainly psychologically inadequate theory. The theory should be seen as an approach to
generate qualitative hypotheses which are empirically testable. These hypotheses refer to differences in behavior in an aggregate of actors due to changes in incentives (preferences and restrictions). Though the basic behavioral principle is simple, there may be many novel and even contraintuitive predictions.

The core idea may be conveniently expressed as a generalized law of demand (cf. Frey, 1992): If the price of an activity relative to the price of another alternative increases, the amount of the activity that will be chosen decreases and vice versa. There are numerous examples for this principle that may be considered as one of the most powerful behavioral principles in the social sciences (cf. Lindenberg and Frey, 1993; McKenzie and Tullock, 1978; Frank, 1994).

Another point is worth noticing. Though the principle of action is primitive it is nevertheless more complex than means-ends rationality which consists in choosing among the means to realize a particular goal. This will not be fully rational behavior because rational actors will also choose among different ends. They will give up some ends in order to realize other ends. There will always be opportunity costs (meaning the utility from the next best alternative) a rational actor has to bear (cf. Harsanyi, 1976: 90–92).

Some further remarks concerning the interpretation of rationality are in order: First, rational choice does not necessarily mean conscious choice among alternatives. To reiterate, the theory does not represent psychological processes but only results of choice behavior. The rules of rational choice behavior may be technically quite complex. To say that actors choose in accordance with RC does not mean to assume that these rules are applied consciously. Analogously, grammatical rules of a natural language are quite complex. But this does not mean that actors will only be able to apply these rules if they do this consciously. If this were so, little children would not be able to learn a language.

Secondly, determinants of behavior are preferences and restrictions. Therefore changes in behavior are explained by changes in preferences or changes in restrictions or by changes in both. However, it seems quite difficult to test hypotheses about preferences or about their changes. There might be a risk to immunize proposed RC explanations if hypotheses about preferences could not be tested empirically and independently from hypotheses about the explanandum (i.e. observed behavior). Virtually any behavior could be ex post “explained” by the assumption that the actor had a preference for that particular behavior (cf. e.g. Harsanyi, 1969). To avoid this problem, many RC theorists adopt a heuristic principle that is clearly elaborated by Stigler and Becker (1977): Behavioral changes should be explained by changes in the restrictions of behavior and not by changing tastes. The fruitfulness of this principle will of course depend on the concept of preferences. In Becker’s (1976; see also 1996) approach tastes are conceptualized in a specific way: Preferences refer to basic commodities such as physical health, social approval and so on, that is “goods” that are directly related to “utility”. These utility arguments are assumed to be interpersonally identical. That means, these tastes are possibly an aspect of human nature that is historically and interculturally more or less stable. Moreover, in Becker’s approach it is not always necessary to develop specific assumptions about those basic commodities and actors’ tastes. It suffices to postulate hypotheses on how those commodities
— whatever they may be — are related to other goods or activities that are prone to “produce” these commodities. For example, a capitalist entrepreneur will want to maximize her firm’s profits not because she values profit per se, but because profit maximization will allow her to satisfy more fundamental needs. Under quite general conditions, increasing profits lead to increasing income from entrepreneurial activity and this will increase the chance to produce the more fundamental commodities (for some sociological applications of this approach cf. Lindenberg, 1986, 1996a,b). Thirdly, this assumption of stable and interpersonally identical tastes should not be over-emphasized (see also Becker, 1996). Notice first that tastes should not always be considered as purely self-interested. Nature has endowed human beings with altruistic preferences at least with regard to certain contexts and vis à vis specific interaction partners (see Becker, 1976: 282–294).

Another aspect closely related to arguments of this type refers to the emotions such as guilt. An endowment of actors with these emotions may be evolutionary stable if they help those actors to commit themselves to cooperative behavior in interactions and if there exists a mechanism to make sure that cooperators are not exploited by opportunists (see Frank, 1988; but see also Elster, 1998). There may even be situations such that precise and empirically testable theories of preference formation are applicable. Very important theoretical work by Becker and Murphy (1988; see also Becker, 1996) suggests that preferences can be contingent on past choices. Important types of behavior patterns related to these preferences are habits, traditions and addictions (cf. Becker, 1992). This approach is illuminating because it means that RC models for the first time allow for a theoretical and empirical analysis of the effects of past behavior. (There are also certain classes of game theoretic models that can deal with a shadow of the past.)


Choice in situations of risk and uncertainty means that actors do not know for certain which outcomes result from their actions. In this case, the decision process is somewhat more complex because preferences have to be defined over so-called risky or uncertain prospects (sometimes called lotteries). A risky prospect $L$, denoted as $L = (A, p; B, 1 - p)$, yields outcome $A$ with probability $p$ and outcome $B$ with probability $1 - p$. Rationality under risk requires again that the actor’s choice behavior be governed by a set of consistency or rationality postulates. The rationality postulates for behavior under certainty are a subset of the set of rationality postulates under risk in the case that $p = 1$ holds for every prospect.

However, in addition to assumptions about consistency (transitivity and connectivity), some other axioms describing an agent’s decision-making behavior vis à vis risky prospects are needed (see for example, Harsanyi, 1977: Ch. 2). The basic reason for this is the fact that an ordinal utility scale is not sufficient to represent choice under risk. In order to be able to measure utility on an interval scale one needs axioms that yield more than complete orderings among prospects. In particular, one will need an Archimedean axiom (continuity axiom) and an independence axiom. One implication of this is the linearity of utility functions

One fundamental result (proved by v. Neumann and Morgenstern for the first time) is the expected utility theorem: Given that the preferences over risky prospects fulfill the rationality postulates, then an order-preserving cardinal utility function \( U \) representing these preferences exists which is unique up to linear transformations \( aU + b \) (\( a > 0 \)). Interpreting this theorem note that an actor’s choice behavior can be described by saying that he maximizes a cardinal utility function, i.e. chooses the action that will yield him the highest expected utility. It is worth noticing that this theorem allows for a theory-oriented measurement of utility (or preferences over risky prospects). Within the social sciences, utility scales build a singular example of measurement on the level of an interval scale that is theoretically sound and based on an axiomatized procedure (cf. e.g. Hogarth, 1987: 278–279; and Davis and Holt, 1993: 115–117 for brief descriptions of that procedure).

The expected utility hypothesis is frequently applied in RC sociology. For example, Coleman (1990: Ch. 5) argues that trust relations are formed if trustors decide to invest trust in accordance with the rules of rational decisions under risk. Expected utility models certainly show close affinities to other models of behavior, e.g. expectancy-value theories and other theories of motivation in psychology. One should, however, keep in mind that all of these models require cardinal measurability of utility or value and consequently the validity of a set of strong rationality criteria. It would be problematic in empirical applications of expected utility theory to try to measure value or utility by procedures that at best can generate ordinal scales. In principle, utility or preferences over lotteries are measurable, but it will not be very convenient to do so in a survey study. Generally, utility measurement will be possible mainly in the sociological laboratory (cf. the discussion of experimental work in Davis and Holt, 1993: Ch. 8; and Camerer, 1995).

This does not, however, present an obstacle to the application of RC in empirical research. It seems not only extremely hard to measure utility directly in a survey study but also generally unnecessary. The main reason is that RC models should yield many empirical predictions that can be tested via survey research or other types of studies. These predictions contain statements about variables that can be measured by objective indicators because they depend on restrictions and social conditions affecting an individual’s incentive structure (using examples of RC analyses of environmental behavior this argument has recently been illustrated by Diekmann, 1996 — but see also Opp, 1998 for a different approach).

**B.3. Rational Choice in Social Interactions: Game Theory**

The hypothesis of expected utility maximization is a necessary but not sufficient condition to yield predictions in situations composed of interacting individuals. Social interaction among rational individuals means that the outcomes of actor A are determined not only by A’s choices but also by the decisions of actors B, C ... and vice versa. Situations of this type are called strategic interactions.
The analysis of strategic interactions is the most complex task for RC approaches. Generally, utility maximization will not be a sufficient criterion. This is so because the expected utility of actor A’s strategy will be determined by actor B’s, C’s, ... decisions. These latter choices in turn depend on each other’s choices. However, A’s expectations will depend on B’s, C’s, ... expectations about A’s expectations ... and so forth. Obviously, continuing this reasoning generates a circle of higher-order expectations that cannot be broken up easily (cf. Lewis, 1969: 28 for an early analysis of higher-order expectations). This ‘Gordian knot’ of mutually dependent expectations about expectations can, so to speak, be ‘solved’ if one applies a core idea of modern game theory: the concept of a Nash equilibrium. A *Nash equilibrium* is a profile of strategies (actions) such that no actor has a positive incentive to unilaterally deviate from that profile, given that the other actors do not deviate from the profile.

In addition to the axioms of rational behavior under risk and uncertainty some further assumptions are required to justify the statement that rational actors will choose actions or strategy profiles that are components of a Nash equilibrium (cf. e.g. Binmore and Dasgupta, 1986: 4–5; Bicchieri, 1993). In particular, one has to assume that there is *common knowledge* among the actors that all actors follow the same rationality postulates.

Classical game theory is based on the assumption of complete information. Every actor is informed about her own preferences and about the preferences of every other actor. This information must be common knowledge (cf. e.g. Bicchieri, 1993). Modern Bayesian game theory which started from Harsanyi’s seminal contributions (1967, 1968a, b) is suitable to analyze games of *incomplete information*. It must, however, be assumed that all uncertainties of a game situation can be quantified by common prior probabilities of the actors (‘Harsanyi doctrine’). The analysis of Bayesian games generally requires refined concepts of an equilibrium. All of these refinements are based on the Nash equilibrium (cf. any modern game theory textbook, e.g. Rasmusen, 1994, for an overview). Other influential refinements of equilibrium refer to dynamic games. In such games actors can frequently apply threats or promises in order to achieve a Nash equilibrium. There may, however, be threats or promises that are not credible because rational actors would not employ them (cf. Schelling, 1960 for numerous examples). *Equilibria* with credible threats or promises will be selected if another refinement, namely (subgame) perfectness, is adopted (cf. Selten, 1965).

Although RC theory generally is based on forward-looking behavior, there are instances such that a shadow of the past may influence today’s behavior. For example, consider Bayesian games of incomplete information. In such games, a common prior probability distribution, for example, one indicating the probability that some player is endowed with preferences of a particular type, is disclosed at the start of the game. All players react to this disclosure of information and possibly also — if the game contains a number of sequences — to the actions chosen by the other players. This information due to observable actions may be a basis for revisions of prior beliefs. This means that there will be a kind of *(Bayesian) learning process* referring to revising the belief that some particular actor is of a particular type. In this sense that rational actors revise their beliefs about certain features of the game...
structure in accordance with rules of Bayesian updating a learning process may take place (see e.g. the discussion in Bicchieri, 1993: Chs 3, 4). Sociologically relevant applications of games of incomplete information include for instance so-called trust games representing trust relations in Coleman’s (1990: Ch. 5) sense (cf. Dasgupta, 1988; Camerer, 1988; Snijders, 1996; Raub and Weesie, 1996).

**B.4. The Model of Man: Limitations, Alternatives and Extensions**

Rational action theory is probably one of the theories that has been most severely tested empirically. One result of these tests is the discovery of a number of anomalies, i.e. empirical phenomena that systematically contradict predictions of the theory. Among the anomalies of expected utility theory are experimental results that refute the central assumption of linearity in the probabilities, for example the well-known Allais paradox (cf. Machina, 1987: 127–136). Other anomalies are so-called framing effects, preference reversal effects and effects that are a result of irrational judgmental heuristics with regard to (subjective) probabilities (for comprehensive surveys and references on these anomalies see e.g. Machina, 1987; Camerer, 1995, see also the contributions in Hogarth and Reder, 1987 and Thaler, 1992: Chs 6, 7, 8).

There are also empirical anomalies referring to game situations. One important example is that the amount of cooperation observed in social dilemma and public goods production situations is significantly higher than predicted by game theoretical rationality standards (see e.g. Thaler, 1992: Ch. 2; Green and Shapiro, 1994: Ch. 5 and the references therein). Anomalies are nowadays widely acknowledged and there seems to be a consensus among RC theorists and economists that humans in fact act boundedly rational.

RC theory in sociology is part of a program that is sometimes labelled ‘explanatory sociology’ (Wippler, 1985, 1996; Esser, 1993). Explanatory sociology aims to explain sociological explananda, i.e. collective phenomena, nomologically by using law-like assumptions about human nature. The theoretical primacy of individuals should be distinguished from the analytical primacy of the social context and of the social outcomes of individual actions (see Wippler and Lindenberg, 1987; Lindenberg, 1990). This distinction is important because it is a much more difficult and important task to analyze micro-macro relations than just to analyze individual behavior. RC theory is that part of explanatory sociology that is endowed with a powerful heuristic to provide micro-macro linkages. The basic reason is that RC’s micro theory of perfectly rational behavior consists of a deductive theoretical model. This feature of RC theory is particularly important because one main aspect of the micro-macro linkage, as conceived in methodological individualism, is a twofold problem of deduction: (1) What are the consequences of a set of assumptions about individual actions for the system level of collective phenomena? (2) What are the consequences of a set of statements about social conditions (contexts) for the antecedent conditions of individual actions? The first of these questions refers to a theoretical aggregation problem, the second is concerned with a problem of bridge assumptions. Both
of these problems will be tractable if there is an explicit (mathematical) model that connects these levels (cf. Coleman, 1964a, 1990; Fararo, 1989; Hummell, 1972; Lindenberg, 1977, 1985; Weesie, 1988; Ziegler, 1972).

It may be the case that in spite of anomalies, models of perfectly rational individuals are important in more than a heuristic sense. It has been argued that some of the sociologically relevant predictions of RC models referring to macro outcomes are robust under quite general conditions (cf. e.g. Coleman, 1987). In particular, it can be shown that some elementary principles of the basic theory of rational action, namely consequences of the generalized law of demand qualitatively predicting changes of behavior in the aggregate, are robust even in the case of certain types of irrational behavior (Becker, 1962). This result, however, does not extend to other circumstances. It can be demonstrated that continuous choice models and quantitative predictions of market equilibria are generally not robust if the actors’ behavior departs from perfect rationality (Akerlof and Yellen, 1985; Russell and Thaler, 1985). Coleman’s exchange system models would be a case in point: predictions of those models will not be very robust if actors were not fully but only boundedly rational. With regard to game situations of strategic interactions it is not difficult to see that outcomes can change dramatically if actors’ behavior is governed by principles of bounded rationality. Other reactions to decision anomalies point out that it might be the case that institutional arrangements developed in order to cope with particular anomalies (Frey and Eichenberger, 1989).

There are some contributions that attempt to show that several novel empirical predictions result from particular models of boundedly rational behavior (e.g. Heiner, 1983; Thaler, 1980). The framing of situational conditions may account for many important sociological phenomena that apparently cannot be explained by standard RC theory (see e.g. Lindenberg, 1988; Lindenberg and Frey, 1993, Esser, 1996; but see also Wittman’s, 1995: Ch. 5 for a critique of framing explanations). With regard to social interactions evolutionary game theory (cf. Axelrod 1984 as an example for an informal evolutionary approach) recently has evolved within the social sciences to cover outcomes of social interactions that are due to boundedly rational behavior and to individual and social learning processes. There has been considerable progress with respect to new equilibrium concepts and dynamic process models that will probably be very important for the social sciences and sociology in particular (see the comprehensive surveys of those works in Weibull, 1995; and Samuelson, 1997).

C. The Emergence of Social Norms

Many, if not most, social scientists would agree that the Hobbesian problem of social order is one of the most important questions that should be answered by social theory. Parsons (1937) not only reintroduced this question into sociology, he also gave an answer known as the “normative solution” (Ellis, 1971). Roughly, the normative solution to the problem of order states that there must be a value consensus among the actors in a social system. These values must be further supplemented by social norms. The Parsonian conception of norms includes the idea that (internalized)
norms yield a generalized categorical commitment to core societal values (cf. Münch, 1982). Similar theses have been advanced from a Weberian perspective: social order could not be stable if the actors would not accept certain values unconditionally. There must be a certain amount of ‘value rationality’. Rational choice must be constrained by values that the actor is not willing to trade-off when more attractive opportunities arise (cf. Voss, 1998a).

To be sure, recently even some theorists sympathetic with RC have advanced conceptions of norms that come close to the Parsonian tradition. Elster (1989: 98–107) defines norms by the feature that they are not future- or outcome-oriented. That is, they cannot be explained by optimizing behavior and they have an “independent motivating power”, in particular independent of self-interest (Elster, 1989: 125).

RC theorists have objected that the normative solution is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, proponents of the normative solution always take norms as given and therefore cease to really solve the difficult problem posed by Hobbes (cf. e.g. Coleman, 1964b). This point is analogous to Parsons’ (1937) critique of Hobbes’ coercive solution. Hobbes, according to Parsons, introduced the state as a deus ex machina without providing satisfactory arguments about the emergence of this central authority. Likewise, Parsons failed to show how norms emerge in the first place. Second, the concept of norms as internalized and as involving an unconditional commitment seems invalid for theoretical as well as empirical reasons. Empirically, there are numerous observations indicating the emergence of norms that generate at least some local social order which developed spontaneously and cannot be plausibly a product of socialization and internalization. Axelrod (1984) describes norms in trench warfare of World War I. Ellickson (1991: 191–206) mentions norms that came into existence among a community of eighteenth and nineteenth century whalers to regulate high-sea fishery. The situations described in these case studies resemble Hobbesian states of nature (see also Ostrom, 1990 for illuminating case studies on common pool resources). There is no central authority that could enforce an agreement about socially advantageous rules. It seems very unlikely that soldiers had learned to internalize the norm of “live and let live” through some extended process of socialization. It seems equally unlikely that whalers have internalized rules about adequate behavior in conflicts about whales arising in high-sea fisheries. Another objection is that the idea of a categorical commitment is theoretically as well as empirically extremely implausible. RC approaches to norms argue that norms will always hold conditionally.

C.1. What are Norms?

The most promising approach to social norms stems from game theory. Game theoretical concepts may be employed to explicate a usage of the term norm that is quite standard within the sociological tradition. Following M. Weber, norms can be considered as particular regularities in the behavior of a population of actors. Of course, not every regularity can be denoted a social norm. Certain regularities are individual regularities (e.g. many people take a shower in the morning).
Sociologically interesting are social regularities arising in recurrent situations of social interdependence. Certain classes of norms have the feature that they will in cases of deviant behavior be enforced by sanctions (see Geiger, 1970: 43–91; Popitz, 1980). To make this concept of a norm more precise, we assume that the actors are involved in a situation of strategic interdependence. Of particular interest are such situations that are called social dilemmas. The prisoner’s dilemma is a very important case in point. Other dilemmas comprise coordination games and bargaining games (cf. for an explanation in game theoretical terms Harsanyi, 1977; see also Raub and Voss, 1986). These situations are dilemmas because rational action will yield inefficient outcomes. For example, in the prisoner’s dilemma universal defection is the unique Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium corresponds to an outcome that is collectively suboptimal in the Pareto sense. That is, every actor would be better off, if universal cooperation could be achieved. The prisoner’s dilemma can be considered as a very simple representation of Hobbesian anarchy (cf. the discussion in Taylor, 1976, 1987). Some further classification will prove helpful. Given an RC approach, norms will be effective if (some) actors in that situation derive a benefit from that. The set of actors who benefit from the norm may be called beneficiaries. The set of actors whose actions are targets of the norm can be called target actors. Social norms with the feature that beneficiaries and target actors intersect such that the set of target actors is a subset of the set of beneficiaries may be called conjoint norms (Coleman, 1990: Ch. 10; Geiger (1970) and Popitz (1980) called these norms reciprocal norms).

C.2. A General Hypothesis

Considering conjoint social norms a general hypothesis is as follows: social norms develop and maintain such that their content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare of the beneficiaries (adopted from Ellickson, 1991: 167; see also e.g. Coleman, 1990: Ch. 10; or Opp, 1979a for similar hypotheses). Instead of welfare or wealth maximization it would be natural to speak about efficient (in the Pareto sense) outcomes because this terminology corresponds better to game theoretical thinking. The meaning is roughly the same.

Note that this hypothesis has a functionalist flavor. A more concrete version of this hypothesis would say that norms serve the interests of the beneficiaries in that they yield outcomes that are superior in terms of Pareto optimality (see also Ullmann-Margalit, 1977). However, it seems quite obvious that this hypothesis is not sufficient for an RC explanation of conjoint norms. Let us restrict our attention for the moment to the prisoner’s dilemma. In the prisoner’s dilemma, rational behavior means universal defection. This inefficient outcome generates, as expressed by Coleman (1990: Ch. 10) a “demand” for a social norm that prescribes universal cooperation. If that norm would be realized, the beneficiaries would be better off. But how can the norm be realized? Knowing that regularities of behavior that conform to a norm are stable if they result, to speak technically, from a Nash equilibrium, this problem corresponds to the following questions: (1) What are the conditions for an efficient equilibrium of universal cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma type situation? Answers
to this question can be broadly classified into exogenous and endogenous solutions. Exogenous solutions draw on conditions such that third parties are involved in the process of enforcement. Another type of exogenous approach would refer to internal sanctions and internalized feelings of guilt and so forth that enforce norms. The problem with these explanations is that they are incomplete. Answering the Hobbesian question would require to explain the emergence and stability of a third party or of an internal sanctioning system. These explanations therefore need to be complemented by an endogenous explanation. Let us restrict our attention to endogenous solutions. Since in an ordinary prisoner’s dilemma type situation there is no cooperation among rational actors, the emergence of norms must depend on threats of sanctions that are created by the target actors themselves. This leads to the second question: (2) What are the conditions for the emergence of sanctions that not only are consistent with Nash equilibrium behavior but also are credible? Technically spoken, what are the conditions for (subgame) perfect equilibria?

**C.3. The Effective Realization of Social Norms**

Answering the two main questions inevitably will lead to the idea that repeated interactions may change actors’ incentives in a social dilemma situation (cf. Taylor, 1976; Axelrod, 1984; see also Voss, 1982, 1985; Kliemt, 1986; Raub and Voss, 1986). Repeated interactions allow for the applicability of a special type of endogenous sanctions. An example are so-called trigger strategies (cf. Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986). These strategies demand conditional cooperation, that is, to cooperate as long as the other actors cooperate. Otherwise the strategy prescribes defection. A necessary condition for such a strategy to be in equilibrium with itself is that the actors’ “shadow of the future” (Axelrod, 1984) is large enough. The shadow of the future corresponds to the actors’ (conditional subjective) probabilities that the iteration of the game will be continued for another period. It can easily be seen that the threat to defect in an iterated dilemma game is in fact credible if universal defection is an equilibrium in the (noniterated) constituent game.

This general idea suggests that social norms of universal cooperation emerge endogenously in dilemma situations if the population of actors is a close-knit community (Ellickson, 1991: 167). A close-knit community is “defined as a social network whose members have credible and reciprocal prospects for the application of power against one another and good supply of information on past and present internal events” (Ellickson, 1991: 181; see also Taylor, 1982; Raub and Voss, 1986 for similar arguments and for hints on the correspondence between game theoretical conditions of cooperation and social conditions of close-knit communities).

This approach, though an illuminating first step, has limitations. One limitation is that the trigger strategy is not the only kind of sanctioning mechanism in real life interactions. In real life situations we encounter sanctions of a retributive type (Boyd and Richerson, 1992), that is, sanctions of a more active type than to defect. Examples of those sanctions are ostracism or the threat to exit a situation, gossip and physical retaliation (cf. Ellickson, 1991; Ostrom, 1990 for some ethnographic descriptions). Coleman (1990: Ch. 11) points out that “incremental” sanctions that deny social
approval to someone who deviated from a norm are very important. At first glance, the application of these sanctions may generate a so-called higher-order problem of cooperation (Oliver, 1980; Axelrod, 1986; Heckathorn, 1989; Coleman, 1990: Ch. 11): if the application of sanctions is necessary to realize a socially optimal outcome and given the assumption that sanctions are costly, there will be a free riding problem of a higher order. The problem can also be expressed referring to meta norms (Axelrod, 1986) that prescribe the application of sanctions toward defectors.

There is some indication that the higher-order problem might well be over-emphasized (see Voss, 1998b). Most contributions on the higher-order problem do not explicitly use game theoretical models. For example, Coleman’s (1990: Ch. 11, 926–930) analysis does not use one game theoretical model that simultaneously represents the decision to cooperate or to defect on both levels (norm level and meta norm level). There is no identification of perfect equilibria. The same is true of other work on the same topic (e.g. Heckathorn, 1988, 1989, 1990). However, if sanctioning is embedded into a dilemma game explicitly, the picture of the second-order problem may change. Some work on ostracism and exit strategies shows that these opportunities may indeed make cooperation easier to achieve than the employment of indirect sanctions of the trigger type alone (see Hirshleifer and Rasmusen, 1989; Schüssler, 1989, 1990; Vanberg and Congleton, 1992). Other results point out that punishment strategies may enforce cooperation even in single shot games if the threat of punishing defection is severe enough (Boyd and Richerson, 1992). It can even be shown that the application of those strategies can be a credible threat (Voss, 1998b).

In addition to game theoretical arguments one other aspect is worth noticing. It may in fact be the case that the application of sanctions is generally not very costly in particular in comparison to the harm that sanctions may cause (Hardin, 1995: 52–53). This seems plausible at least with regard to the sanction of denying someone one’s social approval.

C.4. Discussion

The sketch of an explanation of conjoint social norms demonstrated that in principle social order emerges among self-interested rational actors if appropriate social conditions are given. It is even the case that social structural conditions with a somewhat shorter “shadow of the future” allow for the endogenous enforcement of conjoint norms in dilemma situations. This is so because there may be multilateral reputation effects in social networks (cf. Raub and Weesie, 1990) that serve to compensate the lack of a large “shadow of the future”.

However, this general approach to social norms is incomplete. There are many instances such that people follow social norms without credible external sanctions. For instance, it is difficult to understand why people conform to the norm to tip in restaurants that they are sure never to visit again. There is ample evidence of cooperation in situations with external incentives to free ride (see references in section B.4. above). This suggests that internal incentives should be incorporated
into an RC analysis of social norms (cf. e.g. Frank, 1992: 150–152 who comments critically on Coleman’s approach; cf. also Ziegler, 1997). Contrary to the traditional sociological approach, internalized norms should not be treated as given, exogenous factors. It seems, however, difficult to explain the development of preferences that prescribe certain norm-oriented types of behavior in a way that is consistent with RC theory.

Only quite recently have several approaches been undertaken to tackle this problem. One important observation in this context is that intrinsic motives may play an instrumental role in an actor’s ability to achieve rewards that are material or social (e.g. social approval). For example, considering a standard (single-shot) prisoner’s dilemma situation, an actor would be better off in terms of her natural (material and social) preferences if she were endowed with internalized “moral” preferences that prescribed conditional cooperation instead of unconditional defection. Under these circumstances an actor with moral preferences would cooperate with a partner who is also endowed with moral preferences. The resulting outcome would be superior even in terms of the actors’ natural preferences (cf. Sen, 1974: 80). Some contributions attempt to demonstrate that rational actors would choose such moral preferences if they had an opportunity to modify their preferences (see in particular Gauthier’s (1986) seminal enterprise; cf. also Bicchieri, 1993: 202–213 for comments from a game theoretical perspective; other works in this direction include e.g. Hegselmann et al., 1986 and Raub and Voss, 1990).

Another body of work is based on the assumption of bounded rationality. First of all, the notion of action frames as used in several branches of interpretative sociology and in cognitive psychology (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory) may be relevant in this context. The basic idea is that actors use situation-specific decision rules. If a situation is framed to be governed by social norms, the individual would use a normative decision rule (cf. e.g. Lindenberg, 1988). The main desideratum of such an analysis is that ad hoc explanations must be strictly avoided. Every behavior could in principle be “explained” by postulating specific preferences. Similarly, framing explanations could be immunized against critique by just assuming a specific frame or decision rule for any specific pattern of behavior. It is furthermore important to model the interplay between intrinsic and extrinsic rewards explicitly (see on this point e.g. Frey, 1994; Kreps, 1997). Otherwise, framing models would not achieve any theoretical progress as compared to conventional concepts of an oversocialized homo sociologicus.

Still another body of work is based on the idea that boundedly rational actors are endowed with preferences that are subject to evolutionary forces (see in particular Frank, 1988). Most recent work on evolutionary game theory suggests that social norms may develop due to evolutionary (learning) processes and are related to stable equilibria of such processes. This approach sheds new light on the evolution of conventions which can be grasped as evolutionary equilibria of coordination problems (see Young, 1996). Other work combines novel ideas from evolutionary game theory with experimental work on social dilemma and bargaining games to analyze the evolution of behavior patterns that seem to be governed by norms of fairness (Binmore and Samuelson, 1994; Samuelson; 1997: 162–167).
D. Applications of Rational Choice Theory in Various Fields of Sociology

As already mentioned, RC theory is appropriate to explain macro phenomena on the basis of individual behavior. In this chapter we will hint at some of such applications of RC theory in various empirical fields of sociology. Our aim is to show for which types of research problems the empirical test of RC theory was successful.

A first area to be reviewed is economic behavior, where analysis based on rational actors has a long tradition in the social sciences. It deals with the central question of how actors coordinate their behavior for the allocation of resources in a group or society. Neoclassical economics stresses the role of markets assuming that supply and demand of rational actors with complete information yield an efficient allocation of goods. The medium of exchange within this model is money, which is used by the actors to value the goods exchanged on the market. As Coleman (1994) pointed out, RC-applications in economic sociology complement this framework usually by two points: first, the social conditions of economic decisions are considered and, second, institutions are brought back into analysis especially by treating these not as given. Concerning the first point, RC-theorists take the social preconditions as well as the social framework of allocation and exchange into consideration. That is, individuals are not treated as isolated in a world of anonymous markets but are seen as social actors. For example, money is not the only — and often not even the most important — utility argument. Social approval, social support or power are other important goods exchanged and allocated within social systems (Coleman, 1990: 119–144). Frank (1985) argued that wage differences in U.S. labor markets are not as large as the economic theory of individual productivity predicts. Assuming that workers are interested in wage as well as in their local social status, he explains this tendency of wage equalization by a market for status: in a group of workers, more productive workers can claim a higher status only if the less capable colleagues stay in their reference group. Consequently, the latter have to be compensated by the highly productive workers with parts of their potential income. Another example of the importance of non-monetary exchange is given in Coleman (1990: 136–142) who analyzes social exchange processes in the classroom. He shows that the distribution of grades in a class can be explained by the assumption of a market structure. Teachers and students exchange grades for effort whereby a competition for the best grades exists. These examples make evident that the social preconditions of exchange are an important factor which RC-analysis should take into consideration.

The social framework of rational decision making in economic settings influences not only the kind of objects which are exchanged. The resources the actors are provided with also result from the social structure they are embedded in. For example actors can invest as well as make use of their so-called social capital which is constituted by their networks of social relations (Coleman, 1990: Ch. 12). One example of the relevance of social networks and social support for market exchange is the success of newly founded businesses being influenced by the support an entrepreneur receives via his personal network (Brüderl and Preisendorfer, 1997). However, networks can also restrict the actors. If markets are interpreted
as a network of individual or corporative actors, the structure around these actors — resulting in a certain distribution of power or information - influences their success in the market (Burt, 1982, 1983, 1992; Braun, 1993).

Concerning economic institutions, two questions arise: first, which alternative institutional mechanisms — defined as rules and constraints which lead to stable behavior — are chosen by rational actors? As Williamson (1985) pointed out, these institutional mechanisms can be placed on a scale with perfect markets on the one end and organizations on the other extreme with several hybrid forms in between. A second aspect concerning institutions is related to the question of how different institutional settings influence the behavior of actors and the resulting allocation. Contrary to neoclassical arguments, these results can be collectively inefficient. Both questions lead to the analysis of organizations as the alternative form of allocation and coordination. Concerning organizations, RC-analysis can focus on two types of actors: individual and corporate actors. Individual actors are usually the object of analysis when intra-organizational processes and problems are to be explained. In this context constraints on action due to organizational structure are of interest. One special type of structural constraint is provided by groups of actors which have to produce a common output. If the individual output cannot be measured by the management, every actor has incentives to show less work effort (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Hechter 1987; Petersen, 1992; Lazear, 1995). It can be argued (cf. Miller, 1992) that self-regulated teams in industrial organizations are faced with serious cooperation problems which can be solved by selective incentives like social norms, status or emotions. There is some evidence (cf. Abraham, 1996) that the competition for status in a firm can have positive consequences for the productivity the employees bring to the workplace.

Besides studies concerning collective goods problems, several other examples of the empirical analysis of rational actors in organizations can be found. There are many contributions dealing with employee turnover and the stability of employment relations, or the intrafirm mobility and career ladders of employees (see e.g. Brüderl, 1991). Common to all of these studies is the assumption that the organization provides a given social structure which determines choices and behavior of the actors within it.

Another type of organizational analysis is given if organizations themselves are defined as units of action. This concept of corporate actors (Coleman, 1974, 1990) fits phenomena like the success of firms, the strategies of employers within employment relations or the analysis of buyer-supplier relationships. Like individual actors, organizations are often confronted with problems of cooperation and trust concerning their relations with actors outside their boundaries. This problem becomes more severe in view of the fact that business partners are relying to a relatively low degree on legal norms and enforceable contracts (Macaulay, 1963; Ellickson, 1987, 1991). Hence rational behavior of corporate actors in this case means that they will try to regulate their problematic relationships with appropriate cooperation mechanisms (cf. Raub and Weesie, 1993: 3). Alliances for research and development between firms are one example of such governance structures. Here the corporate actors face the problem that quality and quantity of the resources
provided by the partner cannot be completely controlled. Since the incentives for free-riding are more severe when the volume of the project and the dependency of both firms are high and there is little experience with the partner, the actors will invest more resources in cooperation mechanisms (Blumberg, 1997).  

Another subject of RC-analyses are families and households. The family as a basic unit of social life has always been a central topic within the social sciences. On the collective level, families are the main place of socialization in society. On the individual level, families and households can be seen as an attempt by actors to benefit from collective action due to economies of scale or an efficient division of labor. It is mostly this second aspect which is highlighted by RC-approaches to families and households. The pioneering work of Gary S. Becker (1962, 1976, 1981) deals with the behavior of family members within a market-oriented framework. His theoretical analysis is based on three core assumptions: the concept of human capital, a theory of time allocation and the idea of a common household production. In this sense, households are organized groups of actors with common interests trying to maximize a common household objective function. Marriage relationships come into existence because they may provide additional individual benefits for the partners. This is a result of the division of work within the common household if there exist comparative advantages between spouses (Becker, 1981: Ch. 2).

This theoretical framework — often called new home economics — deals mainly with five topics (see Krüsselberg et al., 1986). First, the marriage decision can be analyzed as goal-oriented behavior. The individuals who are acting in the marriage market decide voluntarily to build a marriage partnership (Becker, 1981: Ch. 2). In this process, the actors evaluate basic commodities provided by the partner like “children, prestige and esteem, health, altruism, envy and pleasure of the senses” (Becker, 1981: 8). On the basis of these commodities, they try to maximize the expected gains of a future partnership by choosing the “best” partner available on the market. Because this evaluation does not end after the wedding, the second application consequently deals with the stability of marriage partnerships. The divorce of marriage partners can be explained within this framework by the expectation of advantages and disadvantages of the partnership in the future. This depends not only on the market situation itself but also on the costs and possibilities of searching for an alternative partner. Because the partners do not have complete knowledge about all possibilities, divorce is treated as a consequence of imperfect information in the marriage market (Becker et al., 1977; Becker, 1981: Ch. 10; Brüderl and Diekmann, 1994). In an empirical analysis Becker et al. (1977) show empirical evidence for such a market-based and search-theoretical argumentation (cf. also Diekmann and Klein, 1991; South and Lloyd, 1995).

A third scope of investigation focuses on the decision for having children in a marriage relationship. The analysis of fertility is based on the assumption that children are basic commodities which are “consumed” by the marriage partners because of their positive utility. This “value of children” can be influenced by intrinsic motives as well as physical benefits like the future support by the descendants. Because this consumption requires certain resources and the quality per child is important for the parents, fertility is explained as the decision of how to
spend the available resources under certain constraints. (Becker, 1981: Ch. 5; Friedman et al., 1994, for empirical studies see South and Lloyd, 1992; Brüderl and Diekmann 1994). This argument can also be used to derive hypotheses concerning intergenerational effects between parents and children in the society. Education and occupation of children can be seen as a result of specific investments by the parents. These investments were made either by altruistic motives or due to the expectation that children with high incomes will be better able to support their parents later on. Coleman (1990: Ch. 22) stresses this expectation by arguing that the shift to modern social security systems produces failures of socialization. If older people receive pensions from the state and are not dependent on financial support from their children, rational actors no longer have incentives to invest in their descendants. This could explain for example the observation that Turkish immigrants have a heavily reduced fertility after having settled down in Germany (Nauck, 1993). Moreover, the employment of parents — and especially of the mother — outside the family household reduces the amount of social support — that is the social capital within the family — a child can rely on. This leads to incomplete socialization and lower chances of accumulating human capital. Empirically, there is evidence of a positive relation between the social capital of the parent-child relationship and the rates of school drop-out (Coleman, 1988, 1990: Ch. 22). The hypothesis, that the institutional context influences the possibility for transferring human capital within a society is also supported by comparative empirical work on Japan and the U.S. (Brinton, 1993).

The allocation of household resources is also a central argument concerning the fifth topic of division of labor and gender roles within the household. Based on the central assumption, that the household members produce basic goods like monetary income and childbearing, the question of who is responsible for which commodities arises. One important example of this type of question is the analysis of female labor market participation, which is interpreted as a decision of the household concerning the human capital and time resources of its members. Due to distinct capabilities and skills of the family members, a division of labor arises which can lead to traditional gender roles: because women often have lower occupational qualifications on the one hand and comparative advantages concerning child care on the other, the theory predicts a tendency to assign the female labor force to the private household (Becker, 1981: Ch. 2). This argument corresponds with some empirical work on the labor market participation of household members which provides evidence as well as additional insights (e.g. Funk, 1993; Bernasco, 1994; Bryant and Zick, 1994).

Although the approach of the new home economics seems to be a powerful explanatory instrument, some critical points have to be mentioned. As Berk (1980: 138) noticed, phenomena like exploitation by the male partner or conflicts between the household members are difficult to analyze with this theoretic framework. Although a common household utility function does not rely on the absence of divergent interests, the conflicts are avoided by side-payments within the household. However, this argument overrides cooperation and distribution problems due to common as well as conflicting interests of the marriage partners (Ben-Porath, 1982: 54). For example the renunciation of occupational work by one partner requires
trust concerning future compensations. However, due to the decreasing stability of marriage relationships, these future payoffs are uncertain. Consequently, marriage partners need mechanisms of governance to solve problems of trust and cooperation (see England and Farkas, 1986; Raub and Weesie, 1993). In other words, it is necessary to take into consideration the transaction costs of family life, which can be defined as “the costs of information collection, advertisement, and negotiations, the creation of provisions and guarantees for enforcement, and so on” (Ben-Porath, 1980: 5). Here the assignment of different mechanisms like contractual agreements or specific investments can be analyzed as decisions of rational actors. This argument leads to a framework “in which the utility of individual household members becomes the fundamental building block” (Berk, 1980: 140). Several empirical studies show evidence that the governance of marriage relations due to basic cooperation problems is an important aspect of household analysis (see Giesen, 1994; Abraham and Funk, 1997).

In political sociology, rational choice applications mainly address political collective action. In this field, rational actors are usually confronted with severe free-rider problems. Although the results of political action like voting, demonstrations, strikes or even revolts and revolutions could be beneficial to each actor in a group, the individual contribution has only trivial effects. Because the political action of an actor leads to individual costs, rational choice approaches face the problem of explaining the production of a collective good by a large group. As Opp (1996) points out, a solution must identify the individual benefits and costs emerging for collective political action. There are two types of arguments concerning these factors: first, we assume that the actors do not care about their opportunities of free-riding. This can be the case if the actors have strong intrinsic values like ideologic convictions (Boudon, 1986) or if they are not aware of the marginal impact of their individual contribution (Moore, 1995; Klandermans, 1997: 13). Empirical results indicate that actors form indeed specific expectations about their influence on the results of collective action that do not correspond with objective probabilities (Finkel et al., 1989; Moe, 1980).

A second possibility to overcome the collective goods problem are positive or negative selective incentives. These come into being either by negative sanctions e.g. due to group norms (Goldstone, 1994) or by benefits like social approval (Lindenberg, 1989). It can be shown that social incentives via personal networks are an important factor for the explanation of individual protest participation during the East German revolution (Opp and Gern, 1993).

Another important aspect of political action is the dynamics of collective action. Here rational choice theory can be helpful in explaining changes in the extent of political action. The general hypothesis is that decreasing individual costs and increasing benefits will lead to a higher chance of a contribution to the collective good. Several studies present empirical evidence for this general assumption (Opp, 1994; Opp and Gern, 1995). These costs and benefits of a single actor can be influenced by the group itself not only by explicit sanctions and benefits but also by constraints of individual action. This latter aspect can be elaborated by using threshold models of collective behavior (Schelling, 1978; Granovetter, 1978; Kuran, 1995). A basic idea is that the decision of an actor to join a politically active group
depends on the number of other people who already participate in the action. For example, considering the decision to join a forbidden demonstration, each actor builds an expectation about the size of the demonstration because this will have an impact on the probability of sanctions: the larger the group, the less likely an individual will be punished by agents of the established regime. Hence it is assumed that each actor will have a threshold, depending on the number of people already demonstrating. If the group succeeds in growing at the beginning and if there is an appropriate distribution of thresholds among the actors, the group size will increase rapidly (Marwell and Oliver, 1993; Granovetter, 1978). It has been argued that the dynamics of the revolution in East Germany in 1989 fits this theoretical model (Prosch and Abraham, 1991; Braun, 1995; see also Kuran, 1991 in this context).10

However, for the explanation of political protest and its different types the described arguments have to be blended. A first step toward such a model is suggested by Oberschall (1994). He stresses the fact that collective political action usually consists of contributions by small groups. Within these groups there is an assurance effect: groups may provide selective incentives, and consequently, considerably higher individual thresholds may be reached. In combination with different production functions for different types of protest, the realization of collective protest becomes more likely than in a world of atomized individuals.

One other field concerning the problem of collective goods and therefore applications of RC-theory is ecological behavior. The quality of our environment like clean air or drinkable water is the aggregate result of actions by numerous individual and corporate actors. For most cases it can be assumed that the actors have the opportunities to choose between different courses of action which lead to distinct ecological consequences. One example is the choice of the vehicle to use. In general, it can be assumed that cars harm the environment much more than trains or public buses, but the environmental benefit is only marginal if a single actor decides to use the train instead of his car. On the other hand, ecological behavior often leads to higher costs for the individual actors: using public transportation is often more expensive and time-consuming than private car usage. This collective dilemma arises either because of the failure to measure individual contributions to pollution or due to the non-existence of rights which prevents the assignment of fees for polluting behavior. Contrary to these theoretical considerations, results of empirical studies show ecologically conscious behavior for some situations without the “classical” instrument of financial fees or legal norms (for an overview see Diekmann, 1996). One example is the wide-spread behavior in Germany to separate different types of rubbish for recycling although there are no financial incentives to do so. In an RC-framework there are three possible explanations for this observation.

The first one focuses on the repeated interactions among the actors. If the collective good can be realized by a group of people, the members have the possibility to implement social norms by reciprocity in future interactions (see also Section C). The observation that residential areas with one-family houses are cleaner than those which large apartment buildings can be explained by social control. Although each individual may have an incentive to throw some waste on the street, everyone knows that others will observe this uncooperative behavior and punish it by behaving the same way. Because every actor prefers a clean street, the actors
will cooperate if uncooperative behavior is well observable. Several empirical studies give support for a positive correlation between cooperative ecological behavior and the closure of local networks (Diekmann and Preisendörfer, 1998; Diekmann et al., 1995). While this argument stresses sanctions by social control, the second possibility of explanation relies on social rewards assuming that actors are interested in social approval. For these actors ecological behavior provides an additional benefit if there is a widespread opinion that environmentalist attitudes should be rewarded (Braun and Franzen, 1995). For the third argument the traditional RC-model is modified by the assumption of moral preferences in form of environmentalist attitudes. However, these attitudes do not automatically lead to cooperative behavior. Instead, actors compare the intrinsic benefits with the costs of ecological behavior. This yields the so-called low-cost hypothesis (see e.g. Harsanyi, 1969): if ecological behavior causes only low costs for an actor, it is more likely that she will take her moral sentiments into consideration. This argument can explain why people behave cooperatively in such situations like separating rubbish for recycling and defect in others like resigning the use of cars (Diekmann, 1996).

Although rational actors face norms and expectations of other individuals in a given social context, they can decide to offend against these restrictions. Hence deviant behavior of rational actors can be modeled by considering costs like negative sanctions and benefits as in the form of gains from illegal behavior. Consequently, RC analysis of crime assumes that crime is purposive, goal-oriented behavior of an offender to obtain basic commodities like “money, status, sex and excitement” (Clarke and Felson, 1993: 6). In this sense, criminal behavior does not differ from other, legal behavior. For the central question of how criminal behavior can be reduced, RC-approaches focus on two core factors: first, the degree of criminal punishment and, second, the probability of punishment. These expected costs of crime are subject of consideration because the benefits of criminal behavior usually cannot be easily influenced. If we assume rational actors, this suggests the hypothesis of deterrence: the more severe the punishment for a crime and the more likely the offender will be captured and sentenced, the lower the crime rate in a group or society will be. However, actors are not completely informed about these factors. Instead, offenders calculate risks and gains of their crime ex ante on the basis of bounded rationality (e.g. Carroll and Weaver, 1986).

Within the RC-approach to criminal behavior, two central positions can be found. First, there can be a market for criminal activities. Here goods like drugs or security by mafia-like actors (Gambetta, 1993) are traded on an illegal market. In such a situation, crimes often provide monetary gains to the criminals which are influenced by demand and supply. These factors are subject to prevention strategies which try to reduce the market profits of offenders. On the basis of this framework two consequences can be derived: first, a society without crime is impossible if there is a demand for these goods. Crime therefore is a “normal” feature of societies in Durkheim’s sense (Ehrlich, 1996). This results from the fact, that a reduction of supply leads to rising prices and therefore to higher benefits for suppliers. Because higher profits compensate greater risks of detection, there will always be a criminal entrepreneur on this market (Becker and Stigler, 1974). Secondly, this theoretical approach predicts a correlation between indicators of economic welfare and crime
rates: for example, the lower the returns for legal activities, the higher will be the
demand for illegal activities (Ehrlich, 1996).

Another approach investigates criminal behavior in non-market structures. It
has been pointed out (e.g. Clark and Felson, 1993) that for certain types of crimes
— like murder or shoplifting — the assumption of a demand side in most cases is
not realistic. Although the offender in these situations tries to gain a benefit from
her crime, there is no price or allocation of illegal goods. In these cases, RC-analysis
focuses on the relation between expected costs of crime and the situational
constraints. Besides consequences on situational design like special cars for women
in the subway, interesting predictions on a macro level can be derived: for example,
increasing female labor market participation may lead to higher rates of
housebreaking because houses and apartments are empty during the daytime.

A growing field of RC-applications is in the sociology of religion.  Contributions
to this topic are mainly based on two theoretical concepts: first, religion as market
behavior and, second, religion as human capital. Within both concepts, religious
behavior is often considered as a matter of individual choice based on cost-benefit
calculations (e.g. Iannaccone, 1995; Chaves, 1995; Durkin and Greeley, 1991). The
market approach focuses on religion as a marketable commodity which is
offered by religious entrepreneurs like churches or sects and consumed by the
worshippers (Iannaccone, 1988; Finke and Stark, 1988; see also Berger, 1967: Ch. 6). Such models usually contain the assumption that the demand for religion is
fairly constant and variations in religious behavior are due to variations of supply
of religious services (Finke et al., 1996: 203). The different level of religious behavior
between countries is a typical question related to this model. For the general
hypothesis that a higher extent of competition leads to a higher religious vitality,
national data indicating that the existence of a religious monopoly leads to less
demand for religious behavior. Stark (1992) shows on the basis of 45 Catholic
countries that Catholicism is weakest in the absence of religious competition.
Similarly, Chaves and Cann (1992) found for eighteen western countries a negative
relation between the level of religious regulation by the state and weekly church
attendance. Moreover, the results of Chaves et. al. (1994) indicate that the model is
also applicable to non-Christian churches. They found in eighteen predominantly
Christian countries a negative correlation between the level of stately regulations
and the frequency of pilgrimage to Mecca of Muslims which is interpreted as a
measure of devoutness.

The second concept of religion as human capital relies on the assumption that
religious actors make investments concerning their religious behavior which are
lost if religious beliefs are abandoned. Moreover, such investments often lead to
more knowledge about the consumed commodity and therefore to a higher utility
(Iannaccone, 1990). Hence the character of these investments in one’s religious
denomination, which are mainly subject of socialization (Greeley, 1998), yields a
tendency to consume more of this good in the future (Becker, 1996). A possible
hypothesis derived from this model is that a conversion between particular religious
groups is more likely if the groups are similar (see Iannaccone, 1990: 300–301 for
details and empirical evidence). Another consequence of the model concerns the
religious behavior of marriage partners: due to the higher amount of homogeneous religious human capital, spouses of the same religion can produce religious commodities more efficiently and should therefore show more religious participation than spouses with different faith (Iannacconne, 1990: 303–306).

References


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**Endnotes**

1. There are some convenient surveys of the main ideas these social thinkers contributed to modern social theory (Hayek, 1967; Schneider, 1967; Vanberg, 1974: Ch. 1; Muller, 1993; Levine, 1995: Ch. 7).
3. For the distinction between risk and uncertainty see e.g. Harsanyi (1977: Ch. 2).
4. For a survey concerning markets in economic and sociological theory see Swedberg (1994), with respect to RC-theory see Coleman (1994).
5. This corresponds with central ideas formulated by Granovetter (1973, 1985) who focused the “social embeddedness” of actors acting on markets. For rational choice explanations of these networks effects see Montgomery (1991, 1994).
6. See also the results in Brüderl et al. (1996).
7. Of course, the distinction between individual and corporative actors is only a heuristic one. The appropriate level of analysis depends on the kind of question and the methods used.
9. For this point see also the classification in Lichbach (1994).
10. However, threshold models cannot explain the decline and fluctuation of participation in the demonstrations subsequent to the overthrow of the last socialist government. Using a game theoretical model, Lohmann (1994) provides a more sophisticated explanation for rising and falling participation in the so-called Monday demonstrations in Leipzig in 1989.
11. A collection of empirical studies based on this model can be found in Cornish and Clarke (1986). More empirical evidence about the relevance of costs and benefits for criminal behavior can be found in Cameron (1988).
12. We are indebted to Andrew Greeley for important hints on this subject.
13. Such investments could be for example “the skills and experience specific to one’s religion include religious knowledge, familiarity with church ritual and doctrine, and friendships with fellow worshipers” (Iannaccone, 1990: 299).
14. Another explanation of this status quo concerning mobility among religious denominations is offered by Chaves and Montgomery (1996) who suggest that risk-aversive behavior and framing effects are responsible for this empirical fact.
Feminist Theory and Critical Reconceptualization in Sociology: The Challenge of the 1990s

Rhoda Reddock

There is no doubt that the re-emergence of feminism and the women’s movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s has had a significant impact on the discipline of sociology. Many of the earliest social science critiques took place within this discipline and sociologists continue to be major contributors to the development of feminist scholarship. The questions raised by early feminist critiques have to a large extent been accommodated by the discipline to one degree or the other. For example, introductory textbooks in sociology have been revised to include chapters on sociology of women or gender and new texts include such sections as a matter of course.

A. Introduction and Background

The establishment of Research Committee 32 — Women and Society within the International Sociological Association (ISA) in the 1970s, in response to demands by women sociologists is also testimony to the attempts by feminist and women sociologists to influence the course of the discipline. It is true however that the subsequent development of Women’s Studies and Gender Studies as independent interdisciplinary disciplines has to a large extent limited the influence of these new ideas on the mainstream of sociology. However there is still much resistance as many of our colleagues continue to teach as if this work and its critiques never took place. Misconceptions of what constitutes feminist sociology abound and in spite of the emergence of a large and vibrant scholarship, its overall impact on the discipline is questionable. Indeed in their 1985 article entitled “The Missing Feminist Revolution in Sociology”, Judith Stacey and Barrie Thorne argued that in comparison with some other disciplines, the potential for this significant paradigmatic shift in sociology was being lost (Stacey and Thorne, 1985).

One of the main achievements of feminist scholarship has been to develop a truly interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approach to knowledge creation. As
such, much of what in recent times has emerged as feminist scholarship cannot be directly seen as ‘sociology’ per se while much of it definitely is. However, the continued expansion of sociology in terms of content and method (as reflected in the ever-increasing list of research committees, working groups and thematic groups in the ISA), opens up new possibilities for incorporating many of the new theoretical and epistemological insights and developments which continue to emerge from the expansion of feminist scholarship.

B. The Emergence of A Feminist Sociology

As noted by Helen Roberts (1981), even prior to the 1960s and early 1970s, evidence of women sociologists’ concern with women’s issues within sociology was evident. In the case of the United Kingdom, she points for example to the classic work of Myrdal and Klein, Women’s Two Roles, published in 1954 along with a number of other studies which preceded it. One early contribution of the new period was Constantina Safilos-Rothschild’s collection Toward a Sociology of Women which included a number of empirical studies on what at that time was loosely referred to as sex roles (Safilos-Rothschild, 1972). It was in 1974 however that two of the most influential feminist critiques of sociology emerged, Ann Oakley’s The Sociology of Housework, and Dorothy Smith’s initial essay, “Women’s Perspective as a Radical Critique of Sociology”.

According to Ann Oakley the invisibility of women in sociology, was a ‘structural weakness’, which put into question the validity of its knowledge. From very early therefore she recognised that simply ‘adding women’ to existing analysis would not solve the problem. As she pointed out:

Male orientation may so colour the organisation of sociology as a discipline that the invisibility of women is a structural weakness, rather than simply a superficial flaw. The male focus incorporated into the definition of subject areas reduces women to a side-issue from the start.... (Oakley, 1985: 4).

In other words, women can be ‘put back’ into sociology, and to a certain extent, our view of what constitutes valid sociological knowledge can be reconstituted to take account of new work on gender differentiation and social structure, but how far would this affect the mainstream theoretical and methodological basis of the subject? This weakness in sociology, according to Oakley, could be traced to the following three influences.

B.1. Its Origins

It is accepted that Sociology owes its origins to the writings and thought of five or six European men of whom according to Oakley only Marx and Weber held emancipated views on women. The others were sexist and lived in a sexist period of nineteenth-century European history.
B.2. It was a Male Profession

Until recently sociology was to a large extent a predominantly male profession. The majority of our textbooks have been written by men and in many parts of the world sociologists are still predominantly male. A 1972 study quoted by Oakley noted that women were under-represented as full professors, editors of journals, and in sociological publications. Much has probably changed since then in that students of sociology are increasingly female, but men still dominate teaching and research positions in most parts of the world.

B.3. The Ideology of Gender

A strong ideology of gender roles, not subject to empirical investigation, which underlies sociology. Whereas other aspects of the social reality were studied, this was not the case in relation to common-sense understandings of gender roles or gender stereotypes. These were uncritically accepted and reflected in the one area of sociology where women were visible, Sociology of the Family. Whereas sociologists warned against common-sense understandings in other areas they did the same when it came to the matters of women and gender. In particular there was the underlying assumption and acceptance of biological determinism, the gendered character of social, political and economic realities, thus negating the need for social research. Following on from this, Oakley argued for an expansion of the content and orientation of existing areas of sociological inquiry e.g. work and industry, crime and deviance, social stratification etc. to include issues related to women and gender differentiation for example, ‘housework’ in relation to the sociology of work.

For her part Dorothy Smith took her critique in a different direction, one which she still holds today (Smith, 1987). Contrary to Oakley she held no brief for the traditional areas of sociological work, which she argued were defined by male principles and interests. In 1974, and later in 1987, she argued that as far as women sociologists accepted that perspective, they were in the process alienating themselves from their own personal experiences. The new Sociology of and for Women she posited should be based on and organized around the lived experiences of women; the social world which women inhabit: their experiences as mothers, their work routines, their bodies and the rites of passage which govern their lives. Women’s experiences she argues, do not conform to the analytical categories developed by sociologists who tend to impose an order and a structure in their sociological expression which is at odds with the lived experience of women in particular and people in general. In constructing this new sociology of women she suggests that the entire organization of sociological discourse had to be questioned, along with its place in the world and the social relations organizing the positions of its subjects which is concealed by its objectification (Smith, 1987).
C. The Influences of Socialist-Feminism

Along with these direct critiques of sociology, then as now, the wider debates of the feminist movement and of women’s studies also influenced and were influenced by feminist sociology. In particular the developments in socialist-feminist theorizing based on critiques and reconceptualizations of the work of Marx, Engels, Lukacs, Rosa Luxembourg, Franz Fanon, Walter Rodney and other socialist and socialist-oriented writers. Key concepts in feminist studies owe much to the work of these scholars. Examples of these include the concept ‘gender’ already used by Oakley and others but developed more comprehensively by the work of the Subordination of Women Workshop of the University of Sussex (1976) which presented that now classic but contentious differentiation between ‘biological sex’ and ‘social gender’ (Young, 1988). They argued for the use of the term ‘gender’—a social construction, as opposed to ‘sex’ a biological construction, as politically more useful because social gender could be changed while biological sex was unchangeable.

The domestic labour debate, the work of the Wages for Housework campaign, and the work of the Bielefeld School of Subsistence production, also owe their origin to socialist-feminist theorizing of different genres. This has resulted in the policy-oriented demands for the recognition of unwaged work in national calculations of GNP, an issue of continued interest to the international women’s movement. Socialist-feminist work on waged work and labour history, has also contributed greatly to a redefinition of the sociology of work and industry, such as the recognition of other forms of ‘unwaged work’, the sexual division of labour, and the critique of the masculinized notion of ‘the worker’.

Methodologically also, claiming Dorothy Smith’s (1974) identification of a standpoint of Women as their starting point, socialist-feminists contributed to the development of feminist standpoint epistemology and theory which is once more under debate today (SIGNS, 1997). This will be explored in more detail later on.

D. The Black Feminist Critique

The Black feminist critique in the United Kingdom and the United States has also been an important contributor to contemporary feminist sociology. This critique pre-figured many of the debates on difference and essence which are central to feminist discourse today. Yet it has been quite a struggle to incorporate these ideas into mainstream feminist discourse.

In the 1970s, black, third world and women of colour, based primarily in North America and the United Kingdom, began a continuous critique of what was seen as mainstream (read white) feminist theory and practice. To summarize, it was argued that mainstream feminism was ethnocentric in that it excluded the experience of non-white women and nevertheless put forward generalized theories of ‘women’s experiences’. Further they noted that in recognizing gender as a key factor in shaping women’s experience, other factors such as race/ethnicity, nationality and to a lesser extent class were ignored. When these and other critiques were acknowledged by the mainstream, it was found that they were seen as separate from and not part of
the general experience of women. When racism became acknowledged within mainstream feminist theorizing it was still regarded as something which only affected black women and women of colour but was largely irrelevant to the experiences of white women. As noted by Evelyn Higginbotham, many feminists were unable to separate their whiteness from their womanness or to see that they too had an ethnic identity which defined their experience as women (Higginbotham, 1996: 7).

Interestingly after many years there is the emergence of a scholarship on ‘whiteness’ as ethnicity in the United States. One of the earlier of such works was Peggy McIntosh’s (1986) comparing the similarities between White privilege and Male privilege based on her own life experiences. Other scholars in what is today referred to as Critical White Studies, reflect on the combination of white privilege with male privilege and the contemporary challenges to its hegemony and the responses to these challenges (Delgado and Stefancic, 1997).

In their classic work This Bridge called my Back, Cherrie Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa summarized the concerns of U.S. women of colour in these words:

how visibility/invisibility as women of color forms our radicalism; 2) the ways in which Third World women derive a feminist political theory specifically from our racial/cultural background and experience; 3) the destructive and demoralizing effects of racism in the women’s movement; 4) the cultural, class and sexuality differences that divide women of color; 5) Third World women’s writing as a tool for self-preservation and revolution; and 6) the ways and means of a Third World feminist future (Moraga and Anzaldúa, 1983: xxiv).

During the 1980s and 1990s a consistent scholarship developed in this area and the effects of this on mainstream feminist theory are now being felt. These concerns as suggested earlier have been placed in sharp relief with the pre-eminence of post-structuralist and post-modernist thought in contemporary scholarship in the humanities and social sciences. The emergence of the concept of ‘difference’ first brought forward by black feminists and further emphasized by post-structuralist philosophers has provided one of the major contemporary challenges for feminist theory and sociology in the 1990s.

In general therefore sociology in general and feminist sociology in particular on the eve of the 1990s, was already being shaped by a number of discourses. To these we can also add the wider criticisms of sociology as being European and North American centric accepting the hegemony of Euro-American behaviours, patterns, theorizing and modes of thought by which other populations were measured. Suffice it to say that these critiques formed the basis for the opening-up of new subject areas for study, exploration and research. But just as importantly, serious questions related to epistemology and methodology also emerged.

E. Feminist Methodology and Epistemology

Feminists raised questions as to whether a specifically feminist method was possible; whether what was necessary were actually new techniques and methods or simply new approaches and epistemological principles (McCarl Nielsen, 1990). To some
extent both have taken place. New approaches to empiricism emerged as well as ‘post-empirical’ (McCarl Nielsen, 1990) approaches to hermeneutics and interpretative sociology. Social history and literary analysis were also reconfigured. But one of the most important developments was the emergence of what has been termed feminist standpoint theory/epistemology.

Feminist standpoints were identified as locations from which feminists experienced and understood the world. Locations which provided them with the possibility of understanding both their own world as well as that of their oppressors; a double vision which was not available to the dominant group. In many ways this understanding was prefigured in the classic work of W.E.B. Dubois *The Souls of Black Folk*, where he identified the *double consciousness* which black people in the United States developed in order to understand and survive in a hostile environment (Dubois, 1961):

> One ever feels his twoness — an American, a Negro: two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder (Dubois, 1961: 17).

As noted by Joyce McCarl Nielsen, feminist standpoints begin but do not end with women’s experiences (McCarl Nielsen, 1990: 24). Feminist standpoint theory injected a political value into the experience of knowledge creation; Feminist standpoints became identified with the standpoints of other oppressed or subordinated groups. It was seen as a basis for a struggle for social justice and political transformation. In a recent essay, Sandra Harding (1997) identifies the emergence of feminist standpoint theory as ‘an idea whose time had come’ as many of the authors whose names have subsequently become associated with it: Smith, Harstock, Jagger, Rose and Harding herself had been working independently and unaware of each others work. As she explains:

> It was a project ‘straining at the bit’ to emerge from feminist social theorists who were familiar with Marx’s Engle’s (sic), and Lukac’s writings on epistemology, the potential parallels Hartstock so incisively delineates between the situations of ‘proletarians’ and of ‘women’ in thinking about relations between and knowledge began to leap off the page... (Harding, 1997: 389).

F. The Feminist Critique of Development

In addition to the impact of feminist sociology on theory and epistemology, it is important to also explore its relationship to social policy and practice. One area where this has been significant has been in the area of development policy where the issue of women/gender and development has been an important aspect of the sociology of development and of development policies and practice emanating from it. In the late 1970s and 1980s, in the context of the United Nations Decade for Women, a major new field of social policy intervention developed around interventions primarily in countries of the economic south — Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean.
While ostensibly emerging from the feminist critique of development, different strands of this discourse and its practice ranged from simply uncritical interventions which left unchallenged the sexual division of labour, and the unequal international division of labour; to others which sought to empower women and transform hierarchical gender relations. In many instances a new north-south relationship of hegemony was instituted, where women/gender and development experts mainly from the North, developed policy for and intervened on behalf of ‘subordinated’ women of the South.

A significant concurrent development was the critique of development as neo-colonial imperialism by Third World feminists located in the Economic South which drew on their own experience of gendered subordination in the post-colonial world (Sen and Grown, 1985: Shiva, 1988). Unfortunately with these two exceptions, this Third World scholarship is relatively unknown and very much on the margins of international feminist scholarship, a reflection of the continued hegemony of Euro-American scholarship in general and in feminist scholarship in particular.

G. The Challenge of the 1990s

The challenges to feminist theory in the 1990s have been many. These have to be examined in the context of international economic and social developments of that period. The 1990s marked a severe departure from the situation of the 1970s and early 1980s. Among the factors contributing to the changed social context were: the collapse of then existing socialism characterized by the fall of the Berlin wall, the break up of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War; the resulting ‘triumphalist’ primacy of economic neo-liberalism emphasizing private initiative; individualism and the hegemony of the market. All this has had deleterious effects on income distribution, employment and social welfare provisions.

The present period is one which is marked by increasing poverty on the one hand and increased accumulation of wealth on the other. The decline of the promise of socialism and of modernization has caused a retreat to group loyalties based on religious fundamentalism, race and ethnicity and nationality and a decline in the importance of organizations based on other forms of solidarity such as trade unions.

It is in this context, that we should examine one of the major epistemological challenges facing feminist scholarship — the deconstruction of the concept ‘woman’ and its implications for sociology as well as the challenge to make feminist theory and feminist sociology more truly international than it is at present.

H. The De-essentializing of the concept ‘woman’

The realization that women’s experiences and identities were multiple, constituted by intersecting, at times contradictory variable[s] has been one of the most creative insights of the last decades of feminist theorizing (Wieringa, 1995: 9–10). While it is true that anthropological scholarship for decades had recognized the cross-cultural diversity of people’s experience and the variability in women’s
roles and statuses this was not always evident in the main theorizing of the early years and certainly less so in sociology. It is ironic that this theorizing which struggled on the margins for so many years to be heard, can now be heralded for forcing one of the significant paradigmatic shifts in mainstream feminist theorizing. These efforts by black feminists were no doubt supported by the efforts of other groups such as lesbian and disabled women which argued quite legitimately for a recognition of the multiple experiences of women and the inability of isolating any ‘woman’ separate from other identities of race/ethnicity, class, age, ability, nationality and sexuality among others (Spelman, 1988).

A critical contributing factor was the widespread influence, coming from literary theory of various strands of post-structuralist and post-modernist thought. By challenging the legitimacy of the mainstream category of ‘woman’, black and ‘women of colour’ contributed to a process of deconstruction which was fulfilled by post-structuralist challenges to the validity of the female subject. This challenge was part of a larger challenge to the concept of the human subject per se as having any essential identity or authentic core which was natural. De-essentializing was a major component of post-structuralist discourse which supported the black feminist ideas of diversity, multiplicity and difference as opposed to some singular gendered essence. Critiques of essentialism also looked at concepts of race, ethnicity and nation as well as more abstract reifications like ‘the economy’. It is interesting therefore to note that this aspect of the black feminist critique became very much part of the mainstream discourse in the 1990s while other aspects remain on the margins.

The hegemony of post-structuralist thought in the late 1980s and early 1990s coincided with the end of the Cold War and all that that meant politically. Old political categories like old political theories notably marxist and neo-marxist ones, were delegitimized. As noted by Susan Hekman in relation to standpoint theory:

> Several developments in the late 1980s have led to this declining influence. First the inspiration for feminist standpoint theory, Marxism, has been discredited in both theory and practice. Second, feminist standpoint theory appears to be at odds with the issue that has dominated feminist debate in the past decade: difference. Third, feminist standpoint theory appears to be opposed to the most significant influences in recent feminist theory: postmodernism and post-structuralism (Hekman, 1997: 342).

Increasingly in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the categories ‘woman’ and ‘women’ became problematic ones. Citing one example, Wieringa refers to Monique Wittig who in 1991:

> ... draws the ultimate consequence of deconstructing womanhood altogether. She asks herself what ‘is’ a woman? Does ‘woman’ exist? Her answer is that a ‘woman’ is just an ideological construct of male domination, that there is nothing ‘real’, essential about women, nor about men for that matter. In her view there is no such thing as a biological reality of the two sexes, constructed as they are by patriarchy (Wittig cited in Wieringa, 1995: 11).
While some scholars accepted the post-modernist thesis of the impossibility of identifying any such category, the academic feminist project of the 1990s, especially in North America, became that of preserving a non-essentialized category of ‘women’ as a basis for a continued feminist politics. In other words, rather than feminist politics being a means for diverse women to actualize their vision and political aspirations, preserving the category ‘women’ became a necessity to keep open a space for feminist politics and feminist scholarship. The problematic had indeed been turned on its head. As noted by a number of writers:

If gender is simply a social construct, the need and even the possibility of a feminist politics becomes immediately problematic. What can we demand in the name of women if ‘women’ do not exist and demands in their name simply reinforce the myth that they do? How can we speak out against sexism as detrimental to the interests of women if the category is a fiction? (Alcoff, 1989: 306).

Feminist politics evaporates, that is without some conception of women as a social collective. Radical politics may remain as a commitment to social justice for all people, among them those called women. Yet the claim that feminism expresses a distinct politics allied with anti-imperialism, anti-racism and gay liberation but asking a unique set of enlightening questions about a distinct axis of social oppression cannot be sustained without some means of conceptualizing women and gender as social structures (Young, 1996: 164).

The attempts to deal with this philosophical problem have taken many forms, all based on some form of complex social constructionism, a conceptual development which should be of much interest to sociologists whose raison d’etre has always been the emphasis on the social over the natural. A fear of descent into essentialism characterizes all these approaches. The dilemma as described by Alcoff (1989) following de Lauretis (1986), is constructed as one “between a post-structuralist genderless subject and a cultural feminist essentialised subject” (Alcoff, 1989: 313).

One attempt to find a way out of this dilemma as noted by Wieringa (1995), was that of de Lauretis. In Technologies of Gender (1987), de Lauretis conceptualizes gender as a product of discourse and of the meanings produced in the power constellation of discourse itself; as well as itself being a constructing process. Thus one not only ‘receives’ one’s gender identity within a given discourse, but also by assuming it, by enacting it, the categories such as men, women, gays and lesbians are created. Another attempt is that developed by Linda Alcoff in 1988/89 of ‘identity politics’. In this conceptualization, “the concept woman is defined not by a particular set of attributes but by a particular position” or positionality (Alcoff, 1989: 323). Gender for Alcoff therefore is not natural, biological, universal, a historical or essential but rather is a position from which feminists can act politically (Alcoff, 1989: 323).

Other scholars argue that “an identity woman, that unites subjects into a group is not [a] natural or social given but rather the fluid construct of a political movement, feminism” (Young, 1996: 166). Further, as noted by Diana Fuss, “woman cannot name a set of attributes that a group of individuals have in common, ... there is not a single female gender identity that defines the social experience of womanhood, rather it is feminist politics itself which creates an identity ‘woman’ out of a coalition
of diverse female persons dispersed across the world” (Fuss, 1989: 36, cited in Young, 1996: 166). The problem here of course is that women exist outside of feminist politics so these approaches cannot account for this.

Clearly from the above it appears to me that feminist theory especially US feminist theory in the late 1990s has found itself in a sort of dead end. On the one hand, as noted by Linda Alcoff following de Lauretis: “the contradiction of feminist theory itself, is that it is at once excluded from discourse and imprisoned within it.” This can also be posited for the female subject — “at once excluded from discourse and imprisoned within it” (cited by Alcoff, 1989: 312).

All the efforts cited above and the many others, to a large degree tend to further imprison the female subject and feminist theory further within a discourse which in turn runs the risk of excluding them once more. Interestingly just at the time when the category ‘woman’ was being accepted into the mainstream it became de-legitimized first by social constructionist theory and later by post-structuralist theory. These philosophical debates also took place at a time when the women’s movement was facing a significant backlash and when economic neo-liberalism and religious fundamentalism were removing many of the gains made by women in the 1970s and early 1980s. There is no doubt that these critiques were useful in developing a more sophisticated analysis of gender relations, but it is possible that this line of theoretical exploration has reached its end. This point is strengthened when black and third world feminists no longer see post-structuralist thought as an ally but rather as a foe. By de-legitimizing any ‘natural’ basis to be a human subject, other subjectivities be they race, colour, age, sexuality, ability etc. are also called into question. So what initially was seen as supporting their call for multiplicity, diversity and difference is now seen as ‘throwing out the baby with the bathwater’ so to speak. This is highlighted by Alexander and Mohanty (1996) who note that “Postmodernist discourse... in dissolving the stability and analytic utility of the categories of race, class, gender and sexuality. This strategy forecloses any valid recuperation of these categories or the social relations through which they are constituted. If we dissolve the category of race, for instance, it becomes difficult to claim the experience of racism” (Alexander and Mohanty, 1996: xvii).

The fear of essentialism has characterized feminist theory especially certain sections of socialist-feminist theory from its inception. Biology and definitions into nature had been used to justify women’s subordination for so long that feminists developed a healthy mistrust of it. Cultural feminist formulations such as those of Adrienne Rich and Mary Daly were seen as constructing and reinforcing essentialisms which imprisoned some women and excluded the reality of others. This strong fear was transformed into something worse in the last decade. The mere mention of the criticism --- essentialist was enough to end any argument or cause a hasty denial.

It may be time therefore to reconsider this position. This dilemma has probably bogged us down in yet another dualistic quagmire characteristic of all of those which we have identified before viz: culture/nature; social/natural; gender/sex. As I have noted for many years and as stated by Sandra Harding - a clean separation between sex and gender is hardly possible. Is it possible to separate the biological from the social aspects of our “sexual identities, practices and desires” (Harding,
Feminist Theory and Critical Reconceptualization in Sociology

1992: 351). While it is true that in feminist theorizing we have moved beyond vulgar biological determinism as natural determinants of human behaviour. Yet it would be foolish to deny the existence of an entire other area of human knowledge and experience, that of biology and the related areas of study.

Maybe the challenge for social science scholarship in the 1990s is to move beyond our disciplinary boundaries and interact and collaborate with the natural scientists in comprehending the complexities of our gendered human reality. In so doing as suggested by Harding (1992) we can then challenge the unmodified biological determinism which continues to flourish in those fields without feminist social science intervention.

Saskia Wieringa (1995) goes one step further in calling for a rapprochement between constructivism/constructionism and essentialism. She notes that while constructivism was a major step forward both theoretically and politically, over essentialism. Essentialism itself should not be reduced to biological reductionism. In a later work, she refers to the work of Birke and Vines (1987) feminist biologists who worked on the interaction of social phenomena with biological phenomena. They suggest that this relation far from being static as feared by early social constructionists, is dynamic and transformative in relation to both social contexts and physiological characteristics:

... they suggest we should think of ‘transformative processes’. In this way the social may be seen as providing the niches in which the biological is acted out. But those niches in turn are constructed in a dialogue with psycho-biological factors. It should be realised that psycho-biological factors can never be studied directly, they are always socially mediated. (Wieringa, 1995: 146).

It should be recalled that in the original conceptualization of the term ‘gender’ the scholars of the social relations of gender school of Sussex argued that the use of the term gender as a social construction in contrast to sex, which was a biological construction, was politically more useful as social gender could be changed while biological sex was unchangeable. As noted by Harding (1992) however, recent evidence suggests that we may have to rethink that formulation, for while we are witnessing startling changes in medical technologies and through ecological disasters; long-standing problems of sexism, racism and classism seem to be particularly resistant and difficult to change. She nevertheless fails to make the bold step and concludes that in spite of the fact that these divisions between culture and gender and sex and gender are empirically false “we cannot afford to dismiss them as irrelevant as they continue to structure our lives and consciousness” (Harding, 1992: 353).

In this critical re-thinking of essentialism, feminists can once more reclaim their bodies not as natural objects but as canvases on which society, including feminists as social actors enscribe and negotiate meaning. This approach would provide men also with the options to re-write their bodily scripts in the ongoing context of the struggle to re-negotiate and transform power relations. Gender then would emerge as suggested by Dorothy Smith through the differential ways in which women, men and others of diverse ethnicities, classes etc. experience their bodies and embodied lives in a social and historical context.
I. Contributions to Feminist Theorizing: a View from the South

As noted earlier, contributions to mainstream feminist scholarship from the South have been limited. As a result what has been termed an international scholarship may more correctly be regarded as the globalization of a hegemonic Euro-American scholarship. Caribbean feminist scholarship for example has a great deal to offer for a number of reasons. For example some of the earliest sociological research was carried out in this region especially in the area of population and demography, sociology of the family, social stratification and plural society and applied sociology/social administration. Indigenous male scholars such as George Roberts, Lloyd Braithwaite and M.G. Smith have contributed to sociology at a wider international level especially in the 1960s, however since that time, the heavy concentration on empiricist work in the Anglophone Caribbean has limited its international appeal.

In the area of feminist sociology, for many years that too tended to be quite empiricist. Building on the rich experience of demography and quantitative sociology in the region especially located in the Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) of The University of the West Indies, the first major collaborative research exercise, the Women in the Caribbean Research Project (WICP) generated a base of empirical data on women’s livelihoods, emotional support and power and authority.

As a multietnic region where the indigenous peoples were almost decimated and where European settlers and investors derived profits from forced labour systems using indigenous and later other imported labourers. Complex systems of social stratification based on race/ethnicity, colour, class and gender - the result of years of plantation agriculture and its attendant migrations - forced and voluntary emerged. Not surprisingly therefore, sociological theories of stratification and plural society, precursors of contemporary understandings of difference have always been significant.

I.1. Towards a Caribbean Feminist Theory of Difference

While as we saw earlier, a vast scholarship on the interrelationship of race/ethnicity, class and gender emerged internationally, this has centred on the experience of black women and ‘women of colour’ in North America and Europe and to a lesser extent South Africa. Little has so far been contributed from post-colonial immigrant societies such as Fiji, Malaysia, Mauritius, Singapore or indeed the regions of the Caribbean (Reddock, 1994).

In a recent paper (Reddock, 1997) I sought to contribute to the feminist understandings of ‘difference’ as it was experienced in the Caribbean situation where the main axis of conflict is not today between ‘white women’ and their ‘others’, but among women and people of colour themselves. Interestingly this context of contestation occurs in a historical context where racial and ethnic stereotypes were largely defined by the European colonialists but continue to influence inter-ethnic relations today. As noted by Brackette Williams in relation to Guyana (former British Guiana):
There is ample evidence to suggest that in Guiana subordinated ethnic segments accepted European cultural domination in practice and consistent with Bartels’s conclusion, utilized racial stereotypes derived from this elite stratum to compete for and to justify their rights to certain economic and political benefits. This image was reinforced by formal and informal administrative policies that encouraged group competition and a notion that political representation along ethnic lines was essential to protect the interests of the different groups (Williams, 1991: 159).

Over the period of the 1990s, in a largely uncoordinated way, a number of anglophone Caribbean scholars have contributed to what I see as an emerging discourse on Difference and Feminism relevant to this sub-region. In so doing, the theorizing which has emerged is relevant not only for this region but for similar post-colonial societies as well as for countries in the North.

In 1991 for example, Gemma Tang Nain, rejected what she saw as the divisiveness of Black feminism in North America and the United Kingdom, suggesting that its re-conceptualization as an anti-racist feminism may be more appropriate. In this article she argued that in the Caribbean’s post-colonial context, although economic control was still to a large extent in the hands of white men, both local and foreign, political power had shifted from white men to black men (and in some cases, one could add today to Indian men). Women had no part in this equation and therefore Caribbean women had not found it necessary to divide feminism into black and white (Tang, 1991: 1).

For her part, Rawwida Baksh-Soodeen, while noting that the post-colonial feminist discourse in the Commonwealth Caribbean had been largely what she terms an afrocentric one (Baksh-Soodeen, 1993: 25), also posits that in spite of the real cultural differences among feminists of different ethnic and religious groupings, the larger tradition of anti-colonial struggle based on the commonalities within the different experiences of the plantation, slavery and indentureship, provide a common base from which to collaborate, and a greater basis for a multicultural feminist platform (Baksh-Soodeen, 1993).

Another worthwhile contribution to this discourse comes from Patricia Mohammed (1994) who in a socio-historical study of Indians in Trinidad argued quite successfully for a system of competing patriarchies operating simultaneously since the colonial period. Mohammed like Tang Nain, focuses on the competitions among males for political power and hegemonic control as being the defining characteristic of the Trinidad and Tobago patriarchal order, an understanding which no doubt has resonance elsewhere. This context she notes is one where:

... the patriarchal context as it existed in Trinidad in 1917 was that of a competition among males of different racial groups, each jostling for power of one sort or the other — economic, political, social status and so on. In the face of a hegemonic control by the white group and another kind of dominance by the ‘Creole’ population, the contestation was both a definition of masculinity between men of different races, and for Indian men to retrieve a ruptured patriarchy from the ravages of indentureship and thus be better placed to compete in this patriarchal race (Mohammed, 1994: 32).

This analysis therefore as it develops puts a new slant on the understanding of gendered power relations and ethnic differentiation among groups, especially
historically subordinated groups. As feminist scholars have noted for some time, ethnic struggles have usually been defined in masculinist terms as struggles for the reclamation of manhood, against emasculation etc. In this process women have both colluded with their men in the interest of the group and/or have struggled against the definitions of place and culture which this process has assigned to them. For my part, I argue that feminist conceptualizations of difference, especially those coming from the Anglophone Caribbean need to be quite different from masculinist ones. They also tend to be different from those in the North in that they highlight the interconnectedness among women as well as the separateness and so provide a basis for collective social action. In conceptualizing difference in the Caribbean, I note that in the colonial context, the groups had been defined in opposition to each other. Women especially have been ‘othered’ in relation to each other to stress group differences, often within the context of historical stereotypes. It can be argued therefore that our understanding of difference has to be one which shows the ways in which our contrasted definitions construct the ‘other’ within ourselves. As noted in a previous publication:

In conceptualizing a theory of difference for the Caribbean therefore, it is not enough to simply celebrate diversity. We need to isolate the ways in which the constructed differences have contributed to how we have conceptualised ourselves. Difference in the Caribbean therefore can be a mechanism for showing interconnectedness. In other words, the long-term project of a feminist understanding of difference would not be simply to come to terms with the other but rather to understand the other within ourselves as we have in many ways been defined in opposition and in relation to each other (Reddock, 1997: 12).

What is interesting here is that in contrast to Northern discussions of difference among feminists, the Caribbean discussion clearly identifies men of competing ethnicities as very much implicated in these processes. The Northern discourse focussed primarily on women and their relations to each other outside of their relations to men. This brings us to the other area where Caribbean scholarship may contribute to international theorizing in sociology and feminist studies.

I.2. Theorizing Manhood and Masculinity in the Caribbean: a Beginning

Increasingly within this region and internationally, the theorizing of masculinity and manhood and its relationship to femininity and womanhood has become an important component of feminist theorizing. Although it is recognized and indeed stressed that men also need to be part of this process. The issue of masculinity therefore will be a serious intellectual challenge for feminists, men’s studies scholars and hopefully sociologists in the 21st century. The significance of this in the Caribbean region, can be attributed to a number of historical factors characteristic of the Anglophone Caribbean. For example, Afro-Caribbean family forms (in common with other New World Afro-American communities) which deviated significantly from the accepted Euro-American conjugal forms, generated a wide range of sociological, anthropological and social-psychological analyses since the 1940s. These forms were
at various points in the literature described ‘matricentric’, ‘mother-centered’, ‘matrifocal’, ‘matrilocal’, ‘matristic’, and ‘denuded’. In other words, all the studies shared a concern with what was seen as the unusually important ‘role’ of women and the relatively ‘marginal’ role of men especially within lower-class families.

In the 1980s a new discourse on male marginality emerged, led by Errol Miller (1986; 1992) who argued that colonial policy had facilitated the elevation of women over men due to the colonialists fear of black men. This resulted in a situation where black men were increasingly educationally and economically marginalized in the Anglophone Caribbean. This thesis, concretized the concerns by many men over the apparent improvement in women’s status and their willingness to act autonomously and challenge accepted forms of male privilege. This concern was fueled by women’s predominance in institutions of higher learning and representation in the higher echelons of the public sector, a situation often contrasting with young male criminality and violence. The fact that the reality of the majority of women continues to be dismal is of little relevance here.

In addition to this masculinist discourse however, a pro-feminist men’s movement and a scholarship on men and masculinity with female and male contributors is slowly emerging. A recently concluded sociological study on gender socialization among males for example, found that far from being marginal fathers, Afro-Caribbean men fulfilled the requirements of fatherhood perceived as required of them in this cultural context and fulfilled other requirements as their mothers’ sons. These requirements however were minimal. Men were therefore not marginal to this type of family but integral to this particular form. This new approach to Caribbean family and the gender relations within it, is finally based on a recognition that Caribbean families are not deviant forms of some overarching norm, but have an internal dynamic which needs to be understood on its own terms if it is to be challenged.

J. Conclusion

This chapter sought to do three things. First it sought to give a broad panoramic overview of developments in feminist sociology over the last two decades internationally. Second it examined one of the key theoretical and epistemological challenges facing feminist theorizing in the 1990s, the deconstruction and reconstruction of the concept ‘woman’. Third, using the example of a small sub-region of the world, the Anglophone Caribbean, it tried to show how the hegemonic international discourse could benefit from insights being developed in other parts of the world.

It would have been impossible in this single article to encompass all of the richness and diversity of feminist sociological scholarship which contest today. In concluding, some of the other issues which should be on the agenda for the 21st century include the following: the interdisciplinary concern with the environment and ecology, much of this work coming from eco-feminists in the social and natural sciences; works on gender identity with an emphasis on formerly ‘hidden’ categories including old and new forms of transgender identities, bringing once more to the fore that contentious relationship between the social and the biological. Issues of
race, class, nationality and citizenship will continue to be on the agenda with the continued contestations of nationalist, ethnic and religious social movements; the feminist critique of science will be an important meeting ground for sociologists of science and for natural and physical scientists as disciplinary barriers continue to be challenged and finally the future of feminism as an international social movement will continue to be a concern for scholars and activists alike in the context of various forms of backlash and the transfer to new generations of scholars and activists.

This was indeed a large task, one which could only be incomplete given the depth and breadth of the subject. It is hoped that rather than being a definitive statement, this paper would be seen as a basis for further discussion.

References


Endnotes


2. It should be noted that some scholars referred to ‘women’s standpoints’ which need to be differentiated from feminist standpoint theory.

3. I thank anthropologist Constance Sutton for this insight.

4. This refers to the UNICEF study coordinated by Janet Brown and Barry Chevannes on Gender Socialization in the Caribbean with special Reference to Male Socialization (Brown et al., 1993).
5 The Challenge of Modernity/Post-Modernity to the Classical Heritage in Sociology of Religion

Ivan Varga

The rapid changes that took place in the last decades of the 20th century had a deep impact on the religious landscape as well. The new phenomena present a double challenge to the sociology of religion: on the one hand, it has to review, refine and reinterpret the classical statements in order to assess their validity in contemporary society. On the other hand, it has to relate the changes in the religious situation to the overall transformations of society.

A. Transformations and challenges

The classic theorists of the sociology of religion, in the first place Émile Durkheim and Max Weber, developed the fundamental categorical system for the sociological study of religion, and the system of categories elaborated by them constitutes the basic discourse in sociology of religion. However, these are increasingly becoming the subject of critical considerations. The main thrust of the critique is that the classical discourse represents a Western, Eurocentric bias, therefore cannot take into consideration the social, cultural and religious dynamics of non-Western societies. In particular, the secularization theory (and amongst the contemporary theories the rational choice theory of religion) are in the crossfire of critics.

However, even the critics operate with the same concepts as the classic theorists, at best there are efforts to reinterpret their content or demonstrate their restricted validity. The classics, indeed, used a vast material from pre-modern societies but their main concern was either to establish a general theory of religion (Durkheim) or analyze the role of religion in different societies (in particular, Weber). Their overall aim was to develop theoretical insights into the role of religion in society, into the interrelations between religion and society, especially in modernity. This is understandable because sociology as a distinct discipline within social sciences is, indeed, a product of modernity. This does not mean that certain assumptions of the classics (e.g. whether modernization and secularization are concomitant phenomena)
cannot be questioned; others, however, are proven by empirical findings (e.g. the growing individualization of religion in modern societies). Yet others (e.g. the relationship between rationality and religiousness) require a more nuanced rethinking of the classics’ positions.

This essay attempts to assess the most relevant changes society underwent since the classics’ time as well as the developments in the post-classical sociology of religion with the aim to intimate at least the challenges contemporary society poses to this sub-discipline. Spatial restrictions do not allow us to review the classics’ contributions nor all efforts of modern sociologies of religion in explaining the new phenomena. I shall first give reasons why the concept “post-modernity” is applied; this will be followed by a discussion of some pertinent features of religion in post-modernity. Finally, some modern theories will be analyzed. As this essay does not aim at an all-encompassing analysis or even survey of the theories concerned, a selective approach will be applied.

B. Why Post-modernity?

I have chosen the concept post-modernity rather reluctantly. There is no consensus amongst sociologists (and they are not the only ones) whether this term makes sense or is just a passing fad. In fact, there is a bewildering array of the interpretations of the concept, ranging from outright rejection to enthusiastic acceptance, and even those who use this concept, attach different interpretations to it. The discussions whether one can speak of post-modernity or rather of ‘late’ modernity (cf. among others Hervieu-Léger, 1993; Gellner, 1992; Meštrović, 1992; Touraine, 1995; Giddens, 1990; Habermas, 1997) are not revolving around terminological issues. Rather, the conceptual differences touch upon the problems of rationality and upon the (even partial) success or failure of the Enlightenment project, the problem of progress and the nature of history, the nature of humanism, the role of the subject, morality and ethics, fixity and relativism and, last but not least, the nature and social role of religion.¹

I suggest considering post-modernity and post modern culture as a distinct phase in history. Of course, modernity and post-modernity cannot be radically separated from one another, that is, post-modernity does not entirely negate modernity. It rather preserves in an exaggerated form certain features of modernity, and at the same time transcends them. Therefore one can conceptualize post-modernity as an excess of modernity and the cultural expression of its crisis.² In that sense postmodernism³ could be viewed as a self-critique of modernity too.

Another argument for considering post-modernity not as a full break with modernity is that in modernity there were also counteracting tendencies to Enlightenment rationality. Wellmer (1985: 356) mentions the German Romantics, the young Hegel, Nietzsche, the early Marx, Adorno, the anarchists and a large part of modern art. However, the mature Hegel and Marx “prepare new triumphs for totalising reason” (1985: 356). Even more radical critics of postmodernism, like Alain Touraine (1995), acknowledge that it is the continuation of the devastating critique of the rationalizing model which begun with Marx, Nietzsche and Freud.
Still, it would be a simplification to view post-modernity as a mere enhancement of the features modernity developed. First of all, one ought to ask the question whether post-modernity is a rejection of (Western) rationality or rather the recognition of its limitations. The instrumental (purposive) rationality, as formulated by Weber, cannot be considered invalid, it did not disappear and cannot be eliminated from social life, mostly but not exclusively because of the preponderance of modern technology. It also permeated everyday life as well as interpersonal relations. However, as Weber foresaw it, instrumental rationality can turn against itself in everyday life, and there are signs that the proliferation of purposive rationality evokes a growing resentment and alienation. Later advances of technology elicit contradictory responses: on the one hand, it reinforces the feeling of powerlessness because technology becomes ever more reified and impervious to the average human being. This aspect has been emphasized by Heidegger (1977) who stated that technology reduces nature to an object of subordination and exploitation, and the consequences for the self-defining human being are detrimental. On the other hand, there is a belief that technology sooner or later will resolve the ills that befall on humanity or the individual; in other words, it assumes the role of a substitute religion.

A postmodern way of thinking about technology and the consequences of its increasing domination over the life-world does not reject the role of instrumental rationality but rather reveals its limitations. Postmodern philosophers emphasize the disappearing of the grand narratives, the universal discourses. These are the narratives that claim to explain nature, society and the subject. Religion, as a grand narrative retains its explanatory value but only for those who believe in it.

The demise of the grand narratives explains, among others, the enhanced plurality of world-views. This is not a uniquely postmodern phenomenon; it began with the advent of modernity. What is new, however, that followers of different ideas and world-views — even if their concepts stem from different, religious or this-worldly, subcultures — compete with one another and claim equal rights or general validity. The marketplace conquered the sphere of ideas as well. It would, however, be much too simplistic to focus exclusively on the marketplace in analyzing the consequences of pluralism brought about by modernity. As Peter Berger argued (1992: 67–70) pluralism has consequences for modern consciousness as well:

Cultural plurality is experienced by the individual, not as something external [...] but as an internal reality, a set of options present in his mind [...] The very phrase ‘religious’ preference [...] perfectly catches this fact: ‘The individual’s religion is not irrevocably given, a datum [...]; rather, religion becomes a choice, a product of the individual’s ongoing project of world- and self-construction. (1992: 67)

Choice gives freedom (or rather the illusion of freedom) for the individual. However, the limits of choice are often not recognized, and the individual frequently does not realize that he or she has to bear the onus of the consequences of a given choice. Nevertheless, there is a vast array of choices competing with one another. As a consequence, modern/postmodern identity becomes fluid, open-ended, incommensurably more than in earlier phases of modernity. The fleetingness mentioned by Baudelaire as well as by Marx (‘all that is solid melts in the air’) has undergone a significant change in post-modernity: while in modernity it could still
be claimed that there was a unity behind the fragmentation (Baudelaire still thought there was eternity behind fleetingness), postmodern societies celebrate diversity: in multiculturalism, plurality of religions, life-styles, identities, discourses. The fragmented group identity becomes the source of identity, and identities cut across customarily accepted lines. Thus, for example, ethnicity can become a more important determinant than class. Sexual orientation can clash with race, etc., etc. Therefore postmodern society could be analyzed more in clusters or matrix than in straight dividing lines.

Representations (and metaphors) became ever more partial or, to use Michel Maffesoli’s apt phrase, pulverized. Communities, in Tönnies’s meaning, have been eradicated by modernity, and in post-modernity became ‘new’ tribes. The neo-tribalism, a term coined by Maffesoli, is a constant search for identity (cf. Maffesoli in Bauman, 1991: 248). The tribes of the contemporary world “[...] are formed — as concepts rather than integrated social bodies — by the multitude of individual acts of self-identification” (Bauman, 1991: 249). They are unstable because they depend on the individual’s decision to adhere, to remain or to quit. (Incidentally, this characterizes many New Religious Movements and to a certain extent even mainstream churches and denominations). This, coupled by the general uncertainty, is characteristic to post-modernity. Bauman (1991: 237) describes this uncertainty as follows:

It is an entire different matter to live with the postmodern awareness of no certain exit from uncertainty; of the escape from contingency being as contingent as the condition from which escape is being sought. The discomfort such awareness brings about is the source of specifically postmodern discontents: discontent against the condition fraught with ambivalence, against the contingency that refuses to go away... [People who live under these conditions] find difficult to accept [...] that whatever they resolve to do would lack the comfort of having the truth, or the laws of history, or the unambiguous verdict of reason on its side.

The ambivalence, combined with the hitherto unknown acceleration of social processes — technological changes, social relationships, cultural mutations — puts the individual into a precarious position, namely, the loss of certainty is also felt as being in a constant upheaval fraught with risks over which the individual feels the loss of control. Ulrich Beck, who is not a postmodernist thinker, claims that risk is the most characteristic feature of contemporary society. He stated that “the calculus of risk exemplifies a type of ethics without morality, the mathematical ethics of the technological age” (1992: 99). Indeed, one can observe the spread of situational morality, that is, ethical justifications for a given behavior or decision based on pragmatic, practical considerations rather than on grounded principles.

Postmodern consciousness includes this uncertainty, ambivalence which is amplified by the fact that, as a consequence of the aforementioned factors, the personality can be more and more likened to a jigsaw puzzle whereby the individual has to carve out the pieces. Another feature of postmodern consciousness is the realization of crisis. The history of humankind was and is crisis ridden, and this is not a specificity of postmodernity. What is new and specific, is the consciousness of crisis, or at least a creeping, uncanny feeling (in the Freudian sense of Unbehagen) — a feeling of uncertainty.
It is telling that in Castel Gandolfo — in the papal summer residence, with the attendance of John-Paul II — in the mid-1980s one of the annual conferences was devoted to the problem of crisis. Noted philosophers and historians (among others Paul Ricoeur, Leszek Koakowski, Reinhard Koselleck) exchanged their views on the crisis. Ricoeur in his paper “Is ‘Crisis’ a Specifically Modern Phenomenon?” emphasized that the crisis of contemporary society is not a ‘crisis’ of history but rather of a socioeconomic system and emphasized that beyond the sphere of economy, ideology as well as the political system are in crisis. (Ricoeur, 1986: 39 and 48.)

The crisis of ideology, which can be extended to the field of culture, consists mainly of the distortion of value-structures or the hierarchy of values, by the proliferation of market ideology (Ricoeur, 1986: 53). He added that the ‘crisis’ consists of a dysfunction of the normally existing relationships between expectation and experience (1986: 57). Thus the taken-for-grantedness of the life-world becomes vulnerable and ever more questioned. It is therefore quite natural that the growing sense of crisis in people’s consciousness, the quest for stability, solidity, for the unchangeable is also growing.

Nietzsche stressed the loss of values, the devaluation of highest values, i.e. as Ricoeur interprets it, values linked to Christianity (1986: 61). He also denounced a-religious humanism as well because for Nietzsche it originated from the same values he himself intended to fight. Thus, Ricoeur concludes, “[A]s soon as modernity is equated with this humanism, ready to perish [untergangsreif], the modern crisis will be nothing else but the crisis of modernity itself” (1986: 60).

Ricoeur’s diagnosis, which is close to Bauman’s analysis, gives at least a partial explanation to the growth of evangelical, fundamentalist tendencies, spirituality and New Religious Movements, and the uncanny, diffused feeling of the crisis contributes to the spread of esoteric cults and movements, like ESP, New Age, satanism, wicca. As the 20th century came to its close, momentous changes took place in the socio-economic sphere that had important impacts on the cultural and religious field as well. The first such change to be mentioned is globalization. It does not occur amongst equal partners, contains and expresses unequal power relationships, both in economics and politics but also in culture. Albeit its influence in the cognitive and religious sphere is much discussed (cf. later in this chapter) globalization is undeniably a most important factor in contemporary society.

The collapse of the Soviet type societies and of the Soviet empire signalled a new historical phase, because it has repercussions for the entire world and not only for the countries that once belonged to the Soviet orbit. It stands to reason to say that the world has entered the period of post-communism. Within the ex-communist countries the restoration of the freedom of conscience and religion led to a revitalization of religion, albeit with different results and magnitude. One of the most unfortunate outcomes is an increasing identification of ethnicity and religion.

A further event, which has far-reaching consequences, is the entering of the developing societies as active, self-asserting players in the world arena. They are undergoing a more or less rapid process of modernization, and at the same time insist on keeping and strengthening their cultural and religious identity and resisting
the incursions of Western, mainly American, culture. This, of course, has important implications for the religious landscape too.

Modernity has been accompanied by increasing individualization that is only amplified in post-modernity. This affects the religious field too, as can be seen for instance in the so-called ‘do-it-yourself’ religiosity, the ‘believing without belonging’ phenomenon, etc. The weakening of traditional bonds (affiliation with traditional churches) can be observed also in the spread of New Religious Movements, in the growth of evangelical Protestantism in traditionally Catholic countries (e.g. in Latin America), in the incursion of Western Christian churches and sects into traditionally Orthodox territory (e.g. Russia), in the decline of mainstream Protestant churches in America and last but not least in the expansion of Islam in areas that formerly did not belong to its sphere of influence (e.g. Black Muslims in the USA).

C. Religion in Post-modernity

It is generally acknowledged amongst sociologists of religion that an observable revitalization of religion - or spirituality - is taking place. The phenomenal growth of evangelical Protestantism, in particular Pentecostalism, and of Islam is well known and documented. (It is perhaps less known that various fundamentalist groups, oriental religions and New Religious Movements are growing in the ex-Soviet countries as well.) The spread of New Religious Movements and New Age movements, the persistence of popular religion in many parts of the world, preoccupation with the self leading to the increasing interest in spirituality — these are all signs that the modern rationality, the ‘disenchantment’ are not dominant features of the postmodern consciousness.

The Italian philosopher, Gianni Vattimo, a noted representative of postmodern philosophy, has this to say about the above mentioned phenomenon:

the return of religion, very manifest in the common culture (as a demand, the new vitality of the churches and sects, as a search for parallel doctrines and practices: the fashion of the oriental religions, etc.), is basically motivated by the threat of certain general risks that seems to be new and without precedent in the history of humanity. (1996: 88)

In this context he also speaks of the “loss of the meaning (sense) of existence that seems inevitably to accompany the frantic consumption” (1996: 89). Vattimo spells out the sentiment shared by many contemporary sociologists as well. Kieran Flanagan, in the “Introduction” to Postmodernity, Sociology and Religion (1996) echoes similar themes. He emphasizes the worries, the “cultural angst, the ambiguity that are characteristic to our epoch”, to post-modernity.

We, contemporaries, witness a curious development: on the one hand, the incertitude, the ambiguity, the openness, the fluidity, and as a reaction to all these, a search for the stable, the predictable, something that is beyond this fickle world — be it the spirit or God. On the other hand, we are surrounded by technology, rational-bureaucratic organizations, experience the influence of forces (this-worldly ones) over which we feel we have no control and find oppressive and stifling. But
we use the technology and, as mentioned, often expect redemption from it. We want to assert our individuality, our self, but live under ever more standardized conditions. We want to escape the chaos and return to the cosmos — to the order, the stable meanings but also want to have a say in defining that meaning.

The traditional religion that claims to represent the truth, is still attractive to a great many people, but many others want to have a say in defining the truth for themselves. This, however, weakens the hold (or monopoly) of church-based religion. Thomas Luckmann, in his paper “The Privatization of Religion and Morality” talks of the end of the “institutionally specialized religion[s] monopolies or oligopolies in the production, distribution and maintenance of sacralized, transcendent universes” (1996: 72–3). But he adds: “The traditional religious orientations (at whose centre are social constructions of the great transcendences) have not disappeared. But their social distribution has become narrower [...]” (1996: 74).

We have an extremely ambiguous relationship to traditions: want them and reject them. The postmodern world is largely a de-traditionalized world but at the same time it experiences a large-scale resurgence of fundamentalism.

C.1. Fundamentalisms

Contemporary societies experience the resurrection of fundamentalist tendencies and movements. They expanded in all areas of the world, penetrated all religions, and some of its variations, e.g. Pentecostalism, are conquering large populations. The growth of Islamic, Jewish, Hindu and Christian fundamentalist movements are well documented, and the number of books on fundamentalism are multiplying. Many of the writings emphasize their political role in ethnic and global conflicts.

The political role and impact of fundamentalism cannot be underestimated; however, it cannot be reduced to politics. Fundamentalism is a cultural phenomenon as well. It is at the same time traditional and postmodern. Traditional, because its reference point is the holy text of the given religion, and their goal is to transform society according to the principles laid down in those texts. It is also postmodern because it is a reaction to the ambiguity and displacements caused by postmodern conditions, in particular by the relativization of normative contents of consciousness (cf. Berger, 1992: 68) and the spread of situational ethics. Nevertheless, it would be a simplification to hold all fundamentalist movements reactionary (in the literary sense of the word) or anti-modernizing. David Martin, in his book Tongues of Fire: The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America (1990), calls the attention to the fact that many Pentecostals are engaged in the modern(izing) sectors, and that their behaviour and values include elements of what Weber called Protestant ethic. Harvey Cox, in Fire from Heaven (1995) calls Pentecostalism a typically urban phenomenon, both in the USA and in Latin America. Vittorio Lanternari, in Dei Profeti Contadini (Gods, Prophets, Peasants, 1988), based on his research in Ghana, emphasizes that Pentecostalists turn against African traditions by forbidding polygamy and participation in traditional festivities.
None the less, fundamentalist movements reinforce traditions, thus counteract the de-traditionalization, so characteristic to modernity. In that, they fall in line with the postmodern backlash to modernity.

C.2. Globalization and Religion

The postmodern world is increasingly a globalized one. Apart from the already mentioned characteristics of globalization (unequal distribution of knowledge, power and wealth as well as increasing cultural domination), it also means that products of other cultures find their way to societies which did not give rise to them. But there is also the reality and perception of crisis that is increasingly worrying an ever larger circle of people. In particular, ecological issues, the danger to the environment, become more a global concern. Because of the ethical implications, e.g. which values should prevail: short or long term benefits (jobs now or sustainable development, sharing or profiting, etc.) they can, and do, preoccupy theologians (e.g. Hans Küng), and raise the questions whether religion can contribute to the solution of the problems.

Another problem is, whether there is a religious globalization, whether a global religion is emerging. Richard Roberts in his account on the second Parliament of World Religions, held in Chicago in 1993, suggests that “religion can be understood as a differentiated global resource, an ambiguous, yet dynamic form of ‘cultural capital’ of vital import in an era of post-materialist value formation” (Roberts, 1995: 122).

This understanding of religion as global resource ought to be distinguished from global religion insofar as it assumes the common interests and eventual collaboration of religions stemming from very different societies and representing a multitude of beliefs and institutions, from historical, mainstream churches in East and West alike, through New Religious Movements to native religions. This development, as Roberts emphasizes, has important consequences for a sociological understanding of religion’s role and place in the postmodern world (e.g. for the assessment of the secularization thesis). However, it does not account for the existence of a global religion or religious globalization.

Cultural globalization has been widely discussed in the recent years. The pioneering works of Roland Robertson, in particular Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture (1992), Featherstone’s Undoing Culture: Globalization, Postmodernism and Identity (1995), Featherstone-Lash-Robertson (eds.) Global Modernities (1995), the special issue of Theory, Culture & Society, published in book form as Featherstone (ed.), Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity (1990) are just a few examples. Without going into any details of these works, it is clear that globalizing culture evokes a localizing tendency as well, that is the assertion of the indigenous culture. This dichotomy has been expressed by Robertson in his neologism: “glocalization”.

But the problem remains, namely, whether the ideas, signs and symbols that are globally distributed — the so-called “macdonaldization” — do carry the same meanings for different cultures or else, is there a cognitive distance, cognitive
discrepancy, which allows different interpretations of the same ideas, signs and symbols. My opinion is that so far (and this leaves open future changes) the cognitive distance remains, and it diminishes only if and when the recipient societies approach the structure and culture of modernity.7

Peter Beyer, in his pioneering work, Religion and Globalization (1994) states that “[g]lobalization [...] is more than the spread of one historically existing culture at the expense of all others. It is also the creation of a new global culture with its attendant social structures, one which increasingly becomes the broader social context of all particular cultures in the world, including those of the West, and that the emergent ‘global culture’ cannot itself become a new overarching particularism because it would then be subject to the same relativization as its predecessors.” (1994: 9). Beyer (following Niklas Luhmann’s approach) applies the religious dichotomy: immanence/transcendence for explaining global religion as a forceful means to counteract the globalized totalizing power. He also questions whether the thesis of privatized religion could be fully applied to modern conditions, and concludes that the public functions of religion cannot be disregarded. This leads to the problem of secularization, a concept that has been under attack for a long time.

C.3. The Dilemma of Secularization

“In my view, secularization theory has been bankrupt for a long time” says Jeffrey Hadden in his Foreword to the new edition of Rodney Stark’s and W.S. Bainbridge’s book, A Theory of Religion (1996:7). The theory could, indeed, be declared bankrupt, would one conceive of it as a rectilinear process that accompanies modernization, that is, the abandonment of religion, at least in its institutionalized form.

The concept is contested, and contemporary sociologists of religion in their majority tend to abandon or reject the secularization thesis. James Beckford, for instance, emphasizes rather the secularization-sacralization dichotomy, thus accepting that religion lost many functions, at least in the public sphere but it does not exclude the possibility of a revival of religion albeit in changed forms and functions. However, one ought to consider, to what extent does religion maintain in a modern, increasingly pluralistic society the functions and the integrative role that it performed in pre-modern societies. Bryan Wilson, who is one of the staunchest defenders of the secularization theory, states that “’[s]ecularization’ relates to the diminution of the social significance of religion, and secularization means that process by which religious institutions, actions, and consciousness, lose their social significance” (1982: 149). Hence, secularization does not mean the disappearance of religion and while religion may not be significant in the working of the social order, “there might be other non-religious constraints which operate to hold men to religious institutions and to persuade them to go through the motions of religious rituals” (1982: 150.)

French sociologists of religion, following de Certeau’s distinction between religion and belief (croire) introduced a useful refinement to the problem. Danièle Hervieu-Léger considers the discussion on secularization already obsolete. She acknowledges the domination of formal rationality in modernity that crystallizes
the essentially material and obliterates from society the “ideal interests, specific to religion” (1993: 187 ff.) Weber’s position, says Hervieu-Léger, overcomes the narrowly rationalist point of view which in a mechanistic way links the end of religion to the unfolding of scientific and technological modernity. In principle it allows us to avoid entirely to confuse the reality of the decline of religious institutions in modern societies, and the elimination of religion as such from society. (1993: 188).

The decline of the institutionalized religion leads to the emergence and spread of a diffused religion — a theme explored by the Italian sociologist Roberto Cipriani. Diffused religion can be interpreted in two ways: literally, as a non-systematized, mostly vague set of beliefs, derived from traditional teachings which, however, in the mind of the believer does not correspond to the doctrinal body of the church into which they have been inducted. Diffused religion does not necessarily influence the believer’s political, economic or, in many instances, moral values. On the other hand, diffused religion expresses church inspired value-orientation amongst many individuals, mainly due to “the structures and unceasing capillary activities [of churches] which guarantee continuity and flexibility in such a way as to leave an unmistakable mark on the years following contact with the church structure” (1991: 36). Cipriani widely quotes from sociological research carried out in Italy, mostly in the 1980s, which show that in the sphere of values “religious elements are being taken up within new social, political and lay functions” (1991: 42) and that in spite of the decline in religious practice, the majority of the population maintained their beliefs without practicing them. Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority in the subjects found meaning in religion for their own existence, even though their beliefs did not necessarily influence their political preference or voting behavior.

The ‘believing without belonging’ phenomenon (cf. Davie, 1994; Hornsby-Smith, 1992) is in essence a sub-case of the first category of diffused religion because it denotes a system of beliefs (often but not always corresponding to a church’s main doctrines) without the accompanying religious behavior or strong feeling to of adherence to a religious group. Needless to say, socioeconomic, historical and cultural factors, such as class position, mobility, urban or rural residence, age, gender, majority or minority status as well as the given church’s historical place in society all play a significant role.

Hervieu-Léger’s position is somewhat similar to the idea about diffused religion. She, however, frames the problem by linking collective memory and religion. Modern societies create a structural contradiction, nay, incompatibility between their mode of operation and traditional religion. However, the collective memory — the carrier of religion — maintains, often underneath the surface, if not the institutionalized religion but rather the sacred. Hervieu-Léger’s aim is to demonstrate that neither the classical explanations of religion (beliefs in a supernatural being or forces) nor the efforts to call ‘religious’ such manifestations which in their substance have nothing to do with religion (e.g. mass sport or pop culture) are satisfactory to explain the return of a certain religious effervescence. Her main point is that at the present historical moment the parallel processes of decomposition and recomposition of religion are taking place. The modalities of belief (or believing, croire) are best expressed in “an authorized” memory, that is a reference to a tradition that is eroded
by modernity, nevertheless reconstituted by reference to a collective memory carried
rather by groups than religious institutions. Her point can be corroborated by the
growth of such groups as the Taizé, or The Family — evangelical Christian groups
that do not maintain formal links with established churches.

Hervieu-Léger’s position, indeed, warrants her rejection of the secularization
thesis. She, of course, acknowledges the decline of the traditional religiosity as a
result of the emergence of modernity in Western societies, but sees in the new
forms of religiosity the reassertion of traditions.

There are, however, several problems concerning the importance of collective
memory and traditions. Apart from the fact that traditions play an ever smaller role
in the economy, policy and culture of modern societies, collective memory is
fragmented, can be manipulated and re/constituted (or, with Eric Hobsbawm’s
expression, invented) according to the interests or perceptions of particular groups,
be they religious or secular. A good example would be the reconstitution of traditions
by communist ideology which reinvented and rewrote the traditions.

The more pluralistic society becomes, the more the fragmentation becomes
perceptible. Albeit the de-traditionalization process is far from complete, and it
cannot be absolutely complete (otherwise societies would lose the anchoring points
in their history, as if they would undergo a collective lobotomy which was
unsuccessful even under totalitarian regimes), modernity, indeed, did diminish the
role of traditions. Individualization brought about a culture where contingency and
individual preference prevailed.

Many contributions to the conference on “Detraditionalization: Authority and
Self in an Age of Cultural Uncertainty”, organized by Lancaster University in 1993
(cf. Heelas et al., 1996), emphasized the ever growing role of the individual in
constructing his or her morality, beliefs, priorities and values. Others, however,
maintained that modern societies preserve at least elements of traditions, and that
tradition is never an a priori givennes. Indeed, there are restrictions that prevent the
realization of a fully individualized society (e.g. the role of authority in companies,
in state and other bureaucracies, in churches and religious organizations, in bonds
of ethnicity, and for many in their values and cherished ideals), thus even in largely
de-traditionalized conditions an element of tradition persists.

The role of tradition is eminently important in assessing the persistence and
change in religion under contemporary conditions; collective memory cannot exist
without them. But post-modernity changes their role and ways of re/con structing.
Thomas Luckmann for instance talked about the shift “of intersubjective
reconstructions” and social constructions away from the great other-worldly
transcendences to the intermediate and, more and more, minimal transcendences
of modern solipsism, which is not the direct consequence of the structural
privatization of individual life in modern society. However, an elective affinity
does seem to obtain between the latter and the sacralization of subjectivity that is
celebrated in much of modern mass culture (Luckmann, 1996: 74).

Even such a fragmentary review reveals that, in spite of conceptual disagreements
amongst contemporary sociologists of religion concerning the problem of
secularization and rationalization in modernity, there is a largely shared opinion
that the classics of sociology of religion envisioned rather a linear development.
However, in post-modernity the rationality of the social is questioned, not only by theoreticians but also—perhaps even first and foremost—by an increasing number of people. Paraphrasing Max Weber, one could speak at least of the ‘iron cage of irrationality’, in the minds of many.

It is therefore not surprising that in the quest for values and spirituality, often as protest against the postmodern conditions of life and as an expression of dissatisfaction with the practice and doctrines of the established churches and mainline denominations, and with the availability of alternative sources of values and perspectives, an increasing number of people turn to new forms for realizing their emotional and spiritual needs.

D. The New: New Religious Movements and New Age

New Religious Movements present a new challenge to sociology of religion insofar as classical theories provide an incomplete explanation for their spread. Earlier in this article the consciousness of the crisis and the individualization of contemporary culture were mentioned as characteristic features of modern and postmodern culture. One could add to it that the tension between the desires for autonomy of the individual as well as the dislocations caused by the weakening of traditional authority structures (but strengthening of the bureaucratic—state and corporate—ones) are strong factors for the growth of New Religious Movements.

The recomposition of the religious field seems to follow along two paths: the attraction of New Religious Movements and the growth of charismatic, evangelical trends within the established churches. In a way this is an expression of the disintegration-reintegration dialectic.

The French sociologist, Françoise Champion has the following to say about the explosion of New Religious Movements, especially the New Age movements: they express “the growing submission of the spiritual interests to the modern culture of the individual and as such [constitute] a paradoxical manifestation of the modern direction towards the ‘simple magic’, the psychological or else, towards a search for a new humanism” (Champion in Hervieu-Léger, 1993: 203).

It is the choice, the rupture with tradition that is new in the spiritual renewal. It is left to the individual whether he or she joins or not a religious or spiritual movement, community, congregation or synagogue. As Wade Clark Roof remarked (1993: 4–5)

Religious and spiritual themes are surfacing in a rich variety of ways—in Eastern religions, in evangelical and fundamentalist teachings, in mysticism and New Age movements, in Goddess worship and other religious rituals, in the mainline churches and synagogues, in Twelve-Step recovery groups, in concern about the environment, in holistic health, and in personal and social transformation. Many within [the baby boomers’] generation who dropped out of churches and synagogues years ago are now shopping around for a congregation. They move freely in and out, across religious boundaries; many combine elements from various traditions to create their own personal, tailor-made meaning systems. Choice, so much a part of this generation, now expresses itself in a dynamic and fluid religious style.
These words, indeed, describe the post-modern characteristic of religiosity. Roof mentions that there is an observable pastiche-type of spirituality (1993: 245), and pastiche is a typical feature of post-modernity. New Religious Movements in advanced industrial societies are products of post-modernity, not only because of the pastiche character of spirituality but also because they express the cultural mixture in postmodern society. They are not only protests against doctrinal and practical authority of mainstream religions (and often of society at large) but in their origin are manifestations of various countercultures.

New Religious Movements are not products of Western societies only. It is well documented that they have spread in India, Southeast Asia, Japan, the Caribbean, Latin America and within Islam too (cf. among others, Beckford, 1996). Their social grounding is partly similar to those in the West, that is, an element of protest. However, their specific features include also a protest against the Western culture as well as inclusion of elements of indigenous religions. New Age movements, as Paul Heelas argued (1995, 1996) are not movements in the sense that they would be built around a central authority; they are rather networks. Their focus is the self but this self is not seen as socially constructed selfhood; it is rather selfhood from within, i.e. achieved by contacting a moral source that leads to spiritual fulfillment and wholeness.

Heelas summarizes three elements of the New Age: “It explains why life — as conventionally experienced — is not what it should be; it provides an account of what it is to find perfection; and it provides the means for obtaining salvation” (1996: 18). He calls the Self-spirituality “the essential lingua franca of New Age”. In different forms New Age groups lay the emphasis on self-perfection which can be achieved only by overcoming the detrimental effects of socialization. Society, including the religious institutions, oppresses the individual and prevents him/her to realize his or her inherent possibilities. Therefore the individual has to discover the inner life which is essentially spiritual. This would lead the individual out of and beyond the socialized ego, towards the discovery of God or Goddess in the Self. Consequently, the individual has to move beyond the socialized self — known as the ‘ego’, ‘lower self’, ‘intellect’ or ‘mind’.

New Age has antecedents in the long history of Western culture, from Judeo-Christian mysticism to romanticism, but Eastern influences, especially since the late 19th century also had an important influence. We cannot trace here the history of spiritualism in Western culture; suffice it to mention occult societies, theosophy, the influence of Gourdjief and Carl Jung. From the 1960s and early 1970s, however, a new pattern has developed (Heelas, 1995: 147). Young people, students, hippies and seekers of the spiritual — adherents of the counterculture — in a growing number opted out from society, i.e. refused to adapt to the mainstream.

Even though the counterculture of the 1970s faded away, the attraction of spirituality and search for self-realization did not. The earlier diffuse, spontaneous search for the inner Self, often induced by psychedelic drugs, has been replaced in the 1980s by structured, organized activities, such as the Erhard Seminars Training, therapeutic movements, emphasis on healing. The number of New Age groups has increased. Stark and Bainbridge (1987: 171–2) described how some groups or movements that did not have a religious origin, gradually transformed themselves
to religious ones. Synanon, an organization that originally aimed at curing drug addiction, ended up in mystical experimentation and encounter sessions. Scientology began as a therapy group. Dianetics that attracted a large number of followers by promising to erase psychological scars and blocks, and enable people to achieve superhuman powers — e.g. total recall of memory, freedom from diseases, even from common cold — and the like. Many New Age groups traveled the opposite road: corporations began to use their resources and techniques. Thus, at least some New Age groups turned from protest against restrictive, authoritarian structures and institutions into their tools. Why? My suggestion is to see the fragility of New Age groups in the extreme subjectivity and withdrawal from society. (This latter ought to be qualified: it is not a total withdrawal because most members of New Age groups actively participate in the workforce, unlike the hippies of the 1950s–1960s, or members of some religious communities.)

New Religious Movements as well as New Age groups have their own dynamic, that is, with their maturation or aging the role of the erstwhile charismatic leader is diminished or faded, groups that have previously been rather amorphous begin to develop authority structures.

E. Homo Oeconomico-Religiosus?: the Rational Choice Theory in Sociology of Religion

Rational choice theory makes inroads in sociology of religion as well. It is considered by many as a new paradigm that is capable to construct an empirically grounded general theory of religion. However, as many critics remarked, rational choice theory — in general as well as in sociology of religion — assumes that “people approach all actions in the same way, evaluating all costs and benefits and acting so as to maximize their net benefits. Hence people choose what religion, if any, they will accept and how extensively they will participate in it” (Iannaccone in Young, 1997: 27). In my view, rational choice theory is the theoretical formulation of a market modeled perception of human actions, and its application to sociology of religion cannot contain the rich variety of religious experience, the socio-cultural and even individual-psychological components of past and present religiosity, religious movements and especially not their mutual relationship to society.

Rational choice theory assumes that people, no matter in what society they live, act according to utilitarian principles. It does not make distinctions amongst different types of society, therefore it posits that people in all societies always make rational choices. What is the choice of, say, a Nuer warrior in maximizing his ‘net’ benefits by following the traditional religion of his society? How do people in traditional societies evaluate ‘all’ costs and benefits?

Another assumption of rational choice theory is that the “ultimate preferences or (‘needs’) that individuals use to assess costs and benefits tend not to vary much from person to person or time to time” (Iannaccone in Young, 1997: 27). This statement assumes that people have all the time, in all societies the same, almost immutable needs, that needs are not socially constructed.
In brief, rational choice theory applies a supply-side, market model for the explanation of a phenomenon which is cognitively but first and foremost emotionally shaped. It disregards the role of race, gender and class in making religious choices and especially, establishing or joining (or abandoning) religious groups or communities. Rational choice theorists claim that their approach provides the adequate explanation for religious conversion, mainly because the convert makes his or her decision by calculating the costs and benefits for achieving salvation. However, studies of conversion indicate that the motivations for conversion (or for leaving a church or a sect) are much more complex, involving personal life history, personality, family relations, etc., etc., and cannot be reduced to cost-benefit calculations. Studies of popular religions do not support, rather refute the claims of rational choice theory applied to religion, and show the Western, ethnocentric bias of that theory.

E.1. Popular Religions

Writings on popular religion usually concentrate on the peasant religions in the developing societies. However, studies on European popular religions (e.g. Albert-Llorca 1996; Hervieu-Léger and Champion, 1987) show that this type of religiosity is much more widespread, and is present in modern societies as well. Pilgrimages, fêtes of saints, penitents’ associations, etc. witness the presence of popular religions in the modern world. They are part and parcel of European religious history and, to use Lanternari’s expression, they “expressed the religiosity of the most disfavoured layers of society” (Lanternari, 1982: 128).

Nonetheless, popular religion today is the most widespread in the so-called Third World. Cristián Parker’s study (1998: 195–212) emphasizes their vitality and force in Latin America, in the urban setting as well. Popular religion is, so to say, an intermediary between official and indigenous religions; it serves the construction of meaning for the popular masses. It is a powerful means for constructing and maintaining identity, especially in face of the globalizing culture. In this sense, emphasizes Parker, it has the potential for protest and resistance. Modern popular religions exist in the conditions of post-modernity, with its inherent incertitude and as a countervailing factor provide “meaningful links that integrate the community and collective representations that furnish actors with collective meaning” (Parker, 1998: 199).

Popular religions, with their life-affirming content provide people with hope in face of destitution, poverty and exploitation. In an urban setting, where often displaced persons, former peasants, eke out a living, they serve as community creating and reinforcing factors. Parker (1998: 203) also emphasizes that popular religions affirm the woman and the feminine viewpoint by the Marian faith and by stressing the role of women as “healer, blesser, midwife”. They, in a syncretistic way, include adoration of saints and other mediators whose icons are worshipped, and represent “concrete symbols of a transcendent reality” (1998: 204.) Popular religion affirms the “festive and carnivalesque”, thus counteracts the ascetic and rigid ethical religions. Its affirmation of the transcendent in the face of the
mainstream, modern, rationalizing, culture endows popular religion with the character of a counterculture.

The relationship of popular religions to modernization is ambivalent: on the one hand they accept modernity, with the hope (and occasionally reality) of better living conditions and improvement in social development but at the same time they represent a countervailing force to instrumental rationality, a protest to domination and unfettered consumerism.

What is important, as Parker stresses, is that today there is no “traditional” popular religion anymore. Parker’s theoretical contribution to the understanding of this widespread phenomenon is significant. He emphasizes that popular religion cannot be perceived as the Marxian statement of religion being the “sigh of the oppressed creature”; it does not condemn people to passivity, and could serve as a vehicle for protest. And contrary to Weber’s contention that “the more a culture is inclined towards a peasant traditional culture, the more withdrawn popular piety is from any ethical rationalization”; rather, studies on Latin American popular religion show that “even in the case of maximal expression of utilitarian magic — the problem of meaning (the ways of ‘salvation’ as substantive demands of the masses) is present” (1998: 209.)

Both studies that were referred to show that the unilinear image of secularization is incorrect, and the homogenization of culture and religion does not take place. In that, the study of popular religions raises important questions about cultural globalization as well. A further study of popular religions in non-Christian parts of the world would certainly contribute to our understanding of the religious and cultural dynamics of modernity and post-modernity.

These considerations could not give full justice to the developments in contemporary religion nor to the later efforts and achievements of sociology of religion. For instance I could not discuss feminist theories and critiques, not because I would not find them worth while for a critical review and analysis. Spatial restrictions would have allowed only a superficial review, the more so because those critiques are intrinsically related to feminist theological theories. Such a discussion, however, would have required a lengthy essay. For the same reason I could not dwell upon the problem whether classics of sociology of religion represented an ethnocentric stand or rather tried to elaborate universalistic theories which could find application — even with certain modifications or precision — to the contemporary situation and to non-Western societies.

There is one encouraging development in contemporary sociology of religion, and it is that the discipline gains greater relevance for the analysis and critique of contemporary society and culture. Later theories seem to have overcome the isolation and self-containment of sociology of religion that has been mentioned by James Beckford (1992: xi) and could contribute to the general sociological understanding of our world.
References


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Endnotes

1. In this connection it is noteworthy that for some theologians, e.g. John Milbank (Milbank, 1994) “postmodernisms” ultimately — and in a self-contradictory manner — put themselves “on a level with the great religious discourses of the world”. (Ibid., 42.)

2. Albrecht Wellmer, in his essay “On the Dialectic of Modernism and Postmodernism” (1985) occupies a somewhat similar position. He wrote that in the “‘modern’ constellation that forms the point of departure of the postmodernism [...] has two parts: (1) already with Max Weber little more was left of the project of the Enlightenment [...] than a process of unceasing rationalisation, bureaucratisation and ‘scientisation’ of social life. The capitalist economy, modern bureaucracy, technical progress and finally the ‘disciplining’ of the body, analysed by Foucault, have reached the dimensions of a powerful process of destruction: first the destruction of traditions, then the destruction of the ecological environment, finally the destruction of ‘meaning’ as well as the unitary self, which was once both the product and motor of the process of Enlightenment.” (Ibid., 355–6.)

3. The distinction between “post-modernity” and “postmodernism” is important insofar as the first denotes a state of society whilst the second refers to the theoretical-philosophical and artistic reflections on the societal conditions.

4. This statement certainly pertains to religion as well albeit is not restricted to it. Many analysts of postmodern culture emphasize the role of dealership in shaping the taste in art thus making or breaking an artist or a style. The market model in competing religious
organizations has been analyzed by Peter Berger already in 1963. His analysis and conclusions were, however, based on different theoretical assumptions than those of the rational choice theory.

5. This does not mean that I would agree with Fukuyama’s contention that “liberal democracy may constitute the ‘end point of mankind’s ideological evolution’ and the ‘final form of government’, and as such constitute[s] the ‘end of history’” (1993: xi). Of course, the author’s arguments are much more complex, grounded in his interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of history.


7. This raises the question — and I shall return to it — whether the different cultural and religious traditions shape the path and forms of modernization, in other words, whether modernization inevitably has to follow the Western pattern.

8. They are too numerous to list them. Thomas Robbins, in *Cults, Converts and Charisma* (1992) lists the relevant studies.
PART III

Social and Cultural Differentiation
6 The Fourth Generation of Comparative Stratification Research

Donald J. Treiman and Harry B. G. Ganzeboom

In a paper published in 1991 with Wout Ultee (Ganzeboom et al. 1991), we reviewed developments in comparative stratification research over the last half century within a framework of three distinctive generations. Although the research questions addressed in the first post-war generation were quite diverse, the main achievement was to produce a set of national probability sample surveys that made it possible for the first time to characterize the stratification patterns of national societies. The central comparative question was whether societies differed in their degree of “openness,” measured by the rate of occupational mobility between generations, and the central conclusion — subsequently proved incorrect — was that observed mobility rates and patterns are essentially similar in industrialized societies (Lipset and Bendix, 1959).

The second generation shifted the central research question from how much mobility there is across generations to how intergenerational transmission of status occurs. A new round of higher quality sample surveys was conducted in many nations; procedures for hierarchically scaling occupations were devised (Duncan, 1961; Treiman, 1977); and multivariate statistical techniques — path analysis, or structural equation modeling — were introduced (Duncan, 1966, 1975; Blau and Duncan, 1967: Ch. 5), which permitted the assessment of the relative importance of various paths to status attainment, e.g., indirect transmission of advantage through education vs. direct transmission of occupational status through mechanisms independent of education. While the seminal contribution of Blau and Duncan, which established the central importance of education as the mechanism by which status is transmitted from generation to generation in the United States, inspired replications in many countries, with essentially similar results, no definitive cross-national comparison of status attainment was completed.

The third generation was characterized by a return to the analysis of intergenerational occupational mobility tables, but this time with a new arsenal of statistical techniques: log-linear and log-multiplicative analysis. These procedures enabled researchers to disaggregate observed mobility patterns into a portion due
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to shifts in the distribution of positions and a portion due to underlying differences in the chances for success of people from different social origins. The principal comparative question was the same as that posed by Lipset and Bendix, but the conclusion drawn by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992), who carried out the major comparative project, was much more sophisticated: observed mobility patterns vary across countries because shifts in the occupational structure across generations occur at different rates from country to country, but the underlying structure of mobility chances — the relative odds of mobility between occupational classes — is very much the same in all industrial societies.

In our 1991 judgement, stratification research through the first three generations became successively more rigorous, with major advances in the availability of high quality data, the solution of vexing measurement problems, and the adoption of an increasingly sophisticated arsenal of statistical procedures. However, these developments were achieved at the cost of a successive narrowing of research questions, from a general interest in the determinants and consequences of social status and of mobility between statuses to a narrowly focused interest on the bivariate relationship between the occupational classes of fathers and sons. Fortunately, this trend, which was perhaps a necessary concomitant of the enormous technical advances of our field, appears now to have reversed. Although it is always dangerous to summarize historical developments while they are in progress, we nonetheless are willing to characterize a fourth generation of research: a return to the broad questions of early stratification research, in particular, the central question of how the stratification outcomes of individuals are affected by their social environment, with improved data; improved statistical tools, especially statistical procedures that combine the advantages of both the quantitative methods of the second generation and the qualitative methods of the third generation; and improved research designs, particularly multilevel designs that permit estimates of both micro- and macro-level effects.

Before turning to a discussion of fourth generation research, we devote some attention to the CASMIN project, which was the culmination of the third generation of comparative mobility research. As the major publication in our field in the 1990’s, The Constant Flux (1992) is central to many of the ongoing debates, and thus warrants special attention.

A. Concluding the Third Generation: The CASMIN Project

In many ways the CASMIN (“Comparative Analysis of Social Mobility in Industrial Nations”) project, from which the central publication was Erikson and Goldthorpe’s The Constant Flux (1992), marks the end of the third generation of comparative stratification research. Although not published until 1992, The Constant Flux dealt almost exclusively with data collected in the 1970s. The CASMIN researchers obtained unit-record data from 12 large-scale national surveys, mainly dedicated social mobility surveys organized by researchers inspired by Blau and Duncan (1967). These data were subjected to extensive recoding to render the occupational and educational classifications as comparable as possible across countries, with
advice from local experts. The first major achievement of the CASMIN project was the level of measurement comparability achieved. The project generalized for international use the class categories earlier developed for analysis of British data (Goldthorpe, 1980: 39–42). The resulting “EGP” scheme, originally consisting of 10, later 12, categories, was meticulously generated from detailed information on occupational titles and employment and supervisory status. It has been shown to be a powerful predictor of social mobility and other life chances (Evans, 1992), and has become widely accepted as the international standard for the categorical classification of occupations. The CASMIN project has not provided a standard algorithm to generate the EGP categories from detailed data. However, such an algorithm was produced by other researchers (Ganzeboom et al., 1989; Ganzeboom and Treiman, 1996) and is used by many.

The second major achievement of the CASMIN project and more generally of the third generation was to take seriously the discrete nature of social stratification and social mobility, not only in theorizing but also in methods of analyses. While second generation research had relied primarily upon continuous one-dimensional measures of stratification variables, the CASMIN researchers explicitly rejected the unidimensionality of stratification and modeled intergenerational mobility between discrete occupational classes as determined by four factors: hierarchy, inheritance, sector, and affinity. Hierarchy is, of course, the vertical dimension of stratification stressed in the second generation. Inheritance refers to the disproportionate propensity for men to work at jobs that are in the same occupational class as the jobs held by their fathers — the propensity for the sons of unskilled laborers to be unskilled laborers, and so on. Sector distinguishes agricultural from non-agricultural occupations, which is necessary considering that in industrial societies there is virtually no mobility into agricultural occupations, although there is massive mobility out of agricultural occupations. Finally, affinity refers to disproportionately high or low mobility between particular occupational categories that cannot be accounted for by the other three factors. In our judgement, the demonstration of inheritance and sector effects is an important addition to our understanding of how intergenerational mobility occurs, although hierarchy effects are rather more important than Erikson and Goldthorpe make them out to be (see Hout and Hauser, 1992). Finally, affinity effects appear to us to be something of a “fudge-factor,” introduced to improve the fit of the model to the data.

The major conclusion of The Constant Flux is that in industrial societies there is a core mobility pattern common to all countries and that the small observed differences between nations are due to idiosyncratic historical and political circumstances rather than to generic factors such as the precise level of industrialization. They also claim that there is little evidence that mobility has increased over time. Their first conclusion, that the pattern of mobility, that is, the relative likelihood of (exchange) mobility between occupational classes, is largely invariant across industrial societies, ranks as a major discovery, although there is rather less certainty that the amount of mobility is as cross-nationally invariant. Their second conclusion is suspect, since they have data for only one point in time and hence must rely on the dubious assumption that there are no age effects on mobility and hence that age differences may be interpreted as cohort effects. By
contrast, Ganzeboom et al. (1989), in an analysis of 149 mobility tables from 35 countries, showed that the rate of intergenerational mobility has in general increased over time: in 16 of the 18 nations for which they had replicate data there was a significant increase in mobility chances, on the order of one to two per cent per year over the second half of this century, which implies very substantial change in mobility regimes from one generation to the next (see also Wong and Hauser, 1992). It is quite possible that the more or less universal trend toward greater societal openness is the consequence of processes posited by Treiman in a 1970 review that is still widely cited — industrialization, urbanization, and the increasing pervasiveness of mass communications — but these claims have yet to be put to an explicit test. Ganzeboom et al. also showed substantial variation in intergenerational mobility rates across the 35 countries they analyzed (which range much more widely in level of development than the 12 industrial nations analyzed by Erikson and Goldthorpe) but they did not attempt to relate observed differences in the extent of mobility to the level of industrialization or other differences between countries.

B. The Fourth Generation

What is most distinctive about stratification research in the 1990s is that it is increasingly comparative, either over time or cross-nationally or both. Increasingly, students of stratification are addressing the central question of how stratification outcomes are affected by institutional arrangements. This is an inherently comparative question, since it calls for the comparison of the impact of different social contexts — different societies, or single societies at different points in time, or smaller units, such as regions, cities, firms, and schools. We begin our discussion of the fourth generation by reviewing the major ongoing comparative projects. We then discuss new research designs, particularly multilevel strategies, the adoption of new statistical techniques, and other new data collection efforts, all of which have led to substantial improvements in the quality of research in our field.

B.1. Major Comparative Projects

Over the past decade there have been two distinctive approaches to carrying out comparative analysis of stratification systems. Not surprisingly given the enormous cost of surveys, there has been a continued reliance upon the re-analysis of existing data, although with greater attention to questions of data comparability than in the past. In addition, several new data collection efforts have been launched, with comparable data collected in sample surveys conducted in several nations. These projects necessarily are more limited in scope than are the secondary-analysis projects; but they have a (potential) comparative advantage with respect to the comparability of the data collected. We review first the secondary analysis projects of Shavit and Blossfeld, Shavit and Müller, DiPrete, and Ganzeboom and Treiman, and then turn to the new data collection projects of Wright, Kelley, and Szélényi.
and Treiman (in each case we identify the project by the principal organizers, although most of these projects involve many additional participants).

### B.2. Secondary Analysis Projects

#### B.2.a. Trends in Educational Transition (Shavit and Blossfeld)

At the 1990 World Congress of Sociology in Madrid, Yossi Shavit and Hans-Peter Blossfeld organized a session reporting on trends in educational transition ratios in 13 nations (Shavit and Blossfeld, 1993). A year earlier they had invited researchers to produce parallel analyses of existing data from each nation, with two main tasks: to estimate OLS equations predicting the level of schooling ultimately attained from various social origin variables; and to estimate logistic regression equations predicting from the same set of factors the odds of making the transition from each educational level to the next, following the paradigm formulated by Robert Mare (1980, 1981). The results reported in the Shavit-Blossfeld volume showed that the dominant (although by no means universal) pattern was one of declining levels of educational reproduction over time, even though for most of the nations studied the odds of making any particular transition remained unchanged over time.9

A serious limitation of the Shavit-Blossfeld project is that it achieved only partial standardization. Shavit and Blossfeld did not force a completely standardized format on the separate contributions. The separate chapters differ substantially in the scope of the data and the precise specification of the models. Moreover, occupational status was measured in a number of different ways (Blossfeld and Shavit, 1993: 11). The result is that it often is quite difficult to compare results across countries. In this respect, the CASMIN work reached a substantially higher level of cross-national comparability. Nonetheless, it must be appreciated that the Shavit-Blossfeld project is also a model of efficiency — the entire project, from conception to publication, took only four years, which is a major accomplishment in itself.

#### B.2.b. The School-to-Work Transition (Shavit and Müller)

Moreover, the project became the model for a new round of comparative analyses: of the school-to-work transition, this time headed by Shavit and Walter Müller. The 13 papers constituting this project were presented at the 1996 Stockholm conference of the ISA RC28 and published a year later (Shavit and Müller, 1997). These papers represent an improvement in standardization: both education and occupational status (at labor market entry) were measured in the same way in all countries, occupation by the EGP classification and education by the CASMIN educational categories developed by Müller et al. (1990). Moreover, these papers carry the fourth generation strategy of combining quantitative and qualitative analysis a step further: both education and occupational position were modeled in
a discrete fashion, and represent the first extensive use of multinomial regression analysis in comparative research in our field.

As Blossfeld and Shavit had done, but in a much more extensive way, Müller and Shavit (1997) carried out a “meta-analysis” of the results of the 13 country studies, in which they focused on how variations in the educational systems of each of the countries affected the connection between schooling and the status of the first job; the increased rigor of the meta-analysis constitutes another major improvement over the Shavit-Blossfeld project. Several of the conclusions of Müller and Shavit are noteworthy. For example, they showed that vocational education yields higher returns in countries where vocational training is occupationally specific and where there are arrangements between employers and schools for the graduates of particular vocational training programs to enter specific firms than in countries where these conditions do not hold. They also showed that occupational returns to education are higher in countries with nationally standardized school curricula and requirements than in other countries, since in the former employers are able to rely upon educational credentials as certifying a particular level of competence.10

B.2.c. Labor Market Institutions and Employment Outcomes (DiPrete et al.)

Whereas Shavit and Müller focused on educational institutions, DiPrete and his colleagues are focusing on how the organization of labor markets mediates the consequences of economic upturns and downturns. Using data from labor force surveys that are now conducted in many nations, they have thus far compared four nations: Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United States.11 In a recently published paper (DiPrete et al., 1997), they characterize the career mobility regime of the U.S. as “individualist,” and that of the Netherlands as “collectivist,” with Sweden and Germany falling in between. Thus, in the U.S., in contrast to the other nations, workers tend to be pushed out of declining industries. Moreover, which workers bear the brunt of economic declines depends strongly on individual characteristics — education and length of tenure. In the Netherlands, at the other extreme, there is no measurable effect of industry expansions or contractions and no variation by education or tenure in the likelihood of leaving jobs.

B.2.d. Status Attainment in Comparative Perspective (Ganzeboom and Treiman)

As noted above, the authors of this paper have been engaged for more than a decade in an effort to complete the work of the second generation by carrying out a cross-national comparison of the process of status attainment. Our aim is to develop a comprehensive account of to what extent and in what ways the processes of educational and occupational attainment vary over time and across societies and what macro-social factors account for such variations. To that end, we have attempted to secure and to standardize the key variables in all existing probability
surveys of national populations that contain information on intergenerational occupational mobility. Thus far, we have obtained some 250 sample surveys from about 40 nations covering most of the 20th century. Of these, 113 have been standardized and a common subset of variables has been made available for public use in the *International Social Mobility and Politics File* (Nieuwbeerta and Ganzeboom, 1996) available on CD-ROM through the Steinmetz Archive in Amsterdam.

Our goals are conceptually modest although technically ambitious: we aim to test the set of hypotheses laid out by Treiman some 25 years ago (1970) regarding the impact of societal development (educational expansion, urbanization, economic growth, etc.) and political structure (principally the distinction between communist and non-communist nations, but also between welfare-states and *laissez-faire* states) on the level of educational and occupational reproduction and on the centrality of education in transmitting advantage across generations. Preliminary analyses have shown that the dependence of education on social origins has declined over time, as a consequence of educational expansion (Ganzeboom and Treiman, 1993); that occupational reproduction has declined over time (Ganzeboom et al., 1989); and that over the course of the 20th century occupational attainment has become more achievement-based, that industrialization strengthens the effect of achievement relative to ascription, and that socialism has a similar effect (Treiman and Yip, 1989; Ganzeboom and Treiman, 1997). Rijken (1997) has shown results similar to those of Ganzeboom and Treiman with respect to educational attainment.

**B.3. New Data Collection Projects**

**B.3.a. The Comparative Project on Class Structure and Class Consciousness (Wright)**

In 1980, Erik Olin Wright launched a comparative project on class structure with closely comparable surveys conducted in the U.S. and Sweden. Since that time, the initial surveys have been more or less closely replicated in 14 additional nations and have been repeated in the U.S., Australia, and Sweden. The principal thrust of the project (Wright, 1989, 1997: xxvii-xxxii) was to take seriously the Marxist class paradigm and to collect data that would permit an empirical comparison of the relative efficacy of Marxist vs. alternative conceptions of social class. To this end, a variety of data were collected both to measure alternative definitions of class and to assess the consequences of location in the class structure, particularly for class consciousness. A second important concern was to assess various theories regarding the causes and consequences of the macro-structural properties of societies, particularly for their class relations. A variety of comparative analyses have come out of this project, including a demonstration by Baxter (1994) that the subjective class identification of working women in the U.S., Sweden, Norway, and Australia depends on the class positions of their husbands’ jobs rather than on the class positions of their own jobs, a result that lends support to Goldthorpe’s (1983) contention that class is a family affair; a demonstration that the openness of class
boundaries, as measured by friendship patterns of persons in different class locations, is structured in a very similar way in the U.S., Canada, Sweden, and Norway (Wright and Cho, 1992); and a comparison of the permeability of class boundaries to intergenerational mobility in the same four nations (Western and Wright, 1994) that showed, consistent with the expectations of Marxist theory, that the property boundary was the least permeable, expertise distinctions more permeable, and the authority boundary the most permeable.

One important shortcoming of these data is that because each survey was locally funded, pressure for exact replication of the questionnaires used in the initial surveys was at best modest, with the result that the surveys are only moderately comparable. Comparability has been further compromised by the fact that Wright himself has repeatedly revised his definition of social classes and that a good deal of the energies of project participants appears to have been devoted to definitional issues (Wright et al., 1989). In this sense, it is fair to say that the level of cross-national comparability achieved is about the same as that of the Shavit-Blossfeld project, leaving open the question of to what extent apparent cross-national differences reflect true differences in social structure rather than non-comparabilities in measurement.

B.3.b. International Survey of Economic Attitudes (Kelley)

The principal interest of this project is to link subjective perceptions of how the social stratification system does operate and beliefs as to how it should operate, perceptions regarding the social position and level of living of respondents, and political attitudes. It is thus a useful supplement to the main body of new comparative data, which are principally concerned with objective aspects of social stratification and mobility (for earlier studies, based on previously available data, see Evans et al., 1992; Kelley and Evans, 1993). The project opportunistically adds a module on economic attitudes to ongoing surveys wherever possible, in addition to fielding surveys with economic attitudes as the central focus. So far the core of the survey has been conducted twice in Australia, twice in Poland, once in Finland, and once in Bulgaria; see Evans and Kelley (1994) for an early report. In addition, many of the questions that make up the core were asked in a 1992/93 Hungarian survey and in a 1991 Polish survey. Although great attention has been paid to standardizing the attitude questions, there is rather less comparability across these surveys with respect to the measurement of socio-demographic characteristics.

B.3.c. Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989 (Szélényi and Treiman)

The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 created a unique opportunity for students of social stratification, as well as for students of social change more generally. Many Eastern European nations, in particular, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, already had well-developed interests in social stratification and strong survey research capabilities. Even within this rich tradition, Hungary stands out: every decade since 1962, the Hungarian Central Statistical Office has carried out a
micro-census explicitly devoted to issues of intergenerational social mobility. The
collapse of communism thus represents a major social transformation that can be
studied on the basis of comparable information collected before and after the
transition.

Szelényi and Treiman, in cooperation with researchers from Eastern Europe
and also from the Netherlands, exploited this opportunity by organizing a set of
sample surveys in each of six post-communist Eastern European countries: Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Slovakia (Treiman and Szelényi,
1993). In each country a probability sample of about 5,000 persons in the general
population was surveyed, mainly in 1993, using an essentially identical
questionnaire. In addition, a probability sample of 2,000 members of the old and
new elite was surveyed in each country (1,000 persons who had held nomenklatura
positions — positions requiring the approval of the central committee of the
communist party — in 1988; and 1,000 persons who held comparable positions in
the political, cultural, and economic elite in 1993). As of early 1997 more than 150
papers and monographs based on these data had already been published or presented

The importance of this project is that it was explicitly designed to investigate
the consequences for stratification systems of the transformation to post-
communism, and hence includes detailed educational, occupational, and residential
histories as well as an unusually rich array of information on the characteristics of
parents and grandparents — in particular, their occupational position at various
historical dates, e.g., 1948, 1952, etc. — and also information on the property owned
by respondents, parents, and grandparents, again at specified dates. The resulting
data set is distinctive in that unusually high standards of data comparability were
imposed upon the local survey teams. Although differences in educational systems
necessitated local variations in the wording of the educational attainment questions,
such differences were kept to a minimum and were designed in advance in such a
way as to permit recoding to two different international standards: the CASMIN
educational categories and a years-of-school-completed variable. Occupation
questions were asked in an identical way in all countries and responses were recoded
to the three accepted international standards (see below).

Although findings from this project are too numerous to summarize here, one
question addressed by the project (Szelényi, Wnuk-Lipinski, and Treiman, 1995) is
of particular interest. There has been a lively debate among Eastern European
scholars as to the likelihood that the old communist elite would be able to “land on
its feet,” transforming itself into a new elite. There are those, such as Staniszkiis
(1991), who argued that social connections and positional advantages left over
from the old regime would propel members of the old communist elite into elite
positions in the new regime. There were others, such as Szelényi, Szelényi, and
Kováč (1995), who argued that the fall of communism was accompanied by a
change in the “logic of stratification,” in which the assets that were valuable in the
old regime — political loyalty and political capital — were devalued in the new
regime and were replaced by the assets crucial for entrepreneurial success —
financial capital and entrepreneurial expertise. As usual, the truth is somewhere in
the middle and rather more complex than anticipated by a priori theories. The old
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The political elite was deposed. Among the old economic elite — those who managed the socialist economy — there was a “revolution of the deputies” — that is, those in the top positions were deposed, mainly through forced early retirement, but were replaced by their deputies. So, in one sense, all the collapse of communism did was to speed the advancement of those who were lucky enough to be in the right position at the right age. The cultural elite, mainly managers of “social sector” institutions — schools, hospitals, newspapers, research institutes, etc. — fell somewhat in between the old political and economic elites, as would be expected from the requirement during the communist period that they be both “red and expert,” that is, politically loyal but also technologically competent.

The debate about the consequences for the old elite of the transformation to post-communism is in some respects similar to a lively debate among students of Chinese society regarding the consequences for cadres of the ongoing transition of the People’s Republic of China to a market economy. In a provocative 1989 article, Victor Nee proposed that the shift from a redistributive to a market economy in China should favor “direct producers” at the expense of cadres. Others have challenged both the theoretical claim and Nee’s empirical evidence, suggesting that the contrast between a redistributive and a market economy is overly simplistic, and that a variety of factors affect the relationship between decollectivization, market reform, changes in property rights, and changes in the power and privilege of local officials (Oi, 1992; Peng, 1992; Walder, 1992, 1996; Lin, 1995; Parish and Michelson, 1996; Xie and Hannum, 1996). This debate, which is very much ongoing, has had the welcome effect of bringing research on China, an unusually interesting case, within the purview of the more general theoretical concerns of students of social stratification (see, for example, Róna-Tas, 1994; Szelényi and Kostello, 1996).

B.4. Design Developments

The most important recent development in stratification research has been the ascendancy of multilevel analytic designs (for a review see DiPrete and Forristal, 1994). Generically, these are designs that include at least two levels of data: a micro level, almost always individual people, and a macro level, which specifies a social context. The basic idea is to study how the behavior of individuals varies according to the social context. Although the macro, or contextual, level may be quite variable, most multilevel applications in stratification have specified either time periods or geographical units, e.g., nations, or both.

There are several ways to analyze multilevel data. The most common approach is to carry out micro-level analysis for each context separately and then to compare the results, either formally or informally. This is the implicit design of any comparison of two or more contexts. Often such comparisons are limited to two points in time or to two or at most a handful of nations. Such comparisons suffer from what is known as the “degrees of freedom” problem. Because any pair of nations or time points may differ in any number of ways, it is difficult to be certain that the particular macro-level differences one adduces to explain any particular differences in the micro-level outcomes are, in fact, the causal agents rather than
some other macro-level differences. For this reason, comparisons of small numbers of contexts are more useful for establishing cross-context regularities than for establishing cross-level differences. To establish differences across contexts, comparisons of three or more contexts are far more persuasive than comparisons of only two contexts. Any sociologist with the slightest imagination can invent a post hoc explanation for any particular observed difference. By contrast, comparisons of as few as three contexts are far more constraining, since we would ordinarily expect at least a monotonic relationship between the level of the contextual variable and the level of the measured micro-level outcome — for example, between the level of industrialization and the relative strength of the effects of education and parental status on occupational status attainment. It turns out that such monotonic relationships are not easy to find, even with as few as three contexts.

The obvious way around the degrees of freedom problem is to compare enough contexts to be able to treat contexts as observations. In this approach, a micro-level process is modeled separately for each context. Then, in a second step, the contexts are treated as observations and the coefficients from the micro-model are treated as dependent variables (by using multilevel modeling procedures both levels can be estimated simultaneously [Mason et al., 1983; Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992; see Kreft et al., 1990 for a review of estimation software]). The variation in the micro-level coefficients is explained by variation in the contextual variables. Note that in this approach complete explanation of variation in the micro-level coefficients is not necessary; rather, the coefficients are treated as stochastic, that is, themselves subject to error. The paper by Treiman and Yip (1989) is an example of this approach.

An interesting new development in stratification research, which exploits the multi-level approach, is the treatment of time as a variable, studying the impact of temporal change on various stratification outcomes. While many previous studies have compared outcomes at two points in time — which is logically equivalent to comparing two nations — until recently there have been few studies that have taken calendar time as a context, studying year-by-year variations in stratification outcomes, and linking variations in outcomes to macro-social historical events such as depressions, wars, revolutions, and social policy changes. This kind of research has burgeoned in recent years as comparable data have accumulated over time. For example, DiPrete and Grusky (1990a) analyzed the impact not only of general trends but also of specific political inventions on the level of occupational attainment in the U.S. in the 1970s and 1980s, using data from General Social Surveys conducted more or less every year between 1972 and 1987. They showed not only a leveling off of the trend toward greater societal openness but also that year-to-year changes in employment and personnel policies and governmental job training budgets had a notable impact on promoting opportunities for women, Blacks, and those from disadvantaged backgrounds.

Deng and Treiman (1997) assessed the effect of a specific historical event, the decade-long Cultural Revolution, on educational reproduction in the People’s Republic of China. Here the data were from a single source, a one per cent sample of the 1982 Census of China. By exploiting the fact that a large fraction of adult Chinese men live in the same households as their fathers, Deng and Treiman were able to utilize census data to study intergenerational relationships. Analyzing
educational attainment for persons born between 1945–1964 as a function of year of birth, father’s occupation, father’s education, and the interaction between the father’s status characteristics and year of birth, and allowing for the effect of year of birth to be discontinuous for those of middle-school age before, during, and after the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution, they showed that, as hypothesized, the advantage of coming from a cadre or intelligentsia family was radically diminished during the Cultural Revolution, and that intelligentsia sons were particularly hard hit.

Interestingly, no comparable effect has been found for Eastern Europe (Heyns and Bialecki, 1993; Matějů, 1993). Even during the period of the “long 50s” in Hungary — the Stalinist years, during which communist ideology was particularly enforced and punitive measures aimed at the children of the pre-communist bourgeoisie and intelligentsia were particularly pronounced — there was no noticeable impact on educational reproduction: family cultural capital continued to play a strong role in educational attainment before, during, and after the “long 50s” (Simkus and Andorka, 1982; Róbert, 1991; Szelényi and Aschaffenburg, 1993). Clearly, one lesson to be drawn from the juxtaposition of these two analyses — obvious, but still worth repeating — is that communism was not monolithic; the way particular communist regimes were organized mattered (and matters) a great deal.

The analyses discussed above all involve the analysis of data from repeated cross-sections of the population — birth cohorts in the case of single survey or, often, replicate surveys combined into a single file. An alternative design, increasingly important in stratification research, is to collect life history data from a sample at a given point in time. This was the strategy of the Szelényi-Treiman project, which collected complete educational, work, and residential histories from each respondent — although these data have yet to be analytically exploited in any substantial way. The advantage of life history approaches is that they permit the analysis of contingent relationships throughout the career. For example, some have argued that in communist Eastern Europe, party membership was a necessary condition for occupational advancement, while others have argued that many persons chosen for advancement joined the party shortly after being promoted, much as American junior executives join a country club not so much as to improve their promotion chances as to solidify the legitimacy of their membership in the executive ranks. By studying the relative timing of party joining and occupational advancement, it would be possible to decide between these hypotheses. Event history analysis can be used to study a different set of contingencies as well, variation in the macro-social context. It has been claimed (Thernstrom, 1973) that the Great Depression mainly affected those who were just beginning their careers when the depression began. Since event history data permit the isolation of those whose career beginnings coincide with the onset of such sustained catastrophes as the Great Depression, it is possible to analyze the impact of these events on the lives of individuals in a way not heretofore possible. However, life history data also have a major limitation — since such data are typically collected from a representative national sample of adults, the histories of younger members of the sample are necessarily truncated. For this reason, great care must be taken to guard against bias due to sample selectivity by age.
One way of partly overcoming this limitation is to focus on selected birth cohorts, thus ensuring that a substantial fraction of respondents experienced particular historical conditions at identical ages. This is the strategy of the German Life History Study (Mayer, 1990), which emulated a Norwegian survey (Rogoff Ramsøy, 1977, 1984) and was in turn emulated by a Swiss survey (Buchmann and Sacchi, 1997). In the German study, life history data were collected in 1981–83 from persons born in 1929–31, 1939–41, and 1949–51, that is, age 32, 42, or 52 at the time of the interview.

The same team used a similar design to collect life history data in 1990 for residents of former East Germany, which has resulted in a rich account of how changing policies of the government of the D.D.R. and changing features of the macro-social structure affected the life chances of individuals (Huinink et al., 1995; see also the review by DiPrete, 1997). The study of social change has also been the focus of much of the work based on the West German and Swiss surveys, including for Germany analyses of cohort differences in career mobility (Blossfeld, 1989), changes in the status of women (Mayer et al., 1990), changes in involvement in continuing education and its effect on income (Schömann and Becker, 1995; Becker and Schömann, 1996), and for Switzerland changes in career patterns over time (Buchmann and Sacchi, 1995a, 1995b). Life history data have also been used to show the effect of variations in the organization of educational systems and labor markets on the school-to-work transition and on career dynamics in West Germany, Norway, and the U.S. (Allmendinger, 1989a, 1989b) and on career dynamics in West Germany and Poland (Mach et al., 1994).

A limitation of both cross-national and cross-temporal multilevel designs is that it is difficult to generate enough cases to sustain anything other than the simplest analysis at the macro level. We seldom have more than 30 or 40 nations or years, which is hardly enough cases from which to estimate a model with more than one or two contextual variables. An obvious solution is to cross years by nations. This is the approach the authors of this review are taking in our current analysis of the process of status attainment, discussed above. Drawing upon data from some 250 sample surveys conducted in about 40 countries since the middle of the century, we define 15 five-year birth cohorts ranging from 1900–1904 to 1970–1974. Thus in principle we have 600 (= 15 x 40) contexts on which to base our macro-level analysis, and are able to study the effect of both variations between nations and cross-temporal variations within nations on the status attainment process. For example, we can test the hypothesis that parental occupational status has a smaller effect on educational attainment in welfare states than in laissez-faire systems by assessing the character of the welfare system in each nation separately for each five year period.

B.5. Statistical Developments

As noted above, the major statistical development in the fourth generation has been the increasing utilization of statistical procedures that combine the advantages of both the quantitative methods of the second generation and the qualitative methods
of the third generation. Whereas the second generation of research in stratification relied mainly on ordinary least squares regression procedures and the third generation of research was dominated by log linear and log multiplicative techniques, the fourth generation may be characterized by the use of statistical procedures that permit quantitative and qualitative measurements of both independent and dependent variables to be combined. Although stratification research began to incorporate discrete representations of independent variables some 25 years ago, only recently has the discrete representation of dependent variables in multivariate analyses become widely applied, first through the adoption of logistic regression procedures that permitted the correct representation of dichotomous dependent variables and more recently through the adoption of various extensions of logistic regression, particularly multinomial logistic regression.

Binomial logistic regression procedures are now utilized quite routinely in research papers in our subfield. Since many outcomes of interest are binary, e.g., attainment of university education, acquisition of a managerial job, etc., it is quite natural to study the chances (odds) of obtaining favorable outcomes. A particularly interesting application of binomial logistic regression is in estimating Mare’s educational continuation model (as in the papers in the Shavit-Blossfeld volume discussed above); see Allison (1982) for additional detail on the design issues involved.

Some outcomes are, of course, polytomous, e.g., attainment of several alternative occupational class positions, but nonetheless may depend, in part, upon variables best represented in a quantitative way, for example, years of schooling. Multinomial logistic regression procedures permit the estimation of such models and hence are finding increasing use in stratification research. Moreover, various specialized forms of logistic regression have been introduced (see Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989, and Long, 1997, for excellent explications of these methods). A particularly important development is the introduction of various procedures for adding individual level covariates to log-linear mobility models (Logan, 1983; DiPrete, 1990; Breen, 1994). Working in this tradition, Logan (1996a, 1996b) has elaborated the two-sided logit model as a way of simultaneously considering the factors that affect variations in opportunity and the factors that affect variations in choice. Although not yet widely used, these procedures show great promise for advancing comparative research on social mobility by combining the insights of the second and third generations.

Another statistical development of potentially great importance is attention to the problem of selection bias (Berk, 1983; Winship and Mare, 1992). It often is the case in non-experimental research that selection into the sample under study is not independent of the outcomes of interest, a condition that — if uncorrected — leads to biased inferences about social processes. For example, individuals may seek higher education in order to prepare for a specific profession; and women may return to work only if they secure a sufficiently high wage. Although as yet little attention has been paid to such problems in comparative stratification research, a number of U.S. studies have employed various procedures to adjust for selection bias, e.g., studies of the effect of school tracking (Gamoran and Mare, 1989), youth employment (Mare and Winship, 1984; Mare et al., 1984; Hagan, 1991;
Sakamoto and Chen, 1991), college choice (Manski and Wise, 1983), occupational mobility in the 19th century (Hardy, 1989), women’s socioeconomic achievement (Fligstein and Wolf, 1978; Tienda et al., 1987; England et al., 1988; and Hagan, 1990), and migration and mobility (Tienda and Wilson, 1992).

**B.6. Measurement standardization**

Considerable closure has now been achieved with respect to the measurement of the key stratification variables: occupational status or position; and education. Despite the salience of the Marxian distinction between capitalists and workers, most stratification research has focused on the occupational division of labor. Jobs are aggregated into classes, or assigned status scores, on the basis of the similarity of their content — their responsibilities and duties — and the similarity of the positions they occupy in labor markets and production units, principally what kind of supervisory responsibility they entail and the nature of the employment status (the most important distinction being between employees, self-employed workers without employees, and employers). A good deal of effort has gone into creating tractable occupational classification schemes and three such schemes have emerged as the classifications of choice, at least for cross-national comparative research: the EGP scheme (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992) as a categorical classification of occupational class categories; the ISEI (Ganzeboom et al., 1992; Ganzeboom and Treiman, 1996) as a socioeconomic index of occupations (linking their average educational requirements and average income); and the SIOPS (Treiman, 1977) for situations in which researchers wish to measure the prestige of occupations (see Ganzeboom and Treiman, 1996, for a review of all three schemes). Still, despite the widespread acceptance of these classification schemes, challenges continue to be thrown up, notably Hauser and Warren’s (1997) argument that separate measures of the educational qualifications of occupations and of their income returns are superior to ISEI measures that confound the two dimensions and Grusky and Sørensen’s (1998; also Sørensen and Grusky 1996) argument that social classes, both in the sense of shared market position and shared perception of class interests, are better measured by disaggregated occupations than by highly aggregated occupational class categories of the sort represented by the EGP classification. Whether these challenges will seriously undercut the emergent consensus on the preferred way to measure occupational position is yet to be seen.

Finally, substantial progress has been made with respect to the far more difficult problem of devising a cross-nationally comparable way to measure educational attainment, notably in the CASMIN scheme proposed by Müller et al. (1990) and used to good effect in the collection of parallel papers on the transition from school to work edited by Shavit and Müller (1997). The basic difficulty is that many educational systems, notably those of European nations, distinguish between academic and vocational education, so that educational attainment has two dimensions: the amount of schooling and the kind of schooling. Müller and his colleagues confront this problem by devising a typology of categories distinguished on the basis of both dimensions at the secondary school level where the dual track system is most important.
B.7. Data Developments

Accompanying the development of new research designs and the application of increasingly sophisticated statistical methods has been a major improvement in the availability of truly comparable cross-national and cross-temporal data. We already have reviewed three recent or on-going multi-national data collection projects specifically devoted to stratification issues (the Wright, Kelley, and Szélényi and Treiman projects). In addition, several other multi-national projects are generating data of considerable interest to researchers in our field.

Perhaps as a consequence of the increasing internationalization of quantitative competence, together with increases in computing power that have made feasible the analysis of large and complex data sets on desktop computers, there has been a shift in focus from the conduct of stand-alone cross-sectional surveys of specific populations to an interest in joining forces to produce comparable data over time or across nations. The initial model for this effort was the U.S. General Social Survey, which began in 1972 and has been repeated thereafter every year or two with careful attention to comparability over time. As the series grew longer, sociologists began to exploit it to do various kinds of trend analysis, including stratification analysis (e.g., the paper by DiPrete and Grusky reviewed above; Hauser and Huang, 1997).

The success of the GSS inspired two highly salutary developments: (1) the launching of similar repeated-cross-section surveys in other nations; and (2) the creation of the International Social Survey Project (ISSP), in which nations conducting annual or bi-annual social surveys on the GSS model collectively design a module of some 15 minutes worth of questions on a particular topic, which is then included in each national survey. From its inception in 1985 with five participating nations, the ISSP has grown to a 22 nation survey. Of particular interest to the stratification research community are the two social inequality modules designed by Jonathan Kelley and Mariah Evans, in 1987 (with nine nations participating) and 1992 (with 18 nations participating), which have generated invaluable information on subjective aspects of stratification; a third inequality module is scheduled for 1999. In addition to the ISSP project, the 12-nation “International Social Justice Project,” which carried out surveys in 1991 and 1996 (Kluegal et al., 1995), is an important resource for stratification researchers since it contains many items concerned with subjective aspects of stratification.

C. The Fate of ‘New Developments’ beyond the Third Generation

In the final section of our 1991 paper we identified several areas that we thought showed promise as new directions for research in our field: new data collection, event history models, multiple indicator and sibling models, multivariate models with categorical variables, women and families, and consequences of social mobility. Of these, we have already reviewed at some length developments with respect to data collection, event history models, and multivariate models with categorical data. We conclude the present chapter with a brief assessment of progress with respect to the three remaining topics.
C.1. Multiple Indicator and Sibling Models

In our 1991 review we noted that earlier work that took seriously the problem of measurement error in status attainment models seemed to have faded into oblivion. Despite well-known problems of unreliability and invalidity with respect to the major variables of stratification research, virtually no attention has been paid to such issues since the early 1980s, either by those working within a status attainment tradition or by those analyzing mobility tables via log-linear analysis. The situation is no different today; potential bias due to measurement error is simply ignored. One substantively oriented approach to the measurement issue, the use of sibling models to separate unmeasured family effects on stratification outcomes from the effects of individual characteristics, such as education, has continued as a kind of minor industry (e.g. De Graaf and Huinink, 1992; Dronkers, 1993; Kuo and Hauser, 1995; Toka and Dronkers, 1996), but has not moved into a central place in the field. In particular, there has been virtually no comparative research in this area. Nonetheless, there are some interesting methodological developments, notably Mare’s (1994) proposal of methods for analyzing sibling data within a discrete-time event history context.

C.2. Consequences of Social Mobility

Here there seems to have been something of a resurgence of activity, with the consequences of social mobility, and of status position more generally, receiving more attention now than any time since the first generation of research in the 1950s and 1960s. We already have noted the work of Kelley and his colleagues, but there is much other research as well. Both technical and substantive developments have promoted this revival. On the technical side, Sobel’s (1981, 1985) diagonal mobility model, which provides a workable solution to the problem of distinguishing effects of mobility per se from the separate effects of origins and destinations, has stimulated new research (e.g., De Graaf et al., 1995 and the references cited there). On the substantive side, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe has focused attention on the relationship between objective status, subjective status, and political attitudes as researchers have tried to understand the vicissitudes of post-communist politics in the region (e.g., Matějů, 1996). Melvin Kohn and his group have continued their long-term project to explore the relationship between social class and psychological functioning with new publications comparing the U.S. and Poland (Kohn and Słomczyński, 1990); Japan, the U.S., and Poland (Kohn et al., 1990); and Poland and the Ukraine (Kohn et al., 1997).

C.3. Women and Families

Comparisons of the mobility chances, achievements, and careers of men and women, and of the relationship between family and job responsibilities, had
already been underway as early as the second generation and continue to have a lively life in our field. Nonetheless, there has been an important recent development: new surveys, including all of those discussed above, now routinely collect data on both men and women rather than on men alone, in a sharp departure from earlier practices. This has permitted new analyses of women’s class position in different societies, focusing in particular on authority relations on the job (Wright and Baxter, 1995); the position of women in the labor market (Rosenfeld and Kalleberg, 1990, 1991; Charles 1992; Wong and Hauser, 1992; Charles and Grusky, 1995; Jacobs and Lim, 1992; Rosenfeld and Birkeland 1995; Wong, 1995; Semyonov and Jones, 1999); and the domestic division of labor (Baxter, 1995, 1997). While lip service continues to be paid to the notion that social status is a property of families and not of individuals, there is as yet little comparative research that attempts to articulate the relationship between individuals and families, apart from the question discussed above of how women rate their own and their husbands’ objective characteristics in arriving at a subjective assessment of their class position.

D. Conclusion

Research on how systems of social stratification and mobility vary over time and across societies is alive and well in the 1990s. After a long period of technical advances and focus on fairly narrow questions, a broad array of new questions is being posed and old questions revisited, with new techniques, better data, and more appropriate research designs. The core questions of our field regarding to what extent, in what ways, and under what conditions processes of social mobility and status attainment vary in different social contexts are continuing to receive substantial attention, but there is also new and renewed interest in specific aspects of these processes, e.g., what accounts for advancement from one level of schooling to the next, how is the transition from school to work mediated by the articulation of educational institutions with labor allocation processes, and how is career mobility, including mobility between employment and unemployment and in and out of the labor force, affected by economic expansion and contraction. Focus on the role of economic expansion and contraction is but one example of another important development — increased attention to how stratification and mobility outcomes are affected by historical events such as policy interventions and political regime changes. Finally, the old question of the consequences of social status and social mobility has been revived, in part motivated by the need to understand the consequences of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, and in part driven by new technical developments. Together these developments identify a fourth generation of comparative stratification research, which has made substantial advances over the previous three generations.

Research in social stratification and social mobility has from its inception been an international enterprise, but never more so than now. There are strong groups of stratification researchers in many nations throughout the world and
sustained contact between researchers from different countries, promoted in large part by the Research Committee on Social Stratification and Mobility (RC 28), which meets regularly twice a year, typically in the spring in Europe and in the late summer in North America. It is notable that every single one of the major comparative research projects reviewed above includes among its core participants researchers from different countries. The active involvement of researchers who were trained in and continue to be influenced by a variety of national traditions has increased both the richness and the rigor of our common enterprise. All in all, these are exciting times for students of social stratification and mobility.

References


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Endnotes

1. We thank the following for comments on earlier drafts of this paper, but hold none of them responsible since we radically reorganized the paper and hence attended to some of the suggestions and ignored others: Janeen Baxter, Gunn Elisabeth Birkelund, Marlis Buchmann, Tom DiPrete, Ted Gerber, Al Kerckhoff, Paul Kingston, Daniel Krymkowski, Matthew McKeever, Larry Raffalovich, Moshe Semyonov, and Mark Western. In addition, Krzysztof Zagorski generously supplied helpful references to the specialized research literature.

2. For still earlier state-of-the-art reviews see the references cited in Ganzeboom et al. (1991: 278–9). In addition, there are subsequent reviews by Rosenfeld (1992), Myles and Turegun (1994), Breiger (1995), and Kerckhoff (1995).

3. Completing such a study has been a part of Treiman’s research agenda for the past 30 years and of Ganzeboom’s for the past 10 years. A monograph now in progress is intended to bring this project to completion.

4. It is not entirely surprising that Erikson and Goldthorpe can find no evidence of the level of industrialization since their analysis is restricted to industrial nations. This point would not be relevant but for the fact that Erikson and Goldthorpe cast their analysis as a refutation of the “liberal theory of industrialism.”

5. Even here there is some contrary evidence (see Sørensen, 1992; Wong, 1990, 1995).

6. This analysis has itself been subjected to criticism, both by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992: 53–54, 100–101) and by Jones (1992). See the papers and rejoinders in the December 1992 issue of the European Sociological Review for the most complete airing of the controversy regarding the central claims of The Constant Flux.
7. Of 44 papers presented at a meeting of the ISA Research Committee on Social Stratification and Mobility (RC 28), held in Tel Aviv in May 1997, more than half (23) involved either cross-national or cross-temporal comparisons, or both. Three other papers presented cross-sectional multilevel analyses within nations, of firms, schools, etc.

8. Kerckhoff (1995) makes the same point. Indeed, he characterizes his review as concerned with "the beginning of a fourth generation of stratification research ... in which the roles of institutional arrangements in the shaping of stratification processes are systematically taken into account" (p. 324).

9. This claim is at odds with Blossfeld and Shavit’s (1993: 15) summary of the 13 studies. They see much less consistency than we do, claiming that only the Netherlands and Sweden show a systematic decline in the effect of social origins on educational attainment over time. However, in six of the eight nations for which OLS regressions were reported cohort-by-cohort, the trend in the R^2’s is clearly down.

10. For another analysis focusing on the effect of differing educational structures for status attainment, see Krymkowski’s (1991) comparison of Poland, the U.S., and West Germany.

11. Following the May 1997 meeting of the ISA Research Committee on Social Stratification in Tel Aviv, which included strong French representation for the first time in many years, the project is being expanded to include French data in collaboration with researchers from the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques.

12. Combining data from different surveys for a single nation has much to recommend it. First, doing so magnifies the statistical power of the data, not only by expanding the sample size but also by lengthening the historical time-frame. A single survey typically will include individuals differing by at most about 50 years in age whereas a concatenation of all surveys since World War II, when survey research began to be widespread, makes it possible to study persons born throughout the century. Second, combining data from different survey years permits estimation of cohort replacement models within an age-period-cohort framework (De Graaf and Luijkx, 1993; Grusky and DiPrete, 1990; DiPrete and Grusky, 1990b). Third, including data from several surveys in a single analysis makes it possible under some circumstances to assess the effect of measurement error and survey house differences. (Of course, the analyst must be careful not to bury measurement problems under the welter of data available when many surveys are joined and also must be careful not to misinterpret artifacts of measurement as true cohort differences, which may happen when some birth cohorts are represented by single surveys.)

13. The complete data base, consisting of all files we have processed, each of which contains the full set of variables included in each survey, is catalogued on the World Wide Web (http://fswinfo.fsw.ruu.nl/soe/HG/ismf/index.htm). Access to the catalogued surveys must be arranged with Ganzeboom (H_Ganzeboom@fss.uu.nl) since use of some of the data sets requires the permission of the original investigators.

14. Ten of the national surveys have now been organized in a common file available through the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR #9323).

15. In practice, of course, we have substantially fewer contexts since we do not have data for all cohorts in each nation.

16. To be sure, there continue to be advances in these techniques as well. One of the most important is the development of a log-multiplicative layer effect model (Xie, 1992) that permits a single-parameter estimate of the extent of association in a mobility table under a very flexible set of models, and thus provides a powerful way to make comparisons across tables. See the papers in Erikson and Jonsson (1996) for several applications of this technique.

17. We do not discuss event history techniques here, except in passing, since we reviewed
developments in this area in the previous section. The major technical treatments of this topic by sociologists include Tuma and Hannan (1984); Allison (1984, 1985); Blossfeld et al. (1989); Yamaguchi (1991), and Blossfeld and Rohwer (1995). See also Mayer and Tuma (1990) for a collection of empirical applications, many of interest to students of stratification.

18. Work on multiple indicator models and other procedures for dealing with measurement error has continued elsewhere in sociology (see, for example, Bollen, 1989; Bollen and Long, 1993; Hagenaars, 1993; Van Eye and Clogg, 1994); unfortunately, this work has not been systematically applied to stratification research in recent years.
7 The ‘Rediscovery’ of Ethnicity: Theory and Analysis

Christine Inglis

The end of a millennium provides a rare opportunity to reexamine and assess achievements. In the sociological study of relations between diverse ethnic, racial and minority groups it marks a real, rather than a largely symbolic, watershed. There has been major transformation in the form and significance attached to these relations, both academically and in more popular discourse. Research on ethnic phenomena as disparate as immigrant incorporation, nationalism and indigenous human rights movements have moved from the margins of sociological relevance to mainstream debate and theorisation as well as generating wider academic and political interest in a manner which is scarcely matched in other areas of sociology (Bulmer and Solomos, 1996).

‘Ethnicity’ is not unproblematic for it has divergent conceptualisations ranging from ‘primordial sentiment’ (Geertz, 1963; 1973; Eller and Coughlan, 1993) to ‘epiphenomenon’ (Eipper, 1983). However, it comes closest to encapsulating the many forms of ethnic phenomena considered in this chapter. All involve individuals by virtue of their membership (whether voluntary or imposed) in diverse ethnic groups. Common to definitions of ethnic groups is that they are social solidary groupings or collectivities which have a shared sense of peoplehood and a real or putative common ancestry based on distinctive attributes such as territory, nationality, language, religion, and/or physical appearance (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992: 8; Gordon, 1964: 23–24, 27–29; Schermerhorn, 1970: 12). When ethnic groups are also seen as socially constructed the nature of ethnic group membership and the processes involved in this, as well as the relations between ethnic groups, become inherently problematic. The focus of research becomes the elucidation of these relations, their production and outcomes. The now discredited view that ‘races’ are biologically determined means that groups organised or based on physical distinctiveness, ‘races’, are also viewed as problematic and a sub-set of the wider category of ethnic groups. This position does not deny that in certain societies, groups categorised on the basis of ‘race’ may be central to ethnic relations. It highlights, however, that caution must be exercised in giving universal theoretical
priority to ‘race’ as an organising criteria in relations between ethnic groups rather than treating this as a matter for investigation. There has been a tendency in the United States of America and in England to assign discussions of ‘ethnicity’ or ‘ethnic’ relations to somewhat ‘softer’ or less important sets of intergroup relations based on ‘culture’ and values as distinct from the ‘physical attributes’ inherent in ‘race relations’ which are viewed as inherently more intractable, immutable and conflictual (Anthias and Yuval Davis, 1992: 6–8; Omi and Winant, 1986 Ch. 2; Phizacklea, 1984; Rex, 1994). Whatever the accuracy of this perception for the UK or USA, experience in the Former Yugoslavia, Spain, Northern Ireland and elsewhere, demonstrates that race has no necessary prerogative over conflict and violence. Other bases of ethnic group membership can be equally significant in inter-group relations and associated with conflict or violence of an intractable type.

Only in recent decades have ethnic and racial phenomena come to the fore in much European and United States discourse, at the academic as distinct from the popular and the political level (Stone, 1986: 9). This contrasts with other parts of the non-industrial world where ethnic diversity was very much a part of the lived daily experiences and a subject of research within the limits allowed by an often weakly developed university system. The daily images of bloody conflicts with an ethnic dimension, which now intrude via television, radio and the press, into homes in the developed world, have clearly played an important part in focusing attention on such issues. They nevertheless constitute only part of the story concerning ethnicity and its reemergence as a major issue of intellectual consideration. Less dramatic, but for that reason no less significant, are the increasingly frequent encounters involving private and public sector enterprises and individuals in market relations with those of different ethnic backgrounds—whether as employees, co-workers, customers or business partners. To see social developments as alone accounting for the resurgence of academic interest in ethnic phenomena is, however, to underestimate the constraints associated with theoretical models and paradigms.

It is not the intention of this chapter to provide an ‘overview’ of the literature on ethnicity, let alone to be encyclopedic. The increased research and writing in the area means that this is beyond the scope of a single chapter. Others have already begun this task (e.g. Allen, 1994; Brownlee and Mitchell, 1997; Cohen, 1995; Coomaraswamy, 1994; DeWind, Hirschman and Kasinitz, 1997; Inglis, 1994; Jinadu, 1994; Kalekin-Fishman, 1994; Kaul, 1994; Kloskowska, 1994; Morokvasic, 1984; Ratcliffe, 1994; Streiff-Fenart, 1997; Taylor, 1994). What these surveys highlight is the diversity in the research foci and traditions in individual societies. Such diversity replicates the extensive variation in the institutional origins and patterns of ethnic relations which comparative accounts of ethnic and race relations have identified (Banton, 1967; Blalock, 1967; Richmond, 1994; Schermerhorn, 1970; van den Berghe, 1967). It also indicates the extent to which the research foci are influenced by the specific socio-historical context as well as by the development of internationally shared theoretical concerns or paradigms.

This diversity creates difficulties in identifying a shared international canon of critical, influential texts in the area. The citation lists of textbooks and research
studies illustrate the rarity of studies which break through this academic parochialism. Studies which in one society may be seen as path-breaking and highly influential may elsewhere either be unknown or seen as of little relevance to understanding local ethnic phenomena. This can reflect how the ethnic phenomena they describe are perceived as unique to their own society. It can also be that what are considered important ‘insights’ or conceptual advances in one academic environment lack novelty for researchers working within other traditions. Despite the diversity, this chapter argues that three distinct phases of sociological research on ethnicity are discernible internationally. Each period (up to the 1960s, the 1970s and 1980s and the present) coincides with a seachange in the way sociologists have examined and theorised ethnic phenomena. Certainly none of these changes emerged de novo and their roots can be identified in earlier work. Neither have they extinguished existing research traditions nor foci. Nevertheless, each period constituted an advance which coincided with a major shift associated with increasing sophistication in the way sociologists have addressed ethnic phenomena. The main focus of the present chapter will be the developments of the last decade associated with the increasing international prominence of ethnicity as a phenomenon in social relations and often political life.

The conceptual and institutional advances in understanding ethnicity, coexist with a diverse range of challenges which confront sociologists working in this area. The popular ‘awareness’ or ‘rediscovery’ of ethnicity has accentuated the intersection of sociological considerations and practical interests or ‘social problems’. This constitutes a major challenge since it involves increasing pressure for (sociological) research and theorising to address practical issues and provide prescriptions to overcome social and political conflict or facilitate economic relations and gain. The political and policy implications derived from research studies can be highly controversial as shown by the responses to Wilson’s study, The Declining Significance of Race (1978), which argued that in the US class differences were of increasing significance within the Afro-American community (Omi and Winant, 1986: 28–29; Morris, 1996). The changing nature of the sociological and academic enterprise, including especially the call for greater ‘relevance’ and accountability, inevitably affects the conceptual and theoretical developments.

Given the inextricable link between the sociological enterprises and its social context, the next section outlines critical developments associated with the renewed focus on ethnicity. This is followed by an examination of the development of each of the three phases of research and the challenges confronting contemporary research.

A. The Context for the ‘Rediscovery’ of Ethnicity

The major seachange now evident in sociological research on ethnicity involves both the dominant theoretical paradigms and the topics as well as their centrality within sociology. The key changes had begun by the late 1960s in those countries with an established sociological tradition. They have accelerated since the 1980s until now when there has also emerged a substantial set of academic institutional supports for research on ethnicity. Reflecting on the new preoccupations of the
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1990s, John Stone (1998: 10) suggests that they have been shaped by a trinity of forces in gender, genocide and globalism. Whereas by the 1970s gender was already associated with a reassessment of women’s role in society and the development of feminist theoretical perspectives, the impact of genocide and globalisation has been more recent. They have gained momentum since the late 1980s with the end of the Cold War and the major political changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The particular significance of these forces which have greatly influenced encounters between individuals from diverse ethnic backgrounds is their widespread international impact on what have hitherto been distinct, local, research traditions.

Despite its imprecision, the term ‘globalisation’ encapsulates a series of economic, cultural and political changes which have led to greatly increased and new forms of international contacts over the last quarter of the 20th century. One of the most significant features has been the exponential increase in international population movements especially since the 1980s. But it is not only that the numbers involved in these migrations are greater (Appleyard, 1991; Castles and Miller, 1993; Cohen, 1995; Kritz, Lim and Zlotnik, 1992; Stahl et al, 1993; Stalker, 1994). There are also highly significant, qualitative changes in the migrations. They involve flows from, and to, a much wider range of countries. The characteristics of the migrants are more varied with women becoming increasingly involved in labour migration and refugee movements. There is also a growing movement of highly skilled technical, professional and managerial workers. At the same time the forms of population movement are becoming more diverse. Permanent immigration and short-term labour migration now exist alongside refugee movements while there are also increasing movements by asylum seekers or those without legal status or documentation. International students too are a significant component in movements as are business people and tourists. A final significant change in recent international population movements is the involvement of the State. Government regulations now govern criteria for entry and residence and their operation is an important political issue. The regime of control which surrounds international population movements has also come to involve increasing international cooperation as individual States realise that individual policies of selection and control are of only limited effect in the face of the pressures for extensive immigration.

A further aspect of globalisation is that the revolution in technology associated with the development of fast, relatively cheap transport and communications via phone, fax, internet and television ensures that those involved in these international population movements are able to stay in direct and immediate contact with family, friends and developments in other countries in a manner unimaginable until very recently. The ‘isolation’ of the migrant from ‘home’ is now very much reduced.

The impact of globalisation on ethnic relations is not restricted to migration as a new source of ethnic diversity. The economic changes resulting from globalisation are felt internationally. While in some cases the demise of the established economic base has led to increasing poverty and disadvantage, elsewhere, as in Scotland or Northern Italy, economic prosperity has been an important factor in the emergence of regional nationalist or independence movements which are often justified by calls for the recognition by the state of the ethnic and national rights of the regional minority.
Another major factor associated with the emergence of nationalist movements is the political disequilibrium resulting from the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the former USSR and other East European communist regimes since the late 1980s. The former Yugoslavia is perhaps the clearest example of the way in which these political changes have been associated with processes of conflict with a strong ethnic dimension which includes at its most extreme attempts at ‘ethnic cleansing’ or elimination. Outside Europe, the end of the Cold War has seen a realignment of the international military powers, especially the USA, and their declining interest in limiting conflict involving client regimes. Into the vacuum created have stepped ambitious local political figures who have become involved in conflict which has in its train created large numbers of refugees, often from ethnic groups associated with political enemies.

Another important development is that indigenous minorities have increasingly gained a public voice. Especially important has been their involvement with non-government organisations in their search for greater political recognition and a reassertion of their cultural rights and search for social justice. This, together with the international alliances formed between indigenous populations seeking indigenous rights, has ensured their representation in a number of United Nations and other, international, forums where they have been able to put their concerns before the world.

B. Classical Theories and the Marginalisation of Ethnic Phenomenon in Sociology

The first phase of sociological research in the nineteenth century coincided with European colonial expansion and the emergence of the European nation states. Yet, those events did not produce a sociological focus on ethnicity. To understand why it was necessary to ‘rediscover’ ethnicity (or at least phenomena which we now associate with this relatively recent term) it is important to recognise that nineteenth century social theorising argued that a major characteristic of the emerging modern industrial societies was their shift from old patterns of social relationships based on a variety of ascriptive social statuses to newer forms of attainment linked to class (Stone, 1986: 9; Omi and Winant 1986: 30). To the extent that ethnic phenomena continued to play a major role in social relations, not least those involving conflict, this was associated with the existence of pre-modern forms of society. Hence the type of conflicts evident in the various European colonies could be seen as a social aberration which would disappear with modernisation.

In the United States where sociology became established early, Collins has identified empirical research on race and ethnic divisions as one of the main activities of American sociologists throughout the 20th century (1997: 1563). This reminder of the work of Park and his colleagues in Chicago and the many studies of African Americans from the work of Du Bois (1899) onwards highlights an important strand of research activity albeit one in which the focus was often on the individual psychology and behaviour rather than on the institutional and structural factors involved in inequality (Allen, 1994: 62). The dominant theoretical paradigm, which
also fitted well with the official ideology, was that of assimilation which viewed the very evident ethnic diversity in the society as losing its significance as individuals become assimilated (Metzger, 1971; Omi and Winant, 1986). Although subject to possible delays or hindrances, assimilation was the end point towards which relations between ethnic and racial groups were, and should be, heading. The assimilation paradigm with its emphasis on the responsibility for change as lying with the individual minority member and a focus on value consensus fitted well into the dominant functionalist paradigm (Metzger, 1971).

Not all research adopted such a functionalist framework as the work of authors such as Cox (1948) on the African American showed. Nevertheless, within main stream sociological writing, to the extent that ethnic diversity was considered, the tendency was to explore the stages of assimilation rather than to question its appropriateness as a theoretical framework or to seek evidence indicating counter trends in the process of immigrant or minority incorporation. In other immigrant countries such as Australia and Israel the extensive research on immigrant groups in the 1950s followed a similar trend with the dominant model of assimilation also being replicated in the national ideology (Inglis, 1994: 79–80; Kalekin-Fishman, 1994: 184ff).

The key point is not that there were no authors writing before the 1970s on topics such as race and immigrant groups in the USA and other immigrant nations. Rather, that they did so from a perspective which saw the issues as tractable and essentially transitory. Not surprisingly ethnicity was rarely accorded significance in mainstream sociological writings. Even such a monumental work as Myrdal’s *An American Dilemma: the Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (1944) with its argument that there was a disjuncture between reality and the American Creed, failed to lead to a new era of research in the area (Bulmer, 1993: 352). For Myrdal (1944) like other authors prominent outside sociology such as Glazer and Moynihan (1965) also was strongly influenced by the assimilationist paradigm (Omi and Winant, 1986: 17–18).

Analyses which provided a very different perspective on ethnic and race relations did exist. Often the work of political scientists and anthropologists they concentrated on non-industrial societies or marginalised indigenous groups. An example is the work of the former colonial administrator, Furnivall (1939, 1948), who argued in his theory of the plural society that it was the power of the colonial rulers which held together the otherwise very disparate racial and ethnic groups contained within the boundaries of the new colonial states. However, this focus on the role of conflict and institutional structures in the maintenance of ethnic diversity, was either unknown or discounted as applying to pre-modern societies (the terrain of anthropologists) rather than to the industrial societies which were then the major focus of sociological expertise and research.

C. The Period of Transition: 1970s and 1980s

By the end of the 1960s the assumptions concerning the transitory or ephemeral nature of ethnicity could no longer be sustained. Race riots in the USA, immigration
from former European colonies following independence and efforts to establish multiethnic states and the growing numbers of ‘guest workers’ labouring in the expanding European economies, highlighted to industrial societies the continuing reality of their own ethnic diversity. Coinciding with these developments, major paradigm shifts were occurring in sociology as the functionalist model, so closely linked to the assimilation paradigm, was being increasingly questioned.

The most significant feature of the research undertaken in the 1970s and 1980s transition period was the increasing diversity in theoretical paradigms as researchers sought to explain the emergent patterns of ethnic relations. Inevitably, these new paradigms directed researchers to new foci in their research which, nevertheless, remained limited within the boundaries of the state.

Critiques of the assimilation paradigm led to a shift from its individualistic neo-classical economic focus to an examination of the role of social institutions and the dominance of social groups in the maintenance of ethnic disadvantage as exemplified in the neo-Marxian focus used in Castles and Kosack’s classical study *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe* (1973). Racism, including institutional racism was a growing concern especially among researchers in Western Europe as they reflected on the nature of the emergent patterns of ethnic relations (Wievorka, 1992; Wrench and Solomos, 1993). The deterministic nature of the class and state-centred approaches, and the by-passing of the experience of the individual led to the further development of approaches to better capture the reality of active involvement by ethnic groups in inter-group relations. Highly influential from the early 1980s were those which introduced a feminist perspective and explored the gender dimension of the relationships of ethnicity, often in conjunction with class (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992; Bottomley and De Lepervanche, 1984; Phizacklea, 1983). Importantly this research problematised the concepts of class and ethnicity as unitary, overarching definers of social reality and experience. In doing so it questioned not only the determinism but, also, the cultural essentialism sometimes present in these concepts. More recently, cultural studies and post-modernist approaches to ethnicity have become influential though less so in sociology than among those working in areas such as literature, communication and cultural studies. While important for drawing attention to discourse and personal experience as a window onto ethnic relations, their failure to move beyond subjective interpretations has attracted criticism from those arguing that power is an essential dimension to understanding ethnicity (Lie, 1995; Stone, 1998: 14).

The influence of paradigm shifts on scholarship has varied from country to country as has the development of research capacity and expertise. Even within one country the development of research agendas were not necessarily characterised by a gradual accumulation of knowledge and interest. In France, as Streiff-Fenart (1997) has shown, an initial development of research interest and activity in the 1960s was followed by a period of relative inactivity which has only recently begun to be addressed in the light of new concerns about immigration and incorporation. Her explanation for this lacunae highlights the important role of the academic and social context of the research. In the French case these included the importance of the Jacobin tradition, the dominance of Marxist perspectives, the limitations in the statistical data and its relationship to official categories into either foreigner or citizen, and the effects of the low status attached to
ethnic research involving as it did a study of groups who were viewed as marginal and not directly relevant to the major debates of the period (1997: 49).

Outside the Western European and North American sociological communities, research on ethnicity was less influenced by migration than by political and economic changes. As the anthropologically informed studies of different ethnic groups, often used in facilitating colonial rule (as well as the control of indigenous minorities in white settler colonies (Inglis, 1994)) became less than satisfactory in addressing the newer patterns of ethnic relations, research shifted to exploring relations between ethnic groups. But, as Jinadu has shown in Africa the initially dominant modernisation paradigms involved an assimilationist perspective which, as elsewhere, proved inadequate to describe the reality of the relationship between urbanisation and ethnicity (Jinadu, 1994: 166ff). Their place during this transition period was taken by neo-Marxian or similar paradigms which examined the significance of class or colonial institutional structures better able to reflect the conflict and competition involved in domestic ethnic relations.

Often limiting the scope of research in these developing and newly independent countries was, however, a relatively small research community of local scholars constrained in some instances by official opposition to research which addressed politically sensitive issues involving national unity. Ethnicity research was frequently proscribed in new multinational states such as Malaysia or in communist regimes (Kloskowska, 1994: 213). In such circumstances, non-national scholars also had little opportunity to complement the work of local scholars. Such use of state power to deter research on ethnicity inevitably encouraged researchers to adopt paradigms which assigned priority to power relations.

Accompanying the growing recognition of the international importance of ethnicity was an acknowledgement of the value of interdisciplinary approaches in gaining a more comprehensive understanding of ethnicity. Many specialist journals such as Ethnic and Racial Studies which commenced publication in 1978, are explicitly interdisciplinary in their orientation, although sociologists are an important group of authors and readers. The first co-editor of Ethnic and Racial Studies examined how the content of its articles had changed in its first twenty years (Stone, 1998). Their eclectic nature reflects the international and interdisciplinary focus of the journal, and indeed the whole area, while providing insights into continuities and changes in research trends. Among the themes salient in the mid 1970s and addressed in the first issue were migration, Blacks and Jews, classical colonialism and internal colonialism, regionalism and tribalism and a consideration of whether ethnicity could be seen as a primordial social bond (Stone, 1998: 3) John Stone noted how these themes and perspectives were subsequently developed and complemented in subsequent issues by the introduction of additional themes which included Walker Connor’s exploration of nationalism (1978).

D. The 1990s and Emergent Research Trends

Many of the themes which gained prominence in the 1970s and 1980s continue to be developed and explored within the individual research traditions of individual
countries. Within Europe concerns about racism continue, now often linked to discussions of social exclusion, particularly in the context of the growth of right wing political groups and high levels of unemployment (Cousins, 1998; Roche and Van Berkel, 1995). This continuity is also seen in the United States where the race riots of the late 1960s were a significant turning point which provided a graphic illustration of the limitation inherent in the dominant functionalist and assimilationist paradigms. Nevertheless the shift towards sociological analysis which could better grasp and address the social reality of the situation of African Americans was slow to emerge (Metzger, 1971). With regard to the experiences of white Americans, Andrew Greeley was writing as late as 1974 about the need to take account of the significance of ethnicity “the importance of ethnicity as a predictor variable can no longer be ignored by American social research” (1974: 170). The recent resurgence of US academic interest in immigration and settlement results from the renewed flow of immigration apparent by the 1980s. Associated with this research has been a return to the assimilation paradigm, albeit conceived as a more complex process with the development of concepts such as ‘segmented assimilation’ (Portes, 1995a; Zhou, 1997) or the exploration of the changing pace and pathways by comparison with earlier generations of immigrants (Perlman and Waldinger, 1997). The continuing political dominance of an assimilationist ideology in the USA combined with the strong individualistic ethos underpins this assimilationist research paradigm: These same trends, together with a focus on the market, rather than the state, in structuring social relations also coincides with the growth of research on economic incorporation involving labour market or status attainment studies and also ethnic entrepreneurs (Light and Karageorgis, 1994; Portes, 1995b).

As elsewhere, not all US research continues within a single paradigm. An alternative to the assimilationist model are those studies, often involving the Asian American experience, which explore settlement within the framework of global economic change and the operation of institutional barriers (Ong, Bonacich and Cheng, 1994). While building on an earlier research tradition this explicit attention to the impact of international economic developments is consistent with more recently developed areas in international research which in the 1990s have gained increasing prominence and are among the most innovative research developments.

One of the most notable advances is that researchers are taking increasing cognisance of the highly porous and shifting nature of national boundaries which they now build into their analysis even when addressing such ‘traditional’ themes as the nature of ethnic minority incorporation. Key terms in the literature such as migration, diaspora, identity, citizenship, multiculturalism and nationalism reflect the dynamic tensions implicit in so much of the current analysis and its attempt to address the new issues.

Reflecting on the new developments in ethnicity research and its impact on teaching Bulmer and Solomos (1996: 781) note that moves to broaden the boundaries of race and ethnic studies have resulted in the proliferation of new critical perspectives which make it difficult to see it as a single recognisable field (1996: 780). Within this constraint they identify three main themes as the focus of research: (1) terminological discussions about the nature of race and ethnicity and the role of their categorisation in the construction of political and social identities; (2) questions
about citizenship and the boundaries of society as well as the nature of conflicts associated with race and ethnicity; and (3) their involvement in national identities and nationalist movements (1996: 778–9). The contribution of each to research advances has been slightly different.

D.1. Identity Construction

Identity construction is a good example of the changing nature of research foci. The tendency in earlier research on non-immigrant groups was to view an individual’s identity as unproblematic, especially when it was based on racial characteristics. This was despite the existence of studies such as those on overseas Chinese communities which showed the impact of diverse patterns of incorporation in South East Asian societies over several centuries on the nature of ‘Chinese’ identities (Purcell, 1951; Skinner, 1996). Also important for illustrating the constructed nature of ethnic identity was Abner Cohen’s (1969) research on urbanisation in West Africa. Among immigrant groups in the major immigrant receiving societies the process of identity formation, especially among the second generation, gradually came to be seen as problematic and situationally constituted rather than following a relatively smooth path towards eventual assimilation (Bottomley, 1978). As research shifted from the individual focus of the assimilation studies towards more institutional and structural analyses, researchers began to explore the ways in which states and societies had actually used their powers to ‘construct’ racial and ethnic groupings through a variety of legal and administrative powers. Much of this research examined the role in modern industrial societies of the dominant institutional structures and state administrative practices which had earlier been acknowledged as important in various colonial societies (Omi and Winant, 1986; Hirschmann, 1986; 1987; Waters, 1990; Hickman, 1995). With increasing globalisation, the focus of research into identity formation has shifted again. No longer is it confined within the boundaries of individuals states or societies. Indeed the significance of international contacts with the ‘homeland’ or other members of the diaspora is considered an important element contributing to ethnic identity formation (Safran, 1991; Cohen, 1997). Among some authors the significance of these expanding range of influences is examined in relation to the development of transnational identities, and, often, their political and economic implications. Examples range from involvement in nationalist movements as in the former Yugoslavia to the way such identities are associated with the development of economic networks and enterprises as occurs among overseas Chinese communities (Lever-Tracy, Ip and Tracy, 1996).

D.2. Citizenship

Citizenship has re-emerged as a major research issue over the last decade (Turner, 1993: 1). Widely acknowledged as a concept deriving from a Western intellectual tradition, albeit lacking an agreed theory, citizenship has gained considerable
prominence in recent discussion of ethnicity, not least because of its potential to bridge debates ranging from moral and normative issues of incorporation and participation to practical questions of legal status and national identity. A major starting point for contemporary sociologists has been the work of T.H. Marshall (1950) who argued that the development of the welfare state had expanded the concept of citizenship beyond legal status and political membership to include full social participation. The extent to which citizenship as social participation has actually been achieved is a theme explored from the perspective of gender by feminist scholars working on the nature of the state and citizenship (Pateman, 1988). Since the late 1980s social citizenship has been increasingly explored in relation to ethnicity, especially among European scholars concerned about barriers to the access and participation of newer immigrant groups, at a time when new pan-European forms of citizenship are being developed via the formation of the European Union. Some of the substantial body of literature involves comparison with immigrant nations of the ‘new world’ which grant access to citizenship relatively easily (Castles and Miller, 1993; Brubaker, 1989). Other authors explore the legal forms of citizenship in European countries, and citizenship’s importance as a barrier to full social participation, especially among the increasing numbers of resident non-citizens or ‘denizens’ (Hammar, 1990; Soysal, 1994). One outcome of this research has been to highlight the close relationship between citizenship laws and ideologies and the representation of the state and society, often in terms of the existence of an ‘ethnic’ or national rather than a ‘civic’ base which affects the ease with which non-citizens can gain access to citizenship through naturalisation. Alongside the growth of legal dual citizenship questions arise about what ‘national identity’ can and should mean for individuals and the state (Bauböck, 1994). At the same time it focuses attention on the use of legal citizenship as a means of social inclusion or exclusion.

The research on citizenship is notable for its close links with proposals for political action and normative philosophical arguments (Martiniello, 1997: 636). Indeed, the strategic significance of citizenship in contemporary politics can hardly be overestimated (Roche, 1992: 1). A similar, though even stronger focus on the normative, rather than explanatory dimensions of citizenship, also characterises work on the citizenship status of members of long-established and indigenous minorities, and the articulation of these with ideals of individual and group rights and the overcoming of social and economic disadvantage (Lutz, Hannum and Burke, 1989). Much of the writing in this area is part of the wider political discourse centred on international forums involving international organisations such as the United Nations and non-governmental organisations. The nature and meaning of citizenship is also increasingly explored from the perspective of a multicultural society, especially one whose multicultural character extends beyond a description of its demography to a normative statement that ethnic diversity is viewed not as a threat and potential source of conflict but, rather, as in Australia and Canada a benefit for all in the society (Inglis, 1996). Canadian philosophers such as Charles Taylor (1992) and Kymlicka (1995; 1997) have been extremely active in exploring multicultural forms of citizenship which recognise cultural diversity within a liberal democratic framework.
In contrast to the strongly normative and policy-oriented dimensions in much of the writing about citizenship, the burgeoning work on nationalism relies much more on a descriptive and explanatory tradition, albeit one in which historians and political scientists as well as sociologists, play a major role. A trend clearly evident in many of the important early studies of nationalism by Anderson (1983), Connor (1978; 1984), Gellner (1983) and Smith (1971; 1979) was the exploration of the development of nationalist movements and ideologies in diverse states. This helped broaden considerations of the role of ethnicity beyond the industrialised nations which had so often been the bailiwick of sociologists. While in the industrialised nations the political potential of ‘ethnicity’ to serve as a basis for social and political movements had begun to be recognised, the study of nationalist movements with their related demands for political independence, took the study of ethnicity into a new dimension. This was characterised by a search for explanatory models able to account for the strength and forms of both national liberation movements and, also, the processes involved in the attempts by states to establish their legitimacy when confronted by ethnic or national diversity. The more recent growth of interest in nationalism has been fuelled by the end of the Cold War and the associated conflicts and calls for independence which have often been couched in terms of national liberation. As well as studies of these new nationalist movements, there has been a refocussing of attention on the origins of European nationalism and reassessments of the nation-state formations which were a hallmark of the nineteenth century Europe. One of the features of this research has been the extensive debates about the appropriate definition of a nation and whether through a focussing on the context of national formation within one state, or even region, there is a tendency for historically specific forms of ‘nations’ to be advanced as more general models (Schnapper, 1991; 1994; Llobera, 1998).

Another aspect of the central importance attached to ethnicity is the growth of research centres focussing on the area. Their existence has contributed to the development of an intellectual body of expertise and interest which had hitherto been absent. Not only is this expertise evident in publishing and in specialist research centres and internet listings but, also, in the enormous range of conferences, seminars and workshops which now take place on themes relevant to this area. These themes...
are not, however, confined only within specialist conferences. At the 1994 ISA World Congress in Bielefeld ‘multiculturalism’ was a major theme explored in many panels and papers.

As governments begin to consider how to meet the challenges resulting from ethnic diversity, there is increasing provision of funding for research in the area. Regional groupings such as the European Union and international agencies such as UNESCO also complemented national initiatives by funding research. UNESCO’s identification of multiculturalism as one of the three key Social Transformations5 warranting attention and management at the end of the twentieth century is significant since it highlights how, at the international as well as the national and local level, issues related to ethnic diversity are being institutionalised within the programs of major research funding agencies.6

More traditional academic sources of research funding also are giving support to research on ethnicity, even at a time when there is often a reduction in funding from such agencies. In Australia, ‘citizenship’ has been identified as a priority research area by the major academic research body (the Australian Research Council). Likewise, in the USA, the Social Sciences Research Council recently initiated a project on immigration. In both instances, the priority given to these research areas reflects their perceived relevance to social developments: the impact of the new and increasing patterns of immigration in the USA and political moves in Australia towards becoming a republic and redefinition of the national identity as a multicultural nation which has increasing ties with Asia.

F. Advances and Challenges

One theme evident in tracing the developments in ethnicity research is the ineluctable link between political and social change and sociological research and theories as change created and necessitated new theoretical frameworks and research foci. The result has been the incorporation of greater complexity in theorisation and new paradigms. There is only a limited extent to which the changes associated with the ‘rediscovery’ of ethnicity have resulted from a recognition of inadequacies in existing theories. Rather, the advances have been spurred by the limitations highlighted by unanticipated developments. At the same time, social changes have focussed attention on new theoretical directions and research areas.

Another level where society impinges on research and highlights the importance of the social context within which sociology operates is via the increasing diversity in researchers and students. For well over a century members of ethnic minorities have been all too well aware of the socio-political significance of ethnicity. As individuals from these backgrounds become involved in sociology they can give a voice to alternative perspectives, hitherto ignored in studies. Identity construction is one research area where their involvement and contribution has been notable.

The impact is also evident through the role of research in policy development and implementation. Weber’s image of the value neutral sociologist is increasingly difficult to sustain where sociologists and their research are identified as variously, critics of society, activists involved in social change or developers of policy
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initiatives. Policy issues impinge on both the potential to do research and the issues surrounding the whole research process. These trends are not unique to the area of ethnicity but they are especially prominent. While researchers themselves may often become involved in normative and policy statements as noted in the discussion of citizenship, the impact can be extensive as shown by the influence studies such as Myrdal’s *The American Dilemma* and Wilson’s *The Declining Significance of Race* have had on debate and policy decisions in the USA.

The economic, political and technological pressures which have contributed to the increasing encounters between those of different ethnic and racial backgrounds show little sign of diminishing. There is also relatively limited success in addressing the potential for conflict arising from them at the international and national levels despite some limited progress with educational initiatives to limit the potential for interpersonal conflict. Ethnicity in all its various forms is thus likely to continue as an important influence on the academic agenda as well as the political and economic agendas of states and markets. The two sets of ongoing challenges for consideration are, first, those which concern the impact of the socio-political context on future research work and, second, the potential directions for future theoretical and research development.

In the first area of the society-theory interface the importance of what funding agencies identify as policy-relevant research will continue to be extremely influential. The practical and ethical challenges associated with this orientation will be key ones for sociologists to address in a critical and sophisticated fashion. While space does not allow for these issues to be explored here they cannot be easily dismissed. The implications of academic non-involvement can be as damaging as those of involvement. The decision to be involved in policy-related research will require the development of many additional skills for most sociologists including the formulation of policy relevant research questions which allow for precise answers. They also necessitate the development of new working relationships with additional research ‘clients’, outside academia — whether these be the participants, the funding agencies, the members of advisory panels or those with an interest and stake in the dissemination of the results.

A focus on mechanisms and strategies to reduce the potential for conflict is one of the most critical policy issues and necessitates reconsideration of paradigm models. The essentialist conceptualisations contained in many of the more alarmist scenarios such as those associated with Huntington’s clash of civilisations (1996), overlooks the advances involved in the problematisation of identity and ignores issues of disadvantage and access to full participation in society which, unlike the essentialist model, point to clear policy directions. Historical research is important as it can show how contemporary ethnic relations and identities have been transformed over even relatively brief time-spans contrary to the essentialist position. Such appears to be the case in the relations between Christians and Moslems in the former Yugoslavia or the Irish in England and the USA (Hickman, 1995; Ignatiev, 1995; Sekulic, 1997).

The value of historical research accords with the increasing recognition given to interdisciplinary research as a means of obtaining a detailed understanding of ethnic and racial phenomena. But, the challenge for sociologists will be not merely
to read the work of colleagues in other disciplines but actually to work with them in undertaking joint research projects. Many major funding bodies already develop their research agendas without reference to disciplinarity and the blurring of academic boundaries is likely to continue. Thus sociologists need to develop the skills required to work with colleagues from other disciplinary paradigms, a task as challenging as working in any other cross-cultural setting.

The second set of challenges are more traditional as they relate to problem-solving and advances within the sociology discipline. One trend that is increasingly evident in more informal, and/or critical, assessments of work concerns the extent to which the focus has shifted, as with Huntington’s analysis, towards the use of ‘culture’ in its most essentialist manifestations, as a means of describing the key aspects of phenomena associated with ethnic diversity. Aligned to these expressions is also a concern about the extent to which what exists under the rubric of ‘post-modernism’ or ‘cultural studies’ has led to a disjunction between ‘myth’ and ‘reality’ or, in structural terms, ignores the institutional bases for the discourses which are only part of the actual relationships between members of different ethnic groups. In particular there is a questioning of the failure to address issues of power, and socio-economic disadvantage, other than in terms of ‘discourse’ (Stone, 1998: 14–15; Lie, 1995). This is not to predict that the importance of discourse in the construction of relationships will be overlooked. Rather, there is likely to be a reassertion of the importance of institutional and structural forms of analysis, including those which examine the relationship between ethnicity and such key social relationships as gender and class. The need to understand the role of the state and market forces in constructing identities and the taken-for granted categories of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘race’ remain important challenges in a period when their boundaries and influence are highly problematic.

G. Conclusion

The ‘rediscovery’ of ethnicity, or its ‘internationalisation’ as a significant social phenomenon has prompted extensive interest in comparative studies at a time when increasing awareness of the problematic nature of ethnicity and its highly varied societal significance cautions against over hasty translation of research and theory from one society to another. Despite the inherent difficulties and need for caution, especially for researchers who focus entirely on one society, there are benefits from examining developments elsewhere, not least to gain an external vantage point for a more informed analysis of the nature of ethnic relations even within one society. Questions highlighted by such comparisons can take the form: “What are the differences between ethnic relations in Australia and Canada, two ‘traditional’ immigration nations, when the key ethnic groupings categories targeted in Canadian policy are those who belong to a ‘visible minority’ whereas in Australia the comparable group is defined not by physical appearance but by language as being from a ‘non-English speaking background’?”

Extending cross-national comparisons further to compare such ‘traditional’ immigrant nations with European countries which have more recently become
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major immigrant destinations (Brubaker, 1989; Castles and Miller, 1993), involves
the challenge of developing mid-level theorisation without sacrificing the socio-
economic historical specificity of particular societies and institutions. Despite the
earlier comparative attempts, such efforts have faltered in recent years while
researchers have concentrated on gaining more detailed knowledge of domestic
developments. However, with increasing recognition of, and interest in, processes
whereby ethnicity and ethnic relations are no longer contained within a single
society, but rather operate in an international arena transcending social boundaries,
the potential to develop qualitatively different forms of theorising of ethnicity
which transcend their local setting and have more general applicability will be a
major challenge.

The advances and challenges identified in this chapter are certainly not
exhaustive. That there will be a myriad of diverse developments has already been
very evident in the last decade since ethnic phenomenon have so actively re-entered
the intellectual arena. The diversity of these trends will reflect both the continuing
theoretical ferment within sociology and related disciplines and, also, the differing
ways in which these responses are related to the ever-changing role of the sociologist
as both citizen, and a potential participant in ethnic interrelations.

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Endnotes

1. For example, recent work by Portes and his colleagues in the USA has drawn attention to the way the assimilation of particular ethnic groups is affected by their social location. The conceptual shift implicit in ‘segmented assimilation’ (Portes, 1995a, 1996) is a departure from the homogeneous view of society involved in earlier, classical models of assimilation. Indicative of the serendipitous nature of this observation is that this point had been made in relation to patterns of assimilation by refugee settlers in Australia in the 1960s by Jean Martin (1965: 99–102).

2. Of the founding fathers of sociology, Weber paid most attention to the existence of ethnic diversity as in his discussion of pariah peoples who were located very much within pre-modern and pre-capitalist social formations. While the work of Weber and other authors may have been used to explore ethnic phenomenon, including nationalism, this involves using their more general principles.

3. An indication of the limited interest is the way it was not until 1995 that Barth’s 1969 classic Introduction in Ethnic Groups and Boundaries was translated into French by Poutignat and Streiff-Fenart (1995).

4. Some indication of the range of centres is the listing which appears regularly in the Bulletin of the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism.

5. The other two issues are urbanisation and the relationship of the global to the local, which are supplemented by a focus on poverty.

6. Among the research topics funded by the UNESCO MOST program are monitoring ethnic conflict in Central and Eastern Europe, ethnicity and conflicts in Africa, citizenship and multiculturalism in Europe, democratic governance in multicultural societies in Central Asia, migration and ethno-cultural diversity in the Asia-Pacific region and terminological clarifications for multicultural and multiethnic societies. For example, recent work by Portes and his colleagues in the USA has drawn attention to the way the assimilation of particular ethnic groups is affected by their social location.
PART IV

Changing Institutions and Collective Action
8 Sociology of the Family: Global Advances and Challenges

Barbara H. Settles

Sociology of the family as a field of research, education and action faces many challenges and critics, both within academic institutions and in the larger society. This paper focuses on recent developments in international family sociology in the context of the discipline of sociology, and its connections to interdisciplinary family studies. Some attention is given to the processes of communication, including publications, collaboration, and innovation. International family sociology is connected to historical and current sociological trends and has been affected by the rise of other specializations in sociology.

The study of family is one of the oldest and most active fields in sociology (Park and Burgess, 1924). In his analysis of the impacts of the discipline of sociology, Gans (1989) noted the ASA study showing that family, along with introductory and social problems, is one of the most frequently taught courses in sociology. A number of comprehensive assessments of the family field were made at the end of the decade of the 80s and beginning of the 90s. The *Handbook of Sociology* (Smelser, 1988), *Handbook of Marriage and the Family* (Sussman and Steinmetz, 1987), "Family Research in the 1980s: The Decade in Review" (Booth, 1990) and the *Sourcebook of Family Theories and Methods A Contextual Approach* (Boss, Doherty, LaRossa, Schumm, and Steinmetz, 1993), provide comprehensive analyses of family sociology research up to the early 1990s.

In Smelser’s volume, Huber and Spitze (1988) were not impressed with where family sociology stood, seeing it as lacking in theories to explain world patterns. Their review of new trends focused on changing structures and relationships as a function of altered costs and benefits, drawing upon the new paradigms in social history, anthropology, and the women’s movement to examine several family domains in the field: technology and family patterns, divorce and remarriage, untraditional dyadic relationships, and parents and children’s effects on each other.

Sussman and Steinmetz (1987) selected scholars from a wide range of disciplinary backgrounds and focused more attention on family diversity than had the earlier handbook edited by Christensen (1964). The growth of other sources of
theoretical and methodological reviews in family studies allowed them to condense those topics and add power, violence, divorce, work, and sex roles as chapters. It took them nine years to bring it together and they immediately started to generate the next handbook published in 1999 with Peterson as a co-editor. New areas in the book include: economics, health, qualitative methodology, measurement, life course development, spirituality, adolescence, early and middle adulthood, social thought, and communication (Sussman et al., 1999).

Booth (1990) used his editorial board to identify the most important topics for integrative essays reflecting the work of the 1980s. Family sociologists are well represented both as authors of essays and in references, however, the *Journal of Marriage and the Family* also draws heavily from family science, social work, health, and developmental fields among others. Not only are life course and family research reviewed, but attention is also given to social problems, policy, and practice.

Boss, Doherty, LaRossa, Schumm, and Steinmetz, (1993) undertook to integrate the major developments in family theory and methods based on the interest of the Theory Construction and Research Methodology Workshop of the National Council on Family Relations. They emphasized the multi-disciplinary nature of the editorial group and the collaboration of contributors. Again family sociology was represented among the authors, citations and reviewers, but was by no means the major contributor. Broadly based interdisciplinary departments, family and developmental departments, research institutes and centers, and private and governmental agencies are among the niches where these family scholars find their support. They identified and critiqued trends for the 1990s on such theoretical issues as feminist and ethnic perspectives, ethics, values and religion concerns, and the breakdown of the private/public dichotomy in family spheres. They also noted changes in the activities of family scholars in greater inclusiveness of family forms, professional participation, constructionist and contextual approaches and limitations. Sprey (1990) in examining new approaches to family theory sees the field of family studies as appropriately pluralistic and diverse.

Global issues are represented in these compendiums. Research and theoretical issues are discussed comparatively in some of the essays. Several projects in the 1990s directed attention to the status of family research world wide. Not only has there been a firm foundation for a global family sociology, there are now resources in communication and analytic tools to link people and projects. Various events during the nineties provided family sociologists with options for integrating family studies. The activities surrounding the International Year of the Family in 1994, the International Sociological Association-Committee on Family Research conferences, the development of the European Observatory on National Family Policies, and a number of specialized conferences and projects gave the field impetus in realizing the scope and substance of a global family sociology. The process of preparing for the celebrations of the year and following up on the policy and program recommendations developed in each country made family sociologists aware that family studies have become an interdisciplinary field in which sociologists need to work with other scholars and practitioners. One project arising from this dynamic was the book of Sussman and Hanks (1996), which collected essays from 23
countries about the status of family studies. While each author chose to approach the topic differently, significant bodies of work were reviewed globally. Although countries throughout the world in both hemispheres were included, major gaps in reporting were found in Africa, parts of Asia, and Latin America. Lack of translation in many languages creates a barrier even when there are interesting scholarly materials such as French and Spanish speaking sociologists have generated.

Several concerns have been expressed about the progress of family sociology. Some critics find the work in family sociology lacking in sophistication and significance (Huber and Spitz, 1988) and failing to provide status or distinction to the scholar (Davis, 1949; Christensen, 1964). Others worry about the narrow scope of the field as a specialty that may undercut sociology in general (Collins, 1989). The importance of family either as a fundamental unit in society or a survivor of reform and change is often acknowledged. Handling the many family forms and processes is a practical problem for the theorist of social systems. Typically it is handled by reduction to a nuclear or maternal dyad. As a technique for simplification this choice is analogous to the physical study of matter of atoms or simple molecules. Perhaps the study of family is more the study of families, with the biological analog of the DNA molecules with many permutations being a more useful metaphor.

The study of a sociology of families is no longer viable from a strictly nationalist or local orientation. Globalization can make any family study a part of a larger understanding of families if scholars acknowledge and address the importance of context and connectedness. To illustrate these concerns and the process of developing an international families sociology, some themes will be examined and the trends of current and future work and activities are suggested. These topics represent, but do not exhaust the interesting and important studies that make the field so exciting at the millennium. Three themes of global family sociology will be examined: rapid social and economic change and its impact on the opportunities for families and scholars; mobility and stability shaping individual, family, ethnic and national identities; and the political dimension of family research including uses and misuses of family studies and concepts. In each section there is a statement of main issues, a few of the historical views in family sociology and some examples of interesting work to illustrate advances and challenges.

A. Rapid Social and Economic Change: Impact on the Opportunities for Families and Scholars

A.1. Issues

Rapid social change provides scholars the opportunity to observe how families handle the challenges of adaptation and manage survival issues in a reasonably short and intense period. It forms an envelope creating the effect of a longitudinal study within an abbreviated moment in the social system. Cseh-Szombathy and Somlai (1996: 199) see this as a moment in time when one can study under laboratory like conditions the interdependence of family and society in a changing world. What might take generations to emerge as a shift in how families behave or are
structured may occur immediately and transparently. Political realignments and economic crisis may be the driving forces for family change, mobility, and innovation. The past decade has been rich in opportunities to see such changes. The end of the cold war, the implementation of the European union, the fall of apartheid in South Africa, the expansion of world trade and business, the rise of democratic governments in Latin America are among the many changes that have opened communication and exchange. It is not simply that the old politics have gone away, but also that new politics must be understood. In South Africa, the sociologists have seen family reconstruction as a process to be examined in the new social and political context (Steyn and Viljoen, 1996). The growth of ethnic, ethnic-religious, tribal, and internal violence in many countries has challenged many of the assumptions about globalization and adoption of a world perspective at the local community level. In the former Yugoslavia there had been a history of interchange with western family sociologists and a considerable body of family studies had been accumulated, however as the political conflicts have devolved the country into enclaves and mini-states, and with the economic collapse of the region, it is difficult to imagine what family sociology may be possible in the immediate future (Petrovi, Petrovi, and Simi, 1996). The reconstruction of society in the future could be aided by sociologists in promoting an understanding of social process and gaining a more sophisticated outcome (Coleman, 1993). Whether and which families will benefit or suffer from rapid change is a question to be investigated both in the short term and over the life course all over the world.

A.2. Historical Views

In order to study changing global systems, it is necessary to develop reliable base lines to identify changes in families and their social contexts. As with many other specializations in sociology, much of the family research fell well within a positivistic, quantitative tradition of social thought emphasized in western developed societies. Theoretically, family sociology has been thought to be essentially part of mainstream sociology, especially as theory has developed from the mid-century (Thomas and Wilcox, 1987). Family sociology has many ties to both substantive areas in sociology and to interdisciplinary study of families. In the early years of founding the discipline of sociology, an adherence to statistical treatments of data was used to help create disciplinary boundaries (Camic and Xie, 1994).

In sociology there has been an over-emphasis on stability that families offer their members. Change in family structure and process has been seen as disintegration or dysfunction rather than as strength (Parsons and Bales, 1955; Zimmerman, 1972; Etzioni, 1977; Huber and Spitz, 1988). In contrast, in the family developmental and marital therapy literature, change is perceived as a normal characteristic of family process (Burgess and Locke, 1950; Carter and McGoldrick, 1980; Mederer and Hill, 1983). Therefore, families that fight change are more likely to be dysfunctional than those that embrace it. White (1991) uses and expands family developmental theory in designing and analyzing a study of Canadian families, suggests that the similarity of norms of family process may be increasing...
cross culturally and that it may be possible and useful to test this proposition. Doherty and colleagues (1993) discussed how systems create relationships among institutions and moderate the effects of cultural and societal level of change on families. Major paradigmatic shifts have altered the understanding of the alternatives that effect families survival and change in their relationships. That is not to say that broadly international and cross cultural issues were left unaddressed, but rather that frustration and unease were often the result of such efforts.

A.3. Advances and Challenges

Assuring comparable data continues to be problematic, because of the difficulties faced in replicating one model of investigation and interpretation in differing cultures and academic traditions. Kain (1993) presented comparative data on rates of change in the developing and developed nations with caveats about comparability and the underlying structure of the data gathering, carefully laying out how he had attempted to handle these problems. For both sampling and measurement it is not necessarily the case that identical procedures produce identical outcomes (Lee and Haas, 1993: 123). Careful translation and back translations are not sufficient to claim that the items are the same. Finding the concept that can be understood in each culture with a similar meaning is necessary. Although the problems of meaning are easily recognized in cross-national or sub-cultural studies as important, especially in sensitive topics or complex issues, in family sociology it is not as well developed as it is in other social science and interdisciplinary studies (Rosenblatt and Fischer, 1993).

Larzerelle and Klein (1987) call for attention to the need in comparative analysis to address the difficulties of separating or finding the boundaries between cultures or within cultures to sub-cultures. Lee (1987) suggests that family sociology may not be comparative simply because the sociology is done elsewhere. Even if the samples are large, they could amount only to a case study that may or may not contribute to a subsequent secondary analysis that is comparative at the social systems level. Rossi (1989), in describing units of analysis in sociological studies, suggests that kinship groups are not used frequently in western societies because of the fuzziness of their definitions and that household has become the contemporary unit of choice for overcoming this ambiguity. Kinship dyads are also of some importance and are often used as a stand-in for family as a concept or in conjunction with household. He questions whether the increasing number of single person households and homeless may make this unit less appropriate as a micro-social unit of analysis. Bulcroft and White (1997) posit that several levels of analysis and appropriate units of analyses are necessary in family studies.

Descriptive studies are still useful for understanding the range of families and policy issues. Analytic opportunities within a descriptive approach were identified in the newly available data on the demography of former Eastern block countries and the Soviet States (Juozelinien, 1993; Taljnaıt, 1993; Laja, 1993). Previously, some governments had treated data on age and gender groups and families/ households as classified security material. These policies have shaped both the
data and impressions about the trends. As political and economic changes make policy makers aware of their need for information, the lack of past base line data and interpretive work puts the contemporary analysts under some strains. Descriptive reports are badly needed to be able to build more complex analyses across these countries and in comparison to other areas. At the same time continuing political and state sponsorship of almost all funding of studies suggests that researchers will be unlikely to continue doing independent research about the family (Zvinkliene, 1996). In Poland the investment in family studies under the state socialism had been relatively high with several schools of family research producing a considerable array of integrated studies. While the social and political changes suggest that new topics and approaches could build insights free of censorship, narrow methods, or political control, there are still issues of conservatism about the choice of issues, open access to publication outlets and funding that serve as a brake on reforms (Wejnert, 1996).

Even when there is a large investment in careful research in developed countries there are gaps. In the detailed study by Nauck (1993) which examined differences in the family situation of a wide spectrum of youth from the former east and west Germany, the social and political context resulted in some of the potentially interesting families being excluded from the original study because they were not citizens of Germany. More recently he has been able to address these groups in another project (Nauck, 1997). The scholar works within and around the merging changes, and studies how these changes are being processed by society. When a project has limits in comparability, strategic decisions about techniques and approaches up front, allow for later comparisons to be practical. Examining the dynamics of social change and family analysis with equivalent or relatively similar data is a continuing challenge.

New values, tastes and preferences may be either a fashion or a fundamental change across a nation or a region of the world. Small details may have important symbolic meanings. Names can convey symbolic meanings. In the United States the fashions around naming children have for the most part reflected current media stars or family traditions. Social movements such as the women’s rights and civil rights movements have returned to historical sources and use these symbols to provide rationales for building common understandings for the need for change. In the women’s movement, hyphenated surnames or new merged names have been popular. In analyzing distinctive African-American names, Leiberson and Mikelson (1995) note the upswing of unique names that followed the increased awareness of cultural roots, but also recognized that there are parameters within that shape the choices to be connected to the societal context linguistically and to convey gender. Clothing is another example of change encompassing symbols. In China the blue and gray of Maoist clothing was reflective of the philosophy of the revolution and the policies of the government, but the radical changes of the past twenty years saw fashionable clothes as symbolic of ideological change and a new status symbol (Kunz, 1996). It is easy to document the fashion or fad, but understanding the meaning of the underlying change itself is more difficult.

Comprehending families in larger social context requires attention to the relative impact and response to change. Careful social accounting would examine who bears
the costs for social decisions made at the broad societal level. In the United States of America, the reasonable investments made in our elderly have not been matched by attention to children’s needs and we have not really assessed those long-term costs (Aldous and Dumon, 1990; Fuchs and Reklis, 1992). The impact of a family member’s unemployment on family life has been shown through current studies and comparisons made to the findings of the studies of the great depression (Targ and Perrucci, 1990). Similar attention is needed to identify the total costs of local competition within and across national boundaries to attract investment and jobs, including tax and other subsidies and the loss of wages across communities. Haas and Hwang (1995) have studied in detail how the company family policies in Sweden have worked out in practice with fathers still finding the corporate culture less than father friendly. Funder (1993) recounted of the consequences of divorce reform in Australia and the continuing lag in women’s earnings and lack of regular paternal support as marginalization of fathers. She observed that the social value of children is itself the underlying problem in crafting good family policy and law.

Kamerman and Kahn (1991) have effectively used cross national studies and analyses to challenge thinking around issues of children’s welfare within the United States system. Their approach countered the claims of those who would protect children and families by neglecting them. They have attempted to draw the US states into a similar dialogue about welfare reform and its impact on children as variously conceived and administered (Kamerman and Kahn, 1997).

A.4. Summary

Recent social and political changes have created opportunities for families to make adjustments and create innovations in condensed time lines. Major interventions have encouraged a reconfiguration of family forms and supports. Developing comparable family data bases and statistics is more practical, but requires scholarly consensus and action across national lines. Distinguishing superficial global commonalties from essential changes in family life requires sensitivity to the meanings of symbols. When the larger social institutions undertake a cost and benefit assessment, the costs to families are usually marginalized in the accounting.

B. Mobility and Stability: Shaping Individual, Family, Ethnic and National Identities

B.1. Issues

Identity is fundamental in everyday life and has implications for the study of family. Legitimacy and recognition of one’s right to exist in a place and to make choices about one’s life style are at the core of individual and family survival. Until a reasonable level of security is achieved little else matters. The right to move, travel and to be in contact with persons you value, is connected to how identity is defined and licensed. Citizenship and passports are indicators of how these rights are
negotiated, legitimized and dispersed. Family has been used to provide an assignment of identity and a context for personal worth.

B.2. Historical Views

From feudalism to corporate loyalty to a market economy, the relationships among the individual, family, and the larger economic system are central to the freedom and control the family or individual may acquire. Formerly social control included tying a person to a location and a hierarchy. At the familial and individual level, mobility has been a strategy for survival. Most barriers to movement have been dysfunctional to family betterment in a changing economy. National and international agreements are made with minor attention to consequences for families. The influence of the Cambridge group in training scholars in techniques of record linkage and the development of family history and life course analysis have made studies across time and cultures more viable (Laslett, 1972, 1995; Hareven, 1996; Sussman and Hanks, 1996). Changes in the way social practices are viewed globally have had an impact on families and the approach of family scholars. Social movements have brought to the forefront issues of equity, personhood, and essential human rights.

B.3. Advances and Challenges

Social and political conflict has been a feature of current mobility controversy. Smelser (1996) sees the movement toward greater internationalization of economic processes and population migration as accelerating. Xenophobic reactions toward new immigrant groups and over-solicitous beliefs about the success of other groups are still quite typical of over generalization about immigration and changing social values (Caplan, Choy, and Whitmore, 1992). There is a sense that to be without an identity in the clan or party is to be vulnerable and that the nation state can not be a protector for individuals and families against such ethnic and racial group rivalry (O’Sullivan and Wilson, 1988). Three areas will be used to illustrate how individual, family, ethnic and national identities are interdependent: economic and social development, homelessness, and fertility and sexual expression.

Families carry most of the transitional costs for implementing economic and social development. Market forces may eventually provide a better quality of life, but many barriers keep families, from taking effective action to improve themselves. Common family economic problems include: the separation of families so that either or both spouses can find work (Steyn, 1998); the employment of women in domestic or nonwaged work, which separates them from their children and husbands (Aymer, 1993); the dependence on other relatives and friends for child care; the growth of the markets for the exploitation of women and children. Exploitative conditions in some businesses, and the offshoring of production and jobs from one country to another, undercut wages and benefits (Settles, 1993). At a fundamental level, individuals and families are micro-systems dealing with macro-systems for
their survival and right to exist. The free movement of labor, hypothesized by some economic paradigms, is highly limited and regulated.

The rights of individuals have been expanding and more people are seen as having a right to influence their own destinies. The expansion of voting rights throughout the world documents this expansion of personhood. The various civil rights acts have solidified these opportunities for the people in the United States of America. The order and sequence of this expansion have been different in other countries and many impediments remain in the world to universal suffrage. Personhood in this context means that an individual is thought to have capacity for choice, responsibility, and contribution to the society. Racial, gender, ethnic, and religious barriers to participation have begun to drop away. However, the markers of class are subtly shifting and many scholars believe that for those in poverty, the class and environmental barriers are becoming more stringent (Wilson, 1991). The present economic climate is threatening to the middle class who are marginal. When the discouraged poor and disadvantaged racial and ethnic groups have no vision of how mobility could become a reality for them, the potentiality for violence and despair is heightened (Lacayo, 1993). Hallinan (1997: 4) sees that current global theories of social change fail to explain the responses of social systems to disruptive events because such theories do not specify the links between macro and micro-level processes.

Home is both a concept and context for family life. By defining home in ever escalating and exclusive terms the poor are left without housing and are denied basic rights. Public spaces are no longer leisure or work places when they become camps for the dislocated and “homelessness becomes part of our everyday lives” (Vaness in Frawley, 1992: 7). Learning to ignore or avoid eye contact may help in getting by each day, but the quality of life for everyone is impaired (Axelson and Dail, 1988). For many individuals and families, home is an elusive concept to establish in their real worlds. Being homeless in community of origin, in a refugee camp, not having valid papers to travel, or not being allowed to bring your family as you define it when you migrate, immigrate, or move within your community are common problems. Facing a change in the government where you have lived may leave you and your family out. Being told to go home to a country, your family has not seen in many generations, and where the local government and community do not recognize your claims may leave you homeless. It is troubling to analyze the relationship between home and country. No one should be homeless or without a country, but current change that suggests a new era for international relationships is having a huge fall-out in a large number of displaced persons (Berger, 1990).

Choices in social expression of sexuality have shown how identity and personal entitlement have changed. The gradual shift in beliefs about sexuality and its expression outside of marriage has been reflected in wider range of personal choices. Thornton’s (1989) analysis of the relationship between norms and behavior over the twentieth century shows a general movement in attitudes toward accepting premarital sexual expression and acknowledgment of the occurrence of extramarital sexuality. Although these trends were identified at least by the 1920s (Francoeur, 1987), public debate was not enlightened by the new norms of behavior
Sociology of the Family: Global Advances and Challenges (McNamara, 1988; Brown and Mann, 1989; Furstenberg, 1991). Social myth has obscured the differences in the timing of physical sexual maturity and delaying of marriage in the twentieth century (Miller, 1987; Miller and Moore, 1990). Not only are youth sexually interested, but also fertile at a much earlier age on average with a much longer time before cohabitation or marriage.

The impact of a contraceptive technology controlled by women on identity and personal freedom can be seen in the studies of female sexual attitudes and behavior. “One important theme to emerge from this analysis [changes since 1960s] is the relaxation of social prescription and an expansion of individual choice” (Thornton, 1989: 887). Modifying sexuality and fertility behavior has been widely studied and principles identified. Education for women, availability of reliable contraception with lower maternal and infant death and morbidity rates, and employment opportunities in the money economy for both men and women tend to accentuate the changes especially for women (Keyfitz, 1989). Fox (1993: 30) suggested that these factors translate into four strategies for population growth reduction: reducing infant and child mortality, increasing educational opportunities... providing access to safe, affordable and effective family planning services, and improving family income. Women have more opportunity to be independent in their choice of activities and family decision making. The expansion of personhood to include women has been encouraged by mobility opportunities.

B.4. Summary

When choosing theoretical models for studies useful to a global sociology of families, family sociologists could pay attention to the approaches families develop to cope with dynamic and normal change. Barriers to mobility may be dysfunctional for families. The loss of mediating institutions in a world market economy puts each family at risk to global economic decisions and conflicts. What is new about the current restructuring is that it does not affect only the classically vulnerable, but also undermines skilled and white collar workers (Cheal, 1996). The ways in which families create alternatives and moderate their own perceptions of globalization will be worth documenting.

In the future families may be the initiators of innovations and as leaders in change. Where change in sexual and fertility norms and behavior has happened, the critical importance of skills and knowledge and access to technology has been demonstrated. The sum of the micro-level decisions in families that involve fertility, mobility, and obtaining and using resources provide a total picture to the macro-processes of society (Huber, 1990). Certainly demography is found in the couple’s bed and change in the woman’s head. Macro-level meets micro-level.

The costs that accompany individual success and class mobility have been ignored, while encouraging achievement has been emphasized. Less is known about coping and adjustment for both those who succeed and those who are left behind. Understanding the systemic relationship among limited resources, increased population density and demands, social conflict and violence is an important
challenge to sociologists (Homer-Dixon et. al., 1993). These problems have been studied by sociologists in Asia where the impact of labor migration on family is evident (Cho and Lee, 1993; Yi, 1993; Quah, 1993a; Quah, 1993b).

C. Political Uses and Misuses of Family Studies and Concepts

C.1. Issues

The role of family sociologists in interpreting their knowledge to the public discourse has become more central. Not only practical programs, policy analysis, and evaluation research have policy implications, but the most basic descriptive statistics and family process studies fuel debate. Sociologists do not agree with each other about interpretation. The hope of many, who love basic research activities, has been that good research would speak for itself. Using a value free or value explicit model was thought to protect the individual from politics. The consequences of applying theory to practice were not the scientists responsibility. Some of this distancing came from a naive view of how other sciences do their work. Gans (1989) worries that the current technologies and criteria for advancement encourage scholars to do piece work that may be chosen because of the convenience of secondary data and computer programs. He suggests that interpreting research and writing for the public should also be considered relevant to promotion and tenure decisions.

In family sociology the increasingly hostile and divisive political climate around the meaning and value of families for society has dominated the 90s. This is not a new problem, but rather that reluctance of mainstream sociologists to interpret findings has allowed a few highly politicized academics with marginal family credentials to take the leadership in speaking for and about families. In the following section two examples of issues, that seem at first glance to be relatively cool topics, will serve to show how current family sociology has become politically charged. The definition of family and the legal regulation of families have been examined closely by researchers in the 90s and connections to the political process have been identified and analyzed.

C.2. Historical Views

Within sociology professional status and prestige have tended to be allocated to those doing macro-level theories and analysis. Application and uses of sociological findings are either seen as work for other professionals or less interesting activities for less prestigious scholars. Davis (1949) suggested that perhaps because the family is a small and intimate unit that is linked to moral and ultimate ends, it has seemed not to be rewarding to study to the sociologist who would like to explain instrumentality in social systems. Huber and Spitz (1988) saw family sociology in the United States as a field persistently criticized for its lack of sophistication and significance in the problems addressed, theories proposed, and data quality.
The use of the family as a building block or a dependent variable has been common in sociological theory development. Murdock’s functions and findings were used to support the universality of the nuclear family (Lee, 1987). Parsons use of this imagery and concepts from Freud dominated the discussion of what is family (Kingsbury and Scanzoni, 1993). Scholars early challenged this perspective with data about the modified extended ties of small families and international family studies showed the close connections among households that have relatives. However, the simplest versions of families still are featured in common perspectives in sociology. In the 1980s controversies about definitions had come to the forefront as research documented a variety of families and their claims to be families (Settles, 1987). In the 1990s this area of theoretical refinement was developed and discussed globally (Settles, Steinmetz, Peterson and Sussman, 1999; Becker, 1991; Singly, 1993; Bawin-Legros, 1999).

Understanding the family from a legal perspective has focused on the changing codes with the advent of women’s rights and civil rights movements. Concerns with age of consent, property rights, divorce and custody, inheritance and responsibilities have been a long-standing area of legal interest. The relationship between the practices of everyday life and legal codes may be seen in a topic like gender role changes of the twentieth century that are not institutionalized completely (Bernard and Chilman, 1970; Huber, 1990) in either the national or international value schema. There has been a trend toward legalizing egalitarian treatment, following role preferences, as has been reported in the United States by Thornton (1989).

The secular trend has been consistently toward an overt and institutionalized commitment for equity and now is recognized by international bodies such as the United Nations and the European Community. The United Nations’ commitment to human rights and the inclusion of women in setting their own destinies has provided a solid foundation for policy and legal reforms world wide (Sokalski, 1992). While actual behavior has not always followed law, attitudes and expectations have been altered. Nader (1986) suggested that male dominance is expressed somewhat differently in various cultures and was not completely captured in many feminist critiques. Adams (1993) found that for men the situation was even more complex in Africa. Many men who were well educated and who had reliable employment were able to continue with traditional role arrangements for a longer time because the powerful families to which they belonged could find women who are willing and interested in the trade-off.

C.3. Challenges and Advances

One of the major controversies in this century has been the conflict among scholars and the legal, service, religious, economic, and political systems over how family and household could or should be defined. This issue is not just an interesting theoretical and conceptual problem, but its consequences for the quality of life, the social acceptance, and the availability and access to services, economic, and social goods.

Institutions have scope in selecting some families over others in distributing rewards and costs. The legal system sets boundaries, responsibilities, and privileges
officially for specific relationships. The continuing responsibilities for family members over the life course are regulated. Eligibility for insurance, programs, tax breaks, and services are determined by bureaucratic definitions. Dependency and care are usually a matter of legal as well as normative expectation. Responsibility, legal mandates, parenting obligations, spousal expectations are useful tools for understanding the definition’s impact on policy outcomes. Incentives for certain family forms and households may be built into codes, benefits, and contracts. Scholarship and professional practice in related disciplines such as family therapy, microeconomics, family science, and child development provided interdisciplinary connections. Ganong, Coleman, and Mapes (1990) find in a meta-analysis of studies that family as a concept remains for many people a conservative view of family structures despite increased family diversity.

Institutions may lag behind the society in recognizing diversity in family structure as normal. These concerns about family forms and functions may lead to the need to negotiate among institutions and the misuse of familial definitions may lead to inadequate or inappropriate service. Grubrium and Holstein (1990) and Forsberg (1995) have documented how practitioners may operationally define families around their perceptions of functionality and normality and then show how action may be guided by these perceptions. Medical institutions serve individuals, but use families as surrogate decision-makers and supportive caregivers in a way that earlier in the century sociologists like Burgess never anticipated (Burgess and Locke, 1950). Some patients may not receive treatment or benefits if there are no appropriate family members to support during the intervention and to handle the post-hospital treatment: single people (Goldman, 1993), AIDS patients (Anderson, 1989; Tibler, Walker and Rolland, 1989); gay and lesbian partners (Larson and Edmondson, 1991; Zicklin, 1995).

Family sociologists have been refining what familial relationships mean in the context of theory. Levin and Trost (1992) used dyadic analysis to reveal family construction as a personal process. Trost (1993) reported gender differences in perceptions with women including more dyads in their families. Quah (1998: 219–246) suggested that the parent child dyad, especially the resiliency of the mother’s ties, is critical to conceptualizing family from a more classical sociological theoretical foundation. Women and children increasingly form more households which function as families no matter what the traditional definition or legally preferred family form remains. Dealing with this fact, in the political situation within the United Nations and among the countries participating, was a challenge in promoting the International Year of the Family in 1994 (United Nations, 1994; Boyden, 1993).

Depending on the stage of life, the likelihood that several households will be involved in one family network is quite high. Household is not a substitute for family either statistically or theoretically. Family ties and living arrangements provide an arena to explore how family is defined and redefined in real life. Theory can be enhanced by encompassing such negotiations as: young adults returning to their parents home (Jones and Wallace, 1992; Levy and Michel, 1991); the increased participation of grandparents in raising their grandchildren (Kivett, 1991; Purnell and Bagby, 1993); custody transfers following divorce and continued relationships
of the divorced and their children (Kitson and Morgan, 1990; Coleman and Ganong, 1990; Duran-Aydintug and Ihinger-Tallman, 1995); and living together apart (Trost and Levin, 1997). Residency, affection, and intimacy are then dimensions in familial relationships, not household features.

Currently several political groups, which claim to have family values, have been reasserting a preference for two-parent families by citing sociological, psychological and economic findings that show advantages of the greater income and social power of these families. The Communitarian Network has been particularly effective in presenting the two-parent nuclear family of western nineteenth and twentieth centuries as a universal truth while denying they propose a narrow definition of family (Elshtain, et al., 1993). Poponoe (1993) has presented a criticism of family policies and practices that uses the 1950s as a baseline and suggests that families have changed negatively from the ideal family of that period. Stacey (1993) counters his claim by noting that this decade is an anomaly not typical of past or present family forms. Glenn (1997) criticized family research and families as portrayed in family textbooks from his conservative view. His approach was twofold attacking texts on: (a) scholarly grounds of balance, accuracy of presenting contrasting views, and arguments from evidence; and (b) attention to the treatment of selected issues of the importance of marriage, effects of families, especially solo parents on children, and analysis of the debates on family change and feminism. As Skolnick (1997) notes in her rejoinder to Glenn, at the center of the culture wars is the issue of defining the family, who is to be included and who is to be excluded from our world view and moral visions. The shaping of secondary level family texts by conservative political forces has already been achieved (Jones and Safrit, 1992; Spinner, 1992), so this debate may limit collegiate texts as well.

The legal and policy encoding and regulation of families are vested at the most local of the governmental units and have been difficult to integrate into a comparative analysis because of the great variety of specific differences and outcomes. However, international interest and leadership in purposeful change has lead to a framework of best practice recommendations from international organizations and advocates. The effects, both intended and unintended, of legal reform have gained the attention of sociologists (Donzelot, 1977; Grother, 1981; Cherlin, 1988; Moen, 1989; Quah, 1990).

The bench law of different judges and courts provides wide latitude in the interpretation of the laws regarding family. In the United States questions of jurisdiction and inter-state cooperation have lead to a belief that there will be nationalization of family law (Buehler and Gerard, 1995; Erickson and Babcock, 1995), and more comparability in enforcement (Courtney and Collins, 1994). Internationally, the problems of legal definition of family and familial rights and responsibilities are similar to the United States, although France still has a more lengthy process and considerable judicial control (Fine and Fine, 1994). In the emerging eastern European countries questions about how these new nations will continue or digress from previous family practice, policy, and law are being examined (Juozelien, 1993; Taljnait, 1993; Laja, 1993). In the European community the effects of differing family laws and regulations are being tracked and monitored as change in the European community affects such policy (Dumon,
The likelihood for practical cooperative effort in research and policy analysis is enhanced when regional groups are nurtured. The challenges of appropriate comparative study and reporting of projects must be addressed so that global study of families is advanced.

The perception of fairness is a measure of effective legal codes and controversy over the values embedded in the code. A case of conflict can be seen in the way the adoption of no-fault divorce legislation across the United States has given rise to political and personal turmoil. Fairness and equity for various family members in the court and legal system nationally are concepts that are now being described from the participants’ perspectives (Rettig, Magistad and Tam, 1994; Frazer and Stum, 1994). Acrimony over fault seems now to be playing itself out in the custody and property settlement arena and reduced awarding of alimony (Fine and Fine, 1994). Re-litigation or abduction of children following divorce is a common happening when there are children’s issues of support, property, custody and visitation or combinations of these issues being important (Koel, Clark, Straus, Whitney and Hauser, 1994; Greif and Hegar, 1994).

Legal reform internationally includes some of these same dynamics. Arising out of the work, in the celebration of the International Year of the Family in 1994, many countries have initiated programs for legal reform especially in domestic violence, elder abuse, and children’s rights. As countries achieved a consensus for change in their legal structure to incorporate United Nations statements on human rights, a real need for model legislation arose. While there are many expressions of desire for new laws, there is not a thorough study of which type of laws and how they should be drafted to be most effective (Sokalski, 1992).

C.4. Summary

Defining the role of international scholarship in policy and legal reform requires some consensus be developed. When sociologists leave their work uninterpreted for policy makers it invites misuse and grave misunderstanding of our studies. When there is not adequate data available, unsubstantiated estimates will be made and rumor will substitute for substance. Advocates may shape debate with anecdotes and data out of context. Decisions are being made at local, national, and international levels that affect families futures and their claims upon society. Sociologists need to build coalitions and cooperative arrangements in order to have influence in defining, studying, and advocating for change. In their review of the consequences of family change, Mancini and Orthner (1988: 366) state, “If family professionals are to behave responsibly, then they must be committed to intervening in family and societal life”.

D. Conclusion

In this chapter three themes have been presented which illustrate where barriers have been overcome and advances have been made that illustrate a growing global
family sociology. The first is the impact of rapid social and economic change on the opportunities for families and scholars. The second theme is the discussion on how mobility and stability shape individual, family, ethnic and national identities. And the third theme focuses on the political dimension, that is, the uses and misuses of family studies and concepts. Rapid social change has been a primary feature of the situation for many families and family sociologists in the nineties. The wider interchange and communication among sociologists have given energy to more global interests in interpretation. There have been and still are opportunities for quasi-experimental and brief historical studies because of rapid social change and mobility of families.

With rapid social change and the mobility that goes with it, the concept of stability for many families ceases. However, with change has come immense challenges and opportunities for families to improve their lives. Interplay of boundaries and markets affects everyday life for both families and scholars. Scholars have many new openings for creating better data bases and more comparative analysis. For families, challenges to protect or expand personal freedoms and unite or reunite families are fundamental. Political processes are not only part of the funding and priority setting in family research and evaluation, but also are part of the agenda for setting policies and programs affecting family life. Both the legal and programmatic regulation of and services to families are affected by the findings and interpretation of family research.

Today family sociologists live in interesting times. There is an accumulation of a vast literature, that is more inclusive of interdisciplinary and international findings, and is accompanied by the techniques to search it. Advances in information services aid while barriers of language and culture hinder today’s sociologists. Taking the responsibility for the outcome of one’s research still has not been totally accepted as an expectation for family sociologists.

The advances in communication and technology and an interest in academic institutions international connections have made it easier for scholars earlier in their careers to be more able to be independent of their local situation and more involved with those of similar interests across the world. While technology makes sending of messages easier, gaps in meaning and language challenge a discourse that is inclusive and objective. Advancing the state of scholarship and support in diverse settings requires some new manners for the academy. Sometimes setting aside hierarchies of what is sophisticated and what provides status to the academic discipline or organization is necessary. Still today methods for evaluating scholarly work have shaped local agendas of research and publication (Shangmar-Handleman, 1996; Quah, 1998: 1–33), and even the importance to publish in English shapes the discourse (Smelser, 1988).

Many interesting ideas arise from contrasting qualitative observations and data crunching and looking behind these measures to find the theoretical and political assumptions buried in our work and support. In order to promote collegial projects cross-nationally or cross-culturally, the needs of participants to meet the expectations of their home institutions and professional peers must be addressed. At a practical level recognizing the underlying organizational differences in academic and national settings is profoundly difficult, and the cultural differences in what reports and
documentation are needed are immense. The differences in institutional settings in demands and rewards and in daily uncertainties of cooperative work are considerable (Kohn, 1987; Sussman and Hanks, 1996). At a basic entry into projects, clear communication about these matters is difficult because the differences are so embedded in the everyday life in society that one may not recognize potential conflict.

Separating the body of knowledge in international family sociology from the process of creating it is a delicate operation that may not be the strategic approach to understanding. Advances in family theory and analytic tools are more widely disseminated so that studies may have clearer links with each other. Comparative analysis is usually easier if the higher level abstractions are incorporated into the planning of studies and a foundation is laid for gathering data that has some unifying constructs. That is not to say that a single master theory must be bought into by everyone, but rather that comparability not be handled at the level of specific social variables that appear similar. Conceptual clarity will recognize that the same behavior may have different meanings and different behaviors may speak to the same idea. Lee and Haas (1993) note that the focus on statistical differences may be misplaced in comparative research. They suggest that Kohn’s argument to pay more attention to explaining similarities is well taken. The investment in attempting to do some of this theoretical work in study design may pay off over and over again in a complex program.

Internationally, sociology as an area of study at the university level has had different levels of acceptance and development. In Europe, North America, and now the Far East there are well-developed programs (Bak, 1996; Tolkii-Nikkonen, 1996; Eriksen and Wetlesen, 1996; Trost, 1996; Shen, 1996; Chow, 1996; Cho and Lee, 1993; Yi, 1993; Quah, 1993a). One of the challenges faced in family sociology is the relative lack of representation of some large areas of the world. Large parts of Africa and Latin America are not regularly heard from in international venues. Underrepresented groups are often isolated from communication and technologies in the developing educational, medical, and economic institutions. Work place technologies such as computers, for word processing, graphic applications and accounting, and transportation have been less accessible to underrepresented populations.

There are many other barriers to international exchange, nevertheless people do get together and some major advances have occurred and many opportunities exist to improve the field globally. In order to extend and advance this process the discipline requires some changes in the ways that we do our work. Special efforts to expand our viewpoints to include a global perspective are needed. Respecting each other’s work and paradigms is a challenge for international family sociology. Reviewing each other’s work for funding or publication is especially crucial because quality standards may be used to mask discrimination or confused with other values and distinctions. When the opportunity to launch cross-national and cross-cultural studies is available, the challenge is to design a practical and equally rewarding implementation. Comparative studies have many logistic and resource demands that make it impracticable for many studies unless there is a strong foundation in theory for the comparison (Lee and Haas, 1993). Kohn (1987) argues for the
importance of cross-national studies. He also recognizes the considerable costs not just in financial outlays, but also in developing the collaborative relationships. Much of the work to be considered in understanding an international family sociology is in analyzing what of each nations family research can contribute to a larger sociological perspective on families.

Sociologists differ among themselves over their responsibility to interpret their work and increasingly differ over the meaning of their studies for policy and program discussions. However, if the field of public opinion is not informed by scholars, misguided and even wrong headed outcomes are likely to occur. Building reasonable inferences from findings and consensus around principles is not just a goal for family sociology and general sociological theory, but is needed in the changing societies.

Sociology of the family is more than just a field of research, education and action. Family sociologists have a stake in the welfare and quality of life of families and households. We are not above the fray only documenting and commenting. The problems we choose to investigate, the recommendations we promulgate, the theories we propose to explain phenomena are part of the social and political discourse that leads to how issues that affect families are addressed.

References


9 International Political Sociology

Richard G. Braungart and Margaret M. Braungart

Political sociology is an interdisciplinary field of inquiry developed by sociologists and political scientists to study the dynamic relationship between society (a complex web of social institutions and social behavior) and politics (the structure and exercise of political power). Although rooted in the classic works of de Tocqueville, Marx, Weber, Mannheim, Mosca, Michels, and others, political sociology did not emerge as a distinct area of specialization until the late 1950s and early 1960s. Much of the impetus for the development of the field grew out of the turbulent events and trends of the twentieth century — mass politics, economic depression, two world wars, fascism, totalitarianism, the cold war, the nuclear age, modernization, nationalism, and the proliferation of new nation-states. Erik Allardt (1997a: 5; 1997b: 2), one of the founders of international political sociology, recounted that the aftermath of the Second World War:

opened entirely new vistas for a democratic mass politics. Many of us ... can remember how a behavioral approach was absent in the studies in political science and how in sociology politics was hardly ever spoken about.... Great optimism was attached to the possibility of building a better world with the aid of social science and research.

Initially, the interest was in identifying the social roots of democracy, the organization and impact of the state, and the role of social scientists in building and testing theories, measuring people’s political attitudes and behavior, and applying the social sciences to public policy. By the late 1950s, leading sociologists and political scientists saw the need for a comparative perspective in trying to understand the interplay between social and political forces. The formal establishment of political sociology as an international field of study occurred during 1959–1960 with a proposal for a new Research Committee on Political Sociology (CPS) at the Fourth World Congress of the International Sociological Association (ISA) meeting in 1959 and the ISA’s acceptance of the proposal in 1960. For more than three decades, the CPS has been a center of cross-national research activity and communication for like-minded sociologists and political
scientists. Now that the 20th century has ended and a new century has begun, it is a propitious time for taking stock of the history, contributions, and future of international political sociology.

With this goal in mind, the focus in this chapter is on the development of international political sociology both organizationally and substantively. First, the origins and growth of the field are described, emphasizing the early days of the CPS and the expanding scope of political sociology as a comparative area of scholarly interest. Next, the process of mapping out international political sociology is illustrated by describing how two landmark hypotheses that launched the field in the early 1960s have been scrutinized, researched, and modified over the course of three decades. More specifically, research findings and observations related to Lipset’s democratization hypothesis and to Lipset and Rokkan’s frozen cleavage hypothesis are tracked from the 1960s–1990s. To illustrate how international political sociology has been extended through debate and research, we use the example of Skocpol and others’ attempt to give the state more emphasis, thereby enriching political sociological inquiry. In the latter part of the essay, we discuss the current depiction of the field as being “at a crossroads,” and after identifying what a number of prominent scholars see as the dominant trends and issues facing the world at the turn of the century, we suggest some of the directions political sociologists may go in the future.

A. Growing and Nurturing the Field

Political sociology would not be where it is today were it not for the persistent efforts of a group of dedicated scholars in the late 1950s and early 1960s who gave the field form, substance, and organization as an interdisciplinary, cross-national area of specialization. Theoretical formulations, research investigations, and publications initiated and sustained political sociology as a legitimate and growing discipline, while face-to-face contacts with colleagues from different countries at international conferences and meetings did much to establish, stimulate, and expand the field.

During the 1960s and early 1970s, political sociology was being etched out as a distinct field of study partially through benchmark journal articles, books, and bibliographies (see Bendix and Lipset, 1967; Coser, 1967; Dowse and Hughes, 1972; Effrat, 1972; Eisenstadt, 1971). Lipset’s Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (1963), in particular, provided a significant catalyst for anchoring political sociology as a new discipline and pushing it in international and cross-cultural directions. While much of the work of political scientists and sociologists was devoted to studying politics and society in their own countries, life was breathed into what Rokkan (1970b) called the “hybrid discipline” through efforts to foster a global focus and network of CPS scholars. Together Committee members began to chart the macro and micro foundations that gave direction to political sociology — although the research focus in the early 1960s was clearly tilted in the direction of macro-sociology, quantitative data-gathering, and a search for “universal” social and political patterns. From 1961–1967, the CPS held four
conferences, whose papers were published in several edited collections (Rokkan, 1970b). The early founders were a productive group, not only in publishing, but in what Lipset (1970: ix) described as “the emergence of a common theoretical and methodological perspective among a group with diverse cultural and intellectual backgrounds.”

CPS’s initial participation as a full-fledged ISA Research Committee occurred at the Fifth World Congress of Sociology in 1962. The CPS organized four sessions that largely focused on the topics of democratization, modernization, social and cultural cleavages, and political systems. Sponsored by the CPS and edited by Lipset and Rokkan, many of the papers were revised for a collection of essays entitled *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives* (1967). In this innovative volume, the introductory chapter by Lipset and Rokkan gave impetus to the field of international political sociology for decades to come; CPS members contributed chapters about Western nations, Eastern Europe, Japan, Brazil, and West Africa. As the first systematic cross-cultural examination of political parties and voting behavior, Karvonen and Ryssevik (1997) credit this landmark collection in general, and Rokkan’s (1970a) work in particular, with fostering the establishment of a data archives movement for conducting cross-cultural research.

International political sociology grew quickly. By the ISA’s Sixth World Congress in 1966, the CPS had become highly active and visible, with roundtable discussions, committee sessions that boasted the heaviest attendance of the entire Congress, and a joint meeting of the Research Committee officers that resulted in a proposal to the ISA to reorganize the Research Committee structure and draw up a new set of ISA Statutes (Rokkan, 1970b). In 1970, in recognition of CPS’s strong political science emphasis and membership, the Committee affiliated with the International Political Science Association (IPSA) as Research Committee 6 (RC-6). The CPS is unique in its joint association with both the ISA and IPSA.

The CPS has grown to approximately 180 members from 34 countries today, with one-third of the current CPS membership joining during the late 1990s (Karvonen, 1997). While the CPS membership continues to be dominated by Western European and American scholars, representation is increasing, albeit slowly, from Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. The hope is to recruit younger members and women scholars along with more members from non-Western countries. The expansion of the CPS is also indicated by thematic panels and sessions held at the 1994 ISA World Congress of Sociology in Bielefeld, Germany (12 panels), and the joint international congress with the South African Sociological Association in 1996 in Durban, South Africa (16 CPS panels with over 60 panelists from 17 countries). In April 1997, the CPS held a special 30-year anniversary *Festschrift* to honor Lipset and Rokkan’s volume *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (1967). During the two-day conference in Bergen, Norway, 20 prominent scholars from around the world presented papers and participated in four panel sessions, where they and a large international audience debated and discussed the strengths and weakness of Lipset and Rokkan’s 1967 book.

The substantive scope of the field is broadening as well. Originally construed as a “sociology of politics” (see Bendix and Lipset, 1967; Lipset, 1962),
international political sociology has become a more comprehensive field of inquiry that now includes the “politics of politics” and “political economy” (see Braungart, 1974, 1981, 1990; Braungart and Braungart, 1990). More specifically, over the course of three decades, political sociologists have developed a more flexible and eclectic conceptual paradigm that provides greater opportunities to investigate a wider range of social and political phenomena around the world. The paradigm that has emerged gives focus to the social roots of politics and political institutions (Bollen and Jackman, 1990, 1995; Bottomore, 1979; Inglehart, 1997; Muller, 1995), the dynamic formulations and processes involved in political policy making (DiTomaso, 1990; Knoke, 1990; Knoke and Burleigh, 1990; Laumann and Knoke, 1987; Shain and Linz, 1995), and the impact or consequences of public policy on society, its citizens and institutions (Buttel, 1990; Devine, 1990; Knoke, Pappi, Broadbent and Tsujinaka, 1996; Walsh and Cable, 1990). This broad, interactive paradigm continues to attract sociologists and political scientists who are interested in testing hypotheses and developing middle-range theories (Barnett, Hinich and Schofield, 1993; Bollen and Appold, 1993; Dye, 1995; Hicks, Misra and Ng, 1995; Janoski and Hicks, 1994). The utility and worth of this paradigm will continue to be evaluated by how well it allows researchers the opportunity to explain the origins, structure, and operations of the state.

B. Mapping the Field

A field of inquiry is mapped out by its theory, research, and debate. Political sociology was fortunate in its early stages to have scholars generating significant hypotheses and observations that laid a strong empirical foundation for international research and the future development of the discipline. While a rich array of hypotheses has been proposed within political sociology, two hypotheses were selected for discussion in this chapter: Lipset’s (1963) democratization hypothesis and Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) frozen cleavage hypothesis. These hypotheses resulted in more than 35 years of rigorous research and debate, and their predominance in the field had much to do with charting the course of international political sociology. Each hypothesis has been amended or modified by years of empirical and analytic scrutiny, providing an illustration of the importance of the slow, tedious task of data-gathering required of researchers to test and confirm their work. The introduction of new areas of investigation is another way to expand and refocus a discipline. As an illustration, we will discuss the efforts of Skocpol (1985) and others to give more emphasis to the state in political sociological investigations around the world.

Two seminal works can be credited with launching and having a sustained influence on international political sociology: Political Man, by Lipset (1963) and Party Systems and Voter Alignments by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). Political Man has sold 400,000 copies and has been translated into 20 languages (Allardt, 1997b). The book is clearly the worldwide best seller in political sociology and continues to be read today. Party Systems and Voter Alignments was the first cross-national collection of essays concentrating on political parties and voting behavior and
has become a classic in the field. Together these two works established a conceptual thrust and global research agenda that endure three decades later. In taking stock of the field of international political sociology, one question is how well these works and their hypotheses hold up in today’s modern, diverse world?

**B.1. Lipset’s Democratization Hypothesis**

A central thesis of Lipset’s *Political Man* is that “economic development correlates with democracy” — a hypothesis that continued to be discussed and tested in the 1990s. Rich with examples from a variety of nation-states, history, and research studies, Lipset’s wide-ranging analysis documented the significance of the association between economic development and democracy. Democracy was defined as a political system with a constitutional government, citizens’ rights and duties, and the free election of public officials (Lipset, 1963: 27). Readily acknowledging his Western and conservative bias, Lipset (1963: 31) stated the axiom: “The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.” Other factors critical to democracy, said Lipset (1963), include the rise of intermediary organizations which act as sources of “countervailing power,” legitimacy and effectiveness which have much to do with democratic stability, and the strains between democratic and authoritarian political expressions within each stratum of society.

Lipset’s central contention is that societal cleavages are a principal feature of pluralist democracies, with economic class frequently the most important. While sometimes criticized for placing too much emphasis on the power of capitalism, Lipset did observe in *Political Man* (1963) that ethnic, regional, religious, age, rural-urban, and gender differences also may be significant for democracy, and in some cases, may be more salient than economic class divisions. In discussing voting and elections, he focused on cross-pressures and factors that correlate with voter turnout in Europe and the United States, along with the impact of class, age or generation, and other social cleavages on left-right political party support, continuity and change. Contending that “the problem of politics does not simply concern nation-states” (1963: 387), Lipset devoted one of the latter chapters in *Political Man* to democracy and the political process in trade unions.

Since the initial publication of *Political Man* in 1963, the study of democracy has generated a cottage industry of debate, research, and social criticism. As the 20th century closed, efforts to understand and track democracy remained all the more pertinent because of the dramatic struggles for democratic order in Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, South Africa, and elsewhere. During the 1980s and 1990s, political sociologists began to develop a more sophisticated recognition of the divergent ways democracy is understood and implemented in Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa when compared to Western nations.

What do the decades of research indicate about Lipset’s initial hypothesis? While continuing to be supported by empirical testing, the economic development and democracy hypothesis was modified, qualified, and reformulated in the late
1980s and 1990s. Modifications included the argument that researchers should not try to pinpoint a “single causal factor” but should engage in a more wide-ranging and complex exploration of multiple causes of democracy in different states and world regions. For example, Dahl (1971, 1989) identified seven “favorable conditions” for democracy, suggesting that “pluralism” was an especially important condition. In his quest to identify the forces promoting democracy over the last century, Huntington (1991: 37–38) reported that the democratization literature included discussions of at least 28 different independent variables related to democracy and concluded that “The causes of democratization differ substantially from one place to another and from one time to another.” And in a global study of 172 nations, Vanhanen (1997) found support for his argument that the relative distribution of power resources is more important than economic development or physical quality of life for democracy, with some notable exceptions. No small confounding effects in this search for the holy grail of democracy are the variety of methodological approaches, indicators, samples, timing, and measurements used by the data-gathers (Dogan and Pelassy, 1984; Dogan and Kazancigil, 1994).

In the 1990s, Lipset (1994) exercised his keen ability to synthesize wide-ranging information and research in order to put the economic development and democracy hypothesis into perspective. What do we know 35 years after the original statement of the democratization hypothesis? Lipset stands by the importance of economic development and the power of the middle class, which he says are necessary but not sufficient conditions for democracy. History and research also show that for democracies to be stable, the process must be gradual, where “opposition and individual rights have emerged in the give and take of politics” (1994: 4). In the which-is-the-most-important-variable debate, Lipset stated, “Cross-national historical evaluations of the correlates of democracy have found that cultural factors appear even more important than economic ones” (1994: 5). A political culture must support democratic ideas and practices, and cultural factors exert a strong influence on politics. As an illustration, Lipset discussed the role that religion plays, noting that Protestantism is positively related to economic development and democracy, whereas Islam and Confucianism, while favorable to capitalism, are not conducive to the promotion of a democratic state. Of course, democracy cannot be mentioned these days without discussing civil society. Observations about civil society are not new, Lipset remarked, and can be traced to de Tocqueville and Schumpeter’s writings and to his own work some 40 years ago. Lipset concludes his review of democracy by stating:

Democracy is an international cause.... There are a number of assertions we can now advance, with considerable confidence, about the structural, cultural, and institutional factors that are conducive to the development of democracy. But specific outcomes depend on particular contexts: on whether the initial electoral and other political institutions are appropriate to the ethnic and cleavage structures of the given country, on the current state of the economy, as well, of course, on the abilities and tactics of the major actors (1994: 16–17).

Lipset can be credited with defining, nurturing, and cultivating a hypothesis and
research agenda that defined much of the discussion and work of political sociologists around the world for decades. Overall, the economic development-democracy hypothesis has been supported but has been qualified and enriched by numerous research studies. Much more is known now than when the hypothesis was first proposed (Bollen, 1980; Bollen and Jackman, 1990, 1995; Lipset, Seong and Torres, 1993; Lipset, 1995). Challenges to Lipset’s assumptions and approach have come largely from the advocates of dependency theory and from the postmodernists who eschew rationalism, positivism, and macro-level analyses in favor of cultural relativism, deconstruction, and discourse analysis.

B.2. Lipset and Rokkan’s Frozen Cleavage Hypothesis

A second hypothesis providing direction and continuity in political sociology is the frozen cleavage hypothesis put forth by Lipset and Rokkan in their classic volume, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (1967). In many ways, Lipset and Rokkan’s volume reflects the early thinking of the contributors to the volume and the CPS membership. When the book was originally published, most members of the CPS were Western, with the bulk of the articles focusing on Continental and Northern Europe, the English-speaking countries of England, United States, and New Zealand, and several latter chapters on “the emerging nations” of Japan, Brazil, and in West Africa. In the introductory chapter, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction,” Lipset and Rokkan applied Parsons’ structural-functional system theory to partisan politics and voting behavior. Although this “conservative” approach was later questioned by many political sociologists, it laid the foundation for the now-famous “frozen cleavage” hypothesis.

The principal contention of the frozen cleavage hypothesis is that political parties and the ideological divisions or cleavages differentiating party support have remained remarkably stable. More specifically, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) maintained that the unique historical transformations that shaped European and North American politics in the 18th and 19th centuries — in particular, the national revolutions that led to the establishment of constitutional democracies and the industrial revolution — produced deep, abiding tensions and conflicts between different members and sectors of society. These structural sources of social tension were identified as: (1) the powerful centers versus powerless peripheries (cultural, ethnic, linguistic); (2) church versus state (sacred-secular); (3) agricultural landed interests versus rising industrial cities; and (4) rich versus poor (class conflict and unionization). Out of these social and political cleavages and antagonisms, argued Lipset and Rokkan (1967), emerged modern political parties and mass politics, which by the second decade of the 20th century in the West had become frozen in place or stabilized. In Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967: 50) words: “the party systems of the 1960’s reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920’s.” They further argued that these party “alternatives” and organizations predate the majority of the voters who participated in national elections, suggesting that party structure and cleavages would be stable for most
of the 20th century. How well does the hypothesis hold, especially in light of the many changes that have taken place in Europe and around the world since the drafting of the hypothesis some 33 years ago?

This was the question posed at a 1997 CPS conference titled “Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Thirty Years After” held in Bergen, Norway. The conference was co-sponsored by the CPS along with the University of Bergen and the Norwegian Social Science Data Service. Some of the contributors to the original volume as well as younger experts in comparative political parties convened in Bergen to assess and update the contributions of the 1967 volume, especially the reliability and validity of the party cleavage hypothesis. What were some of the findings of this informative conference?

Despite the passage of 33 years since the original statement of the hypothesis and the biases inherent in Parsons’ systems approach to electoral politics, some of the central tenets of the frozen cleavage hypothesis continue to be supported. The political party system in the West has remained stable over time: the left-right continuum still prevails, there is remarkable electoral and political stability, and political parties play an active role in mobilizing the electorate at the turn of the 21st century. As Mair (1997: 21) summarized, “to the extent that the freezing of a party system implies the establishment of a stable structure of competition, and hence a stable equilibrium; then to that extent the thesis still stands up quite well” (also see Deschouwer, 1997; Katz, 1997; Linz and Montero, 1997).

While political party systems are stable, significant changes have occurred in the original cleavage structures outlined by Lipset and Rokkan in 1967. More specifically, although the center-periphery, church-state, rural-industrial urban, and class politics divisions may have been salient in much of the 20th century, they became less important in the latter quarter of the century. There are several reasons why. The growth of the middle classes around the world and movement toward middle-of-the-road politics in regions such as Europe, the United States, and parts of Asia mitigated some of the old cleavage structures. Increased affluence and a rising standard of living have broadened the social base of political parties, particularly among the more educated, older, urban voters. In addition, new inequalities and cleavages have appeared. The most significant change is that class politics is being supplanted by cultural forms of politics, with heightened divisiveness and conflict based on race, ethnicity, gender, and religion. For example, although traditional parties appear relatively stable throughout Europe, they are being challenged by immigrants and ethnic minorities, especially those who are unemployed. Another new cleavage is generational, with a number of significant differences between the World War II generation and younger voters in the West as well as in Asia (Dogan, 1997; Inglehart, 1997; Pesonen, 1997).

Besides shifts in the cleavage structure, party politics has become less polarized but more fragmented and volatile. While the party system is firmly in place, especially in Western countries, considerable changes and fluctuations occur from election to election, with some of the current “fractionalization” attributable to cultural and generational differences (Deschouwer, 1997: 14). As Pesonen (1997: 12) explained, “In many countries the traditional position of political parties has been weakened, on the one hand by the volatility of the more individualized voters,
and on the other hand by the more personalizing emphasis on political leaders rather than on party organizations and party identity.” Young people, in particular, express little interest in politics, political parties, or becoming personally involved with politics. Increasingly, the electorates in the modern world are more affluent, educated, and affected by the mass media, especially television, and they are more unpredictable. At election time, voters may well be influenced more by politicians’ personalities or sponsorship by interest groups (trade unions, big business, environmental, koenkai associations) than by the candidate’s party affiliation (Allardt, 1997a; Dogan, 1997; Watanuki, 1997).

Many of these generalizations about the stability and change in political parties pertain to the economically advanced states in Western Europe, North America, Israel, and Japan. More widely varying and deviant cases are evident in Eastern and Central Europe, the Third World, and the small island states. The inclusion of political sociologists interested in non-Western nations is relatively recent and contributes much to our understanding of the multifaceted and variegated relationships between society and politics throughout the world. This information is new and well worth reviewing. In examining Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic, Lawson (1997) observed that there is no “freezing effect” of party systems due to the recent breakup of 40 years of communism and the struggle in the 1990s to institute a new democratic party system. Moreover, the cleavages identified in Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) essay were not helpful in understanding the Central and Eastern European states in the 1990s, since each state has its own history, culture/subcultures, and unique cleavage structure. For example, Poland divides along social and political lines based on education, economics, agriculture, religious-secular outlooks, and divergent perceptions about former communists and communist rule. Hungary’s cleavages have more to do with orientation to the West versus a traditionalist view, while the growth in civil society is central to understanding Bulgaria and the Czech Republic (Lawson, 1997). These kinds of observations and qualifications are important in developing more sophisticated theories and research in comparative political sociology.

The situation is somewhat different in third world countries — defined as those countries that are economically underdeveloped, predominantly agricultural, and post-colonial. Randall (1997) noted that there are well over 100 states that comprise the third world, each with its unique culture, history, and pertinent economic indicators. Most third world states are in Central and Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia — those vast regions of the world that have been peripheral to Western (Enlightenment) influence. Whereas both Europe and the United States have their democratic origins in national and industrial revolutions and are characterized by universal suffrage and mass party systems, third world states are much more numerous and heterogeneous. Neither capitalist nor ideological, third world states and their institutions are often steeped in ethnic and regional differences — many of which were transformed during periods of colonization, but whose cultural cleavages resurfaced once colonialism had ended. As Randall (1997) explained, it is not mass franchise and party politics, but clientelism and patronage that play an important role in third world politics, where political parties often lack autonomy from the state, and where authoritarian
regimes or colonial powers create and control parties. Most third world states do not have a persistent system of competitive party politics, and opposition parties typically have a difficult time making electoral gains in places such as Mexico, much of Africa, and parts of Asia and Latin America. While social and historical cleavages influence party politics in the West, it is the reverse in many third world states where political parties were established by colonial rule or domestic elites (Randall, 1997).

Small island states are another special and distinctive case. For example, while political parties are considered essential in Western democracies, some island states are democracies without party systems. Another permutation is that “in the world of small island states there are often democratizations and parties but no nations and no industrializations” (Anckar, 1997: 2). Small in size, at election time, the emphasis in the island states is likely to be on personal qualities, family ties, and local issues rather than on parties, platforms, and national or “system” issues. Identifying 46 island states (32 of which are considered small), Anckar (1997) explained that almost all of the small island states were former colonies, which clearly had an impact on their political structure and institutions, with the British especially likely to have left a democratic legacy. Another factor to consider is that many indigenous people and cultures have their own democratic traditions and customs. For example, among the Tuvalu islanders, Anckar (1997: 16) reported, government and social affairs are to be conducted by “agreement, courtesy and the search for consensus, in accordance with traditional Tuvaluan procedures, rather than alien ideas of confrontation and divisiveness.” And, although political parties and parliamentary government are being introduced into small island states — and the structure may eventually take hold — island people may well ignore the structure and vote on the basis of personal ties. They then leave it to the winners of the elections to organize themselves in parliament or to govern. Thus, concluded Anckar, while a modern system may appear to be operating, it is the traditional one that counts!

The frozen cleavage hypothesis provides an example of how many features of the hypothesis may be supported in the West (stable party systems with more volatile electorates), whereas the hypothesis has limited utility in most non-Western nations. Globally, the hypothesis has partial support, but in the process of scrutiny and testing, political sociologists have come to recognize the complexity and uniqueness of the world’s diverse regions and states.

B.3. Skocpol Brings In the State

Identifying the relationship between society and politics (including the state) is the central focus of political sociology. The dominant international political sociological paradigm is the “sociology of the state” approach where the principal question addressed is which social, economic, and cultural factors have what kinds of impact on the modern states? Both the democratization and frozen cleavage hypotheses are reflections of this perspective. Yet, the social roots of politics approach has been criticized for dominating much of the conceptual
and research focus in both sociology and political science. One of the foremost critics has been Theda Skocpol, and it must be said that one cannot discuss the state without mentioning her work and dedication to the state as a paramount concept and focus for research. Undoubtedly, the rapid growth of states since the 1960s has given impetus — if not a sense of urgency — to a better understanding of the state in an international system of competing nation-states. It might be argued that what Lipset (1963) did in pulling together and organizing information on the social correlates of democracy in the 1960s, Skocpol attempted to do for the state in her much-discussed essay “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” published in the edited volume Bringing the State Back In (Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 1985: 3–37). At the time the book was written, the editors contended in the Preface that “the term ‘state’ was rarely used” and that the “dominant theoretical paradigms in the comparative social sciences did not highlight states as organizational structures or as potentially autonomous actors” (Evans et al., 1985: vii). Given the wealth of discussion, debate, and research on the state, it could be argued that the state was never really “out” or neglected as a topic of historic and widespread interest (Weber, Hintze, Poggi). Nonetheless, this landmark work can be credited with bringing the state into sharper focus by highlighting some of the discussion and research on the subject, stimulating a clearer conceptualization of the state, and identifying topics pertinent to understanding the state.

In her essay, Skocpol (1985) questioned the conventional approach to studying the state for being too “society-centered” and called for a “theoretical reorientation.” She argued that instead of viewing the state as merely reacting to the many groups and demands from society, it is important to recognize that states formulate and pursue goals, they have some autonomy, and they are forceful actors. From what she calls a “Tocquevillian” perspective, Skocpol (1985: 21) contended that states are actors, and they “matter not simply because of the goal-oriented activities of state officials. They matter because their organizational configurations, along with their overall patterns of activity, affect political culture, encourage some kinds of group formation and collective political actions (but not others), and make possible the raising of certain political issues (but not others).” She also noted that state policies are not merely the reflections of social influences and societal actors; some state policies are intended to reinforce the state and its actors or to assure longevity. “The most basic research task for those interested in state autonomy surely is to explore why, when, and how such distinctive policies are fashioned by states,” advised Skocpol (1985: 15).

In what may be termed “the politics of the state” approach, the state (decision makers, political system, policies) has become one of the principal units of analysis in comparative political sociology. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, certain events stimulated interest in the state, such as the proliferation of new nation-states, the collapse of communism along with the rise of struggling independent states, and the crisis of confidence expressed by citizens in a number of states about their government’s operation and functioning. Topics of concern in examinations of domestic, national, international, and intrastate-interstate relations include citizen initiatives, institutional networks making up the state, and globalization. As an
illustration, Bendix, Bendix, and Furniss (1990) described how the nature of the interaction between the state and civil society resulted in different types of welfare policies in three Western states, carefully noting the crisis nature and built-in tensions between the two institutional sectors. Horowitz (1990) identified various forms of militarism in Latin America and the complex relationship between the military and the state, observing that state control in the region may proceed from civil to military or from military to civil authority.

It is not only the state itself that has been featured and studied in the 1980s and 1990s; political sociologists were also giving focus to the impact of the state on society. Termed a “political-economy” perspective, the interest was on identifying, tracking, and evaluating state policies and practices as these affect the surrounding society, culture, and other states. For example, Knoke and Burleigh (1990) were able to cut through the bewildering variety of actors, events, and relationships to more clearly specify the patterns of policy decisions in advanced industrial democracies by building a model of national policy formation. In another highly original work, Gamson and Modigliani (1990) looked at the American government’s shifting policy on affirmative action over two decades by examining the changing interpretations of messages played out in various media sources such as television, news magazines, political cartoons, and opinion columns (also see Devine, 1990; Buttel, 1990).

What the research on the state suggests is that states are not isolated independent institutions or systems — their decision makers, political structures, and policies are influenced by both endogenous and exogenous forces. As the principal political institution the world over, states share many features in common (see Braungart and Braungart, 1990; Graubard, 1979; Knoke et al., 1996; Shain and Linz, 1995). At the same time, each state is unique, with its own special history, identity, and culture, and as such, cannot easily be compared with other states (Anckar, 1997; Bremmer and Taras, 1997; Randall, 1997). A plethora of topics have accompanied political sociologists’ attempts to successfully bring the state back in, including citizenship rights and duties, nation-states and nationalism, democratic-nondemocratic states, types of welfare states, ideology, comparative public administration and public policy, warfare-conflict, taxes, leadership, international relations, and civil society.

C. Political Sociology at the Crossroads and into the Future

Where did political sociology stand as the 20th century came to an end, and where might it head in the 21st century? Observations about the status of the field were highlighted in a special issue of Current Sociology (1996) entitled “Political Sociology at the Crossroads.” As we assess international political sociology, several principal issues are germane for political sociologists to consider. The second question about the future of the field is explored by summarizing some of the prevailing trends identified as carrying us into the 21st century, followed by a brief discussion of the implications and challenges for political sociologists around the world.
C.1. At the Crossroads

Why is political sociology characterized as being at a crossroads? One reason is that the field continues to suffer from an identity crisis. Political sociology has never been easy to define; for the most part, the split between sociology and political science has remained, perhaps largely due to the different orientations and training involved in becoming a sociologist specializing in politics, or a political scientist specializing in sociology. Allardt (1996: 16), a veteran of the field, remarked that political sociologists do not yet "form a group with a clear identity as political sociologists," further arguing that studies are needed that focus on dominant social and political cleavages and on large-scale transformations and changes. Moreover, political sociologists typically restrict their investigations to either the social roots of politics, the structure of politics, or to the influence of the state on society, when there is a need to include all three dimensions of analysis within a single cross-national study design.

A second theme is that political sociology has become a more complex and sophisticated field of inquiry than was the case in the 1960s and 1970s. There are several dimensions to this generalization. First, political sociology is a comprehensive and critical enterprise. How much less complicated it is to work in the separate disciplines of sociology or political science than to try to fathom the intricacies, variations, and subtleties involved in the interplay between society and politics (Allardt, 1996). Second, the simple hypotheses and axiomatic assertions of 35 years ago have undergone careful examination over the years. Political sociologists have uncovered a host of topics, variables, and qualifications about observed relationships and have come to recognize that these relationships are likely to be altered in a rapidly changing global environment (Reis, 1996). Third, much of what was theorized, hypothesized, and found in political sociology in the past applies to the West. While the field continues to have its European-American bias and heavy representation of Western scholars, there is now a wider inclusion of political sociologists from other parts of the world (Khondker, 1996). Only recently have we begun to fully appreciate that political sociologists the world over conduct their work in a specific historical and social context; international political sociological inquiry varies widely among states and is strongly influenced by the culture, structures, and currents within its country of origin (Kubiak, 1996; Voronkov and Zdravomyslova, 1996). More explicit attention now and in the future needs to be focused on how theories, hypotheses, generalizations, and research findings apply, do not apply, or apply in unique ways to great variety of non-Western regions and states.

A third theme involves some of the current criticisms of political sociology. While the discipline has been chastised for its prevailing Western bias — if not arrogance — political sociology has undergone rough times in some Western countries. For example, conservative pundits and politicians in the West are not shy about ardently expressing their disdain for the social sciences and what they pejoratively refer to as "social engineering"/meddling in people’s lives. Moreover, political sociologists at Western European and North American universities are sometimes frustrated by today’s vocationally oriented students and the elevation
of applied professional fields at the expense of the social sciences (Rootes, 1996). In the United States, political sociology has been criticized for lacking both coherence and any major guiding paradigm. In Orum’s (1996) view, American political sociologists are competitive and spend considerable time and effort debating, wrangling, tugging and pulling about what direction the field should go. Perhaps the most vitriolic salvo against traditional political sociology has been levelled by the radical feminists and postmodernists. Contemptuous of systematic empirical research, the postmodernist critique appears bent on “de-institutionalizing” the social sciences and offering itself as an alternative to political sociology. To put the latest challenge to the social sciences in perspective, social criticism has had a strong tradition in political sociology (Mills, Gouldner, Szymanski), and the postmodernists are simply another reflection of this tradition. By the mid-1990s, the postmodernist critique — especially its more radical, strident form — was on the receiving end of criticism and appears to have run its course (Allardt, 1996; Kimmerling, 1996).

C.2. Future Trends, Changes, and Paradoxes: The Global Context

It was out of the tumultuous events, trends, and changes surrounding the Second World War that international political sociology developed as a formal specialty area, and it will be the current and future trends that will direct the work of political sociologists in the new millennium. In the 1990s, a spate of books appeared assessing the 20th century, making predictions about the world’s future, and offering suggestions for coping with, if not improving, social and political life. The themes and generalizations are instructive for political sociologists to consider.

The predominant trend of the 20th century was the globalization of the economy and technology, which undoubtedly improved the quality of life for many people and promoted the rise of the middle classes. At the same time, the pervasive notion of “progress” as economic and technological has had some severe negative consequences, such as fostering excessive individualism, materialism, and environmental destruction at the expense of morality, spirituality, and the well-being of the community and earth’s future. Moreover, the gap between rich and poor nations appears to be widening rather than lessening. An accompanying trend has been the globalization of culture, made possible by the economy and technology. And while there has been a remarkable increase in the worldwide communication of ideas, values, and knowledge, the global cultural revolution has been accused of being overly intrusive, commercialized, manipulative, exploitative, and degrading, while undermining traditional and local or indigenous values (Ahmed, 1995; Kennedy, 1993).

Another international trend has been the strong push for democracy and citizenship, often spearheaded by social movements. Paradoxically, the goal of making societies and states more democratic occurred during a century that was declared to be the most violent and bloody in recorded history. In their quest for freedom, justice, equality, and self-determination, people around the world
have struggled tragically against discrimination, totalitarian repression, and exter-
minations in what Brzezenski (1993) calls the century of “megadeath” and “organized insanity.” In the 20th century many more civilians than soldiers were killed by intent, aided by sinister arsenals of weapons of mass destruction.

As the world is becoming globalized and made more interdependent, it is also being fractured into smaller units. The latter decades of the 20th century, in particular, have been characterized by a proliferation of new nation-states and “statelets.” In yet another paradox, as the number of new states has been multiplying (approximately 200 states today), the authority of the state is in decline due to pressures from both external and internal forces. Major external threats and influences on states come from supranational markets and bureaucratic organizations such as multinational corporations, the United Nations, and European Economic Community, while the principal internal threat comes from ethnic or cultural divisiveness or what has been termed a “new tribalism” (Naisbett, 1994). Cultural differences and ethnic conflict have become the basis for the new political world order, in a clash of cultures or civilizations. The predictions are that the world will no longer be dominated by the West, whose authority many agree, is waning. According to Huntington (1996), the new fault lines are among at least 8–9 different civilizations: Sinic or Chinese, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Western, Orthodox, Buddhist, Latin American, and African.

Forecasts for the 21st century are pessimistic, if not grim. If the current trends in globalization and splintering continue, the world will become chaotic and out of control — “pandemonium” is Moynihan’s (1993) characterization. Add to the mix of trends already discussed, an expected population explosion in the next century, with as many as five-sixths of the world’s population living in third world countries. As a result, migrations and the refugee problem already being experienced the world over will only escalate. The “new Barbarism” or degeneration of human conduct is expected to worsen due to the breakdown of civil society (Lukacs, 1993).

Is there hope? As the new century begins, the world appears to be at a turning point. As Kennedy summarizes:

... we do not know the future, it is impossible to say with certainty whether global trends will lead to terrible disasters or be diverted by astonishing advances in human adaption. What is clear is that as the Cold War fades away, we face not a “new world order” but a troubled and fractured planet, whose problems deserve the serious attention of politicians and publics alike.... If these challenges are not met, however, humankind will have only itself to blame for the troubles, and the disasters, that could be lying ahead (1993: 349).

What is to be done? A number of suggestions are being proposed. First, the time has come to impose limits on economic greed and the quest for cultural power and to give much greater focus to individual and collective responsibility. Second, individuals and nations will need to strive for balance and harmony in almost every facet of life than is currently the practice. Notions of what constitutes progress will have to be redefined, incorporating the criteria of
voluntary restraints, balance, and respect for human dignity and the earth. Third, some experts advise salvaging the best that the West has to offer, which are its concepts of democracy and civil society, but they also maintain that no single Western or global model will likely be successfully imposed in any unilateral fashion. Respect and tolerance for cultural differences are essential, with some trend-watchers suggesting that we learn to relish and enjoy such distinctiveness and differences among the world’s peoples. Planning, sharing, cooperating, tolerance, morality and ethics need to be the watchwords and modus operandi for all kinds of social and political systems now and in the future (see Berlin, 1995; Heilbroner, 1995; Huntington, 1996).

C.3. Challenges Ahead for Political Sociologists

What are the implications of these discussions for political sociologists? Certainly the main drift toward globalization and interdependence signifies the necessity and value of cross-cultural studies of society and politics. In order to gain a clearer understanding of a complicated world, political sociologists have a significant role to play by gathering much-needed knowledge about crucial societal trends and by using the scientific method to debunk and de-mythologize disinformation and wrongheaded notions being promulgated by the media, politicians, and powerful interest groups. Moreover, the field of political sociology was initially established to examine sociopolitical patterns from historical, macro-level, and comparative perspectives. While heavily criticized — especially by the postmodernists — current indications are that political sociologists need not apologize for trying to identify similarities across cultures and nation-states. Large-scale, comparative investigations are called for, perhaps using teams and networks of political sociologists from all world regions. To aid in this task, Karvonen and Ryssevik (1997) point out that national data archives are under-utilized and could assist political sociologists in their international studies.

At the same time, the breakup of nation-states and the ascendance of cultural divisiveness as the basis for the new world order indicate the need for numerous intrastate studies that utilize a combination of micro and macro analyses. Understanding deviation and differences is becoming as pertinent to political sociology as identifying cross-national patterns, but, thus far, little explicit attention has been given to the former agenda. Broader methodologies are required that use multivariate, multi-method approaches within the same study design. Comparative intrastate analyses would be helpful, where findings are pulled together in systematic fashion while also highlighting variations and uniqueness.

With the field viewed as being at a crossroads, how are political sociologists to accomplish their challenging tasks? Instead of taking either a sociology of politics or a politics of the state approach, encompassing all aspects of the political sociological paradigm would prove fruitful in expanding the scope and depth of inquiry. Similarly, greater cooperation and collaboration by political
scientists and sociologists would promote better integration and coherence within the discipline. The CPS already has benefitted from involving under-represented groups and younger colleagues, and in the process, its members are learning to give more attention to comparative history and culture in their work. The field also would be advanced by including additional perspectives — historians, political economists, political psychologists, political anthropologists, ecologists, and policy experts have much to share with political sociology. Due to the complexity and diversity of this demanding research agenda, skilled use of quantitative and qualitative research methods as well as the investigation of interaction effects become essential for international studies. In an era of rapid global and cultural transformations, static, cross-sectional survey designs appear less useful than more dynamic temporal approaches, such as longitudinal, time-series, panel, and life-history designs.

In every world region, the changes have been dramatic and are predicted to accelerate in the 21st century. The map of international political sociology will continue to be charted, modified, and filled in, and the demands on political sociologists will only increase to be more knowledgeable about other people’s cultures and political processes. One caveat is not to be sidetracked from political sociology’s purposes by narrow tradition, politicization, or professional squabbling. Lessons can be learned from Nedelmann’s (1997) analysis of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1945 to 1989. Identifying four distinct generations of political sociologists during this period, she cited the importance of the core values on which political sociology was constructed: a macrosociological point of view, a historical orientation, empirical research, and theory building. Her cautionary tale is that when these values become blurred or disregarded — as they did for several generations in post-Nazi Germany — the contributions of political sociology were seriously weakened. Based on what has been learned over the past 40 years about the development of the field, the future of political sociology rests squarely on its core values, scientific tradition, and interdisciplinary exchange of ideas and scholars.

References


Although the military as a social institution and war as a social process figured prominently in classical sociological theory, military sociology did not emerge as a field of empirical study until World War II. Then, for four decades, the field was dominated by scholars in the United States, whose research agenda reflected the concerns of the Cold War period. As we enter the twenty-first century, military sociology is being globalized. At the same time, the military institution is being transformed, as the end of the Cold War in Europe and the worldwide democratic revolution require nations to reconsider the structure, roles and missions of their armed forces. In this chapter we use movement toward a post-Cold War military as a developmental construct to describe the changes that have taken place in military organization and in civil-military relations. Lasswell (1951:11) described developmental constructs as specifications “of the institutional pattern from which we are moving and the pattern toward which we are going.” He suggested that “trend and [scientific] thinking are requisite to projective thinking...Projective thinking is carried out by developmental constructs, which we characterize as theoretical models of significant cross-sections of past and future” (Lasswell, 1958).

A. Background

In classical theory, Spencer (1908) argued that societies would evolve from primitive military structures to advanced industrial forms. In contrast, Lenin (1916) saw military forces as necessary for the imperialism that capitalist industrial societies would have to pursue as they exhausted domestic raw materials and markets. And Weber (1947) drew heavily on the example of the Prussian Army in his general model of bureaucratic organization.

Spencer’s expectations had not been realized by the Cold War period. The military, in one form or another, played a major role in most societies. Furthermore, most industrial societies were also military powers. In many modern industrialized nations, such as Switzerland, Israel, and the Soviet Union, the military played a
major integrative role in society. In developing nations, such as those of Latin America, the military has been the central actor in both domestic social control and modernization, with the social control function shifting from counter-insurgency to drug interdiction. The literature (see Babin, 1986) describes how the military was often the only institution in developing societies capable of coalescing a population and molding it into a coherent, integrated modern nation. With the weaknesses of state and government apparatus, the military’s monopoly on violence, the inability of civilian leaders to act effectively and consistently, and the absence of institutional controls limiting military power, the military was able to move relatively unopposed into a position of authority in many Third World Nations. In fact the military, more than other agencies in developing nations, was able to gather resources and execute policies which contributed to economic development and modernization. It was often the only bureaucratic organization able to bring political stability and economic advancement to a society. Furthermore, in developing nations, the military provided social and economic mobility channels usually unavailable in the civilian sector to those who wanted education and advancement. In these countries military service not only was a form of human capital, but also became a channel for supplying a greatly needed technically trained and educated population.

Neo-Marxist scholars pointed to the role of the military in international capitalist expansion (see for example, Evans, 1979 and Cardoso, 1973). Organized force was used as an instrument to control and direct capitalist survival and expansion. Early writings discuss factors which drive advanced capitalist societies to geographical expansion of their economies through the application of organized force. Military force and violence were the means by which capitalism gained economic advantage (Lenin, 1916; Engels, 1939). Even in modern democratic nations, where the military played a less central role, it was likely to affect the lives of a large proportion of the population through its impact on economic, political, educational and familial institutions.

The military has been more central to society than to sociology. As early as the Franco-Prussian War, du Picq’s (1921) Battle Studies, and later Vagt’s (1937) classic work, The History of Militarism, pointed the way to structural themes that emerged later in military sociology. At the time of their publication, however, these books were regarded as social history rather than sociology, and decades passed before their influence on military sociology was felt. The same was true of Demeter’s (1935) pre-World War II pioneering study of the military profession in Germany, Das Deutsche Heer und Seine Offiziere, which built upon Weber’s insights. The military organizations described by classical theorists were the first modern armed forces, reflecting the citizenship revolution and the evolution of the modern state system. However, only recently has military sociology been comfortable with comparative historical analysis.

**B. World War II and the Postwar Period**

World War II was a turning point for the sociological study of the military (Segal and Segal, 1993). The United States mobilized large numbers of academic
sociologists in a variety of research and analysis roles in support of the war effort. Thus, the new subfield was initially dominated by Americans. Because the problems studied were not contained within the boundaries of a single discipline, these sociologists established a pattern of interdisciplinary collaboration. Because armies tended to be the largest services and were the most labor-intensive, military sociology emerged primarily as the sociology of ground forces. Because World War II was a period of major military conscription on both sides, military sociology emerged largely as the sociology of conscript forces. And because the research was aimed explicitly at helping to manage the army and the war, it emerged largely as an applied subfield of sociology — one oriented toward organizational and small-group processes, rather than national or trans-national concerns.

Many of the sociologists who were mobilized in non-research roles in World War II recorded their experiences and observations in the sociological literature, including, for example, Homans’ (1946) observations of social relations on a small warship, which contained the seeds of what was to develop as social exchange theory, and Shibutani’s (1978) study of demoralization in a company of Japanese-American soldiers. In 1946, the American Journal of Sociology published a special issue on “Human Behavior in Military Society.” Hill (1949) conducted a landmark study of the stress that military service imposes on families. This became a major theme in military sociology. However, the major knowledge base of the field, as well as major conceptual and methodological advances in the discipline of sociology, came from the reporting of the results of experiments and surveys conducted by the Information and Education Division of the War Department. The four volumes of Studies in Social Psychology in World War II, including the American Soldier studies authored by Stouffer and his colleagues (1949) covered a range of topics, including race relations, cohesion, leadership, primary groups, morale, communication, and persuasion, that helped establish the research agenda of sociology and social psychology for decades to come. Other research, such as the work of Shils and Janowitz (1948) on social dynamics of German army units based on interviews with prisoners of war, has had continuing impact on the field, but its importance was not immediately recognized.

C. The Korean and Vietnam Wars

Sociological research during the Korean War continued to focus on group processes in conscript forces. Little (1964) studied the importance of interpersonal relations in small units for motivation and support in combat. The Special Operations Research Office of Johns Hopkins University studied race relations in the newly integrated U.S. Army (Bogart et al., 1969). Both the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force became principal sponsors of small group research (see Segal, 1983). This was in part a consequence of the army’s research on leadership and cohesion in World War II and Korea, and was also influenced by the apparent success of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in using principles of group dynamics in support of political indoctrination and the building of military morale, as well as demoralizing American POWs through “brainwashing” (Lifton, 1961). Between the Korean and Vietnam
Wars, a new research theme emerged. Prior to the 1960s, there had been occasional attempts by scholars to describe the structural relations between military forces and their host societies in the modern world. Mills’s book (1956), *The Power Elite*, and Lasswell’s (1941) developmental construct of “the garrison state” were among the most important of these. However, it was not until the 1960s that military sociology emerged as a viable academic field.

At the turn of the decade, Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960) published major analyses of the military profession, describing the social role of the officer and the structural relationship between military and civilian institutions, broadening the research agenda of military sociology from the study of conscript forces to the study of military service as a profession. Much of the comparative research of this period dealt with the degree to which American conceptions of military professionalism were applicable in other national settings. For example, although often military professionals in Latin America were trained in the United States, their role in their own societies diverged greatly from the U.S. model. While the American military was committed to political neutrality, in many of the newly independent developing nations the military leadership (i.e., officers) often moved relatively unopposed into positions of authority. They took on administrative and leadership roles which, more often than not, turned into political roles (Janowitz, 1960, 1969; Huntington, 1957; Pye, 1962). Military leaders had the educational background, administrative skills and cosmopolitan outlook which enabled them to unify a country, run a government, institute programs of controlled change, and negotiate with leaders of the developed world. Military leaders in the less developed countries were often more congenial to change than the traditional elite. Unlike the advanced nations, the military profession often went beyond their partnership with civilian authorities and moved into central positions of authority. Analysis of the economic, social and political development of Third World nations requires an understanding of the form of military professionalism.

Sociological research on the Vietnam War again focused on group dynamics in conscript forces. There were significant debates on the nature of leadership, unit cohesion (including the cohesion of the Vietnamese military (Henderson, 1985), and military professionalism in that conflict (e.g., Moskos, 1970; Savage and Gabriel, 1976; Gregory, 1977). One of the casualties of the Vietnam War in the United States was the process of military conscription, which declined markedly in legitimacy during the war (Segal, 1989). The end of military conscription in the United States in 1973, and the advent of large standing voluntary military forces, presaged similar changes in other nations. The conscription based mass armed forces of the first three decades of the Cold War were being replaced by the more voluntary and professionalized late Cold War armed forces (Segal, 1993).

The modern mass armed force, characterized by professional military cadres augmented by conscription, reserves, and cycles of societal mobilization and demobilization, had been a product of the American and French revolutions. These cycles, reflecting national security needs in times of war and both resistance to large military expenditures and distrust of large standing forces in times of peace, will continue to shape the military of the future. The mobilization phases represented societal commitment of resources — military manpower; industrial, agricultural,
and commercial productivity; and the civilian labor force — to the waging of total war. The demobilization phases reflected the redirection of these resources to civilian production and consumption after a conflict.

The American and French revolutions also helped transform the relationship of the individual to the state from one of subjection to one of citizenship, reflecting a worldwide and ongoing citizenship revolution (Segal and Segal, 1983). The extension and derivatives of this revolution will likewise influence the military of the future, because the citizenship revolution has defined military service variously as a citizenship right and responsibility.

D. The Emergence of an Industrial Military after the Vietnam War

The social turbulence in Western industrial nations in the 1960s, including the anti-Vietnam War movement, and a range of civil rights, human rights, and feminist movements, contributed to the end of military conscription in the United States, and as this citizenship revolution spread internationally, the declining legitimacy of involuntary military servitude contributed to an international decline in mass armed forces, and an international trend from conscription to voluntary and more professionalized military forces. This trend raised questions about individual motivations to serve and the relationship between the citizen and the state. At the same time, increasingly complex technologies of warfare led to increased substitution of capital for labor in military forces, and an increasingly complex division of labor and specialization among military personnel, contributing further to the debate on the nature of the military.

Much of the debate has been framed by Moskos’s (1977) developmental construct of change from an institutional to an occupational military. The institutional military is the mass armed force of the early Cold War Period. The occupational military is the late Cold War armed force. The debate involves discussions of the nature of military service, the nature of the military as an organization and profession, and the nature of civil-military relations (Segal, 1986). The characteristics of the mass army and the late Cold War army as developmental constructs are presented in Table 10.1.

In the institutional military, service is viewed as a calling, and is legitimized by normative social values; in the occupational military, service is viewed as a job and legitimized by the dynamics of the labor market. The recruitment appeals of the institutional military focus on character and lifestyle (e.g., “The Brave, The Proud, The Marines”), while the recruiting appeals of the occupational military focus on pay and skill training (“It’s a good place to start”). Compensation in the institutional military is frequently in-kind (food, clothing, shelter) or deferred (veterans’ benefits), while compensation in the occupational military is reflected directly in salary and bonuses, and veterans get no special treatment. Compensation differences in the institutional military are determined by rank and seniority. In the occupational military they reflect market conditions for people with particular skills or aptitudes. The evaluation of performance of personnel in the institutional military is holistic and qualitative. In the occupational military it is segmented and quantitative. The
basis of public esteem of the institutional military is the service rendered. The esteem of the occupational military, like that of other jobs in the labor force, is rooted in the compensation earned. The role commitment of personnel in the institutional military is diffuse: they are generalists. As soldiers, they expect to be called upon to do a wide variety of jobs. The role commitment of personnel in the occupational military is specific: they resent being asked to undertake tasks outside of their specific military occupations or trades. Reflecting this, the reference groups of personnel in the institutional military are within the service: they identify with other soldiers. Personnel in the occupational military, by contrast, identify with other workers in the same trade, whether or not they are in the military.

The institutional military has its own legal system, while order and justice in the occupational military are rooted in civil jurisprudence. Women’s roles in the traditionally masculine institutional military are limited, while the occupational military reflects the ongoing gender integration of the civilian labor force. Spouses of military personnel are incorporated into the institutional military; the occupational military separates work and family. This is reflected in residential patterns: in the institutional military, work and residence are collocated, and service may involve frequent family relocation. In the occupational military, work and residence are separated, and service is more geographically stabilized.

Moskos’s formulation was initially meant to describe change in the post-Vietnam War American army as it moved from conscription to voluntarism. However, as had been the case with military professionalism over a decade earlier, a major item in the research agenda of military sociology from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s became the application of this formulation to the armed forces of other industrial nations (see Moskos and Wood, 1988). A 1985 conference on the institutional and occupational military models attracted analysts from eight Western nations in addition to the United States. While their analyses of their own countries do not represent a random sample of Western nations, they probably reflect the range of applicability of these models to the Western world.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Mass Army</th>
<th>Late Cold War Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>Normative values</td>
<td>Market economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base of public esteem</td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>Compensation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role commitment</td>
<td>Diffuse, generalist</td>
<td>Specific, specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference groups</td>
<td>Within military</td>
<td>Within occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment appeals</td>
<td>Character, lifestyle</td>
<td>Pay, skill training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance evaluation</td>
<td>Holistic, qualitative</td>
<td>Segmented, quantitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation basis</td>
<td>Rank and seniority</td>
<td>Market conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation mode</td>
<td>In-kind, deferred</td>
<td>Salary and bonuses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal system</td>
<td>Military justice</td>
<td>Civil jurisprudence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s roles</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouses’ roles</td>
<td>Part of community</td>
<td>Removed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence stabilized</td>
<td>Collocated with work</td>
<td>Separated from work, frequent relocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postservice status</td>
<td>Veterans’ benefits</td>
<td>Same as nonserver</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Israel appeared to be the most institutional of the military forces considered, with the Israeli Defense Force being value-driven, manned predominantly by reservists and conscripts, with a clear sense of mission, and military roles defined in diffuse and general terms (Gal, 1986). Even with increasing administrative centralization, increasing social distance between leaders and followers, increasing public criticism of the military and involvement in aggressive wars, and a tendency among some officers to view their service in occupational terms, Israel seemed to be the prototype traditional institutional military.

Switzerland too was seen as having a value-driven institutional structure, rooted in universal male service, lacking even the small professional officer corps found in Israel. However, some occupational trends include the advent of modern weapons technologies that required increasing specialization of military personnel and civilianization of some military functions, and a declining willingness of higher status youth to serve beyond the minimum period required, depriving the military of a major traditional source of officer and non-commissioned officer citizen-soldiers (Haltiner, 1986).

The British military has historically been, and remains, institutional. While lacking a history of conscription or universal service, recruitment appeals have been value-driven, emphasizing self-sacrifice and serving the common good. At the same time, however, British forces have partially adopted pay comparability with civilian occupations, and offer specialty pay to needed technicians, thus admitting the dynamics of the labor market into the military personnel equation (Downes, 1986). Similarly, Australia has an all-volunteer military with strong institutional traditions, but seemed to be moving in an occupational direction more rapidly than Great Britain (Jans, 1986).

West Germany and France had armed forces comprised of both conscripts and professional soldiers, but the nature of the mix was different in terms of the models being discussed here. The French have tried to maintain an institutional military, with the least technical branch, the army, being the most institutional, and the most technical branch, the air force, being the most occupational. However, there have been clear tendencies in an occupational direction, with career personnel living off base, and resenting military interference in their private and family lives (Boene, 1986), and France has subsequently ended military conscription.

The Germans, when they established the Bundeswehr in the 1950s, rather than building a uniquely military institution, used their civil service as their military prototype. Career soldiers are unionized, personnel receive overtime pay, civilian courts have jurisdiction over service members, and recruitment appeals are occupational. However, the continuation of conscription, and tendencies to avoid specialization at senior levels, have contributed institutional undercurrents (Fleckenstein, 1986). The Dutch have been very much like the Germans, with a unionized force, and a reputation for being unkempt and confining their service to the terms of their contract, but with a tradition of conscription, and efforts on the part of military professionals to reinstitutionalize the military (van der Meulen, 1986). However, the Netherlands and Belgium were the first two nations in continental Europe to abolish conscription after the Cold War (van der Meulen and Manigart, 1997).
By contrast, the Greek military has historically been almost archaically institutional. However, like the British, Australians, and French, it was moving in an occupational direction. Draftees were not allowed to wear civilian cloths, even when off duty. Promotion to senior officer ranks was limited to generalists. Salary was entirely determined by seniority and rank. All crimes by military personnel, including traffic offenses, were tried by military courts. However, competitive salaries had been introduced to recruit technicians, larger numbers of officers were being sent to civilian universities, officers’ wives were increasingly entering the civilian labor force, and the purview of the military justice system was being restricted (Smokovitis, 1986).

E. The Post-Cold War Army

The debate on institutional and occupational military forces assumed the continuation of a bipolar world order and threat perceptions associated with the Cold War that would encourage Western nations to maintain large military forces even as technological advances were making it increasingly difficult to raise these forces through conscription. The collapse of the Berlin Wall, the Warsaw Pact, and the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s decreased the willingness of Western nations to maintain large standing military forces, and turned the attention of military analysts to the nature of the force that was likely to evolve after the Cold War in Europe ended.

The post-Cold War period is characterized by the dramatic decline of the mass armed force. Haltiner’s (1996) comparative analysis of 15 Western European nations that recognized universal military conscription as recently as 1991 revealed the following patterns: 1. three of the fifteen nations that had conscription in 1991 had abolished it by 1996; 2. the mean Military Participation Ratio (MPR) (the proportion of a country’s population participating in the active or reserve military forces), which had been above 5% in the 1970–1990 period, declined to less than 4% subsequently; 3. the Conscript Ratio (the proportion of military personnel who have been conscripted) declined from more than 60% in 1970–1989 to about 50% in 1994; 4. the MPR of military age cohorts (aged 18–32), which was above 50% in the 1987–1991 time period (meaning that half of Western European male citizens in these age groups were drafted), declined after 1991, to slightly above one third in 1994; 5. the participation of women in the military forces of Western European nations increased markedly after 1989, particularly in air services.

Harries-Jenkins (1996) presents data (Table 10.2) on eight NATO nations that dramatically demonstrate these trends. In each country, defense expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product decreased between 1975 and 1995. In six of the eight countries, the 1995 defense budget as a percent of GDP was 75% or less of what it had been in 1975. In each of these countries, the size of the 1995 force had declined relative to its 1975 size, although the range of decline was considerable. In Belgium, the 1995 force was less than half its 1975 size, while the Italian force, which had increased markedly in the 1980s and early 1990s, was in 1995 still 95% of its 1975 size. And in all of these countries, the percentage of the labor force
involved in defense had declined. In 1975, all of these countries except Denmark had more than two percent of their labor forces involved in defense. France and the U.S. had more than three percent so employed. By 1995, only two of these countries (France and Italy) had more than two percent of their labor force employed in defense.

One developmental construct that has been suggested to describe this military institution is what Moskos has referred to as the military in “the warless society,” “post-Cold War society,” and “post-modern society.” Table 10.3 presents the dimensions that Moskos has used to describe the stages in the decline of the mass armed force. The early Cold War period, preceding the evolution of the nuclear arms race, presumed nations that perceived threats to their security and were supportive of both armed forces and high military expenditures. The military still bore the vestigial structure of the mass force that was maintained by conscription and prepared to repel an invasion. While there were tensions among services and branches regarding their appropriate roles, the military professional was seen primarily as a warrior. The military was an institution of heterosexual males who were fulfilling a citizenship obligation. Women were excluded completely, or at least from offensive combat, and segregated in their own branches; homosexuals were punished; and conscientious objection was not valued. The families of professional soldiers were incorporated into the military community. Military personnel saw themselves primarily as soldiers. This was the military force that Moskos described as “institutional.”

Increasing demands for technical specialization and growing unpopularity of military conscription led to a shift from mass armies primarily manned by conscripts to large standing forces in a deterrence posture, increasingly manned by professional soldiers who saw themselves as managers rather than warriors, or by short-term volunteers, both of whom identified increasingly with the broader labor force rather than the military. This trend was fueled by the facts that military personnel

### Table 10.2 Change in Defense Expenditures, Change in Force Size, and Percentage of Labor Force Involved in Defense for Eight NATO Nations: 1975–1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>1995 Defense Expenditure as % of GDP**</th>
<th>Change in Annual Average Strength**</th>
<th>Change in % of Labor Force in Defense***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1.2 / 2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>1.3 / 1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2.4 / 3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>1.3 / 2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>2.1 / 2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>1.4 / 2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>1.3 / 2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1.9 / 3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Average of 1975–1979 = 100
** 1975 = 100
*** 1995% / 1975%
Source: Adapted from Harries-Jenkins, 1996.
increasingly had second jobs in the civilian sector and, when on duty, often found
themselves working side by side with civilians, often doing the same job (Moskos, 1988).

The public did not become more negative toward the military, but the military
did become less salient in the public consciousness, and increasing criticism was
directed at defense expenditures as real economic growth declined. This was also
the case throughout most of Latin America which experienced economic decline in
the 1980s and a decrease in the significance of the military in the civilian sector.

Competition among services for economic resources increased. As reflections
of the ongoing citizenship revolution, conflicts among diverse segments of society
came to the fore as major social issues. At the same time, women were accepted
into the military, not on equal terms with men, but in larger numbers and more
roles; and conscientious objection and homosexuality came to be treated with greater
tolerance. The broader range of civilian roles played by military spouses contributed
to increasing separation of the family and the military. This was the force Moskos
characterized as “occupational.” The developmental construct of the post-Cold War
military anticipates a smaller professional armed force, supported by a substantial
reserve structure. Modern technologies of war and transportation require the
maintenance of standing forces and deny nations the luxuries of time and distance
from the battlefield that characterized demobilizations of the past. While the collapse
of the bipolar antagonism between the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Alliance
allows for smaller forces, subsequent events in Asia, Eastern and Central Europe,
Africa, and Latin America demonstrate that the world has not been pacified. Indeed,
the number of military operations seems to be increasing.

Four major organizational changes are emerging in this post-Cold War military
organization (Moskos, Williams and Segal, 2000). First, there is increasing
interpenetrability of civilian and military spheres, reflected not only in the

Table 10.3 Decline of the Mass Armed Force: Phases of the Post-World War II Army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Structure</th>
<th>Early Cold War</th>
<th>Late Cold War</th>
<th>Post-Cold War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>Mass army</td>
<td>Large professional army</td>
<td>Smaller professional army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public opinion</td>
<td>Invasion</td>
<td>Nuclear war</td>
<td>Subnational/nonmilitary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant issue</td>
<td>Supportive</td>
<td>Ambivalent</td>
<td>Skeptical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Budget</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Culture conflicts</td>
<td>Economic growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tension</td>
<td>Supported</td>
<td>Tolerated</td>
<td>Resisted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional role</td>
<td>Roles</td>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Womens’ roles</td>
<td>Warrior</td>
<td>Technician/manager</td>
<td>Statesman/scholar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse</td>
<td>Separate/excluded</td>
<td>Partial integration</td>
<td>Full integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&amp; community</td>
<td>Integral</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Removed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexuals</td>
<td>Punished</td>
<td>Discharged</td>
<td>Accepted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscientious</td>
<td>Limited/prohibited</td>
<td>Permitted</td>
<td>Alternative service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>objection</td>
<td>Identification</td>
<td>Occupational</td>
<td>Civic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posture</td>
<td>Readiness</td>
<td>Deterrence</td>
<td>Flexible response</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Segal, 1993, p.18.
privatization and outsourcing of military support functions, but in the legitimation of entrepreneurial military operations as well. For example, Executive Outcomes, a South African firm, offers to train soldiers for governments with ineffective armed forces, and in fact leads troops and flies combat missions against rebels and outlaws, with striking successes in Angola, Sierra Leone, and New Guinea. Similarly, Professional Military Resources, Inc., a U.S. corporation, has a contract to train the militaries of Croatia and the Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia.

Second is the diminution of differences within the armed services based on branch of service, rank, and combat versus support functions. This is reflected in countries that have formally combined arms, such as Canada and Israel, as well as an increased emphasis on joint operations, as in the United States.

The third is the change in the purpose of the military, from a focus on fighting wars to missions that were at best secondary, such as humanitarian assistance, and frequently not regarded as military in the past, such as drug interdiction.

Fourth, national militaries are increasingly being used in multinational forces and authorized, or at least legitimized, by entities beyond the nation state. The linkage between the military and the state has been moved in a trans-national direction. For example, the German government allows male citizens of the Danish minority living in Schleswig-Holstein the option of fulfilling their military service obligation in either the German or the Danish army. Military units are increasingly cross-national. For example, NATO now has a Franco-German brigade. Moreover, the United Nations has sponsored more peacekeeping operations since the end of the Cold War in Europe than it did during the first four decades of its existence. When Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali proposed a permanent United Nations military force in his *Agenda for Peace*, the proposal received serious debate in many Western capitals.

However, the post-Cold War society is clearly not a warless society. Harries-Jenkins (1996: 6) notes that “the breaking of the link between potential nuclear conflict and the waging of conventional war means that the use of force to attain a political objective is once again an available option.” Von Bredow (1994) takes a similar position: “many conflicts taking place all over the world could in the future be decided by military means and organized forces more frequently than in the past, with diplomatic negotiations, peace compromises, and the non-violent settlement of disputes taking a back seat.”

F. Latin American Military Forces

The form and structure of military organization in Latin America has not radically changed over time. Moskos’ institutional-occupational formula would most likely characterize the military organizations of Latin America as “institutional”: they have remained isolated from the broader society and have validated and legitimated themselves in terms of their own system of values and norms. The military profession continues to be regarded by its members as a calling to maintain the status quo, values, and institutions of society. However, conditions in Latin America have moved the military from a politically central role in society, have rendered it ineffective,
and left it with little or no mission. National defense, which has always been a secondary mission for Latin American militaries, has become even less significant as interstate conflict has declined. Consequently, on the face of it, Latin American military organizations, like Western European and North American military organizations after the Cold War, have little or nothing to do and are experiencing an identity crisis in terms of mission (Millett and Gold-Biss, 1996). However, to understand the changes in the role of the military organization in Latin America, it is more important to understand the structure of civil-military relationships in these societies and the function of the military as a “modernizing” institution.

The growth of military organizations in the industrialized nations after-World War II was in large part a consequence or outcome of the Cold War. In Latin America, the growth of the armed forces, as well as its increasing centrality in society, although a response to growing Marxist-Leninist movements inspired by the Cuban model (Marcella, 1994a), was a consequence of internal societal pressures — the inability of political parties to handle insurgencies, guerrilla movements, the need for a state agency to engage in nation-building and modernization, and establishing conditions amenable to economic development. Most important is the fact that Latin American military organizations saw themselves as the main actors in establishing conditions for economic development, internal peace, and social order. According to modernization theories, the military moved into its political role, handling state and government functions, instituting programs of order and change more efficiently than other segments of society (see Babin, 1986 for review of the role of the military in modernization of Third World nations). Latin America lacked strong penetrating political parties capable of checking the power or strength of the military and other societal institutions were too weak to manage the affairs of government. Consequently, the military assumed a role that in the nations of the industrialized world was not considered rightfully theirs.

However, in the early 1980s, after two decades of military rule in Latin America, the role of the military declined drastically. The decline parallels the downsizing of armed forces in Europe and North America, but occurred for different reasons. Whereas the end of the Cold War reduced the raison d’etre for large military organizations in the East and the West, the decline of the military organization in Latin America is primarily a consequence of indigenous factors and only secondarily external factors (such as U.S. policy, see Marcella, 1994b). Until the 1980s the swings between democracy and military governments seemed to be highly influenced by outside forces such as foreign trade, regimes considered favorable to the U.S. security and economic policies, etc. Also by the 1980s Cuba had been discredited as a political model and, therefore, no longer posed a threat to other countries. However, more salient in Latin America, was the fact that the 1980s began a sharp economic decline, an increase in narcotrafficking and insurgencies, and an urgent need to consider the future of the environment.

In spite of its central political role, the armed forces in Latin America have not succeeded in “militarizing” or “mobilizing” society (Wesson, 1986). Since 1978, the military has withdrawn from the government of nine Latin American countries. Generally, the armed forces represent a small percentage of the population, especially in relation to the political power they have held. Latin America spends a smaller
fraction of national wealth on the military than any other region of the world and
has a smaller proportion of men in the armed forces with the exception of sub-
Saharan Africa. In fact, in 1993, while most of the industrialized “Western” nations
had a military burden of approximately 2–4.99% (military expenditures as a
percentage of GNP), most of the Latin American countries had a burden of 1.99%
or less (the only exceptions are Nicaragua, Colombia and Chile) (U.S. Arms Control

Since the 1980s the sharp decline in the role of the military is reflected in the
decrease of military expenditures and the size of the armed forces in most Latin
American countries. Generally, (see Table 10.4) there has been a decline in military
expenditures and the size of the military over the ten year period between 1983 and
1993. In only two cases, Bolivia and Brazil, have military expenditures increased.
Where the size of the armed forces has increased, the increase has been very small.
In some Latin American countries the military budgets have been reduced to such
a degree that it has created civil-military tensions (Marcella, 1994b). For example,
in Brazil, military expenditures were reduced by 75% between 1985 and 1990,
creating serious morale and readiness issues. The composition of the Latin American
military organizations has for the most part remained the same over the years. Most
often the enlisted ranks of Latin American armed forces have been primarily of
lower class origin while the officer corps comes from the lower middle or middle
classes. They usually serve for short periods of one to two years. Only in Argentina
and to some extent in Chile has there been an effort to apply conscription to all
socio-economic classes. Throughout Latin America, and within each country, the
ranks have consisted of a combination of conscripts and volunteers. It is not unusual
for national constitutions, such as that of Colombia which requires service from all
when there is a need to defend the country, to require military service or at least
registration for service. However, in reality only a very small proportion of the
population serves and an even smaller proportion are drafted. A trend throughout
most Latin American countries is the highly disproportionate number of enlisted
who come from the lower classes. Usually the middle or upper classes manage to
obtain exemptions from military service (Wesson, 1986).

Although there is not much prestige in being an ordinary soldier in most of
these countries, the military continues to offer channels for advancement and
improvement, mostly in the form of education and technical training. In this manner,
the military has continued to be a “modernization” vehicle for the state (Babin,
1986). Training and reenlistment are the two methods of gaining non-commissioned
officer status and a military career. However, it is very uncommon for non-
commissioned officers (most of whom are volunteers) to make it into the officer
ranks in Latin American armed forces (Wesson, 1986).

In Third World countries the military had little to do with the traditional structure
of elites and was more congenial than other ruling classes to modernization. Unlike
officer corps of Europe which came from aristocracy, those of developing nations
were recruited from middle and lower middle classes (Babin, 1986). This has also
been true in the Latin American countries. The military offers a vehicle to prestige,
relative affluence, and possible political power. The officers, being middle class,
have tended to be conservative — distrustful of politics, politicians, and political
groups. They have consistently been inclined to be highly self-regarding and strongly socialized to their discipline (Wesson, 1986). Much of this is a result of extensive training programs. Training schools are of central importance and training has been a method of keeping officers busy, since there have been few, if any, national missions. Since the last part of the 19th and the early 20th century military schools of all types have proliferated (Wesson, 1986).

Furthermore, the professionalization of military officers in Latin America has put forward a value system which has encouraged political involvement of the military in state affairs. In Mexico where civil-military relations have been tranquil, the education and professionalization of officers have emphasized a value system which has inhibited the political behavior of officers (Ackroyd, 1991). Stepan’s “new professionalism” model of officer education (1973) distinguishes between

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<td>ME* ME/ ME/ Armed ME* ME/ Armed Change ME/ Change of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>capita CGE** forces per 1000 capita CGE** forces pop</td>
<td>pop</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>9202 311 14.9 5.9</td>
<td>4251 127 24.8 1.9</td>
<td>-184 -4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>52 9 4.8 4.6</td>
<td>126 17 7.6 4.2</td>
<td>8 -0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>3636 28 2.8 3.5</td>
<td>5852 37 NA 1.9</td>
<td>9 -1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>911 78 12.7 10.8</td>
<td>1002 73 9.2 6.7</td>
<td>-5 -4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>426 15 8.4 2.5</td>
<td>1232 35 NA 4.0</td>
<td>20 1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>35 14 3 2.8</td>
<td>NA NA NA 2.5</td>
<td>NA -0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>2082 211 NA 25.3</td>
<td>+426 39 NA 16.0</td>
<td>-172 -9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>325 39 23.3 4.7</td>
<td>150 14 7.8 5.4</td>
<td>-25 0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>+230 50 22.8 6.9</td>
<td>100 18 10.1 8.7</td>
<td>-32 1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>+177 22 15.5 5.1</td>
<td>113 11 9.5 4.2</td>
<td>-11 -0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>14 18 5.5 9.2</td>
<td>****5 ****7 ****2.8 2.7</td>
<td>-18 -6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>43 8 6.1 1.5</td>
<td>+30 5 NA 1.3</td>
<td>-3 -0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>+57 14 10.9 4.8</td>
<td>44 8 7.6 3.3</td>
<td>-6 1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>+1450 20 2 1.8</td>
<td>1656 18 2.8 1.9</td>
<td>-2 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>+225 75 15.7 15.3</td>
<td>37 9 NA 3.8</td>
<td>-66 -11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>105 50 5.5 4.8</td>
<td>0 0 0 4.3</td>
<td>-5.0 -0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>96 26 17.7 4.3</td>
<td>****19 ****24 ****8.3 3.2</td>
<td>-26 -1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1876 100 24.7 8.9</td>
<td>696 30 13.3 4.8</td>
<td>-70 -4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>324 109 12.4 10.1</td>
<td>+256 81 NA 7.9</td>
<td>-28 -2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1070 68 10.4 3.6</td>
<td>1029 51 7.8 3.7</td>
<td>-17 0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Military expenditure  
** Military expenditures per capita  
*** Military expenditures per central government expenditures  
**** 1992 data, 1993 data not available  
+ estimate based on partial or uncertain data  
NA Data not available  

those systems that focus on extranational factors, which depoliticize the military by forcing officers to devote study to international war, and those systems whose focus is internal, which teach officers that threats to nations result from inadequate national development. Mexico’s education of officers emphasized the external focus, providing officers with a value system placing the nation above the political efficacy of the military.

Despite its lack of mission, increased isolation, and reduced role in national affairs, the Latin American military has reserved some degree of political power for itself as well as its ability to intervene in national political affairs. Across Latin America there is a spectrum of civil-military relations ranging from what Marcella (1994a) calls “subordination” of the military to civilian authority (as in Colombia, Mexico and the Dominican Republic) to autonomy from civilian control as in Chile, Guatemala and Nicaragua. However, the majority are in transition—Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Honduras, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.

With the majority of armed forces making this transition, interstate conflict in decline, reduced budget appropriations, and the decline of security assistance from the U.S., the mission and rationale for maintaining a military in Latin America is of issue. Argentina has coped somewhat with this through its extensive peacekeeping commitment in Bosnia (Marcella, 1994b). However, throughout the region, Latin American countries will need to define a mission that will validate and legitimate the need for armed forces.

G. Discussion

As Western industrial nations move toward a post-Cold War model, and Latin American (and other developing) nations move toward a post-praetorian model, the two regions have increased participation in multinational military operations other than war. Participation in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations has become the lingua franca of the international community, and even nations that since World War II have eschewed or been constrained from participation, such as Germany and Japan, have felt obliged to contribute to these efforts. Military forces do not necessarily embrace these operations cheerfully, and the current era has left them with an organizational identity crisis. However, these are the major missions on the cusp of the twenty-first century.

Such multinational missions raise interesting questions regarding civil-military relations. To the extent that many nations still maintain conscript forces, they may find themselves legally, normatively, or constitutionally constrained against using their military personnel outside of their national territories (as France did during the Gulf War), and thus unable to participate in the missions that currently define both the role of the military and the position of the state in the international system. Even if they have volunteer forces, they may find that using their military organizations on missions whose relationship to their own national interest is not clear may lead to a politicization both of their armed forces and the processes by which military deployment decisions are made. Both of these processes have occurred in the United States.
Peace operations are inherently political, and the utilization of military personnel on such missions obscures the distinction between that which is military and that which is civilian. Indeed, just as we see civil-military relations in Latin America (and in other developing areas) approximating the traditional Western industrial model, with the military receding from influence, the impact of new missions may be moving civil-military relations in the industrial west (and perhaps in Eastern Europe as well) toward the politicization that has been more characteristic of Latin America.

References


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**Endnote**

1. This research was supported by the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences under Contract No. DASW 0195K005. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily of the Army Research Institute, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.
11 Social Movements: Trends and Turns

Bert Klandermans

Social movements according to Tarrow, who builds on Charles Tilly’s work, are “collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities” (1994a: 4). Elaborating on this definition Tarrow emphasizes (a) that movements mount disruptive action against elites, authorities, other groups and cultural codes; (b) that they do so in the name of common claims against opponents, authorities and elites; (c) that they are rooted in feelings of solidarity or collective identity; and (d) that it is by sustaining their resulting collective action that contention turns into a social movement.

During the past decades many new and old movements have been studied by social movement scholars all over the world: the labor movement, farmer’s protest, the women’s movement, the gay and lesbian movement, the environmental movement, democratization movements, and movements of the extreme right, to mention only some. Reviewing what is found with regard to all these movements is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, I have taken a more conceptual approach. I will start with four concepts which in the past decades have dominated the field: grievances, resources, opportunities, and meaning. Then, I will discuss some new issues which have cornered the field during the past years: the internalization of politics and protest, political change as it impacts on protest behavior, collective identity, social movements and culture, protest policing, and sustained participation. Furthermore, I will allude to the growing methodological sophistication that characterizes the field. The downside of all these developments is disciplinary fragmentation. Therefore, the need for synthesizing theoretical frameworks is growing. In a final section I will discuss a few recently undertaken attempts to such a synthesis.

A. Grievances, Resources, Opportunities and Meaning

The different theoretical approaches in social movement literature can be defined as putting an emphasis on one of four factors: grievances, resources, political
opportunities or processes of meaning construction (see Klandermans, 1997 for an extended treatment of this distinction between theoretical approaches). Besides, social movements have been conceptualized as epiphenomena of societal breakdown, as politics with other means, or as collectivities in search of (a new) identity. These categorizations were, of course, not independent. An emphasis on grievances matched with breakdown theories; resources and opportunities fitted into a view on social movements as politics with other means; and meaning construction and identity formation were akin (see Jenkins, 1983; Pichardo, 1997; Rule, 1988; Tarrow, 1988; Zimmermann, 1983 for more extensive discussions of theories on social movements).

A.1. Societal Breakdown

Breakdown theories owe their name to the underlying assumption that social movements are epiphenomena of societal change and of the breakdown of social arrangements and bonds associated with social change. Traditionally associated with this approach are names like Le Bon (1960), Hoffer (1951), Blumer (1969), Kornhauser (1959), Smelser (1971), Toch (1966) and Gurr (1970); and concepts such as strain, stress, mass society, emotion, irrationality, contagion, alienation, frustration, or relative deprivation. Le Bon, Hoffer, Blumer and Kornhauser all assumed that social movements are aggregates of individuals who respond to social changes, disruptions and strains in a social system. The puzzle of how hardship is translated into collective action is simply solved by referring to leaders. Alienated, uprooted masses stirred by agitators or extremists constitute unconstrained social and political movements. Although the models developed by Smelser, Gurr or Toch are much more sophisticated also these models lack elaborated accounts of the mobilization of aggrieved individuals.

Social psychological literature on relative deprivation and more general on ways of coping with stress has always emphasized that collective action is only one of the possible responses to stress, and evidence suggests not even the one chosen most frequently. More likely reactions are avoidance or individual action (Hartley et al., 1991; Major, 1994). Otherwise, Major (1994) observed that little is known about the factors that make individuals chose one way or another.

A.2. Politics with Other Means

Resource mobilization and political process theories start from the assumption that insurgency constitutes a set of rational collective actions by excluded groups to advance their interests. Because of the assumed rationality of collective action, Mancur Olson’s *The Logic of Collective Action* (1968) enjoyed the interest of generations of movement scholars. This is not the place to give an extensive account of Olson’s theory and the way it has been used in social movement theory. There are some excellent treatises available in the literature (cf. Marwell and Oliver, 1993). My point is that in the eyes of both rational choice theorists such
as Opp (1989), resource mobilization theorists as Oberschall (1973, 1994), Gamson (1989), Tilly (1978) and McCarthy and Zald (1976) and political process theorists such as McAdam (1982), Jenkins (1985) and Tarrow (1989, 1991) collective action is a mean to achieve a goal; a mean to be chosen from action repertoires available in a society.

With the emphasis on the means and the processes involved in the choice of those means, interest in the grievances that fueled collective action waned. Grievances were seen as ubiquitous and certainly not sufficient reason for collective action. Not that grievances were unimportant, but the focal research question became, what makes aggrieved people protest, rather than what makes people aggrieved. The answers to this question has been sought in three different directions: (1) at the individual level in the perceived costs and benefits of participation, (2) at the societal level in the availability of resources, especially indigenous organizations and social networks, and (3) at the political level in the presence or change of political opportunities.

A.2.a. Perceived Costs and Benefits

Participation in a social movement entails involvement in concrete and specific activities: attending a rally or demonstration, donating money, joining a picket line, or staffing an office. Because the perceived costs and benefits of participation are the costs and benefits of taking part in specific activities, we have no reason to assume that someone who is motivated to take part in one kind of activity will be willing to take part in any, or every, other kind of activity. The perceived costs and benefits of participation vary not only according to the kind of activity in question, but according to individual circumstance, temperament, and predilection as well. Indeed, it is quite likely that an activity perceived as relatively cost free by one individual, will seem relatively costly to another.

The motivational dynamics of movement participation are controlled by collective and selective incentives. Building upon this distinction adopted from Olson (1968) Klandermans developed a social psychological theory of movement participation (see Klandermans 1997 for a comprehensive discussion). At the core of this theory is the assumption that the expected behavior of others mediates between individual behavior and the collective incentives contingent upon that behavior.

A.2.b. Resources

According to resource mobilization theory, social movements emerge not so much because grievances increase, but because there is an increase in the availability of resources in an aggrieved population. Organization, especially indigenous organization is one of these resources, and, in the eyes of scholars such as McAdam (1982), Morris (1984), or Schwartz (1976), a resource of crucial importance. A movement’s allies are important providers of such resources. The
resources furnished to a social movement organization by its allies are both tangible (money, space, equipment, etc.) and non-tangible (organizational experience, leadership, strategic and tactical know-how, ideological justifications, etc.) (Aveni, 1978; Maguire, 1995). More important, alliance systems provide social movement organizations with extended communication and recruitment networks. Especially, links that connect the movement organization with a variety of other organizations with a membership different from that of the movement organizations are important transmitters, as these social relays (Ohlemacher, 1992) reach out to new constituencies. Non-movement networks turn out to be extremely important for a movement organization in consensus and action mobilization, especially in the earlier stages of mobilization (Klandermans, 1988). Resource mobilization theorists have stated that external support is a necessary condition for effective movement organizations to develop (McCarthy and Zald, 1976). Both McAdam (1982) and Morris (1984) have argued convincingly that indigenous resources are more important than external support, especially in the initial stages of the movement. External support is relevant, but as a rule it will become available only after a movement has had some initial success (Jenkins and Eckert, 1986).

A.2.c. Political Opportunities

Sidney Tarrow defines political opportunity structure as those “consistent — but not necessarily formal or permanent — dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations of success and failure” (1994a: 85). Indeed, political opportunities are both stable and transitory and both diverging and changing levels of political protest have been explained with reference to political opportunities (see Tarrow, 1989, 1991, 1994a, 1994b; Kriesi et al., 1995; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996 for more extended reviews). Political opportunities have been applied in comparisons of space and of time. Comparisons of space have predominantly concerned state characteristics such as state strength, repression and facilitation, party systems, and neo-corporatism. Kriesi et al. (1995) emphasize that formal structures are informally applied in typical ways. And that these ‘prevailing strategies’ are equally stable characteristics of a political system, which certainly impact on social movement strategies. For the explanation of differences within the social movement sector in a single country or changes over time we need to look into more transitory political opportunities, which are opportunities that are open to some or all movements at some point in time. Indeed, Tarrow (1994a) sees these less stable opportunities as the more important factors in movement formation. Movement formation, he argues, is the product of people seizing and making opportunities which were not present before. Thus, his approach to political opportunities is a dynamic one, it is about political changes that open windows of opportunities for social movements that were closed before: increased access to polity, destabilizing political alignments, changes in a movement’s alliance structures, elites that become divided opportunities would not have any
impact had they not been seized. Through processes of meaning construction in which movement organizations take their part, political opportunities are assessed and reacted upon.

A.3. In Search of Identity

New social movement literature drew the attention of students of social movements to yet another aspect of social movements, namely social movements as sponsors of meaning and carriers of identity.

A.3.a. Movements as Sponsors of Meaning

The social construction of meaning became a central part of social movement theory, as witnessed by such anthologies as Morris and Mueller (1992), Larana et al. (1994), Johnston and Klandermans (1995). Within social movement literature, framing and frame alignment became the concepts that signified processes of meaning construction and collective action frame the label for the outcome of these processes. The name of Snow and his colleagues (Snow et al., 1986; Snow and Benford, 1988, 1992) is inextricably bound to the concept of framing. Framing in Snow’s conception refers to the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action. The process of frame alignment, or consensus mobilization as I have called it (Klandermans, 1984, 1988) conceptualizes how the shared meanings and definitions that people bring to their situation are generated. Indeed, collective action frames — the outcome of framing processes — are defined by Gamson (1992: 7) as “a set of action-oriented beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate social movement activities and campaigns”. Gamson distinguishes three components of collective action frames: a sense of (1) injustice, (2) identity, and (3) agency.

A.3.b. Movements as Carriers of Identity

Acting collectively requires some collective identity or consciousness. Admittedly, this is not a very groundbreaking observation. For example, studies of the labor movement have always underscored the importance of class consciousness or solidarity for class action (see Fantasia, 1988; and Weakliem, 1993 for recent examples). At the same time these studies have also demonstrated that such consciousness does not develop automatically.

Melucci (1989) therefore argued that the creation of collective identity is one of the fundamental challenges would-be movement participants face. Collective identity, according to Melucci (1996: 44) is “an interactive and shared definition produced by several individuals (or groups at a more complex level) and concerned with the orientation of action and field of opportunities and constraints in which
the action takes place.” He conceives of collective identity as a process, because it is constructed and negotiated through a repeated activation of the relationship that links individuals or groups. Taylor and Whittier (1992, 1995), in their attempt to define and operationalize collective identity, emphasize comparable aspects and processes. They define collective identity as “the shared definition of a group that derives from members’ common interests, and solidarity.” (1995: 172).

A.4. Summing Up

Overlooking these approaches to social movements I maintain that when it comes to the level of concrete, empirical studies they compensate each other rather than compete. Obviously, grievances are not sufficient reasons for social movements to develop, or for individuals to participate in social movements. Certainly, resources and opportunities are important to understand why some aggrieved populations do mobilize and others don’t. And indeed, individuals do generate a common identity when they come to share grievances and act collectively. But this doesn’t justify any exclusive rights to the domain. On the contrary, in my view each of the three approaches separately would necessarily fall short as an explanatory framework for the study of social movements.

B. New Issues

The social movement domain is populated by an actively involved scientific community which has enriched the field with studies on a whole array of new issues. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss them all, but I will briefly mention six issues which have occupied many of us during the last few years.

B.1. Internationalization

Thus far political opportunity structures have been conceived very much as national structures. But obvious to even the uninformed onlooker, supranational political structures are mushrooming. Political process is globalizing and we may wonder what consequences these processes of internationalization have for social movements and for movement participants. This question was the focal theme of a conference on Cross-National Influences on Social Movements in 1995 and this section draws very much on the discussions at that conference.1

Sidney Tarrow in his paper for the conference (co-authored with Doug Imig) and in related work (Imig and Tarrow, 1995; Tarrow, 1994b, 1995) starts from the argument elaborated in his Power in Movement (1994a, 1998) that social movements developed when national states came into being. If then the national state looses to supranational political structures, what would that mean to social movements? The European Union is an interesting case in point, because in Europe indeed national powers are gradually devolved to supranational structures. Tarrow
argues that at least for some time movements will continue to aim at national politics. Based on a preliminary assessment of collective action in Europe in the period of 1985–1993, Imig and Tarrow conclude that “truly transnational social movement action — where national movements cross borders to act, or where they coordinate action across borders — has been slow and erratic in coming” (1995: 45). Their observations confirm those of Marks and McAdam (1999) that with the possible exception of the environmental movement, thus far, social movements have not been very successful in developing strategies and structures to feature in supranational political arenas. In their discussion of labor unions within the European Union, Ebbinghaus and Visser (1994) arrive at exactly the same conclusion.

This is not to say that internationalization of politics has no impact whatsoever. On the contrary, Imig and Tarrow point to the influence of the European Union on the repertoire of political tactics that collective actors adopt across the continent. Orderly, institutional and representative approaches are clearly preferred in Brussels, and as a consequence unless movement organizations have the resources to maintain elaborated lobbying facilities or hire lobbyist, their influence on European policy making is minimal. A trend which Imig and Tarrow qualify as ominous, because it excludes resource-poor social actors.

But the creation of supranational structures with powers that exceed those of national states has also brought opportunities to social movements which weren’t there before. They can appeal directly to supranational structures, they can try to co-opt national authorities in their struggle with supranational structures or vice versa. For that matter, Marks and McAdam (1999) emphasize that these opportunities are not identical for all challenging groups. It depends very much on the extent to which policy authority has actually been transferred from the national to the supranational level. In those domains where authority has not been transferred, challengers have no choice but to target national authorities. Marks and McAdam mention energy-policy as an example and point to the inability of the anti-nuclear power movements to internationalize as a consequence. Ebbinghaus and Visser (1994) conclude that unions remain dependent on whatever openings or leverages they can muster nationally as long as their classic opponent — the employers — have no supranational institutions unions can negotiate with. But, in those instances where actually authority is transferred, challengers can and have successfully approached the supranational level sometimes even to enforce national authorities to change policy.

B.2. Political Change

Changes in the political alignments that control the state, or the configuration of power as they are called by Kriesi (1995), create opportunities for challengers. In this regard, Kriesi refers especially to the distribution of power in the party system and in other parts of the system of interest intermediation. The make up of these systems may change, some parties or interest associations may grow, others may decline or breakdown altogether. Such changes may open opportunities for some
movements and close opportunities for others. For example, the odds of the Prolife and Pro-choice movements changed dramatically when Reagan entered office. In the European context, Kriesi points to the position of the social democrats in the seventies and eighties (in government or opposition) and whether the left is divided into major communist and social democratic parties. He assumed that these aspects of the party system made a significant difference for new social movements. An assumption which actually was proven to be true in comparisons of new social movements in the Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany and France (Kriesi et al., 1995) and of left-libertarian movements in Germany and Italy (Della Porta and Rucht, 1995). In Germany and the Netherlands, for example, new social movements were more supported by the left when it was in opposition than when it was in government; in France it was just the other way around. Another example comes from the Netherlands where the defeat of the Christian Democrats and their subsequent change from government to opposition in 1994, changed the configuration of power unfavorably for any type of movement or interest organization whose fate was linked to that of the Christian Democrats (farmers and the Christian union federation are two examples).

Much more pervasive were the changes in Eastern Europe. The ongoing changes in political alignments in those countries first fostered and then impeded movements of democratization (Rucht, 1995; Szabo, 1994; Pickvance, 1996). These authors demonstrate (Rucht with regard to East Germany, Szabo with regard to Hungary and Pickvance with regard to Hungary and Russia) that the organizations that flourished in these countries on the eve of political turnover lost momentum when changes actually took place. Yet another example of a regime changes which brought a movement in a totally different position vis à vis the power holders provides South Africa. A movement takes office, one could summarize the new position of those who struggled against apartheid. And the interesting question is, of course, how this is taking place and what it means to the social movement sector. For example, in South Africa, almost every movement organization ‘lost’ part of its leadership to government. Institutionalization — as one could call it — is not new as a topic in social movement literature. But in the wake of changes such as those that are taking place in South Africa it deserves to regain our interest. And indeed it does as witnessed by a volume edited by David Meyer and Sidney Tarrow which appeared recently (1998).

B.3. Protest Policing

In his classical study From Mobilization to Revolution Charles Tilly (1978) defined repression and facilitation as important concepts in his theoretical approach to mobilization. He classified political regimes on the basis of the degree of repression and facilitation. A decade later, a growing interest in this mixture of state repression and facilitation evolved into what Donatella della Porta called the policing of protest. Intrigued by the increasing subtlety and sophistication of the control of protest in Western democracies scholars like Della Porta in Italy, McCarthy and McPhail in the U.S., Fillieule in France, Waddington in the U.K.
and Wisler in Switzerland began to discover that certainly in Western democracies the control of protest has become a profession in and of itself. Outright repression is replaced by more subtle measures, and indeed there seems to be a shared interest between police and organizers to keep protest peaceful and orderly. Of course, repression has not disappeared but the more subtle mechanisms and measures of control deserve our attention. The efforts of these scholars have resulted in several publications, inter alia, an anthology titled *The Policing of Protest in Contemporary Democracies*, which discusses and compares protest policing in West European countries and the U.S. (Della Porta and Reiter, 1998). In the introductory chapter to the volume the editors explain how protest policing in Western democracies became less repressive and how underenforcement of the law, a search to bargain, and large-scale collection of information became the typical characteristics of protest policing in the 1990s throughout the countries under review. Meanwhile the study of protest policing is proliferating as witnessed by the work of Olivier in South Africa and Szabo in Hungary.

### B.4. Culture

Culture and identity are certainly among the more recent additions to the ever changing conceptual framework for social movement studies. Whereas a few years ago a conference was organized to explore culture as an aspect of social movements and their environment and to discuss the usefulness of typical cultural concepts such as symbols, rituals, and meaning for our domain, today we seem to have convinced ourselves and have turned culture as a framework for the study of social movements into a little growth industry in the field.

In their introduction to *Social Movements and Culture*, Johnston and Klandermans (1995) make a distinction between culture as a factor in the emergence of social movements and culture as a movement characteristic. These authors emphasize that movements are not only shaped by culture, but that they also shape and reshape it. Symbols, values, meaning, icons, and beliefs are adapted and molded to suit the movement’s aims and frequently are injected into the broader culture via institutionalization and routinization. A central part of the process of culture consumption and production concerns meaning construction. In public discourse, through persuasive communication, and through consciousness raising during episodes of collective action (Klandermans, 1992) meaning is constructed and reconstructed; in a complex interplay between mass media and social actors such as movements, countermovements, political parties, and authorities, and in interpersonal interaction in social networks and friendship groups (see Szasz, 1994 for a fascinating account of all these processes in the context of protest against toxic waste).

With regard to culture as a movement characteristic, Taylor and Whittier (1995) refer to such concepts as emergent norms, collective action frames, collective identity, ritual and discourse. Lofland (1995) provides a list of six matters he calls culture: values, material objects and iconic personages, stories, characteristics of movement occasions (gatherings), typical roles, and the persona exhibited by
participants. He suggests that movements differ in degree of culture, that is, have a more or less complex and rich culture. He hypothesizes that such differences impact on participant morale, and commitment and tenacity in the face of adversity and retention of movement participants.

B.5. Identity

The concept of identity has a relatively short career in social movement literature, much shorter than injustice or agency. As a consequence, the literature on identity in the social movement domain is still very uneven. In fact, it is often not clear what identity signifies, how it is conceptualized and operationalized. Most of the writing is theoretical, and there is hardly any empirical work done within the social movement domain. Collective identity as it is usually denoted in that literature seems to figure as one of those concepts everyone knows about, but only very few have actually tried to assess. In my view this state of affairs is to a large extent due to the fact that the individual and the collective levels of analysis are not properly distinguished. Only if we keep those levels straight we will be able to conceptualize the identity component of collective action frames in a proper way.

In his essay on ‘The Social Psychology of Collective Action’ Gamson (1992) seems to take a similar stand. In Gamson’s eyes some of the key-questions of social movement literature involve the mesh between self and society, which he sees as characteristically social psychological questions. More specifically he argues, that collective identity concerns the mesh between the individual and cultural systems. Part of the reason why, according to Gamson, social movement literature on collective identity is so excessively vague is the tendency to blur individual and cultural levels. Gamson holds that “the locus of collective identity is cultural; it is manifested through the language and symbols by which it is publicly expressed. We know collective identity by the cultural icons and artifacts displayed by those who embrace it. To measure it one would ask people about the meaning of labels and other cultural symbols, not about their personal identity” (1992: 60).

The indiscriminate and imprecise use of various self and identity concepts in social movement literature encouraged Stryker and his colleagues to organize in 1997 a conference on the interface of self, identity and social movements. This conference was attended by sociologists and social psychologists and attempted to bring students of identity at the individual and the collective levels of analysis together. Throughout the conference the distinction between personal and collective identity was emphasized. The sociological concept of collective identity, it was argued, is to be conceived of as a characteristic of a group, it concerns cognitions, values, or symbols shared by members of a single group. Individuals are members of more than one group, and therefore share in different collective identities. At the individual level, collective identity manifests itself as social identity. The social psychological self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1994) conceives of identity as composed of personal and social identity. Depending on the context someone’s
Social identity may become more salient and may make an individual act as a member of a group rather than as a unique individual. Stryker in his contribution to the conference argues that self can be conceived of as comprised of multiple identities varying in salience. All this mounts to a dynamic conception of identity, with contextual factors determining which of the multiple identities is salient at a point in time. As a consequence, individuals may experience competing identities as for example Kurtz (forthcoming) and Roth (1997) demonstrate in their work on women activists in the labor unions. These studies concern two conflicting activist identities, but in a similar vein activist identities may conflict with non-activist identities. This was, for instance, the case for some of the peace movement supporters in Oegema and Klandermans’ study (1994) who, at the same time, identified with the peace movement and with the Christian Democratic Party which was opposing the peace movement’s most significant goal, that is, to enforce the government to refrain from the deployment of cruise missiles. Identity is a dynamic concept and such questions as why and how does the one identity rather than the other become salient and why and how does identity politicize are still waiting for an answer.

B.6. Sustained Participation

A defining characteristic of social movements is their continued existence over time. Well-known movement organizations such as the African National Congress (ANC), the Dutch Interdenominational Peace Council (IKV) and the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), the American National Organization for Women (NOW) and National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP) have now been in existence for several decades. From the endurance of these movement organizations we can infer that some dedicated people remain lifelong participants.

Social movement literature, however, is inclined to emphasize the transient character of social movements. To be sure, many movements die, but many movements continue to exist for extended periods and participants dedicate lifetimes of commitment to their causes. The movement against apartheid, for example, illustrates that participants in a movement continue to be active for many, many years — and it would not be difficult to give many more examples. Yet, in recent times interest in sustained participation in social movements is growing, as witnessed by several new tendencies in the literature such as the appearance of the concept of movement commitment (Downton and Wehr, 1997; Klandermans, 1997), and the growing interest in the biographical consequences of movement participation (Andrews, 1991; Teske, 1995; McAdam, 1989; Marwell et al., 1987, 1993).

Activism especially sustained activism can have dramatic biographical consequences. People’s identities change when for the first time in their lives they take part in protest activities. From people who do not take part in protest, they have turned into people who do. These identity changes do not only take place in the eyes of the newborn activists themselves, but in the eyes of their social
environment as well. It is not unlikely for them, to have become a deviant and therefore to become treated as a deviant. The prospect of such reactions of one’s environment is, of course, a concern to people. For example, would-be union activists may wonder or be concerned whether becoming an activist would do any damage to their career. In the context of today’s industrial relations in Western-Europe this may not be a very serious risk. But there was a time that such concerns were certainly not exaggerated. Examples abound in European labor history of people who were put at a disadvantage, sacked, of even ousted out from their craft or town because they were union activists. Besides, these are not just historical matters, as for example, Fantasia (1988) demonstrated even today workers in the U.S. may risk their jobs or positions in the company if they campaign for unionization. Of course, the labor movement is not the only movement whose activists experience serious biographical consequences of their activism. Taylor and Raeburn (1995) show that even in a liberal domain as academic sociology in the U.S. those who engaged in activism for the gay and lesbian movement have suffered career consequences.

This is not to say that movement participation has only negative biographical consequences. Had that been the case, very few people would have been willing to continue participating. On the contrary, life history interviews time and again reveal that long-term participants value their participation highly. To be sure they did sacrifice, but it was worth it. Life histories can tell us something that surveys of participants might not be able to tell us, which is how the choice to become active and stay active in a movement fits into the course of someones life. And how those choices gradually produce what Kelly and Breinlinger (1996) two social psychologists who have been studying social identity of movements participants called an activist identity.

C. Social Movement Research

Over the last few decades the social movement domain have become more and more empirically oriented and social movement research have become more and more sophisticated. For a long time, conceptual treatises without any testing and descriptive case studies without much theorizing were the most frequently encountered works in the social movement domain. But increasingly, theory-driven empirical work has become common practice in social movement literature. To be sure, case studies are still an important part of social movement research and will continue to do so, but they are more often designed to test theoretical arguments rather than to describe yet another movement. Good examples of such studies are Sharon Kurtz’ (forthcoming) and Silke Roth’s (1997) works on women in the labor union. Roth’s work is also a good example of another methodological improvement, namely the use of various methods of data collection. Life history interviews, survey results and archival data combine into a convincing story. As the insight is growing that social movements must be studied both at the collective and the individual level multi-method research has become indispensable.
Qualitative research continues to be a significant part of the empirical work in the field and some of the best studies on social movements are in that category. Verta Taylor’s study of the postpartum depression self help movement (1996), or Nancy Whittier’s (1995) study of changing identities in the radical women’s movement and the work of Benford on framing (see Benford, 1997 for a critical review) are recent examples. Yet, social movement research has become more quantitative too over the past few decades partly because of the ever-growing capacity of computers but not in the least because of methodological innovation. Klandermans and his colleagues (see 1997 for an overview) demonstrated how movement cycles of any kind can be exploited to conduct field research on movement participation. In doing so, they used those cycles as natural experiments in (de)mobilization and showed how survey research can produce significant results when deliberately employed in such contexts. A rapidly expanding innovation has been the study of protest events (see Rucht, Koopmans and Neidhardt 1998 for an overview). Using newspapers and more recently police archives and the files of press agencies as sources scholars such as Tilly, Tarrow, Olzak, Kriesi and his colleagues, Rucht and Neidhardt, Koopmans, McCarthy and his colleagues and Fillieule have developed increasingly sophisticated methods to collect and process protest event data. In addition to individual behavior, protest events have become a central unit of analysis in empirical work on social movements.

The availability of evermore sophisticated techniques of data collection and data processing have made another important development possible, namely longitudinal and comparative research. Comparisons of time and place are crucial in a field where the core questions are about change and the differential impact of movements, movement characteristics and characteristics of the environment. Kriesi et al.’s study of new social movement in Western Europe (1995) is an excellent example of a comparison of both time and place. Such comparisons need not necessarily concern between country-comparisons. For example, Klandermans and Oegema (Klandermans and Oegema, 1987; Oegema and Klandermans, 1994) compared mobilization campaigns of the Dutch peace movement over time in different communities; Raka Ray (1999) compared local branches of the Indian women’s movement in two cities; Cynthia Irvin (1999) compared the Basque nationalist movement with the Irish Republic Army; Mona Youniss (forthcoming) compared the Palestinian Liberation Army with the African National Congress and Klandermans (1993) compared mobilization campaigns of the women’s movement, the labor movement and the peace movement.

D. Fragmentation and Syntheses

McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (1996:18) in the inaugural issue of Mobilization observe that the field of social movement research is characterized by an “increasingly insular, subfield-specific nature of scholarship” which in combination with “the difficulties inherent and the lack of professional rewards encouraging efforts at theoretical/empirical stock-taking produce a proliferation of specialized scholarship that may add lines to vitae but little to general knowledge.” Others
(Lofland, 1993) complain that ‘theory-bashing’ has become common practice in movement literature and started to raise the question of why this is the case. One need not agree with Lofland’s diagnosis to accept his argument that protagonist of different theoretical strands address diverging aspects of social movements or their dynamics and to a large extent are talking past each other. In this final section I want to discuss recent attempts which have been undertaken toward synthesizing theory and research on social movements since Sidney Tarrow and I (Klandermans and Tarrow, 1988) attempted to bring the European and American approach to social movements together arguing that the former was better in explaining ‘why’ movements mobilize and the latter in explaining ‘how’ they mobilize. Although very instrumental in bringing scholars from the two continents together (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996: xi), as a synthesis this wasn’t really satisfactory in the long run.

Since then, some have proposed taxonomic solutions (Lofland, 1993; Neidhardt and Rucht, 1993), others have proposed analytic schemas (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 1996), and I myself have tried to carefully distinguish levels of analysis (Klandermans, 1997). I will briefly discuss each.

In an interesting article, Friedhelm Neidhardt and Dieter Rucht (1993) distinguish three types of conditions for the development of social movements — conditions of problematization, mobilization, and consolidation. Each condition is further defined at the individual, the collective and the structural level of analysis. The authors maintain that the nine conditions they distinguish in fact are addressed by various currents in social movement literature. John Lofland (1993) comes up with a similar argument. After having developed a matrix with as much as 119 entries each specifying different questions about a variety of aspects of social movements, he suggests that different theories emphasize different questions about and aspects of social movements. Lofland distinguishes such questions as what is the aspect and how frequent is it? What causes the aspect and what are its consequences? What are the processes involved and what is the human agency? Each of these questions can be phrased with regard to a variety of aspects such as organization, beliefs taken to be true by a movement, leaders, participants, constituents, media, elites, bystanders publics, countermovements, and so on. Lofland’s point is that he does not believe that there is a grand theory capable of explaining all these different aspects, but that the theories which have been developed over the past decades are middle-range theories fit to answer some subset of questions. Indeed, in my view the succession of approaches that featured in the social movement literature were not so much paradigmatic shifts but subsequent attempts to cure what were deemed to be flaws or gaps in existing theoretical frameworks.

Two other attempts to synthesis take a different approach and try to define analytic categories which integrate the field. In their *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* McAdam, McCarthy and Zald propose three sets of factors in analyzing the emergence and development of social movements (1996: 2): “(1) the structure of political opportunities and constraints confronting the movement; (2) the forms of organization (informal as well as informal), available to insurgents;
and (3) the collective processes of interpretation, attribution, and social construction that mediate between opportunity and action.” Political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes — the shorthand designations these authors suggest — are pointed to as the central analytic foci of most scholarship in the area, and proposed as the framework for a comparative cross-national perspective on social movements. Perhaps the most ambitious agenda is that of McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, who announced a year ago the establishment of a network of researchers which aims at “producing a intelligible map of the field, a synthesis of recent inquiries, a specification of the scope conditions for the validity of available theories, and an exploration of worldwide changes in the character of contention.” (1996:17). The authors divided the field in subdomains and provide preliminary sketches of the kind of synthesis they hope to achieve in three such domains. The three subdomains they distinguish are: connecting social movements, cycles and revolutions; relating collective identities and social networks; and linking institutional politics and collective action.

Finally, in my book The Social Psychology of Protest (1997), I hold that much of the theoretical debates in social movement literature reflects a failure to make a proper distinction between levels of analysis. In my view, the argument that social psychological theories fall short as explanations of the emergence of social movements is a typical example of such a mistake. Social psychology may be capable of explaining why individuals do or do not participate in social movements, do or do not identify with some social category, do or do not share some beliefs, but necessarily fails as a theoretical framework for an answer to such questions as why at a specific point in time or among a specific section of the population a social movement develops, or declines. More specifically, I argue that the confusion about social psychology among students of social movements originates to a large extent in the inappropriate treatment of the individual and the collective levels of analysis. I emphasize that we must try to keep our levels straight. In the section on identity I have provided an example of this kind of synthesis by linking collective identity, social identity and group identification to each other.

Coda: I have tried to give an account of the state of the art in my field, the field of social movements, collective action and change. Inevitably, such an account has a personal touch. Had it been someone else a different story would have been written, with different emphases and different choices.

References


Endnotes

1. An anthology based on the conference edited by Hanspeter Kriesi, Donatella Della Porta, and Dieter Rucht was published by Macmillan in 1999.

12 Late Modern Institutions and Collective Action

Pierre Hamel, Henri Lustiger-Thaler and Louis Maheu

This chapter examines the transforming horizon of late-modern institutions. We contend that there is no phenomenon more central or germane to the future of collective action than the conflict ridden process of institutionalization. This leads us to inquire into a number of approaches in this contribution. We argue that it is critical to begin a process of reconceptualizing the very notion of institutions as standard bearers of collective action. We are therefore compelled to ask two encompassing and key questions. Where does the institutionalization process begin, as it weaves itself deeper and deeper within a given process of collective action? Is collective action already embedded in the first institutional instance, and if so, how can we use this residual of action to better understand the late modern institution? What we hope to convey in this exploratory essay is that thinking about institutions and the process of institutionalization must embrace the new realities surrounding collective action. These are very much experientially coded around issues of subjectivity and its collective action spinoffs. A revisitation of institutional theories by way of social movement analyses has a special role to play in this late modern inquiry.

Social movement theorists by observing grassroots groups, right wing movements and global movements have always, in one manner or another, been perched at the critical input valve of institutionalization processes. This has kept analysts focused on conflict laden processes of social transformation, in all its complexity. This vantage-point has led some theorists, particularly in the European social movement schools, to reassess the fundamental role of social movements in relation to social change, and or changes within a given system of political action. It is at the wellspring of these questions, that is, about the changing nature of the phenomena itself that the sociology of social movements offers its best insights as it faces its surest challenges. It is equally at this juncture that the sociology of social movements, as it once laid claim to a popular language of protest and collective action, must now offer a similarly new vocabulary in more ambivalent and uncertain times.
Our argument will therefore take seriously approaches which privilege the cognitive, cultural, symbolic and historical dimensions of collective action in relation to institutionalization processes. Hence, we are engaged on a road that others are already exploring (see Offe, 1987; Eder, 1993; Meyer and Scott, 1994; Clemens, 1997). However, the very concepts that have been used in much of this literature are weak explanations of the complex global and informational complexities we are now facing. As our knowledge of collective action increases, the institution is appearing at points in the social movement cycle that marks its centrality in the very construction of identities, or rather the experience of an identity upon which collective action is ultimately based. Again, the sociology of social movements is well positioned to bring a valuable contribution towards a late modern reading of institutional life, as it is now more and more ridden with the residue and effects of collective action. In short, social movement activities and forms of contentious politics (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 1996) are increasingly difficult to separate from the institutions they confront and come to inhabit. But, the late-modern condition so named through its institutional life, what of its resolution.

A. Institutions and Collective Action Theories

Sociology’s quest for a theory that bridges research on modern institutions and the study of collective action is in a state of flux. On the one hand, the sociology of institutions or organizations has a strong conceptual framework for movement oriented collective action. This is expressed under the rubric of pressures placed upon an institution, whether this be in the form of street or interest group politics. Collective action theories, on the other hand, see institutionalization as the end-point of a social movement cycle, the last screen for collective action. In the epistemological framework of institutionalist theories, inquiries about collective action have been for the most part understood in a diachronic way. Collective action becomes a pressure on the institution to respond to the agency or dysfunctionality of actors as well as the power of central agents to influence the frames of reference by which people live their lives. This is echoed in the work of Elizabeth Clemens (1997). Clemens makes the case that movements have an inherent capacity for mimetic isomorphism. This means that they often exercise an innovative capacity to imitate the institutional actors they are challenging, for more rights and privileges. Social movements as challengers are now copying the institutional practices of elites, in the same way as elites have traditionally copied challengers by integrating dissent into political programs or through the transformation of cultural revolt into cultural consumption.

While we should expect this secondary and normative emphasis from institutional analysts such as Clemens — after all their focus is not social movement activity —, we should be less tolerant of theories of collective action attempting to explain the function of agency within institutions or social movements as agents of social change. However, from either perspective, that is whether one begins from the spaces of collective action, or the institution as a
space of action which enables or restrains collective action, we are left with an open black box from a collective action perspective. How do we increase our understanding of the mechanisms of social transformation when theories of collective action do not take the institution as a form of agency centrally enough, that is, as a full partner in the reflexivity and subjectivity undergirding social change, rather than the end-process that one masters as part of a cycle of collective action?

Additionally, how does an understanding of socio-cultural pressures from grassroots, community groups, and powerful forces such as multinationals and states figure into the very construction of the institution? In other words, can collective action from an institutional perspective, ever be more than a pressure which seeks equilibrium within its own system, following the, by now well known, models of cooptation, inclusion/marginalization and routinization (Meyer and Scott, 1994)? Can institutional transformation, from the point of view of collective action theory, be ever more than a social process of social recomposition which seeks out the grounds for a measured correspondence between actors and systems of action? Curiously, both approaches share an interest in the problem of social stability, or the possibility of the institution as a process of valuation and power from which to create order from already existing sets of order or unruly collective actions. Both institutional analysis as well as contemporary theories of collective action claim approaches which privilege “acts of correspondence” between systems and actors if from vastly different vantage points. By an act of social correspondence we mean the ability of the institution to channel conflict towards social compromises, if not a sense of ultimate ends.

Clearly, the concept of the institution is fraught with an ambiguity that denies achieving such ultimate ends in the Weberian sense of the term. Yet, it is instructive to be reminded that the earliest proponents of institutional theory were very much concerned with the dynamics of social change, rather than viewing the institution as a collection of rule enforcing or “rule-frames” from which to gage behaviors. Whether in the analysis of economic behavior, the institutional approach in political science, the historical/rational construction of rules of governance, or in the more familiar sociological tradition of Weber and Durkheim, those concerned with institutions saw them as potentially conflictual and rich with symbolic meaning, through a subjectivity based on negotiating the rules of the social order. As Hirsch, Michaels and Friedman (1987) have argued, this however was not long lasting. The institutional reference to conflicting systems of order and value was siphoned out of political science by behavioralist views and similarly out of economics by the hegemony of classical economic thought.

Sociology has been the main discipline to retain the original pulse for institutional studies, principally through empirical research and an explicit theory of organizations in the classical works of Parsons, Merton, and a later generation of scholars with which the field is still today synonymous such as Berger and Luckmann (1967), Putnam (1992) or Etzioni (1993). It is also important to note, that the passage through the sociology of organizations — which remains one of the richest veins for institutional theories — was closely coupled with functionalism, particularly through Parsons’ influential and foundational essay
on formal organizations. It is from this intellectual history that we derive what we will later call the traditional paradigm of institutions, one that has been absorbed by social movement theories, though they come from radically different assumptions about the nature of social transformation.

B. Social Movements and the New Institutionalists

Institutions and the process of institutionalization are far from simply matters of historical debate. Nor are they sequestered at the margins of sociology. They are at the forefront of current sociological interest. The institution has been a topic of much debate, particularly concerning the new institutionalist position, or neo-institutionalism (Dimaggio and Powell, 1991; Abbott, 1992; Granovetter, 1992; Stinchcombe, 1997; Dimaggio, 1997). From the interest standpoint of a social movement analyst, recent studies have looked at “institutional disharmonies” between value frames. In this respect, analysts argue that the new focus of research should be between institutions and culture or the realm of ideas. One of the key questions they ask is: to what extent do institutions prescribe the type of action found in oppositional groups? The new institutionalism, in its ongoing debates with rational choice theory and the “old historical-institutionalists”, is reviving the debate, captured in the older system/life world, state/civil society dichotomy, the new terms however being institutions/cognition.

W. Richard Scott (1995) has been most eloquent in his framing of institutional approaches, in the terms we are using here, that is, the regulative, normative, and cognitive framing of action. We believe these definitions to be useful, if overly segmented in Scott’s approach. Much occurs between these “epistemological pillars” (Hirsch and Lounsbury, 1996). The regulative characterization of institutions is that organizations function on the basis of coercion, compliance and surveillance, whilst the normative view is concerned with social context and values. Most studies within sociology fall within these two broad categories.

The cognitive pillar, which views culture as an interlocking set of historical constructs, is the preferred territory of the new institutionalists. The new institutionalists have been faulted in this regard for not paying enough credence to the cultural specificity of human agency. Yet, it is at times difficult to see how the new institutionalists differ substantively from the old functionalism in their attention to embedded cultural patterns of behavior. Their approach reissues some of the same problems found in the regulative and normative pillars described by Scott (1995). In the end, the new institutionalism is steadfast in its attachment to a rather traditional reading of the subject as a receptacle for overwhelming structural forces.

Indeed, there is a stirring in the current literature on collective action which tells us that the three mini-paradigmatic approaches, outlined by Scott (1995), have likely exhausted themselves. The clearest indication is what can be called a ‘partial institutionalization’ explanation. This is an approach within the collective action literature that defines a field of action by taking into account the problem of ‘social correspondence’ between actors and systems of action. Social
movements, from this view, are actors that acquiesce within as well as challenge the symbolic order as an ongoing cultural practice. The partial institutionalization thesis is documented by studies which trace the manner in which movements deal with political opportunity structures as they channel protest actions through varying forms of contentious politics (Eder, 1993; Offe, 1985; Dalton and Kuechler, 1990; Tarrow and Meyer, 1998). What we are referring to as the partial institutionalization thesis suggests that social movements are part of, though not fully defined by, institutions.

Although this approach describes the flux of social relations in the face of institutions, the partial institutionalization thesis offers no insight towards reconstructing this process from the view of subjectivity. This perspective has not produced a convincing analysis of the relational process that exists between movements, actors and institutions, except to postulate various degrees of sociopolitical absorption and/or resistances. In our view, the partial institutionalization thesis, a current model in theories of collective action, is but an indicator — though a powerful one — of the decline of the traditional paradigm of institutionalization as used in collective action approaches. It should also be a red light for institutional theories which pay close attention to the cultural and symbolic meanings of institutional practices. Perhaps more important for the development of our own thinking in this essay is that the increasing problem of non-correspondence between actors and systems of action remains undeveloped.

In multiple ways, and pushed forward by massive structural transformations in global/local informational systems, actors and institutions remain in conflict, submerged in tensions not caught by normative, regulative, cognitive, partial institutionalization or interactionist perspectives. This intense layering of social ambivalence suggests several problems for theory. For example: (a) institutions in late modernity are more fragile and fragmented than we have recognized them to be, suggesting increasing levels of non-correspondence between actors and systems; (b) this changing character of institutions diffuses their legitimacy into the realm of culture, that is itself under enormous pressures for social and political accountability; (c) the oppositional collective actions that emerge from this are ultimately struggling less with alliances, or 'sets of tactical coherences' than with combating the hegemony of the social, cultural and/or politically reconstituted norm, supported by an institutional process of social containment.

C. Institutions, Subjects and Collective Action

Subject centered agency has become a central issue in our understanding of modernity. During the past decade, the sociology of social movements has given greater attention to the social, personal, cultural, and political dimensions of subjectivity. These analyses provide very useful comments about issues emerging from the more recent examples of the local and global institutionalization of collective action. We will group these elements around 3 factors. These categorical distinctions overlap in several instances, but define separate fields of action.
The first is defined in relation to diverse models of action. Individual subjectivity forces actors to reposition themselves in diverse fields of action (Giddens, 1991; Beck, 1992; 1994). By calling upon their subjectivity individual actors experience the possibilities and limits of a collective way of being implicated in a series of actions. Learning new skills; the affirmation of a specific identity; the discovery of the ethical requirements of action in the social field — which deeply engages the authenticity of the self — these are all aspects that characterize subjectivity as a basis for experiencing within the framework of late-modernity. This model of action takes its distance from the traditional framing of community. The actor is no longer an abstract representation: she/he becomes an acting agent. On an organizational level, this model is characterized by gatherings or by networks that have limited duration and objectives: individual actors negotiate their participation within a community framework through linkages and distances. In this sense, the network within which action takes place is no longer a given. Instead it appears as the result of action itself.

The second factor considered here results from concrete applications that follow the rise of a new model of action described above. This is linked to the forms of citizenship that appeared with the first expressions of democratic individualism. Within the sociological tradition, citizenship has long been viewed as a central theme of modernity. From this viewpoint, the extension of political rights to social rights — notably through the construction of the Welfare State — was considered a key factor in the progression of human rights (Rosanvallon, 1981; 1995). However, more recently, these questions have given rise to interpretations that consider as partial and too restrictive the prevailing paradigm of social citizenship. These previous models of integration had a limited capacity to account for social and cultural differences. They also had problems adapting to the requirements of minority groups because they promoted a homogeneous vision of the social and of the political which actually leveled out cultural pluralism and social differences to the advantage of top-down forms of integration (Donzelot and Jaillet, 1997).

New social movements appeared on the scene against this backdrop, to mobilize in the 1960s and 1970s. They transformed issues that were traditionally thought of as a private nature — for instance domestic violence, personal choices regarding sexual identity, etc. — into political themes. Moreover, by drawing attention to the limits of the traditional forms of political representation, movements did not simply act in a different way on the political and judicial field. Indeed, beyond these aspects, they are actually involved in building a new relationship with politics (Maheu, 1991). However, the success of new social movements had a self-limited mandate. This is because they have not succeeded in transforming the cultural field of civil society as deeply as they had hoped regarding the requirements of democratic participation (Cohen and Arato, 1992). In addition, while they were gaining recognition from public authorities — becoming “a normal feature of everyday life” (Eder, 1993; Roth, 1996) — their subversive significance began to diminish. It is as if, beyond their initial intentions, these movements had to assume, sometimes against their will, social integration functions (Scott, 1990).
Our third factor relates to the subjectivity of actors involved in collective action. On numerous occasions researchers have pointed out the specificity of new social movements as being linked to identity claims (Touraine, 1981; 1984; 1992; Eder, 1985; Melucci, 1980; 1985; 1989). Taking account of identity in the definition of action invites us to take our distance from traditional representations of political culture. It becomes clearer, within such a reformulation, that the fragmented character of struggles led by social movements are no longer considered negatively. Late-modern identities, and the principles of recognition they are linked to, have to be continuously adjusted to contextual changes. During processes of collective action, individual actors find themselves immersed within fields of mutual recognition (Connolly, 1991), where they experience not only their own identities, but also their differences with others (Dubet, 1994). During these exchanges, actors learn to deal with others, find solutions of compromise, involve themselves in processes and even in strategies of change that involve their personal life. It follows therefore that individuality and subjectivity are essential components of action.

D. The Global and Reflexive Content of Action in Late Modernity

These three factors of subjectivity, that is: the experiencing individual, the remaking of the citizen, and the subject as an actor based upon mutuality, structure the global and reflexive content of collective action. Institutions are implicated in the very construction of action both locally and globally. The globalization of collective action is central to the relational form of the late-modern institution. As Roland Robertson (1992) has pointed out, in much the same vein as Barbara Adam (1994; 1995), the dichotomy of the local and the global may be largely a false one. Today, globalization must be understood in relation to the subjective and personal sphere, to the construction and invention of diverse localities through global flows of ideas and information.

The global effect on the modern institution is clearly of such a countenance. Institutions both embed and disembed action through the creation of global and local spaces. Their ability to create extended milieus and significant cultural/personal spaces (Durrschmidt, 1997) contains a double dialectic. This double dialectic interweaves issues of social correspondence (the construction of a conflict between actors) and non-correspondence (the construction of institutionally embedded exclusionary practices) between actors and systems of action. The effect of this dialectical interweaving is especially present in the linkages between personal biography and global culture as individuals accommodate forces seemingly beyond their control while at the same time lacking the tools to address these forces locally. New global conditions of action, and the accompanying construction of personal and social experiences they entail, disrupt traditional institutional arrangements, particularly those wedded to the nation-state, and increasingly local communities.

Barbara Adam (1995) has similarly argued, that in a context of globalization, the construction of experience proceeds more and more through global culture.
This takes the form of a personal experience of ‘global-izing culture’. The personal experience of global-izing culture involves the networking of citizens, the stretching of agency — the creation of new functional roles that are developed in an interaction — to wider social processes that provide direct access to politics. Adam’s point is that the difference between the globalization of social processes, as an historical trend, and the more personal global-izing culture of experiencing constitutes the current ambivalent framework of global institutional forces. Global-izing culture involves relationships to, and absorption within, locally based institutions creating local/global forms of knowledge.

We are increasingly aware that action functions on knowledge spinoffs (Giddens, 1991), in the sense that knowledge repeats and modifies itself as it constructs social reality. Knowledge has a recursive nature as it refurbishes the social and symbolic order. What distinguishes reflexivity in late modernity is the tempo, accessibility and acceleration of action as a narrative of change.

There is a useful distinction to be made here about the reflexive nature of the modern and late modern sense of reflexive self hood. The modernist understanding of the actor, is predicated on a sense of self, that is able to mirror itself in a plurality of assigned roles, yet a still powerfully singular identity, such as the working class subject, women, ethnic identity. This is the essential experience and interpretation of the plural and modern self. This means that there is a necessary distance between the actor, the roles adopted and the agency or control exercised over the adoption of the role. Actors in this modernist sense of the self have distance and control over the roles they choose and the way that they are played out. The operative notion here is that of an essential being, the Kantian subject of judgment, will and experience. This redimensions the self as actor and the actor as self. From a collective action perspective it assumes the capacity of the agent to promote and defend an identity. In contrast, a late-modernist reflexive reading assumes that the modernist idea of a unitary reflexive self is difficult to defend. Primarily, we can say that this condition is precipitated by larger degrees of freedom, and more diverse forms of moral attachments people have in regards to chosen roles (this in itself creates greater numbers and varieties of roles) and again, most importantly, an increasing distance from any particular role. The problem of mobile identities or ‘non-identification’ becomes a cultural and political option from a late-modern reading. In terms of social movement analysis, this takes us from Nietzsche’s “genuine actor” to Goffman’s more radical notion of the self as “a dramatic effect”. With Goffman’s reflexive insight regarding the actor, we can perhaps begin to better understand the late-modernist concept of the self as a complex site of differences, incapable of being collapsed into a fixed identity, or a permanent stage.

This process is dependent upon a deepening of our knowledge of action frames and their informational component as integral to late modern reflexivity. Manuel Castells (1989; 1996) has argued that information and globalization are at the root of a new societal form where “fundamental macro-structural forces operated independently from society’s values and conflicts” (Castells, 1996: 1). We think that Castells has come upon an important point about reflexivity and globalization. Late modern institutionalization processes are part of the global restructuring of
relations of domination. This inserts an ambivalent fusion between the experience of actors and institutions. One starting point of our problematic could therefore be an analysis of the experience of changing subject-positions which emerge from a shift in collective action frameworks within institutions and their global frames of reference. Collective actors within institutions, or the unfolding of subject-positions as experientially-coded institutional identities, inject these same institutions with an internal reflexivity.

Thus, actors accept to register their action inside networks of negotiation, even though they are aware that, most of the time, they will have to make some compromises. In so doing, they involve themselves in a new form of institutional experimentation process. What counts here is not a gain of a simple institutional recognition inside a formal system, but the opportunity to take part in the transformation of the rules that orient action. From this viewpoint, we can no longer consider institutions as if they were simple receptacles of action. The unidimensional correspondence between actors and systems of action that seemed so obvious in traditional approaches has ended. Institutions are now more than ever dependent on the absorption of the external reflexivity and diversity of agents that frequent, and in their myriad ways, influence, subvert and contest them. At this level of analysis, institutions in late-modernity are ambivalent regions, sites that actors have no choice but to engage and actively modify as points of social entry.

E. Exclusion and Non-places: the Experience of Impasse

Is it too much to say that institutionalization is part of a social relationship which is the basis for experiencing modernity? Clearly, the view of institutionalization forwarded in this essay does not rest on the idea of the institution as a marker at the end of a cyclical social movement process that occurred in the institutionalization of civil rights movement as in equal access policies, but rather as a relational combination of contexts or fields of action, much like the reflexive self described earlier. The late modern institution is therefore not the point of knowledge, the object to be deciphered, as in the life-cycle approach. Nor is it merely a stand-off in the political, social and cultural wars that exist between challengers and elites as expressed in a good portion of the ‘new institutionalist’ approaches. It is rather a constitutive set of social circumstances which produce themselves through the effects of knowledge.

In this manner, institutions reproduce themselves through an exclusionary process. David Held (1995) has coined the act of social and political exclusion as “nautonomic”, or nautonomy, a playful inversion of the process of autonomy. For Held, nautonomy refers to “the asymmetrical production and distribution of life chances which limit and erode the possibilities of political participation” (1995: 171). Thus, nautonomic structures, are shaped by access to socially patterned and material resources. They are the basis of exclusion, or social closure, by the monopolization of power. Yet, Held’s discussion of exclusion is still largely based on a classical relative deprivation scenario, however materialized in the political realm.
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There is another way that can help us reframe the problem of exclusion, one that focuses on what we might call the experiencing subject. Three dimensions of subjectivity will be briefly examined here. Each in turn is the basis for a form of social exclusion, as they also connote a type of social decomposition in the form of increasing non-correspondences between actors and systems of action.

E.1. Choosing

The problem of ‘choosing’ is central to the transformed status of late-modern institutional arrangements. There has been a retreat from collective action rooted in the traditional division of labor and its identitarian features to a late-modern version where groups based on region, age, sex, health status, etc. are present throughout the various rationales of institutions. In addition, a late-modernist reflexive reading assumes that this condition is precipitated by larger degrees of freedom, and more diverse forms of moral attachments people have in regards to chosen roles (this in itself creates greater numbers and varieties of roles) and again, most importantly, an increasing distance from any particular role. Increased attention to the social limits of growth — environmental devastation — has further pushed the moral envelope under which we choose and the attendant institutional structures from which they function. The problem of choice has therefore placed the individual in a framework of multiple deliberation which personalizes as well as collectivizes the act of choosing. Institutionalization is thus a process in which choice is constructed in the first instance, that is, as an entry point about the experience of being able to choose. The ability to exercise choice cannot be disassociated from the context of reflexive/informational processes, globalization and authenticity as a subject’s relation to history.

E.2. Belonging

Belonging refers to the ability to state one’s preferences, and act upon it, within a political/institutional structure. It is the necessary counterpart of autonomy. One can say that there is no autonomy without the inverse sense of belonging to a larger political community that autonomy makes possible. This was certainly the case till now. In late-modernity, however, it is this very sense of belonging that has been made problematical. Belonging, traditionally, has referred to an embodied subjectivity through meaning-making, community, and one’s place in the associative society. However, if a key indicator of globalization is disembedding and re-embedding as a process of reorganization of the social, the very notion of community acquires an abstract, disaggregated quality. Belonging is problematical when cultural boundedness is itself strained and at issue. Hence, the very principle of belonging, in its constitutional/institutional format or otherwise must be rethought afresh. Martin Albrow, John Eade, Jorg Durrschmidt and Neil Washbourne (1997) have provocatively argued that, “globalization does not merely have impact on sociological concepts, it is a process in which
sociological thought is an element in the overall transformation of people’s lives” (1997). It is this kind of rethinking, regarding the phenomenal concept of belonging, that needs to be initiated. Belonging, in a late-modern context of changing concepts of place and identity, risks the possibility of spaces construed for those who do not belong.

E.3. Recognition

And finally, recognition underlines that embodied subjectivity is only possible within institutional arrangements that operate on the principle of reciprocity. This means that institutionalization is necessarily embedded in local civil societies, as well as global informational networks, which seek-out social correspondence as a matter of course. A politics of recognition as Charles Taylor (1992) argues, undergirds the modern constitution of the self founded on a claim of authenticity. But, in the same instance choosing, belonging and recognition represent the matrix for an exclusionary process, which denies the subject. Part of our definition of social exclusion can be understood as the institutional counterpart of what Marc Augé (1995) has called les non-lieu, or non-place — connoting a social impasse within institutions — that is, social locations that constrain the experiential conditions for agency. For Augé (1995), the anthropological notion of lieu or place is where one produces identity, social relationships of correspondence and history/memory. The non-place is a transitional moment where the experiential conditions of subjectivity are weak, disaggregated, disembodied and scattered.

For our purposes, the non-place gains expression within the institution as the residue of non-correspondence between actors and systems, as an impasse of conflict. This manifests itself not only in terms of an historically constrained identity, but of limited access to reflexive/informational and global knowledge, marking a new form of relative deprivation. The ontological framing of social exclusion that we are offering is dependent on the social status of experiencing. This leads us some way from a traditional ontology of conflictual social relations, to one of institutionally based exclusion that incorporates, constructs, reconceptualizes the personal. The idea of exclusion, that may once have existed outside the institutional universe, is now part of its hierarchical structure, experienced in the agentless anonymity of a non-place. This condition strategically lacks a grounding from which to build anything other than the experience of transit, unstable identities, solitary contractuality and social incoherence.

F. Conclusion

What can be drawn from this still early reading of the nature of the late-modern institution and its exclusionary sites in relation to social movements and collective action? The first is that an understanding of modern processes of institutionalization is unavoidably central to the study of contemporary social movement, regardless of the staying power of the traditional approach. The experience of subjectivity
has entered full force into the task of defining late-modern forms of deprivation. If this is so however, how then can we think about social reconstruction when older models of social integration such as welfare policies are no longer functioning? What role can communities, local milieu, and social movements play in the restructuring of social integration models? These questions contain important cultural and political repercussions (Ion, 1994; 1995). Theoretically, the question of integration has historically called upon a social contract invoking free and equal citizens. However, in practice, it has been translated into compromises concerning values and political power relations. This can be seen through the difficulty of reconciling cultural relativism and universal moral principles (Caney, 1992). Without entering into the ongoing debate in North America regarding the confrontation between the “liberals” and the “communitarians” (Spitz, 1993), we can say that the way individual actors assert themselves or have their identities and personal differences acknowledged, involves, above all, an existing democratic framework, an institution. This forces us, therefore, to rethink, simultaneously, individual rights as well as the requirements related to citizenship. How does one integrate the ‘choosing agent’ and the will to citizenship as a collective action problem? Making choices in a context of cultural and social uncertainty forces actors to come to terms with their authenticity (recognition) and feelings of place (belonging) in a shrinking yet globalized world. In this sense, their ability to weave social bonds — and to share experiencing with others — has become critical. Furthermore, the place they occupy in a world mediated by information and characterized by an increasingly globalized knowledge unavoidably reflects their margin of maneuver as social agents.

What import does this have for sociology, particularly the sociology of social movements, as it confronts the coming trials and challenges of the 21st century? Most importantly perhaps is that the institutional interweaving of late-modern agency, as it pertains to collective action, will likely be the central concern for social movement theorists. This interweaving suggests that the late-modern reflexive experience of the subject, beyond identity, will emerge as a social barometer for new forms of action. At the heart of current discussions surrounding inclusion and exclusion within institutions, rest some of the most vexing problems about the future of democracy itself.

References


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Endnote

1. Our definition of institutions takes its distance from the classical view that insists on rationalization and its attendant bureaucratic forms of rationality. From such a perspective, institutions are seen as a transcription of routinized, conflict-laden social relations. Additionally in this respect, institutions are the result of an inevitable process of social integration that goes along with values, norms, authorities and hierarchies. Thus, actors and systems of action are part of the same experiment through mechanisms of correspondence. Challenges to stability are contained or redirected towards systemic equilibrium.
In contrast with this conception, we consider that within late-modernity social demands are neither necessarily channelled nor integrated by institutional normalization. Institutions reveal themselves as being fragile and fragmented. They become a field of experiencing that can be defined before all in relational terms that put together movements and institutions in a state of non correspondence. Involved in the construction of action, institutions play a dynamic role with regard to social experiences. At the same time, collective action interact in a dual way with institutions, that is to say, on the inside and on the outside in the extra-institutional. In this perspective, collective action experiences ambivalence towards new forms of relation to the social, cultural and political spheres. Furthermore, collective action contributes to highlighting the complexity and fragility of institutionalization processes that characterize late-modernity.
PART V

Demography, Cities and Housing
This chapter reviews the field of demography from 1990 to the present and identifies what are in my opinion some of its major conceptual and methodological advances and challenges. Demography may be defined as the scientific study of the size, composition, and spatial distribution of human populations; and the changes that occur in these phenomena through the processes of fertility, mortality and migration. The subject matter of demography is often divided into formal or mathematical demography and social demography or population studies (Hauser and Duncan, 1959).

Formal demography may be distinguished from social demography by the substantive foci of the independent and dependent variables. Both model dependent variables that are demographic in nature, viz., they are concerned with one of the demographic processes of fertility, mortality or migration, or, less frequently, with one of the so-called demographic characteristics of age and sex. However, the independent variables of formal demography are also demographic, whereas those of social demography are nondemographic.

For instance, a formal demographer might examine among populations the influence of age composition on the birth rate, or, alternately, the influence of the birth rate on age composition. In contrast, a social demographer might study the influence of a sociological independent variable, such as social class, on the death rate; or the effects of a social psychological variable, such as attitudes about motherhood, on desired and intended fertility (see Kammeyer and Ginn, 1986: chapter 1, for discussion and more examples). Social demography is necessarily broader in scope and orientation than formal demography. As Preston (1993: 593) has written, it includes “research of any disciplinary stripe on the causes and consequences of population change.” Schofield and Coleman (1986) have brought these two approaches together, as follows:

The subject matter of demography may be imagined as being arranged within a sphere with a hard mathematical core and a softer socio-economic and biological rind. The core represents the specific technical property of demography; the mathematical theory which deals with statics and dynamics of population; vital rates
in relation to the age structure, dynamics, growth and their perturbations, and all the techniques of measurement, analysis and substitution that follow. An outer structure of theory and fact is then necessary to explain and predict that population’s response, through the specific agencies of independent biological, social and economic causes and consequences of population trends. In this outer region of demography, the numerical techniques and ideas of demography act as an interdisciplinary common currency. Demography, which deals with the hardest (biological) facts in social science, enables material from one subject to be used in conjunction with material drawn from another. This permits the risks of the fundamental human events of birth and death to be analyzed interchangeably by ideas which may draw on sociology, geography, history, biology and other subjects (Schofield and Coleman, 1986: 5).

Demographers, in general, however seldom agree fully about the boundaries and restrictions of their field. Caldwell has stated the problem succinctly: "What demography is and what demographers should be confined to doing remains a difficult area in terms not only of the scope of professional interests, but also of the coverage aimed at in the syllabuses for students and in what is acceptable for journals in the field" (1996: 305).

I have reviewed the conceptual and methodological developments and challenges in demography over past decades, with more attention given to the recent, than to the distant, past. My review has benefited greatly from the publication in 1996 of two special issues of demography journals: the first is a special issue of Population Studies (volume 50, number 3, November, 1996, pages 297–553), containing ten chapters by top figures in demography on advances in the field in the past fifty years. The second is a 336-page supplement to volume 22 of Population and Development Review, edited by John B. Casterline, Ronald D. Lee and Karen A. Foote, entitled “Fertility in the United States: New Patterns, New Theories.” Both special issues are comprehensive, although in some instances not totally dispassionate, reviews of key developments and contributions.

In my opinion, there are several areas that should be considered as preeminent ones in terms of their actual or potential contribution to the state of knowledge of demography. Three of them are substantive, and one is methodological. The substantive ones are (1) the proximate determinants paradigm; (2) bio-demography; and (3) male fertility. The methodological one is multilevel modeling. I more than accept the fact that this is a short, selective, and idiosyncratic listing. These are areas that have impressed me as important, relevant and challenging. However, I do not know whether other demographers will agree with my selection. Most probably will not.

A. Proximate Determinants

In 1953 the demographer Louis Henry introduced the concept of “natural fertility” to refer to uncontrolled fertility (Henry, 1953), that is childbearing that occurs without the imposition of contraception, birth control, and induced abortion (see also, Henry, 1961). The concept today refers to situations where couples do not attempt to terminate childbearing before the end of the biological reproductive span; they do not aim for a desired family size and make no effort not to exceed a certain
number once it is reached. This kind of uncontrolled fertility characterized populations with high birth and death rates, i.e., before the onset of the demographic transition. Indeed, many demographers believe that family limitation, i.e., “behavior intended to stop childbearing at some particular number of children” (Knodel and van de Walle, 1979: 227), that is, the opposite of natural fertility, was the key to the onset of the demographic transition (Knodel, 1979).

The proximate fertility variables are “the biological and behavioral factors through which social, economic, and environmental variables affect fertility” (Bongaarts and Potter, 1983: 1). They are referred to as determinants because of their direct, rather than indirect, influences on fertility. No other variables intervene between them and the onset of actual fertility outcomes.

The first published research on this topic was by Davis and Blake (1956) on the so-called intermediate fertility variables, in which they set forth eleven variables representing various factors affecting exposure to intercourse, conception, and gestation, the three processes that result ultimately in reproduction. These eleven intermediate variables have been collapsed and recast by Bongaarts (1976; 1978; 1982) in a manner conducive for quantitative analysis (see also Bongaarts and Potter, 1983). Bongaarts proposed seven proximate determinants of fertility, the first four of which he classified as “principal” determinants, and the last three as “secondary” determinants. The four principal determinants are: (a) marriage and marital dissolution; (b) contraceptive use and prevalence; (c) induced abortion; and (d) duration of post-partum infecundability, dependent primarily on breastfeeding patterns and practices. The three secondary determinants are: (e) waiting time to conception and fecundability; (f) risk of intrauterine mortality; and (g) onset of permanent sterility. Bongaarts has showed that the first four are the most significant of the seven; in fact they account for virtually all the variation in fertility among populations. There is little variation among populations in the last three determinants. He then wrote a simple and straightforward equation summarizing the relationships between the primary determinants and fertility (see Hobcraft and Little, 1984, for an alternative, although similar, treatment).

Bongaarts and Potter (1983) have illustrated in their Figure 1 how the four principal proximate determinants influence fertility in their consideration of “four different types of fertility levels ... from which the impact of the proximate variables can be derived” (p. 79). The figure shows that when “the inhibiting effects of all [four principal] proximate variables [are] present, a population’s actual level of fertility is observed” (p. 79). This level of fertility is referred to as TFR, or the total fertility rate, and it represents the number of children a woman has had by the time she has come to the end of her reproductive years; it only includes legitimate births (TFR is the first entry on the left side of the bar in Figure 13.1). They then removed the fertility-inhibiting effects of both delayed marriage and marital disruption with no other alterations or adjustments in fertility behavior; when this is done, fertility increases to a level known as TM, or the total marital fertility rate. When the fertility-inhibiting effects of the practices of contraception and induced abortion are also eliminated, fertility increases still further to a level known as TN, or the total natural fertility rate. Finally, when they removed the
effect of postpartum infecundability, i.e., the practices of lactation and postpartum abstinence, fertility is raised to its maximum known as TF, or the total fecundity rate. (See Reinis, 1992, for a critical review.)

Bongaarts and Potter have shown empirically that these “fertility rates TFR, TM, and TN vary widely among populations, but that the TFs of most populations fall within the range from 13 to 17 births per woman, with an average near 15. The TF is relatively invariant because the three [other] remaining proximate factors ... which determine TF usually cause only modest changes in fertility” (1983: 79). They tested the validity of their model by first calculating indexes to represent each of the four principal determinants; they then gathered data on these indexes for 41 developed, developing, and historical populations, and then estimated total fertility rates with data on these four proximate determinants. Finally, they compared the TFRs estimated from the four proximate determinants with the

Figure 13.1 Relationships between the Fertility Inhibition Effects of Proximate Variables and Various Measures of Fertility

Source: Bongaarts and Potter, 1983: 79.
observed TFRs for these 41 populations. They found the overall fit to be very
good. "The model estimates of TFR ... explain 96 percent of the variation in the
observed" TFRs (1983: 91).

The appearance in the literature of the Bongaarts proximate fertility models
coincided with the conduct of, and the resulting publication of data from, the World
Fertility Survey (WFS), and its successor, the Demographic Health Surveys (DHS).
Between 1974 and 1986, 62 countries (42 developing and 20 developed),
representing about 40 percent of the population of the world, participated in the
WFS by conducting nationally representative fertility surveys. Between 1986 and
1995, sixty more surveys were completed. Both the WFS and DHS survey
instruments contained items reflecting behaviors and knowledge associated with
the proximate determinants (for discussions of the WFS and DHS, see Cleland,
1996: 443–449; also, Cleland and Scott, 1987).

The proximate fertility determinants paradigm has proven to be very appealing
and widely employed. In my opinion, one of the best applications of this paradigm
is the analysis of Thailand’s Reproductive Revolution by Knodel, Chamratrithirong
and Debavalya (1987), a book which I still regularly assign in several of my
graduate courses. Knodel and his colleagues operationalize the proximate
determinants both quantitatively and qualitatively. The way in which they view
changes in social, cultural, family planning, and associated variables (the less
proximate determinants) working through the proximate variables to influence
fertility is shown in Figure 13.2.

I have conducted an extensive search of the demographic literature from 1990
to 1996. I found 111 published articles or book chapters reporting empirical
investigations of the proximate determinants of fertility in various countries or
regions of the world, as well as 30 conference papers and seven dissertations and
theses. Among the published works I found were analyses focusing on Botswana
(Letamo, 1996), Canada (Trovato and Odynak, 1993), China (Cheng and Rajulton,
1992), Egypt (Hussein and Shawky, 1996), India (Bhattacharya, Singh, and Singh,
1995), Kenya (Robinson and Harbison, 1995), Mexico (Chen, Hicks, Johnson,
and Rodriguez, 1990), Namibia (Raitis, 1995), Pakistan (Aziz, 1994), Senegal
(Onuoha, 1992), and France before and after the Revolution of 1789 (Mroz and

The proximate determinants paradigm of fertility, both micro- and macro-based
versions, has been successfully applied in hundreds of settings. Our store of
knowledge has been enhanced considerably with regard to the importance and
functioning of the proximate fertility determinants. We also have a much better
understanding now than we did previously of how various social, economic,
geographic and related factors influence fertility via the proximate determinants.
Theoretical work, however, is still needed. We need to know more about how
and in what manner the less proximate variables are associated with fertility
through the proximate variables.

For instance, we know from countless individual-level and aggregate studies
that women’s labor force participation is negatively associated with fertility. But
we do not know much about how this independent variable works through one or
more of the proximate determinants in its association with fertility. Is the most
important effect on fertility of a variable such as labor force participation through the breastfeeding determinant, or the age at marriage determinant, or another of the determinants? To this end, Menken has noted that attention needs to be focused “on increasing understanding of causal mechanisms. The proximate determinants are an important intermediate part of the story; they need now to be treated as the dependent variables in the search for explanations of demographic change” (1987: 711–712). Demography is replete with fertility theories, but none to my knowledge have worked out the various ways their respective independent variables effect fertility through the proximate determinants. Such a task is indeed a major challenge.

There is yet another challenge with respect to the proximate determinants paradigm. So far I have been concentrating exclusively on proximate fertility determinants. The proximate determinants paradigm has also been applied to mortality, although with much less success. Mosley and Chen proposed in 1984 a proximate determinants model of mortality, focusing particularly on infants and children, consisting of five categories of proximate determinants: 1) maternal factors, such as age, parity, birth interval, and so forth; 2) environmental contamination caused by the air, food/water, soil/inanimate objects, insects, and so forth; 3) nutrient deficiency; 4) accidental injuries; 5) personal illness control. All these proximate determinants are believed to be influenced by socioeconomic factors. The use of such a framework would enable researchers to undertake integrated studies of the social and biological determinants of mortality.

Menken wrote in 1987 that the development of models of the proximate determinants of mortality analogous to those developed for fertility is in its infancy.
Today, more than a decade later, although there have been some advances, considerable work remains on the proximate determinants of mortality. However, the “problems posed by mortality analysis are far more complex than in fertility analysis because a death is the ultimate consequence of a cumulative series of biological insults, rather than the outcome of a single biological event, conception to generate a birth” (Mosley and Chen, 1984: 29).

A major issue regarding the advancement of research on the proximate determinants of mortality is that there needs to be some agreement among scholars about the specification of the proximate determinants. The empirical literature shows no such agreement. Some studies refer to proximate variables as any which intervene between the independent variables of substantive and theoretical interest and the dependent variable. The proximate variables of mortality in some studies are the less proximate predictors of mortality in other studies. Gray (1989) has prepared a good review of the proximate and underlying determinants of mortality, along with a series of recommendations. But scholars do not appear to have followed his suggestions, and those of Mosley and Chen. The empirical literature I reviewed on this topic, from the mid-1980s to the present, is striking with regard to the lack of agreement about a specific number of proximate determinants.

There has been nowhere as much empirical research on the proximate determinants of mortality as on the proximate determinants of fertility. In a review of all empirical work on this topic between 1990 and 1996 (the same time frame I used in my review of studies of proximate fertility variables), I found but 12 published articles and chapters, 11 unpublished conference papers, and five dissertations. (My review of studies of proximate determinants of fertility produced corresponding counts of 130, 11, and 7.)

The proximate mortality paradigm has been applied in several settings and in many developing countries and areas. The published literature contains studies of infant and/or child survival in Bangladesh (Bhuiya and Streatfield, 1992), Egypt (Miller and Hirschhorn, 1995), Liberia (Ahmad, Eberstein, and Sly, 1991), Nigeria (Ahonsi, 1995), Tanzania (Mbago, 1994), and Yemen (Myntti, 1993), among other countries. More studies are needed for the mortality of other groups, say, minority peoples and the elderly. Hummer’s (1993) analysis of racial differences in infant mortality in the U.S. is a step in this direction. However, more conceptual and theoretical development is required. Nevertheless, I believe that the major challenge in the years ahead will be for demographers to approach some sort of agreement about the identification and delineation of the proximate determinants of mortality. Then, I would expect that empirical research using a more or less agreed upon proximate determinants model would begin to appear with greater frequency than has heretofore been the case.

B. Bio-Demography

I turn now to a review of, and commentary on, what I refer to as bio-demography. By this I mean the development of models that combine biological variables (that is, hormonal levels, genetic factors, and so forth) with social variables to predict
demographic outcomes, in particular, those outcomes or processes that are biological in nature, viz., fertility and mortality. My previous discussion of the proximate determinants indicated that several of them are biological. However, I would not include studies of the proximate determinants as examples of bio-demography unless one or more of the less proximate independent variables, not the proximate determinants themselves, are biological. Aside from studies of the proximate determinants, the further incorporation of biological variables into explanatory models of demographic processes is not an activity to which demographers have devoted even a modest amount of attention. It is my judgment that there are proportionally more sociologists than demographers developing and testing biosocial models of human behavior. However, I do agree with Casterline (1995), one of a handful of demographers who recognizes the importance of incorporating biological thinking into our theories of demography, that we “can no longer run away from biosocial models. ... It requires either extraordinary blindness or exceptional stubbornness to fail to recognize that fertility and mortality ... are determined in part by biological variables” (1995: 359).

It is Casterline’s belief that after 1994, the “passive avoidance of biosocial models [among demographers] is no longer an option ... [because of J. Richard Udry’s presidential address in 1994 to the Population Association of America] challenging demographers to take biosocial models seriously” (Casterline, 1995: 360). In his address, Udry reported research showing that “one-fourth of the variance in women’s ‘gendered’ behavior” is accounted for by a model comprised of “prenatal and adult androgen measures and their interaction” (Udry, 1994: 570). This research (Udry, Morris, and Kovenock, 1995) has concluded that “gendered behavior is not entirely socially constructed, but partly built on a biological foundation” (1995: 367).

My review of the demographic literature found very few examples of empirical research incorporating biological and social variables in models of demographic processes. There are a few published papers on the bio-demography of variation in human frailty. In one of them, Weiss observed that “a population is composed of individuals who are heterogeneous in their susceptibility to death and disease, [which is] ... reflected in the age-specific incidence or mortality (hazard) function. ... A substantial fraction of variation in frailty ... has an underlying genetic basis.” By taking these biological considerations into account in their theories, demographers should be able “to model frailty, and thus mortality, in a better way” (Weiss, 1990: 185; and 1995; see also Yashin and Iachine, 1997).

Richard Udry is the one demographer who over the years has paid more attention than most to biosocial models of demographic outcomes. He has published several papers introducing “biosocial models of adolescent sexuality that combine traditional sociological models with models derived from a biological theory of hormone effects” (1988: 709; see also Udry, Talbert and Morris, 1986). Weller (1995) has written that just because Udry claims that a “behavior has biological foundations [does not mean he believes] it does not also have social foundations” (1995: 281). James Vaupel and his colleagues have undertaken several investigations of human mortality in which genetic variables have been shown to be important factors in understanding questions about longevity (Vaupel, 1988; Vaupel, Yashin, and Manton, 1987).
I will now summarize an analysis Udry conducted with several colleagues (Halpern et al., 1994) that illustrates well, I hold, the combined use of biological and social variables as predictors of an outcome of interest to demographers, namely, adolescent sexual behavior (see also Udry, 1988). There is an extensive literature on the effects of testosterone on the sexual interests and activities of males. Traditionally, sociological models of adolescent sexuality have taken as a given the effects of biological factors, and have tended to “focus on ‘social controls’ that either inhibit or facilitate the expression of sexual motivation” (Halpern et al., 1994: 217; unless otherwise noted, all further references in this section are to page numbers of the Udry study, i.e., Halpern, Udry, and associates, 1994). One such “social control” is religious behavior “as indexed by frequent attendance at religious services, or self-ratings of the importance of religion ... Adolescents who never or infrequently attend religious services, or who consider religion as relatively unimportant in their lives, report the least restrictive attitudes regarding premarital sex and are the most likely to have had intercourse” (1994: 218).

The Udry analysis “examines the joint effects of early testosterone levels and religiosity on sexual ideation, motivation, attitudes, and activity” (1994: 218). Persons with relatively high testosterone levels but with low or no social constraint of religious involvement should show the highest levels of sexual activity. At the other extreme, persons with low levels of testosterone and high religious activity should have the lowest levels of sexual activity. “Subjects for whom the two factors are operating in opposite directions should fall somewhere between the two extreme groups, depending upon the relative strengths of the two predictor variables” (1994: 218).

The subjects were 12- and 13-year old boys, randomly selected from school districts in a southeastern state in the U.S. “Boys completed a self-administered, confidential questionnaire during five semi-annual interviews, and completed a sixth interview about 1 year later. ... [Several physical measures including] an 18-ml blood sample were obtained semi-annually by registered nurses employed by the project” (1994: 219). Among the sexual variables were a “heavy petting” index, and whether or not the boy had engaged in coitus. The questions on sexual behavior were adapted from earlier surveys. Coitus was measured as “yes,” the boy has ever had sexual intercourse, or “no,” he has never had sexual intercourse. “Heavy petting” was the sum of several “yes/no” items on specific activities, such as “touching breasts over clothes,” “touching breasts under or without clothes,” and so forth. Religiosity was measured in terms of attendance at religious services. Testosterone levels were measured via blood samples; “three blood samples were collected at 15-minute intervals” and were “physically pooled to achieve a biological average”; this was done in each of the semi-annual physical examinations. Plasma was separated and “assayed for testosterone and sex hormone binding globulin” (Udry et al., 1994: 220).

Udry and his colleagues formed four groups of boys based on the Round 1 data on testosterone levels and religious attendance; subjects were split into a high and a low testosterone group using a median split. “Subjects who attended religious services once a week or more were considered high attenders, and the balance
were low attenders” (1994: 223). The four groups formed were: low testosterone and low attendance ($n = 13$), low testosterone and high attendance ($n = 16$), high testosterone and low attendance ($n = 15$), and high testosterone and high attendance ($n = 18$).

Figure 13.3 plots the mean value of the heavy petting variable at each of the six rounds of questioning for the four groups of boys. Boys with high testosterone and low attendance at the beginning of the study (Time 1) consistently had the highest levels of petting, and conversely for those with low testosterone and high attendance. Figure 13.4 plots the mean percentage value of the coitus variable at each of the six rounds of questioning for the four groups of boys. Boys with high testosterone and low attendance at the beginning of the study (Time 1) consistently had the highest percentages of nonvirginity, and conversely for those with low testosterone and high attendance.

The group of greatest interest is the high testosterone and high attendance group (the light connected line in the figures); it shows a level of heavy petting, and a percentage of nonvirginity, lower than boys with high testosterone and low attendance (the heavy connected line in the figures). These results suggest that a sociological factor, such as religious behavior, can modify the straightforward effects of a biological factor, such as testosterone, on two types of sexual activity, among 12- and 13-year old boys. Further statistical analysis of these data indicated “no significant interactions between religious attendance and the free testosterone index, a finding consistent with earlier biosocial models ... Thus while these two variables are complementary in their improvement of behavioral models, their effects appear to be essentially independent of each other” (Udry et. al., 1994: 232–233).

I close by considering a hypothetical equation, proposed by Casterline (1995):

$$D_i = hB_i + sS_i + c(B_i \ast S_i) + e_i$$

where $D$ is some demographic outcome, $B$ is a vector of biological variables, $S$ is a vector of social variables, $h$ and $s$ are vectors of parameters to be estimated indicating the effects of the biological and social variables, $e$ is a disturbance, and the subscript $i$ refers to individuals (Casterline, 1995: 360).

In the first place, much of demography assumes the parameter $h$ not to be significantly different from zero. Casterline has stated, and I agree, that the “denial of the existence of parameter $h$ ... [is] now amply refuted by empirical scientific evidence. As scientists we must acknowledge that a substantial and solid body of evidence supports the proposition that individual variation in many behaviors is biologically driven ... The challenge for scientists is to determine the magnitude of parameter $h$” (Casterline, 1995: 361).

In Casterline’s equation the biological and social variables may be considered as additive and as interacting. “The $B_i \ast S_i$ interaction would posit that the effect of biological variables is conditioned by the level of social variables” (Casterline, 1995: 361), a point argued by Udry (1994) in his presidential address to the Population Association of America, mentioned earlier (see also Udry, 1995). The fact that the parameter $c$ was not significant in the analysis by Halpern, Udry and
Figure 13.3 Heavy Petting by Free Testosterone (FTI) and Church Attendance at Round 1

Figure 13.4 Percent Nonvirgins by Free Testosterone (FTI) and Church Attendance at Round 1

Key for all figures: ——— low FTI/low attendance; ——— low FTI/high attendance; ——— high FTI/low attendance; ——— high FTI/high attendance.

associates just summarized does not rule out the attractiveness of the above equation.

Casterline (1995) and Udry (1994; 1996) both admit that biosocial models will possibly have no role in many demographic studies. "A large fraction of the central research questions in social demography concerns secular change and or macro/societal variation, and hence it is not clear that much attention need be given [in such analyses] to biological variables" (Casterline, 1995: 368). The role of biosocial models in demography thus depends greatly on the demographic outcome being investigated. Given the results of Udry, Vaupel, and a few other demographers regarding the empirical importance of biological variables as predictors of certain types of demographic outcomes, demographers can no longer afford to ignore the potential of biological predictors of these demographic behaviors.

C. Male Fertility

I turn now to the last substantive challenge, a dedicated research focus on male fertility. I will try to suggest why virtually all the attention in fertility research has been directed to females, and not to both males and females. In so doing I will also comment on key contributions in the very small literature on male fertility. It is not an understatement that up until the past few years virtually all demographic research on fertility was devoted to analyses of women. Why has fertility research concentrated largely if not exclusively on women? It is not because female and male fertility rates are the same. Common sense would suggest they should be, but they are not. And there are reasons why they are not the same, some of which I note below.

C.1. Reasons for Exclusion

There are several reasons why males have not been included in fertility studies. Keyfitz (1977) has mentioned four; his first two are: (1) Data on parental age at the birth of a child are more frequently collected on registration certificates for mothers than fathers; and (2) When data are obtained for mothers and fathers, there are a greater number of instances of unreported age data for fathers, and this is especially the situation for births occurring outside marriage. It is true that if birth registration systems do not collect the same data for both parents, they will certainly favor the mothers; and that missing data will more frequently occur for the fathers. In the past, demographic surveys of fertility have also tended to focus more on women than men. For instance, of the 42 World Fertility Surveys completed in developing countries, 93 percent of them only interviewed women (Verma, 1985).

This situation has improved with the Demographic and Health Surveys; of the 103 surveys conducted as of March 1997, 43 have included men or husbands (Demographic and Health Surveys, 1997: 6–7). Fertility surveys are tending now
to gather data on males more so than previously. And birth registration certificates, at least in the developed world, now usually include data on both parents. Certificates for births occurring outside marriage, however, still do occasionally omit data on fathers. Finally, Coleman (1995: 10) has identified fifteen countries in the industrialized world, including the U.S., that have published, at one or more times since 1989, data and/or rates on male fertility in their demographic yearbooks or related publications.

The next two reasons set out by Keyfitz are: (3) the childbearing years of women occur in a more sharply defined and narrower range (15–49) than for men (15–79); and (4) “both the spacing and number of children are less subject to variation among women; a woman can have children only at intervals of 1 or 2 years, whereas a man can have hundreds” (1977: 114). The third point is true theoretically, and indeed “in polygamous populations male fertility can remain high well into the 50s and 60s; ... however, in controlled fertility societies, it peaks ... with a mode in the mid-twenties” (Coleman, 1995: 8). This is due in part to low fertility norms in Western societies, as well as to a small average age difference of about two to three years between men and women in first marriages. Regarding the fourth point of Keyfitz, Guyer (1995: 5–6) has noted that although biologically a man has the potential for siring dozens more children than a woman, this large difference in number of children ever born only occurs in a few societies and “amongst a tiny minority of the population” (1995: 6).

There are additional reasons for justifying the exclusion of men in studies of fertility. A fifth reason is the incompatibility of male and female fertility rates. Unless the population is closed and has a stable age distribution, the rates will likely be different. Let us look at this counter-intuitive issue. After all, one would think the rates should be nearly identical in a closed population because each partnership producing a birth requires but one male and one female. I will use the total fertility rate, a summary cross-sectional measure of fertility that represents the number of children a person would have during her (or his) childbearing years if following the age-specific fertility rates of an area at one point in time.

Coleman (1995: 14) has noted that in past decades “male rates have typically been below those of females.” The TFRs for the U.S. in 1992, and for France in 1974, were 2.05 for males and 2.11 for females; in Denmark in 1988, they were 1.37 for males and 1.50 for females; in Taiwan in 1993, the TFRs were 1.7 for males and 1.8 for females. The differential rates are due to a host of well-known causes, some of which are that more males are born than females, males have higher age-specific death rates than females, males marry at older ages than females, and emigration and immigration both tend to be sex-selective. These and other factors act together to produce male and female fertility rates that are not the same.

To further illustrate this point, consider the fact that lower male than female TFRs is a relatively new phenomenon. Previously, the various causes producing differential rates interacted in such a way that in many countries the TFRs were higher for males than females. Coleman (1995) has traced TFRs for males and females in France from 1899 to 1974. The rates vary by sex for the same year, and the most important cause is believed to be different levels of nuptiality,
Demography particularly affected by the two wars. Before World War I, the “male TFR was slightly higher than that of women. For a decade after the war, the male TFR was strikingly higher, reflecting the relative shortage of men after that conflict and their corresponding higher levels of nuptiality” (1995: 16). By the 1960s male fertility rates fell below female fertility rates. “This reflects a pattern common to most industrialized countries, where males have moved into [relative] surplus as populations recover from wartime losses and where ... emigration dominated by males has been greatly reduced and replaced by immigration initially dominated by males” (1995: 16).

Although the male TFR in the U.S. is now lower than the female TFR (2.05 versus 2.11, in 1992), less than two decades ago in the U.S. the opposite situation held, that is, the female TFR was lower than the male TFR, 1.84 versus 1.87, in 1980. Smith (1992) has written that this was due to the fact that “women outnumbered men at all ages over 25, and outnumbered men 3 years older than themselves, the mean age difference between parents, at all ages over 20. In computing fertility rates, births are thus averaged across smaller numbers of males than females at almost all ages, a pattern that has held [in the U.S.] for most of the 20th century” (1992: 227; see also Myers, 1941).

In my opinion, the fact that male and female fertility rates are not the same makes it all the more important and necessary to analyze male fertility along with female fertility. The factors causing the differentials vary over time in their magnitude and effects on the male and female fertility rates. In some cases these are sex-specific, and will not be realized or understood empirically unless both male and female rates are investigated.

A sixth reason for not including males in fertility studies is the presumed lack of interest among men in decision making with regard to childbearing and contraception, an assumption that does not seem today to receive much empirical support. Men have been perceived, especially in developing countries, as having more of a pro-natalist view than women, hence acting as a barrier to the use of contraception. Research conducted in Sierra Leone (Steady, 1978), India (Karra, Stark, and Wolf, 1997), and Kenya (Dodoo, 1998) to cite just three articles, however, indicates the prominent, if not preeminent role played by men in these areas; however, see Omondi-Odhiambo (1997) for an opposite finding with regard to Kenya. I argue that men should not be omitted from such studies owing to their perceived disinterest; even if true, this would be all the more reason for including them.

Finally, several developing countries actually report data showing men with higher rates of contraceptive prevalence than women (Ezeh and Mboup, 1997). This is a situation that obviously needs to be better recognized and understood because if couples are united and in agreement about their contraceptive decision making, they should be less likely to employ traditional contraceptive methods (Ezeh and Mboup, 1997: 119). In any case, we would not even be entertaining such an hypothesis had males initially been excluded from the study.

A seventh reason is that female rates have been thought to be more fundamental because they are more physiological, more bound by biological limitations, and more influenced by the proximate determinants, say, by breastfeeding, than are
male rates. Indeed several of the proximate determinants, Coleman (1995: 3) reminds us, are virtually “man-free.” Because of this physiological nature of female rates, male rates are less tractable (Coleman, 1995: 2–3; see also Hajnal, 1948). “Births outside marriage are often only attributed to their mothers, not to fathers, and false paternity is another and even more intractable obstacle to accuracy” (Coleman, 1995: 3). Along these lines, Guyer has written that “until DNA testing is done on whole populations, the genetics of male fertility cannot be studied; what we are studying are claims to paternity, which the entire history of kinship studies has treated as a function of culture and society” (Guyer, 1995: 4).

We will never get away from the biological fact that births are more tractable to mothers than fathers. But, again, I would argue that this fact makes it all the more necessary to include males in fertility studies, if for the only reason that by including males we would then be able to endeavor to estimate the degree of false paternity in a population, a subject about which we know very little.

C.2. Reasons for Inclusion

To this point I have listed, and then answered, seven reasons that have been suggested for excluding males from fertility analyses. I now comment on a major reason for including them.

Goldscheider, Webster and Kaufman (1995) have reminded us that in the last third of this century there have been dramatic adjustments in the fertility patterns of countries in the developed world. These changes include “the growth in nonfamily living and in nonmarital cohabitation, and a doubling, or even tripling, of the divorce rate in a very short period in most industrialized countries (1995: 1; see also Goldscheider and Kaufman, 1996). The magnitude of these changes has been large and pervasive, resulting in some demographers referring to them as the “second demographic transition” (van de Kaa, 1987).

One of the implications of the so-called second demographic transition is that the relationships between men and children have become increasingly complex. “Women have primary responsibility for children, and in particular, normally retain custody at separation or divorce. With the dramatic rise in the divorce rate, this has meant that young men and women contemplating marriage are not only likely to fear that their marriages will not last, but men (though not women) can expect that their coresidential relationship with their potential biological children might be tenuous as well” (Goldscheider et al., 1995: 1; see also Seltzer, 1998).

The complexities of these relationships dictate that fertility and fertility-related data on males must be included in such analyses. An aspect of the second demographic transition is one which is “almost never noted by scholars, namely, the costs to men of their changing relationships to children” (Goldscheider, et al., 1995: 8). Fortunately, the 1987–88 National Survey of Families and Households asked women and men about family- and fertility-related attitudes and practices, including respondents in cohabiting arrangements, recent marriages and stepfamilies (Sweet, Bumpass and Call, 1988). Future surveys must continue to include males as respondents.
I remarked earlier that one reason for including males in fertility studies is precisely the fact that male and female fertility rates are not the same. The same may be said with respect to other social demographic phenomena, for instance, childlessness. In the 1970s and early 1980s I devoted a lot of time to investigations of voluntary and involuntary childlessness in developed and developing countries (for examples, see Poston, 1974; 1976; Poston and Trent, 1982; Poston and Kramer, 1983). My studies focused entirely on women, a concentration that also characterized at the time virtually all the childlessness literature. Not only was little known about male childlessness, no one seemed to care.

We know now that male and female childlessness rates are not the same. In many developed countries, childlessness has been shown to be more common for men than for women. It is thought that this is due to the fact that "men are more likely to remain single than women. ... For ever-married people, childlessness is [also] more frequent for men. One reason could be that, in the case of divorce without children, women, more frequently than men, enter a second union and have children in this second union" (Toulemon and Lapierre-Adancyk, 1995: 3). However, the fact of childlessness being more prominent for men than women "appears to have reversed its pattern since the beginning of the [first] demographic transition" (Coleman, 1995: 20). To be able to understand these patterns and changes in all forms of childlessness, we definitely need to include males in our analyses.

In this section I have identified, and endeavored to respond to, an assortment of reasons that have been proposed for not including males in fertility studies. I have also mentioned the increasing complexities in male/father — children relationships, and male/female differentials in childlessness as additional reasons for including males. For all these concerns I agree with Goldscheider and Kaufman (1996) that "it is increasingly necessary to take men’s roles and commitments into account in considering the factors leading to decisions about bearing and rearing children" (1996: 95).

D. Multilevel Models

In the social sciences, our concepts and data structures are often hierarchical. By this I mean that the dependent variables are intended to describe the behavior of individuals, but that the individuals themselves are grouped into larger units, such as families or neighborhoods and so forth. Thus the independent variables we should be interested in employing should refer to the characteristics of both the individuals and the higher order units (de Leeuw, 1992: xiii).

Indeed, DiPrete and Forristal have written that “the idea that individuals respond to the social context is a defining claim of the sociological discipline, which is found in Marx’s work on political economy, in Durkheim’s studies of the impact of community on anomia and suicide, in Weber’s research on how the religious community shapes economic behavior, in Merton’s work on communities, relative deprivation, and social comparison theory, and in Berelson and his colleagues’ research on the effect of social context on voting” (1994: 331).
A fine example of this genre from demography is the work of Mason, Wong and Entwisle (1983) in which they examined how differences in socioeconomic development and family planning among fifteen developing countries influenced and interacted with the individual-level relationship between women’s educational attainment and the number of children ever born. They used development and family planning information collected at the national level and educational and fertility information collected at the individual level. The women and their households are nested within countries, and the basic data structure is hierarchical. This analysis by Mason and associates, published in 1983, was one of the first papers in demography describing a general linear multilevel model and its application.

What kind of statistical techniques could be used to take hierarchical structure into account? Traditionally, there have been two obvious and elementary procedures, both of which have problems; one involves disaggregation, and the other involves aggregation. The first is to disaggregate all the contextual level variables down to the level of the individuals. If one were examining the effects of country characteristics on the fertility behavior of women from different countries, the characteristics of the countries would all be assigned to the individual women, and the analysis would then proceed at the individual level, perhaps using a linear model such as Ordinary Least Squares. The problem with this approach is that if we know that women are from the same country, then we also know that they have the same values on the various country characteristics. “Thus we cannot use the assumption of independence of observations that is basic for the use of classic statistical techniques” (de Leeuw, 1992: xiv) because women are not randomly assigned to countries.

An alternative is to aggregate the individual-level characteristics up to the contextual level and to conduct the analysis at the aggregate level. In the case of the above example, we would aggregate, i.e., average, the country-specific women characteristics on educational attainment and on fertility up to the country level of analysis and then conduct the analysis among countries. The main problem here is that we discard all the within-group (i.e., within-country) variation, which could well mean that as much as 80–90 percent of the variation could be thrown away before the analysis begins. Often as a result, relations between the aggregate (country) variables are much stronger, and could well be different from their relationships at the individual level. Information is frequently wasted, and, moreover, the interpretation of the results could be distorted, if not fallacious, if we endeavor to interpret the aggregate relationship at the individual level (de Leeuw, 1992: xiv).

There is a modest to fair literature in demography examining the effects of context on individual behavior. I have conducted a review of the demographic literature and found more than fifty multilevel investigations written between 1990 and 1996, a dozen or more of them dissertations. Regarding the published literature, there are many multilevel analyses of fertility and contraceptive use (Entwisle and Mason, 1985; Entwisle, Casterline and Sayed, 1989; Hirschman and Guest, 1990; Guest and Chamratrithirong, 1992). Other topics covered include premarital sexual behavior (Ku, Sonenstein, and Pleck, 1993; Brewster, 1994), nonmarital

Most of the multilevel investigations uncovered in my review of the demographic literature have used standard and straightforward statistical methods such as analysis of variance and ordinary least squares regression. Others have taken into account some of the potential pitfalls of using traditional statistical methods in multilevel analysis by introducing various kinds of multilevel methods which have become increasingly prominent in demography and the social sciences in the past decade or so. These approaches are sometimes referred to as multilevel linear models, mixed-effects models, random-effects models, random-coefficient regression models, covariance components models, or hierarchical linear models. I shall refer to such elaborations as hierarchical models.

One of the basic features of hierarchical approaches has to do with the independence assumption basic to traditional linear models. Using the demographic example introduced above, hierarchical multilevel models permit women from the same country to be similar to each other, hence not requiring them to be independent. Each country thus has a different regression model of, say the effect of educational attainment and other predictors on fertility, with its own intercept and slope(s). If the countries have been properly sampled, or if they comprise the universe of all countries, then we can assume that the intercepts and slopes are random. The next step then is to examine the effects of the country characteristics on the individual level relationships and this involves a regression of regressions. Until the mid-1980s or so fitting models of the type just described was technically not possible. Then, at about the same time, several special purpose statistical packages were developed for fitting multilevel models (Mason et al., 1988; Bryk et al., 1988; Longford, 1988; and Prosser et al., 1991). In my current research I have been using a latter version of the software developed by Bryk and his colleagues (1996), referred to as hierarchical linear models (HLM).

Multilevel models of the type mentioned above are certainly not the solution to all the data analysis problems in the social sciences. In one sense they are limited because they are based on the relatively simple regression structure in which a single dependent variable depends on other (independent) variables at the micro and macro levels. Nevertheless, they are a big step ahead of the elementary aggregation and disaggregation approaches mentioned above, “mainly because they are statistically correct and do not waste information” (de Leeuw, 1992: xv). I add, however, that in some instances, OLS models will be perfectly adequate alternatives to the more involved HLM approaches (see Goldstein, 1995: 25–26, for more detail).

In research in progress I am endeavoring to assess the economic attainment patterns of Asian-born male immigrants to the U.S. Specifically, using hierarchical linear models (HLM), I am undertaking a multi-level analysis of these patterns. The specific question I am asking is to what extent do the human capital characteristics of the immigrants themselves, as well as the contextual
characteristics of their countrymen, influence their levels of economic attainment. I am concerned with more than an assessment of the human capital characteristics of the immigrants owing to the suggestion of Portes and Bach (1985: 268) that the “distinct social context which receives and incorporates ... (immigrant groups) decisively affect ... (their) collective fates, regardless of the skills ... (that they bring to the U.S.).”

I am examining the economic attainment patterns in 1989 of more than 62 thousand male immigrants born in 29 Asian countries, and am appraising the degree to which individual-level, i.e., human capital, factors, as well as group-level, i.e., structural, factors are related to the patterns of annual earnings of the individual Asian immigrants.

In my example I have used two human capital variables as individual-level predictors of economic attainment, namely, educational attainment and professional status; and two contextual variables as group-level predictors of economic attainment, namely, mean school years of education for each of the 29 immigrant populations living in the U.S., and the percentage of each of the 29 Asian populations living in the U.S. that is naturalized. What have I found so far, and what are the implications of my analysis?

At the individual level, I have found that years of school completed and professional status are strongly associated with the amount of earnings attained, and that at the country level, mean years of school is the most influential predictor. Both of these findings are consistent with prior research, particularly the finding pointing to the powerful influence of educational attainment, at both the micro and macro levels, on earnings achievement. And indeed, had I conducted two ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of annual earnings, one micro and one macro, it is likely that similar results would have been obtained. My use of hierarchical linear models, however, has permitted me to measure these micro and macro relationships in much more precise ways, and in a more combined way, than would have been possible with OLS regressions. Let me elaborate on this point, drawing on a similar elaboration of Arnold (1992: 74–75).

In the first place, the HLM approach has allowed me to determine how much of the variability in earnings among Asian immigrants is due to variance within countries and how much is due to variance between countries. I found that by far the greatest amount of the variation in the annual earnings of Asian immigrants is at the individual level, i.e., within country-groups, namely, a little less than 93 percent; and that about seven percent of the variance in earnings occurs between the country-groups of Asian men. It is these two variances that I endeavored to then explain, or account for, in the hierarchical linear modeling (see Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992).

Secondly, the HLM strategy involves producing for each Asian country a separate regression equation; the intercepts and slopes from these equations are then averaged across the countries and “weighted by the inverse of the standard error of each estimate” (Arnold, 1992: 74). Thus the actual within-Asian country associations are averaged, but the regression results from those countries that had more precise estimates count more in the overall equation than the coefficients from countries with less precise estimates.
Thirdly, the HLM analyses enable me to specify the degree of association between the within-country relationships and two (level-2) characteristics of the countries themselves. Similar to the preceding, when I use HLM to gauge the degree of association between country characteristics and average earnings, these estimates are weighted by the degree of precision of each Asian country’s mean earnings estimate (Arnold, 1992: 74).

Fourthly, my employment of HLM permits me to examine the influence of country characteristics on the education-earnings slopes and the professional-earnings slopes. That is, I am able to ascertain the degree to which the level-2 variables of mean level of school completed and the naturalization rate influence the individual-level associations between educational attainment and earnings, and professional status and earnings. This asset may well be the most important of the many advantages of hierarchical linear modeling, at least in the context of my investigation of the influences of micro and macro variables on the earnings attainment of Asian immigrants. I will consider this point in more detail.

A major conclusion in the literature on the socioeconomic achievement of foreign-born immigrants is the importance of considering the effects on achievement of the opportunity structures of the specific immigrant environments. Immigrants to the U.S. do not arrive as isolated individuals with only their human capital skills available to them; depending upon their specific country of birth, they have entree to various kinds of opportunity structures, networking environments, and other social contexts provided through their countrymen and countrywomen. Many scholars have shown, particularly Alejandro Portes and his associates (Portes and Bach, 1985; Wilson and Portes, 1980; Wilson and Martin, 1982; among many others) that these country-specific contexts “which receive and incorporate ... (the immigrant groups) decisively affect ... (their) collective fates, regardless of the (human capital) skills ... (that they bring to the U.S.)” (Portes and Bach, 1985: 268).

Presumably, the country-specific contexts in the form of opportunities and networks available to the immigrants, and the degree to which the immigrants avail themselves of them, better allow them to use their human capital skills in the workplace than would be the case if these country-specific contexts were not available. Hierarchical linear modeling allows me to appraise in a very precise way the degree to which this is true. HLM permits the investigator to ascertain directly whether and in what way the country-specific contexts influence the rates at which the human capital characteristics of immigrants from the respective countries are translated into socioeconomic achievements, and in the case of my current analysis, into earnings.

Specifically, my hierarchical linear models have enabled me to see whether and to what degree the average years of school completed by, and the naturalization rate of, U.S. residents from Asian countries, influence the extent to which male Asian immigrants convert their own educational achievement into earnings, and their own professional status into earnings. I have found evidence of a definite tendency for Asian males from countries with high mean school years to have larger education-earnings slopes than males from countries with low means. For each increment in an Asian country’s mean school years,
the slope for male Asian immigrants of educational attainment on earnings is increased by about $230.

Similarly, my HLM analyses show evidence of a tendency for males from Asian countries with high naturalization rates to have larger education-earnings slopes than those from countries with low rates. For every one percent increment in a country’s naturalization rate, the slope for male immigrants from that country of educational attainment on earnings is increased by almost $10.

However, my HLM investigations do not show evidence of similar effects of these same two level-2 characteristics on the slopes for male immigrants of professional status on earnings. Without the kind of hierarchical linear modeling discussed here, I would not have been able to make these kinds of empirical assessments.

Considerable work remains in my multi-level analysis of the earnings patterns of Asian immigrants to the U.S., and I have addressed some of these issues elsewhere (Poston, 1996). My main purpose here has been to illustrate in a summary manner an application of multilevel models in a study of immigrant assimilation. The development of statistical software in the past decade now makes possible the fitting of multilevel models, of the type shown here, that was technically not possible earlier. In my opinion, this methodological development may well be one of the more important ones in demography in several decades.

E. Finale

In this chapter I have set forth what are in my opinion the major conceptual and methodological advances and challenges in demography. Three of them are substantive, and one methodological. This is a short and very selective list and consists of topics and areas that have impressed me as important, relevant and challenging. I am not confident that other demographers will necessarily agree with my selection.

References


Sometime between 1968 and 1973, a revolution occurred in the field of urban sociology, a paradigm shift that became the predominant, if not the exclusive, orientation in the 1980s and continues to guide current work, even as some of its former enthusiasts look to new sources of inspiration. From its inception with the Chicago School in the early years of this century, urban sociology had embraced the social organization paradigm founded on the concepts of community organization and disorganization, ecological succession, and market-regulated social differentiation. In the late 1960s, a crisis developed in urban society and in the academy, particularly in the United States, England, and France where a new urban sociology soon blossomed. The social crisis was composed, in different combinations cross-nationally, of racial segregation and conflict, poverty, urban riots, political mobilization of communities around employment and education, and efforts to replace urban renewal with affordable housing. The urban crisis energized social scientists who quickly discovered that the venerable paradigm of social organization failed to engage contemporary problems. The old theory was designed for an era of migrant adaptation, urban growth and differentiation, social mobility, and community. The crisis called for an explanation of growing inequality and social unrest.

Ill-defined at first, a new paradigm began to emerge under the name *political economy*. In 1968, Manuel Castells published an article in Paris that asked “Is there an urban sociology?” Drawing on the work of Henri Lefebvre and Alain Touraine, Castells claimed that urban sociology lacked the combination of theory and substantive focus necessary for an explanatory science (Castells, 1975). Castells’ early writing in French reached a limited audience until the author took a position at the University of Wisconsin and Chris Pickvance (1975) published a translation and exposition of various French writers in the United Kingdom. In 1973, however, David Harvey, a British geographer working at Johns Hopkins University, published *Social Justice and The City* to an enthusiastic reception that clearly signalled that a paradigm shift was under way. Harvey’s book, like the field itself, began with a set of “liberal formulations” such as central place theory. It found them inadequate to
a structural explanation of urbanization and began to reconstruct the appropriately "radical formulations" that explained the coherence of urban form and process in the workings of capital accumulation. A new set of tools was being fashioned that promised to reveal the mechanisms of inequality and the interests underlying urban policy. For a new generation of urban sociologists, there was no going back.

If European theorists hewed to a new-Marxist interpretation of urbanization, North American converts inclined to a critical political economy that gave greater emphasis to the structure of political power than to the mode of production. Urban sociologists in the United States at the time were influenced less by Marx than by C. Wright Mills and Floyd Hunter. Inequality and political conflict were the meter of the new urban sociologists of the time (e.g. Piven and Cloward, 1971; Miller and Roby, 1970; Alford, 1975). Yet the emerging paradigm was interdisciplinary and intercontinental, a joint undertaking of neo-Marxists and left liberals, a growth industry in social science, and something of an intellectual community. Political economy was the phrase that best covered its diverse supporters.

In outline, the events described and the general timing of the paradigm shift in urban sociology are substantiated by various observers. Sharon Zukin (1980) may have been the first to use the phrase "the new urban sociology" in a relatively partisan discussion of developments in the 1970s. She characterizes the work as an approach that:

Situated the new urban sociology within an equally emergent political economy, which requires urban sociology to be a more interdisciplinary enterprise (with economics and political science) than it has been. Political economy has directed the [political economists] toward inquiries about costs, prices, rents, taxes, wages; in short, toward the valuation process of capital itself. Finally, they have been critically re-evaluating the history of urbanization. Rather than merely document the successive emergence of urban forms (e.g. the change from the preindustrial to the industrial city, or the reproduction of metropolitan urban forms in colonial and post-colonial capitals), their historical analysis focuses on the hegemony of urban forms within social formations and the hegemony of metropolitan culture within the world system as a whole.... By tying together urbanization, the quest for profit and domination, and the state's attempts to moderate domestic conflict between social classes, the new urban sociology achieves a coherence the field lacked (Zukin, 1980: 579).

Written without knowledge of Zukin’s forthcoming piece, a contemporaneous paper of my own entitled “The new urban sociology” discussed the now familiar origins of the approach and described it as follows.

First, from a theoretical and historical standpoint it holds that urbanism itself requires definition and explanation rather than being taken for granted or treated simply as a phenomenon of aggregation. Urbanism and urbanization must assume the status of 'theoretical objects' in the sense of phenomena that arise (or do not) and take different forms under various modes of socioeconomic organization and political control. Second, the approach is concerned with the interplay of relations of production, consumption, exchange and the structure of power manifest in the state. None of these can be understood separately or as analytically prior except in the sense of a logical exercise. Third, as in the case of urbanism generally, concrete urban processes (e.g. ecological patterns, community organization, economic activities, class and
ethnic politics, local government) must be understood in terms of their structural bases or how they are conditioned by their connection with economic exigencies, political arrangements, and the socio-cultural milieu. Fourth, the approach is fundamentally concerned with social change and conceives of this as growing out of conflicts (or contradictions) among classes and status groups. These conflicts are the basis of political process, which increasingly is coincident with the arena of the state. Changes in the economy are socially and politically generated as well as mediated. Political and social changes are in no sense independent of the economy. Finally, the perspective is inextricably tied to the concerns of normative theory. It is concerned not only to draw out the ideological and distributive implications of alternative positions, but is critically aware of its own premises and the dilemmas they too pose (Walton, 1981: 376).

Although these descriptions were in general agreement and each was based on close study of the change, it was not long before other versions began to appear that rewrote the history. By the mid-1980s, urban sociology was being characterized as a field divided by “two paradigms, ecology and Marxism” (Gans, 1984: 218; see also Logan and Molotch, 1987: 4–12). In fact, the juxtaposition of ecology and Marxism served the later authors as a device for typifying approaches with which they disagreed and as a springboard for introducing their own formulations. Worthy as those are, as we shall see below, the contrast did not accurately reflect developments in the field. Although human ecology has made valuable contributions to urban sociology, from Ernest Burgess and Amos Hawley to John Kasarda, there has never been an ecological paradigm that unified the field in a single set of assumptions and animated a professional community, in Kuhn’s (1962) sense of the term. In this sense, a social organization paradigm existed, within which urban ecologists labored amicably alongside students of community, anomie, “pathology” (e.g. crime and delinquency), differentiation and succession, social area analysis, political pluralism, and so forth. This was the paradigm formulated by the Chicago School, advanced in a new generation of ethnographic work by Gans (1962) and Suttles (1968), and theoretically rendered in its last version by Greer (1962). And for all its genuine achievements, this was the paradigm that the new urban sociologists judged inadequate to the social and intellectual tasks of the late 1960s. The social organization paradigm, moreover, was succeeded not by new-Marxism, but by a more nuanced and catholic political economy.

The purposes of this chapter are to set straight this record of theoretical development, describe the major accomplishments of political economy, and consider recent criticism about the desirable directions of future work. In brief, my argument is that political economy has been the dominant paradigm for the past 25 years; like its predecessor it has produced valuable results; and by the mid-1990s the field is once again in need of new direction.

A. The Subject of Urban Sociology

Twenty-five years have passed since Manuel Castells (1975 [1968]) posed the question “is there an urban sociology?” and answered it in the negative. Castells’ influential criticism gave pause to many urban sociologists, but discouraged few. On the contrary, the challenge to a peculiar yet dominant North American tradition
issued by Castells and a number of European urbanites produced a generally sympathetic response concerning the need for a new urban sociology. The great force of the criticism lay less in its formalistic objection to a disassociation of “real and theoretical objects” than with its lucid and undeniable demonstration of the explanatory weakness of urban theory. In brief, Castells argued that urban sociology had no “real” or concrete object because “urban” referred only vaguely to things not rural rather than to some specific phenomenon. Rather, urban sociology (or “ideology”) was concerned with certain activities such as how social groups formed communities, created a subculture, and avoided anomie, none of the intrinsically urban. On the basis of such material sociologists produced a general sociology of integration, admirable in its own right but a peculiar approach to urban issues, as would become apparent later on when inequality and unrest rather than integration came to the forefront of city problems needing explanation. The problem was a divorce between the real and the theorized objects that defined cities. For his own part, Castells argues that there was a unity to urban phenomena that lay in the connection between spatial relations and the process of collective consumption [i.e. the consumption of non-divisible goods such as air quality or public transportation, which Theodore Lowi (1969) and Mancur Olson (1965) had previously called “public goods”]. Not surprisingly, Castells claimed that Marxist theory linked these concrete processes in a general explanation. The sociology of collective consumption is a scientific undertaking. Urban sociology is not.

There was nothing new in the general effort to specify what is distinctive about cities in history that was rekindled in the late 1960s — Max Weber, Lewis Mumford, Jane Jacobs, and many others had previously addressed the question. Peter Saunders (1981: 250) observes that “The history of urban sociology has been the history of a search for a sociological phenomenon the source of which may be located in the physical entity of the city. It has been the history of an institutionalized subdiscipline in search of a subject.” Castells’ mock “astonishment” at the lack of a uniquely urban theoretical object, and his consequent characterization of the field as “ideological,” was no more than a forceful rhetorical device for arguing, as others have before and since, that urban sociology would gain more coherence by focusing on a particular set of problems that lend themselves to explanation from a preferred theoretical orientation. For Castells, of course, the key unifying problem was “collective consumption.”

If we take Castells’ contribution as no more or less than a valuable example of how urban sociology has developed, two important observations follow. First, such reasoning has typically made a strong case for looking at things in a new way, a case based on the fertility and problem-solving capacity of the proffered perspective. Invariable, however, it has also produced demurs in the form of alternative solutions to the problem that carry their own research and interpretive implications. David Harvey (1973, 1985a), for example, joined in the conclusion that urban sociology was ripe for a Marxian theoretical revolution, but argued distinctively, and with at least equal force, that urbanization was best understood as the uniquely modern mechanism of capitalist accumulation. Reflecting on these developments, Peter Saunders (1981: 256) concludes that “What emerges out of the consideration of the Marxist literature, therefore, is an appreciation that ‘the’ urban question is in
fact two questions ... from Castells a theoretical concern with collective consumption [and] from Lefebvre, Harvey, and others a theoretical concern with the function of space in the process of capital accumulation. These two questions are both valid....

The current predominance of political economy is demonstrated in the modern urban sociology texts (e.g. Light, 1983) and in the most celebrated research synthesis to be published in the United States in several decades. Urban Fortunes by John Logan and Harvey Molotch (1987: 17) is based on the political economy premise that “the market in land and buildings orders the urban phenomena and determines what city life can be.” The key difference from Marxist and ecological conceptions is that Logan and Molotch understand markets as social constructions generated in the conflict between residents interested in the use value of property and entrepreneurs striving to realize exchange value in the “urban growth machine.” Responding to earlier critical discussions of the ill-defined subject, Logan and Molotch argue that by showing “how social factors shape prices of places and humans’ responses to those prices, we can understand the physical and social shape of cities. We will continue to study land markets retaining thereby the real objects of ecologists,” but with a theory of socially constructed interest conflict.

With this framework, Logan and Molotch (1987: 49) “strive to develop an authentic urban sociology” and in many ways they succeed. Their book is at once a refreshing interpretation of previous research and an extension of political economy. Yet the subject matter problem is solved no more definitively here than it was in Castells. A “political economy of place” based on socially constructed struggles in the market over alternative use of space is as much a societal, or rural, phenomenon as it is urban (as the authors tacitly concede in their analysis of the environmental movement that would qualify the struggle to save the Grand Canyon from air pollution as an urban issue). All of this suggests that the pursuit of a uniquely “urban object” may be misleading.

Thus, the second observation: The proliferation of attempts to reconceptualize urban sociology suggests that there is such a field — an energetically contentious one at that. Although urban sociologists differ, the various exponents of modern approached coalesce around a sociology of space — the processes in which socioeconomic change and inequality operate in and through space. No single formulation of the urban question has yet won universal and permanent allegiance, nor is any one likely to. The urban question is not an epistemological riddle that promises some timeless solution. Rhetorical devices must not lead to a confusion of theory (the explanations we invent for empirical regularities) and metaphysics. The urban question is rather a historical problem that lends itself to a variety of particular solutions that take the general form: “if we look at things in this fashion (e.g. cities promote capitalism), here are the problems that can be solved (e.g. alterations in spatial form that correspond to changes in the organization of production).” Understood in that way, the proliferation of efforts to find a subject has made urban sociology more coherent than most fields. In response to the question “Is there an urban sociology?” a good many more complementary answers can be produced than would be the case if the question were put to, say, an economic, political, or medical sociology.
Since the late 1960s, the urban question has been formulated in various ways that have a political economy orientation in common. What have we learned form the effort?

B. The Contributions of Political Economy

In the limited space available, I simply highlight the diverse contributions of political economy with a set of themes and representative research. In most cases, the research comes from authors who would identify themselves as proponents of the new urban sociology or who approach the subject in ways that conform to the earlier characterizations. In the illustrations that follow, therefore, I have not imposed any framework on the authors cited or used their work to prove any points beyond those they intended. My claim is that political economy has been the most unifying and vigorous paradigm in urban sociology during the last two decades. That does not mean that all urban sociologists subscribe to the approach or that the only valuable research produced in the period fits within the paradigm. The following summary, therefore, chronicles the achievements of the prevailing style in urban research.

B.1. Historical Explanation

As the previous characterizations of political economy agree, urbanization and urbanism must be explained as contingent historical processes. Kingsley Davis (1955: 429) has remarked that “compared to most other aspects of society — e.g., language, religion, stratification, or the family — cities appeared only yesterday, and urbanization, meaning that a sizeable proportion of the population lives in cities, has developed only in the last few moments of man’s existence.”

Urbanization is the demographic expression of agricultural commercialization, industrialization, market centralization, and state formation. Although these processes have unfolded most rapidly under western capitalism, urbanization on a grand scale has occurred in China, the former Soviet Union, and various developed and developing countries with mixed economies. If some advocates of political economy have erroneously equated capitalism and urban inequalities, others have demonstrated similar problems in socialist urbanization (e.g. Szelenyi, 1983).

David Harvey (1985a, 1985b), one of the most important and certainly one of the most prolific writers on the new urban sociology develops a rigorous Marxist analysis of how urbanization proceeds under capitalism, how capitalist urbanization shapes consciousness, and so also the terms of political conflict. Harvey’s first premise is that “urban” is not a proper subject of inquiry by contrast to the capitalist forms of urbanization that have a specific meaning and are not generalizable across societies. The urban process under capitalism arises from the interplay of accumulation and class struggle. Thus, the “built environment” is produced to serve production, circulation and consumption. It changes in response to periodic and inherent crises which invigorate class struggles nascent
in a continuous process of uneven development. What we see and reify as the city is a physical network of factories, stores, offices, schools, and roads, all hitched to the primary function of accumulating capital and all vulnerable to decay understood as devaluation (e.g. abandoned plants or railroads) stemming from failing profits and the obligation of capital to plow new circuits. Change results from crises which are costly in terms of devaluation and the resistance of those left behind by the next cycle.

The asperity of this framework, however, gives way to complex narrative when Harvey analyzes the historical renovation of Paris after 1848 that led to the revolutionary Commune of 1871. The Second Empire of Louis Napoleonic Bonaparte pursued a program of economic recovery founded on state investment in national and urban infrastructure. Paris annexed its suburbs and, with immigration, doubled its population in 20 years. The emperor appointed Baron Haussman to rebuild Paris, with a massive program of public works and liberal credit devoted to roads, rail networks, fashionable boulevards, department stores, and the infrastructure of gas, water, and sewers to support them. “What was perhaps the first great crisis of capitalism was overcome, it seemed, through the long-term application of capital to the reorganization of space relations” (Harvey 1985b: 70). But the reorganization threatened other banking and property interests, displaced the city’s large working class through deindustrialization, and mobilized liberal professional groups all of whom supported the Commune’s appropriation of public space created by Haussman’s reconstruction. After the bloody defeat of the Commune, the Basilica of the Sacred Heart was erected, a symbol of popular excess and bourgeois triumph. The study is organized around an underlying economic crisis and the contradictions of its resolution, yet the historical and symbolic emoluments of the analysis show that Harvey’s explanation goes far beyond Marxist functionalism.

In summary, there are two Harveys, or two levels in his work. At the level of grand theory, a Marxist analysis of capital accumulation explains everything that is important about urbanization, but it does so by equating urbanization with some of the many ways in which capital accumulation is facilitated. At the level of historical research, particularly the nuanced analysis of Paris under the Second Empire, the contradictions of capitalist development provide a background against which urban renewal, political conflict, mobilization in space, and revolution all take place in related but unpredictable ways. Harvey’s purpose is precisely to set up this tension of theoretical logic and empirical contingency as a way of challenging our explanatory schemes.

Harvey is not the only one to find the foundations of urban theory in nineteenth-century France. Charles Tilly (1974, 1975) explains the growing concentration of people and power in cities through the interrelated processes of capitalist development and state formation. On one hand, capitalist development, which is increasingly industrial in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, reduced the labor requirements of commercialized agriculture, attracted migrants to urban factories, centralized commerce, and concentrated wealth in cities. On the other hand, governments in the formative nation states allied with capital and created new urban constituents such as armies and civil servants. As
resources were directed to the urban center, provincial and agrarian interests suffered. In the area of food policy, for example, supply was appropriated for export to the cities, leaving the towns and villages with shortages. Prices paid to the producer were reduced in favor of the urban consumer. Food riots in the provincial towns were a characteristic symptom of centralization throughout western Europe. For Tilly, crucial urban processes such as migration, proletarianization, and collective action are explained by the interrelation of actors pursuing capitalist development and state formation.

Urban political economy has also focused on historical change in the United States. The same theoretical contrast between Harvey and Tilly distinguishes the approaches of David Gordon (1978) and John Mollenkopf (1983). Gordon argues that urban development in the United States is divided into three periods (commercial, industrial, and corporate), each with its own economic priority and, accordingly, its distinctive urban form, function, and conflicts. During the first 200 years of US history, four commercial cities dominated: New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and Baltimore. The commercial city centered on the port, the business of the docks and shipping. The principal occupational groups included merchants, artisans, and laborers (sailors and longshoremen). Conflicts concerned customs, trade restrictions, and impressment of labor into merchant service which occasionally predicted riots. The industrial city emerged after the Civil War in midwestern sites such as prototypical Chicago. A few commercial states such as Philadelphia made the transition, but for the most part the industrial cities were the new Pittsburgh and Akrons. A rapidly expanding labor force of European immigrants formed working class neighborhoods near the factories, themselves convenient to rail transportation outside the central business districts. The upper and middle classes lived a comfortable distance from noxious factories. Segregation by race and class took root under these conditions. Conflicts concerned industrial strikes and the labor movement. Gordon argues that an important part of the shift to industrial decentralization in the modern corporate city began in the 1920s and was a deliberate effort to move industrial production away from organized working-class neighborhoods to the suburbs where strikes and union demands might be avoided. The corporate city introduced a new form of segregation that extended class and racial divisions across whole metropolitan areas while adding great differences in wealth and political power to the city-suburb divide. Conflicts now focused on differential quality schools, employment, investment (redlining), public expenditures, and amenities.

Mollenkopf would agree with this evolutionary pattern of American urban history, but he would explain the central processes and transitions by reference to the political realm. Urban policy has been the centerpiece of national efforts by political parties to develop coalitions that will put them in power. After the depression, the Democratic Party built an alliance of urban blue collar workers, black migrants to northern cities, Catholics, and ethnic minorities. But Republicans in the 1950s were able to draw suburban support and the new defense industries. Johnson’s war on poverty and Nixon’s new federalism were subsequent chapters in the struggle over the “contested city.”
B.2. Comparative Studies and Global Cities

Perhaps the most distinct feature of urban political economy is its comparative breadth. The new work has attained a truly international perspective both by encouraging cross-national research and by attracting scholars from a variety of countries, including specialists on Third World urbanization. The leading journal publishing the new urban sociology is the *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* and the excellent *Urban Studies* is subtitled *An International Journal for Research.*

The previous social organization paradigm generated relatively little comparative work, as an otherwise useful collection by Schwirian (1974) demonstrates in its paucity of international coverage and interpretations limited mainly to replicating US research designs (e.g. social area analysis) in other places. The new urban sociology was received enthusiastically and developed further by students of Third World urbanization (e.g. Roberts, 1979; Portes and Walton, 1976; Gilbert and Gugler, 1982; Gugler and Flanagan, 1978; McGee, 1967; McGee and Armstrong, 1985).

Underdeveloped and rapidly urbanizing countries provided a global laboratory for observing the effects of rural modernization on urban migration, dependent capitalism on the urban labor force, elite power on public policy as well as how the combination of these forces produces poorly served cities surrounded by squatter settlements. From the pioneering urban anthropology of Oscar Lewis (1959) and urban sociology of Jenet Abu-Lughod (1961) to more recent studies of squatters and their social networks (Lomnitz 1977; Vélez-Ibáñez, 1983), ethnographic work on Third World cities had added a comparative dimension to North American treatments of the urban village. But studies of Third World urbanization have moved outward and upward from city neighborhoods to questions of how national and regional economies affect the urban labor market, how cultural and religious divisions shape class-formation in the city, and how collective action such as labor movement protest is affected by these converging forces (e.g. Lubeck, 1986). In a recent study with Charles Ragin, we demonstrated how the Third World debt crisis led to cross-nationally implemented economic austerity, or “structural adjustment,” programs and how in turn these regressive policies generated a global wave of food riots and strikes in cities and among the urban poor (Walton and Ragin, 1990). When combined with case studies of the urban condition and political conflict (e.g. Seddon, 1984), this kind of analysis provides a solid link between local insight and global generalization.

Recently, comparative studies of urban political economy have turned their attention to what Friedman and Wolf (1982) call “global cities,” those major international hubs of capital and information that seem more closely linked to one another than to their domestic hinterlands. Anthony King (1990) has studied internationalizing London in post-imperial context. Saskia Sassen’s (1991) book *The Global City* develops a comparison of New York, London, and Tokyo within a network of cross-border influences of capital and labor. Sassen argues that these cities epitomize a process of globalization in which the functions of finance and control of the economy become more concentrated in a few great cities while production is increasingly decentralized. The two trends are causally related: Greater
concentration of financial and business services is required by the fragmentation and dispersal of manufacturing to non-metropolitan subsidiaries, offshore platforms, and low-wage enclaves around the world. One familiar result of this process is deindustrialization in developed countries and the decline of old manufacturing cities such as Manchester and Detroit. Another is the growing polarization of the global cities themselves as the metropolitan labor force is divided between the well-paid professionals in law, trade, and finance, and the poorly paid service workers who cook, clean, and babysit for professionals or who labor in the new electronic and apparel sweatshops. The fundamental dynamic posited here is that the more globalized the economy becomes, the higher the agglomeration of central functions in a relatively few sites, the global cities, leading to cities that produce mainly specialized services, a truncated national urban system, and polarization within the global city (Sassen, 1991: 5). Interestingly, Sassen’s comparison shows that the “fundamental dynamic” works as suggested in New York and London, but not in Tokyo, suggesting that cultural factors temporize the influence of capital on urban social organization. The general problem of economic restructuring and its urban implications is analyzed comparatively in a collection by John Logan and Todd Swanstrom (1990) which includes a good theoretical introduction and a critique of certain trends in urban sociology. Recently, research interest in global cities has multiplied to encompass the globalization process working through a multidimensional network of influences on cities and regions. We turn to that work in a forward-looking conclusion.

Finally, the end of the cold war during the 1980s has produced new opportunities in comparative research for scholars from eastern Europe and the west. This research has two foci, the more established studies of socialist urbanization (e.g. Musil, 1980) and the newer work on cities after socialism (Harloe et al., 1992). Szelenyi’s (1983) work shows that social inequalities under socialism stem from centralized state policies, particularly those in support of heavy industry where employment grew more rapidly than it did in cities. Many of the contrasts between socialist and capitalist urbanization previously theorized from scattered sources (e.g. Giddens, 1973) have been documented recently. In a useful review of this literature, Kennedy and Smith (1989) conclude that the countries of east central Europe are underurbanized given their level of industrialization by contrast to the west, that regional inequalities are less marked, and that low levels of urban primacy derive from the historical pattern in which the east was assigned the role of a food-producing periphery for the west. Doubtless east-west comparisons will be the most lively avenue of urban research in the next decade as investigators try to determine whether the earlier pattern of socialist urbanization will change to resemble western cities with the introduction of market economies. One of the great natural experiments in urban sociology is underway.

**B.3. Socioeconomic Processes**

One of the most general discoveries of the new urban sociology is the informal economy—a variety of paid and cost-saving economic activities that operate outside
the ambit of state regulation through households, social networks, and clandestine businesses. The informal “sector” (the term many prefer to “economy” which suggest dualism) was first noted by Keith Hart (1973) whose work in Accra, Ghana showed that many more people were employed or economically active than those counted in formal or census-enumerated jobs. The discrepancy was explained by the large number who made a living in various forms of officially uncounted self-employment, from street vending to prostitution and crime. Following Hart, a number of researchers demonstrated vigorous informal sectors in Latin America and Asian cities. And these authors took the next interpretive step by showing the crucial role of casual labor in subsidizing formal sector employers, including multinational corporations, and middle-class consumers. Although the formal sector benefits from the informal economy’s cheap labor and available services, it externalizes the costs — that is the formal sector bears none of the costs of social reproduction. (Portes and Walton, 1981; Bromley and Gerry, 1979; McGee and Armstrong, 1985). The informal sector was defined by this feature; it was unregulated, meaning that workers enjoyed no protections, job-related benefits, social security, or continuous employment. The absence of state employer protections makes informal sector labor and services cheaper and more flexible, explaining why they have been on the increase with the economic development of Third World Cities.

Researchers have turned to the growing role of the informal sector or the “second economy” in the developed countries. Ray Pahl’s (1984) Divisions of Labour demonstrated in a British sample the frequent use of informal services (but not of informal employment) and the irony that the more affluent were the greater beneficiaries of cost-saving exchanges of services. Two recent collections (Portes et al., 1989; Redclift and Mingione, 1985) describe the growing variety of informal work internationally, supporting the general proposition that casual, flexible, and low-wage work is replacing the formal sector, unionized, well-paid work of the industrial city. That, of course, dovetails with Sassen’s study and suggests that the future of employment is a vital policy question for continuing work in urban political economy.

My point here is that the new urban sociology has produced important discoveries by asking explanatory questions such as Hart’s query about the discrepancy between official and actual employment figures and what all those “unemployed” were doing to survive. The question uncovered a complex process which we now call the informal sector. Similar processes explain such key problems as how industry has adapted to rapid technological change and decentralization and how households contribute to the reproduction of society. The processes are flexible specialization and the gender division of labor — large subjects that must be described here in a small space.

Studies of flexible specialization in manufacturing (e.g. Piore and Sable, 1984) have been extended to urban studies with the question of what is in store for the “post-Fordist” city where manufacturing jobs and working class institutions have vanished. The literature on flexible specialization claims that manufacturing has reduced the size and dispersed the locations of firms capable of rapid response to changing consumer preferences and technological change. The computer industry and its origins in Santa Clara County, California, garages is the prototypical image.
Allen Scott (1988) has studied the regional distribution of these industries (e.g. film-making, electronics, apparel) in Southern California, concluding that the production process, and specifically flexible specialization, generates an urban structure that is decentralized, mobile, and polarized. Critics suggest, however, that the pre- and post-Fordist divide oversimplifies matters, that industry has always been flexible, that certain inflexibilities are advantageous, and generally that much more than the production process is at work shaping the modern or post-modern city (e.g. Sayer, 1989).

Finally, research on gender and the household economy demonstrates how families divide productive work, paid and unpaid, and how they persevere in hard times, training and supporting family members in their roles as citizens and workers. Perhaps the most extensive study of the household in developing society is the book by Henry Selby and associates (1990) based on participant observation and a survey of some 9000 Mexican households. Their principal discovery was the great resilience of extended families in crisis; their ability to double up home occupancy, increase the number of income earners, reduce expenditures, and survive physically if not culturally (that is, as undamaged persons). Related research in developing and developed countries demonstrates the great amount of society’s necessary and productive labor that is performed by women in the household economy whose work is not only unpaid but unrecognized as essential to the process of social reproduction.

B.4. Spatial Relations

A singular accomplishment of urban political economy has been the integration of social and spatial processes. From the landmark research on human ecology (Hawley, 1950) to modern theoretical formulations such as “distantiation” (Giddens, 1981), sociologists have tried to incorporate the constraining fact of space into their analyses of society. Although the ecologists made important studies of land use and urban spatial “zones,” effective integration with social action was not accomplished.

It is only recently that a marriage of geography and urban political economy has made a breakthrough possible. Roger Friedland (1992:11) observes about some of this new writing: “in the last decade, we have begun once again to focus on space as an integral component of social structure and action. The social organization of space and the spatial organization of society have become two sides of a singly preoccupation.”

Logan and Molotch (1987), as we have seen, represent this new approach in their effort to develop a “political economy of place.” Space enters the analysis with the recognition that place has value that affects social action. Moreover, place may have different and conflicting (use and exchange) values that give rise to socially constructed markets that organize urban (and, one must add, rural) space. Geographer David Harvey is perhaps the most constant and insightful synthesizer, as he shows in a lucid essay on “Money, time, space, and the city” (Harvey, 1985b: 1): “I argue that the very existence of money as a mediator of commodity exchange radically transforms and fixes the meanings of space and time in social life and defines
limits and imposes necessities upon the shape and form of urbanization.” Sociologists have yet to develop the full implications of the socio-spatial vision found in writers such as Harvey, yet urbanists have been dealing with issues of space all along. As Harvey (1985b:19) notes, “Gans thus brought to life in The Urban Villagers what had been evident to close observers of the urban scene for many years; that the struggle to create protected places and communities was as fiercely fought in urban areas as its evident loss was felt in rural areas.”

B.5. Ethnicity and Community

It may come as a surprise that research on ethnicity and community should be named as one of the strengths of urban political economy. Surely this is the centerpiece of the social organization paradigm, the focus of classics from the centerpice of the social organization paradigm, the focus of classics from Drake and Clayton’s (1945) Black Metropolis to Kornblum’s (1974) Blue Collar Community. I agree with the latter point but suggest that the new urban sociology has added a vital ingredient to the study of ethnicity and community by locating those local processes within the larger economy, labor force, and political environment, and by integrating these levels. That is, beyond employing these broader forces simply as background, the new work attempts to follow structural influences into the processes of ethnic identity formation and community action.

Earlier work often understood this idea. An important, if seldom noted, theme in Gan’s (1962) study of Italians in Boston was that ethnic identity was becoming submerged in class consciousness. In a related vein, Yancey et al. (1976) argued persuasively that ethnicity was “emergent,” a product of the situations in which nationality groups found themselves as vulnerable minorities, rather than some intrinsic identity or essential cultural trait carried by immigrants. It was particularly in the urban setting that stratified labor markets, segregated housing patterns, and powerful political machines all combined to create new ethnic identities for groups introduced to the city in different times and conditions.

Using the case of Koreans in Los Angeles, Light and Bonacich (1988) expand this approach into a comprehensive model for the study of ethnic minorities. The group’s migration history is first analyzed to determine education, skills, reasons for moving, and how the timing of the sojourn is affected by conditions in Korea and Los Angeles. Locational preferences in the United States are examined as a product of past migrations and enclave settlements. Korean immigrants are then located within the Los Angeles labor and housing markets at the time of their arrival. The intersection of these factors helps to explain how a close-knit Korean community took root in the southwest and south central area of the city, a community based substantially on small retail and labor, working long hours at low wage rates, and retailing the goods and services of the major US corporations (e.g. in gas stations, fast-food outlets, grocery stores) in new and expanded markets in their own and adjacent African American neighborhoods. Light and Bonacich conclude that ethnic business actually provides “cheap labor” for the major national firms. Small businesses are interpreted as labor in the sense that Korean immigrants exploit
themselves and their extended families in the process of creating markets that would not otherwise exist unless someone were willing to maintain retail outlets in ghetto areas, or to work all hours of the night in high crime areas for small profits. In the process, moreover, Koreans attract the resentment of African and Latin Americans who may lack the capital or experience to operate a business and who see Koreans as exploiting them. Indeed, during the 1992 Los Angeles riot, “more than two thousand Korean-owned businesses were destroyed or damaged ... much evidence suggests, moreover, that the Korean merchants who own and run a large number of the liquor stores in South L.A. were selected as special targets of violence” (Rutten, 1992: 52). In addition to describing the family and associational life of the Korean community in Los Angeles, the Light and Bonacich study provides a profound explanation for urban conflict.

The best-known recent book on urban minorities is certainly William Julius Wilson’s (1987) The Truly Disadvantaged. Wilson would probably not consider himself primarily an urban sociologist, and his work is not explicitly anchored in the urban political economy tradition. Nevertheless, Wilson’s analysis of the urban underclass follows a similar approach, moving from structural changes in the broader economy to local social effects. Blacks and Hispanics migrated to the cities in great numbers just as the urban economy was shifting from manufacturing to services. Blue-collar jobs that absorbed earlier waves of European migrants were being replaced by less stable or rewarding jobs in services such as eating and drinking establishments, health care, and retail stores. The new urban minorities faced shrinking employment opportunities, repeated sharp recessions from the 1970s to the early 1990s, a decline in neighborhood institutions such as schools and churches, and growing economic competition among themselves (e.g. between Koreans and African Americans). The changes conform to Sassen’s description of social polarization in large cities and its economic causes. The result, according to Wilson, is a steady undermining of social institutions and the creation of disadvantaged underclass.

A number of recent studies have focused on international migration, social exclusion, and ethnic segregation in cities. The journal Urban Studies has devoted a special issue to the subject and Marcuse and Kemper (1999) treat it in a set of comparative studies.

**B.6. Social and Political Movements**

As something of a social movement in its own right, urban political economy was born in the midst of contention during the late 1960s and has always taken collective action as its *metier*. Castells’ early work addressed social movements in Paris (Pickvance, 1975), and his research evolved within a few years to the point that he abandoned structural Marxism and the issue of collective consumption in favor of popular movements as the key agent in urban change (Castells, 1983).

In the United States, Piven and Cloward (1977) analyzed poor peoples’ movements with an explicit political economy which attributed periods of success in the labor, civil rights, and welfare rights movements to the effect of urbanization
on shifting political coalitions at the national level. Indeed, their pessimistic, even prophetic, conclusion was that popular movements enjoyed only brief windows of opportunity to influence policy and were best advised to battle disruptively for whatever they could get before the co-opting structures of politics enveloped them again. Norman and Susan Fainstein (1974) writing at the same time developed a kindred approach based on the specifically urban, analyzing movements for community control, planning, schools, housing, and so forth.

Much of the work in the field of social movements, of course, has flourished under the influence of resource mobilization theory (Jenkins, 1983) which, despite Charles Tilly’s formative contributions, has not dealt uniquely with urban issues. A new book by Margit Mayer (forthcoming), however, develops an important approach based on the state and social movements. Comparing urban conflicts in the United States and Germany, Mayer argues that the timing, resources, and prospects for success of movements derive in large part from the political environment created by the state.

C. New Directions

The success of urban political economy lies in its capacity for structural explanations of a variety of urban conditions. The structural logic of capitalist accumulation, for example, requires an expanding metropolitan market linked by transportation and infrastructure as well as an adequately housed labor force within economical commuting distance of factories and offices. These requirements embody social class contradictions (e.g. over land use, rent, access to public services) that occasion social struggles (e.g. between capital and labor or between property and industrial capital). State mediation of these conflicts follows the contours of political power that describe each conflict. By way of analysis, this imposing framework is projected on to the physical and social landscape. Assumptions about causality and the potency of various elements of the framework are prefigured in the structural argument. Action flows along one of several predictable courses depending on particular combinations of antecedent structural conditions. Social movements hatch from these structural contradictions, not from other sorts of contradictions independent of the framework and not from non-contradictory conditions of urban life. Consciousness, too, is a reflex of structural arrangements. In short, the very success of urban political economy begins to suggest its limitations. Densely developed theories of structural causation have laid to rest earlier anecdotal (community study) and metaphorical (human ecology) treatments of the city, and in the process may have laid themselves in a new procrustean bed.

Despite its impressive accomplishments, or because so many of them go back a decade and more, a re-thinking of urban political economy is underway. Two problems trouble the field. First is overconfidence; the accumulation of an impressive body of theory and research that allows practitioners to prefigure answers to new questions. A cocksure analytical style begins to enter the writing in which developed theory is used implicitly to “read off” interpretations for empirical events. A genuine sense of puzzlement is encountered less often. Second is the problem of economism:
the tendency for political economy to become enamored of the seeming causal potency of economistic analyses — to collapse complex social issues into elusively precise technical and organizational terms.

In the last few years, urban research has developed a new direction built on the accomplishments of political economy, mindful of its limitations, and fitted to the transformations and global society. The new work may lack the theoretical unity of a “paradigm,” but it coheres in its synthesis of culture and global society. That is, cross-national processes that carry globalizing, market-integrating pressures are examined insofar as they affect social inequality, spatial organization, community life, economic structure, political responses, and, indeed, a variety of urban activities. Some of this work continues in the tradition of global cities, but refines and elaborates that approach through analyses of a variety of globalizing processes that affect cities in general (not simply those large capital cities that may fit the ill defined standards of a “world city”). Research on globalization may focus on job loss or gain, shifting production sites, cross-national influences on urban inequality and labor organizing, spatial and ethnic exclusion, information flows, neoliberal political regimes (e.g. structural adjustment), or new cultural forms. The basic premise is that globalizing influences are increasingly an aspect of urban social organization and, while not leading to any sort of homogenization, are nevertheless sources of new global-local tensions that are experienced differentially (Castells, 1991).

The distinctive feature of this new work, however, is the manner in which it incorporates cultural analyses. Certainly one of the best known books of the last decade is Mike Davis’s (1990) City of Quartz, a study of Los Angeles that centers on the struggle between competing “city myths” of sunshine and noir and the constituencies that align on these axes of cultural conflict. Equally provocative as a study of identity and the politics of representation is Paul Gilroy’s (1987) analysis of race and urban social movements in London. In a more conventional history of unconventional groups, George Chauncey (1994) analyzes gender and urban culture in the making of the New York male gay world. John Clammer (1997) has written a cultural interpretation of Tokyo organized around the sociology of consumption. Sharon Zukin’s (1991) Landscapes of Power describes how cultural symbols are deployed in the process of urban economic development. Lyn Lofland’s (1998) new study of who defines and controls the public realm and Harvey Molotch’s (1996) analysis of how art works and design shape the urban economy both testify to a new integration of cultural and socio-economic concerns. Linda McDowell’s Capital Culture explores gender and occupational culture in City of London banking firms. An accessible summary of this new work is Sharon Zukin’s (1995) The Cultures of Cities which develops the “symbolic economy” as both a developmental initiative and a vision of the city’s aspirations for itself.

The burgeoning work on globalization and culture defies summary in the space allotted here for a review of trends over the last several decades. Political economy continues to thrive, particularly in empirical studies of globalization, economic restructuring, and inequality, but theoretically today’s action is with the symbolic community. The next urban sociology will reveal the cultural character of the political economy in a world shaped increasingly by the tensions between global incorporation and local particularity.
References


At its most elementary level, housing serves as shelter, offering protection against inclement weather and victimization by street crime. Housing fulfills other functions as well. It is typically a significant economic investment, for households as well as builders. Residents also tend to hold emotional attachments to housing as home. In addition, governments have used housing as a tool to attain other policy objectives, such as reducing unemployment or inflation, and dispersing, integrating or segregating population groups.

Given its significant roles in society, housing provides important angles for sociological research. First, housing must accommodate behavioral needs related to family life and neighborly interactions. Second, housing reflects and reinforces social and economic structures. For example, stratification and discrimination crystallize as a tangible housing problematic whose study sheds light on their broader manifestation. Third, housing links outcomes at the individual level to higher level phenomena. The homelessness of households, for example, can be seen in the context of regional housing and labor markets, which in turn operate under national policies and global investment patterns. It is an arena where interest group dynamics are played out in regard to the allocation of scarce resources.

Against this background, there are two roles for sociology in regard to housing. First, sociology has a role in housing research. Studies may examine the role of design in shaping neighborly interactions or the effects of crowding on family dynamics. Such investigations are conducted alongside research from other fields such as economics, which may investigate house price elasticity, or law, which may examine the constitutionality of tenant eviction procedures. In these cases the attention is on a particular housing(related) issue. Thus, inter alia, sociology has a legitimate place in housing research.

However, we can also analyze housing research itself: what defines its directions and foci? These questions inquire about the linkages between housing research and economic, political, demographic and cultural variables. They require consideration of the societal contexts within which housing research is embedded. This type of analysis is best called sociology of housing research. In this chapter, we address the
wider sociological analysis of housing research, which deals with housing both as object and as process, together with the contexts in which such analysis has emerged.

A. An Organizational Scheme for Housing Research

At the heart of Figure 15.1 is the conventional conception of housing as a tangible object [II]: apartments, housing units, buildings. They vary by design, cost, location, and scale. Whatever their characteristics, they are the physical objects of built environment. It is essential to know what quality of housing is available with specific design characteristics, and at specific costs, locations, and scales. The quantitative side is similarly important, both in aggregate and with respect to design, cost, location, and scale considerations. This kind of information is important both in its own right and in conjunction with how housing gets built (I) and how housing impacts on individuals and groups (III).

Before construction lies the myriad of concerns as to how housing has come to be what it is. This includes the considerations of those who provide housing. This also includes the needs of the residents. The relevant actors fall within one or more of the private, public, and non-profit sectors. Sociological focus typically applies to diverse interests within and between sectors.

Within the “before” realm, is first the difference between supply and demand. The former involves the rationales to produce housing. The latter involves the criteria of users. Second, the rationales fuelling both supply and demand may lie anywhere in between two extremes: (1) intrinsic reasons for building (i.e. the elemental functions of housing) and (2) extrinsic reasons for building (i.e. economic profit, social prestige, and more). Insofar as those supplying housing have become increasingly different from those demanding it, the goals motivating producers and users have become not only qualitatively different but at times in conflict. Mechanisms that help shape the outcome of the dynamics among conflicting interests include government policies, laws (e.g. zoning), economic contexts (e.g. capitalism, socialism), and culture.

Sociological interest in housing genesis has not been to the exclusion of interest in the effects of housing on people. The factors involved take many forms (III). Impacts concern health, behavior, satisfaction, and material outcomes. At the collective level, distributive outcomes are particularly salient. Such distributive outcomes refer to the extent that different subsectors of the population wind up with more or less of resources with outcomes relevant not only to their own well-being but also to the functioning of the societies in which they live. Housing itself serves as a conduit joining societal causes to individual effects. Its necessity, its provision largely by third parties, its relatively great cost, its centrality to primary group and biological functioning provide unique substance (II). Housing is certainly not simply a generic commodity.

Major themes in the housing literature fit within this organizing scheme, which helps to show how housing represents a reasonably coherent field of research and not a chaotic congeries of specific studies. In the next section, we turn to a historical overview as to when and why certain issues gained research interest.
### The Sociology of Housing

#### Figure 15.1
An Organizational Scheme for Housing Research

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<th>I. How Housing gets Built</th>
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<th>B. Mediating Mechanisms</th>
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<th>II. Housing Units and Complexes</th>
<th>A. Design</th>
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<th>III. How Housing Impacts on Individuals and Groups</th>
<th>A. Health</th>
<th>B. Behavior</th>
<th>C. Satisfaction</th>
<th>D. Material Outcomes</th>
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followed by an examination of how national priorities have accentuated particular themes.

B. The Societal Context: An Historical Perspective

This section illustrates the connections between societal contexts and research themes, largely, though not exclusively, with respect to historical trends in North America and represented by English-language literature. We situate research themes in the eras in which they first became full-blown, though tracing their development and expression in subsequent eras as well.


Connections between research and attempts to influence living conditions go back to ancient times, when Greek, Roman and Oriental civilizations codified findings from extensive surveys undertaken to help ensure orderly functioning of family, city, and state. By the middle of the 19th century, investigations into housing became more prevalent with the advance of industrialization, urbanization and the horrendous circumstances of the working poor. Concerns about sanitary conditions and public hygiene became widespread. Such concerns were based on and produced community surveys, documenting in vivid detail the insalubrious quarters of many urban households (Booth, 1892; Riis, 1891; Veiller, 1910). The American Journal of Sociology published a series of studies between 1910 and 1915, many of them by Saphonisba Breckinridge and Edith Abbott, which described decrepit and unhealthy housing conditions in Chicago and which urged reform. The situation prompted calls for action.

In France, public health objectives for reform received attention but only when connected to the larger social issues and economic transformations of the time. During the 1850s and 1860s, the Paris Commission on Unhealthful dwellings issued reports criticizing the absence of adequate guidelines for new building and setting forth specifications for residential construction. During this time, societies for workers’ housing were founded, not as much for the benefit of the households, as to render the working class “inaccessible to the seductions of politics” and a means to “pacifically disarm resistance” (Shapiro, 1985). The same sort of conservative ideology accommodated the early drive towards owner occupation, which in the 1820s found expression in the U.S. in the battle for universal (male) suffrage, inclusive of tenants theretofore excluded from the right to vote (Heskin, 1998). Humanitarians and paternalistic philanthropists also championed of housing improvements for the working class. They suffered a scathing attack by Engels (1872) who saw housing problems as simply another manifestation of the fundamental problems of capitalist society. The solution, according to him, was to address the underlying structural causes; promoting home ownership was a snare to fetter the workers, robbing them of their freedom of movement necessary to sell their labor most profitably.
In Britain, in 1905, the Board of Trade undertook several massive surveys, gathering information on the cost of living and rents in major cities. Comparable studies in France, Germany, the U.S. and Belgium followed, induced by concerns about economic competitiveness (Daunton, 1990). In this work, social reform took a subservient position. Yet more so in the U.S., where housing studies tended to define housing problems in terms of their populations, high crime rates, and saloon culture. Social reformers, acting moralistically on behalf of the poor and ill-housed, rather than with them, sought to achieve progress through restrictive codes and incremental housing legislation (Andrachek, 1979). Even Edith Wood (1919), who criticized what she viewed as the ineffectual approach by Veiller (1920), ascribed responsibility for housing to local, rather than national government.

This limited framework for action portended problems in later decades, a case in point being the refusal of many local governments during the 1950s and 1960s to be a site for federally mandated public housing. When the federal government did become involved in the early specification of standards, it linked them to income, not family size (Andrachek, 1979). Following disastrous fires in Chicago (1871) and San Francisco (1906), municipalities began developing comprehensive local building codes in conjunction with land use regulation. They adopted model codes, which were further studied and refined by, for example, the International Conference of Building Officials, founded in 1922, and the American Public Health Association in 1945. Today, 97% of U.S. building adheres to one of three such model codes (Howe, 1998). Research was not only instrumental in their development, but also in revealing problems associated with their enforcement, including the effect of increasing cost. European nations also instituted housing standards as the century progressed, particularly in Scandinavia, supported by Social Democratic governments (c.f. Dalén and Holm, 1965).

B.2. 1920s–1930s: Eventual, Selective Government Intervention

The period between the World Wars built heavily on the earlier data about the health in crowded housing in large urban cities. Carol Aronovici (1920, 1939) emphasized the virtues of housing, created for workers by public authorities and philanthropists, with adequate inside space, higher standards, and access to pleasant common outdoor space. Neither journalists nor social scientists used sophisticated research designs with careful controls. Nonetheless, the coincidence of tuberculosis and other respiratory diseases, losses of life due to fire, and the blending of poverty and unconventional behavior with crowding in inadequate buildings led to demands for public action. In the logic of Figure 15.1, health outcomes (IIIA 1, 2) led to pressures for public sector mediation (IB) between supply (IA) and demand (IC).

In reaction to accumulated reports and as a basis for later research, governments began to mediate housing conditions. There was precedent from the United Kingdom and from socialist experiments in improved worker housing in big, crowded European cities such as Vienna (Chaddock, 1932). The U.S. government first funded research on what it considered a housing problem in 1892. During World War I, it provided emergency housing for defense workers. Comprehensive
civilian housing programs did not occur until the Great Depression interfered with
the operations of the private housing market. Federal institutions were then created
to lend money for housing production. Government reinforced ideological support
for private sector production. These efforts in the 1930s also reflected labor force
objectives, not simply the supply of housing (Beyer, 1958). The Canadian
governmental housing finance corporation grew up also as largely a vehicle to
heat up and cool down the economy.

Some housing for people unable to get decent housing on the private market
was built during this period (c.f. Aronovici, 1939; Robbins, 1966), but with the
initiative of lower levels of government and philanthropic bodies. The U.S. federal
government only entered this sphere closer to the end of the depression, in 1937.

In the 1930s, a coalition of liberal reformers, the National Housing Conference,
the National Association of Housing Officials, and labor groups had pressured the
U.S. government to take permanent responsibility for the provision of low-rent
public housing. They had been opposed by wealthy and powerful interests such as
the National Association for Real Estate Boards, the US Savings and Loan League,
and the US Mortgage Bankers Association, who considered government
involvement undesirable, but who welcomed slum clearance as long as the vacant
land would be made available for lucrative commercial development. In these
battles, resulting in the Housing Act of 1937, housing for the poor was not the
only or even the central issue. Indeed, its more important functions became to
assist the stagnant construction industry, to reduce unemployment, and to weed
out blighted areas. The concentration in slums of poverty, disease, and broken
families was seen as injurious to the health, safety and morals of citizens. Some of
the production was suburban, following the neighborhood unit plan guidelines
put forward earlier in the decade by Perry (1937). A few planned communities
were built, too.

World War II ended the Great Depression in the United States, but the war
stalled responses to housing needs. Despite some pioneer work (e.g. Riemer, 1943;
Merton, 1946), housing research by sociologists during this period followed the
housing market, and empirical assessment of housing initiatives awaited the
explosion of post-war activities. Both the U.S. and Canadian governments fostered
the development of suburbia through mortgage guarantee policies on the assumption
that inner city housing was a less safe investment for lending than single-family
housing in newly-built areas. Governments thus effectively steered development
to the periphery. Suburban life, unfamiliar as a mass phenomenon, prompted many
sociological studies (e.g. Berger, 1960; Clark, 1966; Gans, 1967). The effects of
this governmental intervention were heavily behavioral in nature (IIIB), but also
involved satisfaction (IIIC) and material outcomes (i.e. the ability to build capital)
(IIID).

Although post-war government mediation did explore other directions such as
public housing (Wilner, 1962), U.S. public policies have strongly fostered private
homeownership. Tax deductibility for mortgage interest is an incentive that many
governments provide (e.g. U.S.A., Sweden) and some others withhold (e.g.
Canada). On a different front, slum clearance and urban renewal took place in the
context of controversial legislation and prompted many critical evaluations (e.g.,
Government intervention has become more diversified, leading to similar diversity of the housing literature. Rent control legislation, for example, has become more common (c.f. Salins, 1980; Baar, 1987), as have rent supplements and housing entitlements in some European nations. Gentrification has occurred as a function of both public and private initiatives (e.g. Spain, 1980; Lang, 1982; Smith, 1996). Cities and nations are now attempting to privatize what once they thought necessary to provide publicly. These and many other forms of mediation since the 1920s have been covered in many anthologies, which increase as the actions of government continue to expand (e.g. Van Vliet, Huttman, and Fava, 1985; van Vliet and van Weesep, 1990; Lambert, Paris, and Blackaby, 1978; Huttman and van Vliet, 1988; Pynoos, Schafer, and Hartman, 1973; van Vliet, 1990).

B.3. 1940s: Responding to Intrinsic Demand

The first US Census of Housing took place in 1940. It recorded the impact of the economic crisis of the preceding decade. More than 23% of urban dwellings lacked a private bath; more than 10% needed major repairs. Rural conditions were worse. About half the unprovided families were living doubled up or in makeshift shelters (Nenno, 1979).

The war left many in Europe without homes. Even in nations untouched by the direct effects of the war, the indirect economic effects of the successive periods of depression and war meant major housing shortages. In North America, the return of millions of soldiers and the beginning of an intense period of family formation brought with it a strong need for new housing. During this time, in the U.S. the field of forces arrayed in favor of and opposed to government intervention in housing was organized along similar lines as for the 1937 Act. The continuing struggle for renewed housing legislation produced a compromise in the Housing Act of 1949, meant to eliminate substandard housing, to stimulate housing construction and to provide a decent home and suitable living environment for every American family.

In Europe, where collapsed private capital markets required the infusion of public funds, government intervention in housing followed a longer tradition and was more oriented towards social rental housing. In Britain, the post-war Labour Government controlled virtually all building through a strict licensing system allowing it to channel materials and labor into the public sector. Private landlordism and owner occupation dwindled further owing to the nationalization of development and values and the continued pre-war rent freeze (Saunders, 1990). Its 1949 Housing Act promoted council housing for all, setting the stage for a social housing sector that would grow to nearly 1/3 of the total stock, before getting eroded by the privatization policies of 1979 and onwards.

Research during this period reflects these developments. Thus, there were analyses of the interest group dynamics surrounding government intervention,
but there were also studies of family maladjustment in crowded housing. This work did not just offer dispassionate assessments. Investigators often assumed activist roles to influence policy. This linkage between research and practice built on the engagement of a previous generation and continues today among housing reformers seeking to advance a progressive policy agenda (e.g., Dreier and Atlas, 1996).

B.4. 1950s and 1960s: The Ramifications of Expansion

Massive building programs continued in the 1960s. Government subsidy policies proliferated. Most were oriented to the supply side and aimed at stimulating production. They had some major ramifications.

B.4.a. Discrimination

After World War II, fought in part to safeguard against arbitrary power based on race, discrimination was still rampant in the victorious nations. In the late 1940s the U.S. Supreme Court declared restrictive covenants prohibiting the sale of housing to named minorities unenforceable by law. But this did not prevent white post-war suburbanization surrounding black inner cities, which became more evident during the 1950s and 1960s, and was followed by an outpouring of research on discrimination and its implications for life chances available within reasonable proximity. Residential discrimination also exposes people to toxic waste risks, with material outcomes.

Sociologists made important contributions to the understanding of these problems. First was documentation of the extent that residential segregation existed and for whom. The focus shifted from case studies to the statistical measurement of which groups were distributed unevenly among local areas, as well as which groups were less likely to share local space with which others (c.f. Duncan and Duncan, 1955; Lieberson, 1963; Taebuer and Taebuer, 1965; Peach, 1981; Farley, 1984; Massey and Denton, 1993).

A second line of research assisted in the understanding of the dynamics of discrimination. One aspect of this has to do with intergroup contact. Some early studies dealt with the circumstances within housing complexes under which people will become acquainted and maintain reasonably friendly interaction or, in contrast, exclude one another (Wilner, et al., 1955; Keller, 1968). Others studied real estate agents as gatekeepers to housing, steering people to areas according to their skin color or ethnic background and withholding information that might lead to residential mixing (Helper, 1969; Brown, 1972). Researchers also examined redlining, in which lenders and insurers withhold financial support and services from minority areas (Squires, 1997). Many such processes involve active human agency by special interests, not just governmental policies (Box IB in Figure 15.1). Research has also demonstrated the role of segregated neighborhoods in producing segregated schools and documented the unequal
learning environment in schools populated by students from the lowest social strata (Coleman, 1969; Kozol, 1991). More recent research has indicated how the segregation of poor, black residents has led to the creation of an isolated underclass (Wilson, 1987).

By the late 1960s, riots had erupted in large US cities. Although rooted in the broader context of structural inequalities and racism, neighborhood and housing factors played a critical role (National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968). After successfully addressing discrimination in employment and education, the civil rights movement turned to housing and was instrumental in the passing of a fair housing act (Title VIII, Civil Rights Act of 1968). Discrimination was not, however, a uniquely U.S. problem. In Britain, for example, Rex and Moore (1967) exposed racially discriminatory housing policies.

**B.4.b. Behavior**

Provision of new housing did not prove a magic solution to the improvement of people’s lives, Wilner et al.’s (1962) painstaking study showed only limited improvements in children’s health and school performance. Nonetheless, both in Britain and in North America researchers found how behavior occurred according to the path of least resistance fostered by the design of buildings and outside spaces (c.f. Gutman, 1972). The total amount of contact among residents, as well as the geographic pattern of contact, was shown related to proximity and design features that bring people together (c.f. Merton, 1946; Festinger, Schachter and Back, 1950; Morris and Mogey, 1965; Michelson, 1970, 1993). More work on behavior focused on families in high-rise apartments, which had begun to proliferate in many countries, not only in public housing developments but also in the private sector as a reaction to increasing land costs. Research studied where and how children play in high rises, family life in them, obstacles to social contact, and what activities people can and can’t do there (Stevenson et al., 1967; Moore, 1969; Jephcott, 1971; Michelson, 1977). It helped produce an international consensus that high rise, as commonly built, was not conducive to child raising.

The analysis of criminal behavior and housing design is a prime example of the interplay between societal issues and housing research. In the late 1960s, the growing incidence of crime in the U.S. prompted a call for proposals to examine the contributing role of housing design. The concept of defensible space was coined to describe how housing design fosters or inhibits social processes that promote proprietary feelings among neighbors and that help identify intruders (Newman, 1972; see also Jeffery, 1977). More recently, a safety audit procedure has been devised to discover places in which people feel threatened (e.g. because of isolation, darkness, or lack of an escape route). The focus on behavioral effects of housing reflected the beginning of a societal shift from dealing with absolute housing shortages towards a long-term task of recognizing the human implications of the built environment.

The 1970s were an era of increasing prosperity for many people. Yet, this prosperity was not uniform. Researchers increasingly studied how housing is produced, according to whose interests, and how well and justly it serves different segments of the population.

B.5.a. Structural Analysis

Rex and Moore (1967) argued that cities provided the arena for a class struggle over the use of houses. This directed attention to the control of access to scarce resources as a relevant and legitimate focus of research and resonated with developments in France, where industrial unrest and urban disturbances prompted government to channel funds into urban social research. Resultant studies criticized the role of the state in the (re)structuring of society (Castells, 1977). Housing was not considered in isolation, but seen as embedded in conflicts inherent in capitalist urban development. This view gained widespread international acceptance. Although, today, it is one of several which guides research, its significance lies in its lasting contribution to a framework for the study of distributive mechanisms in housing.

The so-called New Urban Sociology, with a neo-Marxian outlook, has examined, for example, the production of housing for extrinsic purposes such as profit (IA2), rather than the primary purposes of housing consumption or physical need (IC1). Although strictly Marxian explanation waned in the 1980s, structural analysis has continued to the present and shows promise of continuing (c.f. Bassett and Short, 1980; Logan and Molotch, 1987; Suttles, 1990; Caulfield, 1994).

A Weberian variation of the same theme involved the structural analysis of the professions involved in the production and design of housing. Researchers have studied architects (Gutman, 1975; Blau, 1984; Lang, 1988), urban planners (Michelson, 1976; Schon, 1983), and developers (Fainstein, 1994). Others produced case studies of significant housing institutions (Batley, 1988; Welfeld, 1992; Kemeny, 1997). Finally, in this activist era the view of housing as a process was represented by researchers examining citizen participation in the design, creation, and maintenance of housing (Arnstein, 1969; Simmie, 1974; Thorns, 1976).

B.5.b. Residential Satisfaction and Population Subsectors

A second theme of research of the 1970s addressed people’s satisfaction with their housing, a complex phenomenon reflecting shifting priorities, prospects for mobility, and a variety of criteria such as dwelling size and adequacy, location, price, and neighbors (Lansing, Marans, and Zehner, 1970; Ermuth, 1974; Michelson, 1977; Morris and Winter, 1978; Despres and Piche, 1997). Satisfaction has been found specific to population groups. Much attention, for example, has been paid to the needs of women, on grounds that their roles have changed drastically in the past 50
years and that predominantly-male planners and architects have never gotten it right. Whereas segregated land-use was a mainstay of suburban growth and planning in large part for the ostensible protection of stay-at-home women and young children, research showed that it makes no logistical sense for women in the labor force and those not living in traditional nuclear families (Hayden, 1984; Wekerle, 1984; Franck and Ahrentzen, 1989; Spain, 1992; Altman and Churchman, 1994).

Children have been found to have unique housing needs, also varying by gender and stage of development. Suburbs that protect toddlers can stifle the very same children 10-15 years later. The literature on children grew until the 1979 International Year of the Child but has subsided since (c.f. Lynch, 1977; Pollowy, 1977; Michelson and Roberts, 1979; Huttman and van Vliet, 1988, pt. IV).

The elderly are another population group, not homogeneous but with unique housing needs. It is the most rapidly growing part of the population. There is a practical need for appropriate environments for the elderly. Psychologists took the lead in this research (c.f. Lawton, 1975; Altman, Lawton and Wohlwill, 1984), which is now strongly multidisciplinary (e.g., Pynoos and Liebig, 1995).

### B.6. 1980s–1990s: Differentiation and Polarization

Throughout the massive post-war building programs in Europe, ending in the mid 1970s, welfare states embraced the principle of universalism. In rhetoric, if not always in practice, policies extended entitlements and incentives to broad segments of the population. Eligibility was widespread. Benefits were highly standardized, and the resulting housing environments were highly uniform. In North America, the emphasis was on suburban single-family housing with segregated land-uses for reasons that blended government actions and private sector interests.

#### B.6.a. Household Differentiation

Household differentiation began to assert itself in earnest in the 1980s. In addition to a declining proportion of two-parent families with several children and a male breadwinner, new household types emerged and grew in number: elderly households, single-person households, single-parent households, dual earner households. Yet other household types began to reveal themselves through a greater variety of lifestyles with corresponding requirements for compatible housing. Research began to address the housing needs of these different household types (c.f. Franck and Ahrentzen, 1989; Arias, 1993; Clark and Dieleman, 1996).

#### B.6.b. Retrenchment

The basic tenet of the welfare state, equal treatment of all, became a limiting mold for changing realities demanding greater flexibility. More and more, the universality of benefits became a financial liability, as economic resources diminished and
governments increasingly looked for ways to limit assistance to only those deemed most in need. The recognition of a more differentiated population and more focused subsidy schemes fit with a drastic reorientation of housing policies during this decade. Many governments embarked upon a two-pronged approach of shifting previously assumed responsibilities to lower levels of government and the private and nonprofit sectors. These processes of, respectively, decentralization and privatization proceeded from different baselines and at a different pace. However, the direction of change was the same and could be observed in market societies, welfare states, and socialist nations, and in the advanced industrialized countries as well as the Third World. Among the significant implications were the curtailment and elimination of housing assistance and a general erosion of the safety net.

**B.6.c. Affordability**

At the same time, and for some of the same reasons, a tacit coalition of finance, development, and government interests, called the urban growth machine (Logan and Molotch, 1987), provided the initiative and legitimation for a solution to urban problems involving the building of upscale developments aimed at the hospitality sector, tourism, recreational use, and affluent residents. Cooperation between the public and private sectors enabled the construction of stadiums, convention centers, hotels, shopping and dining areas, and condominiums in many cities—but not social housing. This ratcheted up the cost of housing without providing for those unable to pay market rents.

Affordability became a housing problem (IIB) with negative material outcomes (IIID) for a growing number of households. Cutbacks in housing and welfare budgets, the urban growth machine, deinstitutionalization, a changing structure of employment, and growing unemployment have produced alarming increases of homeless households. Research has profiled such households and detailed the effects of homelessness on them. It has also situated the incidence of individual episodes of homelessness in the wider context of political and economic changes at national and international levels. (Dear and Wolch, 1987; Rossi, 1989; Daly, 1996; Mingione, 1996).

A very different aspect of globalization is direct access to communication by computer and hence the chance for a greater number of people to work in and from their own homes, rather than to remain dependent on external workplaces. Accompanying this trend, a growing literature is reassessing the place of housing in people’s activities and regarding its size, design, and infrastructure as more than a traditional housing unit (c.f. Wikström, Palm Lindén and Michelson, 1998).

**C. The Societal Context: A Cross-National Contrast**

The preceding historical sketch helps elucidate how housing research bears the stamp of broader developments. We now change focus to a broad comparison of market systems, welfare states, and socialist states. The objective is a further
understanding of how important societal context is to both trends in housing itself and to the housing research that interacts with them.

C.1. Market Systems

A defining characteristic of market-based systems of housing provision is the interplay of supply and demand. The model holds that households experience a need for housing, which they meet by willingly paying a price. The supply side is said to respond to this demand, setting a price that covers costs and maximizes profit. Housing is treated as a market commodity, produced and traded for financial gain. The private profit motive propels the system.

Free interplay of market forces, however, is a myth. Governments intervene in numerous direct and indirect ways. Public policies that help shape the market outcomes result from a balance of contending parties, dominated by capitalist interests. Market-based housing systems exist, in various forms, in advanced industrialized economies, but are also found in the developing world (e.g., Pakistan, Brazil, Ghana, Thailand). During the last two decades, many welfare states and, during the last decade, most formerly socialist nations have also, in various ways and degrees, embraced privatization policies that give a greater role to market forces (Strong et al., 1996; Struyk, 1996).

Market systems produce problems resulting from the fundamental premise that access to housing is governed by one’s ability to pay. Households that cannot translate their housing needs into a (profit yielding) demand will fall by the wayside, unless government or community-based initiatives provide assistance. This is not because the system does not work, but because that is how the system works (Marcuse, 1987). Not surprisingly, affordability of housing has been a major research and policy motif in countries with market-based housing systems.

Government intervention in housing markets is allegedly based on the so-called filtering model. It suggests a process of households moving upwards on a downwards escalator. It assumes that, as their incomes improve, people move to newer, more expensive housing, vacating units that then trickle down to households in the next stratum. Governments will favor and justify regressive subsidies, benefitting the most affluent households on the assumption that such policies would have a multiplier effect, eventually benefitting the entire population. However, the so-called vacancy chains are short-circuited because housing markets tend to be segmented and distorted. The barriers that prevent markets from functioning smoothly can be spatial (e.g., a geographic mismatch with job markets), and they can parallel dimensions of population differentiation (e.g., discrimination against ethnic and racial minorities, women, or families with children).

The bias of market-oriented housing policies and the problems resulting from their inadequacy are the subject of extensive literature. There is also a large body of research on community-based organizations attempting to make up for lack of government support (e.g., Davis, 1994; Goetz, 1993).
C.2. Welfare States

Welfare states maintain private ownership of enterprise, but have policies protecting the rights of individuals to basic human needs. The Scandinavian nations and The Netherlands are good examples, though welfare programs in other European nations are also strong in international perspective (c.f. Boelhouwer and van de Heijden, 1992; Papa, 1992). The European trends in our historical overview reflected relevant contexts in the welfare states: needs for new housing after World War II coupled to the production of large apartment projects built according to specific standards. Housing was treated as a universal human need, parallel to others like medical care and education. This led to a very high level of housing research in government institutions and universities. The immediate start for housing research in Sweden reflected women’s needs, as widespread female participation in the labor force started early in Sweden, and attention was paid to the functionality of such aspects of housing design as kitchens and laundries. But like the other nations, Sweden had a severe housing shortage after the war.

Sweden then became famous after World War II for the design and construction of suburbs near Stockholm whose construction was integrated with expanded public transportation. But Sweden needed much more new housing, and instituted an intensive ten-year housing program to construct a million new housing units (for a population then of about seven million people). Many apartments were built by local governments and by cooperative social housing corporations under national government programs. Some single-family homes were built, but these were kept to a small segment of the market. Although there were both successful and unsuccessful results, this program stimulated much increase in evaluative research, which contributed to the worldwide critique of high-rise family buildings without sufficient support services and activities (c.f. Flenström and Ronnby, 1972; Gordon and Molin, 1972). Others studied the social and cultural aspects of the growing suburbs (c.f. Daun, 1974).

Once the million dwellings had been completed, and partly in reaction to the research done on them, housing policy and research turned to more specific, qualitative concerns: care for the elderly, social contact among neighbors, easier and safer childcare, and lessened housework through housing with services provided, activity spaces, and resident-management, ecological sensitivity, segregation between ethnic groups, renovation, and resident participation in design and planning (Thiberg, 1990).

A similar discussion of contexts and research in other welfare state nations would show individual differences from the Swedish model, but would unlikely be confused with the market and socialist contexts and research responses.

C.3. Socialist States

The formerly centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe were examples of socialist societies organized on the premise that the state distributes costs and benefits, resulting from national functioning and development, equally among all
segments of the population. Other examples come from the developing world (chiefly, China, Vietnam, Cuba and North Korea), although also here changes are in evidence. In socialist systems, housing is a legislated entitlement and, in theory, households have equal access to it. According to this egalitarian ideology, the state must maintain full administrative control over rationally conducted planning, production, management and consumption processes.

Independent housing research was difficult to carry out. There was very limited access to and strict control over relevant information, no or little funding, and opportunities to disseminate findings were few and far between. Attendance and presentations at foreign conferences had to be officially sanctioned and were rarely critical of prevailing policies. Some work illustrates research in relation to this particular societal context. For example, Szelenyi (1983) described patterns of inequality in housing resulting from bureaucratic allocation decisions that gave preferential treatment to occupants of high-ranking positions in the societal hierarchy, such as the leading intelligentsia, the party elite, champion athletes, and top officers in the military and security forces. Similar inequalities were reported, among others, by Daniel (1985) and Misztal (1990).

Note that research has observed inequalities in market-based as well as socialist housing systems. However, while the outcome has been similar, the processes through which they came about have differed markedly.

Other work on socialist housing revealed the underlying tension between the low-cost provision of housing (with households typically paying 15 to 20% of what their counterparts in market economies paid), producing a minimal return on investment, and the need to commit national resources to more productive sectors of the economy, notably heavy manufacturing. The trade-off frequently led to the use of inferior construction materials and substandard maintenance, and authorities covertly tolerated black market mechanisms.

More recently, the transition to market systems of the formerly socialist countries in Eastern Europe has brought with it new problems. For example, privatization proceeds without, for example, well established lending and real estate institutions, lacking a secondary mortgage market, and in the absence of an efficient land taxation system or provisions for management of large housing estates. The transfer of formerly state-owned units to private owner-occupiers is also fraught with inequities. Under the current, more open system of government, housing research in Eastern Europe has blossomed, a development which, in and of itself, irrespective of content, illustrates well the significance of the connections between developments of societies at large and the housing research conducted in them.

D. Concluding Remarks

This chapter shows the influence of societal contexts on housing research. Societal developments create the issues and opportunities that attract researchers. The effects of research on policy, legislation and housing conditions are less evident. Research neither determines societal outcomes, nor is immaterial to them. It is one of several factors playing a role, in varying ways and in varying degrees depending on a
variety of circumstances. A few examples: Community surveys before 1920 of unacceptable housing conditions contributed to the development of criteria for ventilation, sanitation, space, access to light and minimum standards deemed appropriate. Later, research on the post-war high-rise boom helped produce legislation outlawing or discouraging the allocation of high-rise apartments to families with children. More broadly, research along this vein has contributed insights into the sociobehavioral needs of special user groups, which have been translated into guidelines for environmental design. A notable example in this regard concerns elderly households whose declining competencies at advanced ages require suitable housing adaptations. Research has also documented the extent and implications of discriminatory practices in housing and the (in)effectiveness of counteracting efforts.

On a more general level, housing research fulfills at least five functions with respect to policy making. (1) Informative: Research of this sort typically consists of routine data gathering. A regular housing census is an example. These data can form an initial basis for the formulation of policy. (2) Evaluative: Often conducted as purposely designed surveys, this research aims to offer an assessment of a particular program or policy. Governments may also undertake demonstration projects to test out experimental initiatives. (3) Monitoring: Some research occurs to help oversee the orderly functioning of the housing system. This work usually occurs at the national level in the form of simple statistics periodically collected and calculated to keep track of basic trends. Examples are housing starts and completions, median sales price, affordability indices, and various lending statistics. (4) Prognostic: Before implementing a particular program governments may carry out prospective assessments of the likelihood of success and to anticipate possibly needed adjustments. Such research is based on assumptions about the behavior of housing consumers and producers. (5) Conceptual: Taken together, the above functions may help to alter the perspectives of policy makers on housing. Accumulated research evidence may demonstrate the significance of housing in overall urban policies, for example, or may show how narrow bricks-and-mortar approaches are less effective than more comprehensive ones that also recognize the social, political and economic significance of housing, thus setting out basic policy paradigms.

The evolution of housing research invites several additional observations with respect to methods, emphasizing further its linkage with societal developments. Early studies, done in the late last and early part of this century, were descriptive. Sampling techniques were still undeveloped. In ecological investigations, popularized by the Chicago School starting in the 1920s, researchers showed more interest in analysis of cause-and-effect relationships, although the favored technique of correlational analysis was ill-suited to that end. With the advent of the computer, multivariate analysis became easier. More sophisticated methodological approaches emerged, making it possible to examine relationships in which housing was implicated, while controlling for the confounding influences of extraneous variables.

Along with the methodological advances in housing research, the nature of the field changed. Studies today concern many more topics. This expansion is reflected in the greater multidisciplinary nature of housing research. The literature
contains contributions from sociologists, geographers, economists, political scientists, lawyers, and many others. Indeed, this multidisciplinarity is a defining characteristic of a major new reference work (van Vliet, 1998). Multidisciplinary, in turn, has stimulated methodological triangulation, i.e., the use of multiple methods to examine a given issue. Homelessness, for example, has been studied through participant observation, survey research, and program evaluation. Finally, research on housing has become increasingly comparative. As countries experience common challenges, they have developed a growing interest in learning from each other’s experiences. These days it is common, for housing ministries to have an international division that dispatches study teams to visit foreign countries. The globalization of economic and political systems has forced policy makers and researchers alike to look beyond national boundaries. In Europe, cross-national housing research has flourished in tandem with the integration of the European Community.

The International Sociological Association’s (ISA) Research Committee on Housing and the Built Environment is a direct expression of these developments. It grew out of a group of individuals who used the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association in the late 1960s to exchange information informally. Aware of the more organized growth of housing research in Europe, this group arranged with ISA for ad hoc group sessions during the 1978 Congress in Uppsala; researchers from 14 nations attended, and a book with some of the proceedings was published (Ungerson and Karn, 1980). Meetings have since been held at subsequent ISA meetings, as well as at international conferences in the years between in places such as Amsterdam, Paris, Hamburg, Prague, Budapest, Nairobi, Beijing, and Montreal. Over time, participation became increasingly international. The 1997 meeting in Alexandria, Virginia, included over 150 papers, from 22 nations and all the continents. Parallel developments, such as the emergence of the European Network for Housing Research and the establishment of the European Social Housing Observation Unit, provide further testimony to the viability and relevance of multidisciplinary, international housing research in an increasingly interdependent global world.

References


### Endnote

1. We acknowledge the advice of one of the anonymous referees on this point.
PART VI

Art and Leisure
Sociology of Art: New Stakes in a Post-Critical Time
16 Sociology of Art: New Stakes in a Post-Critical Time

Antoine Hennion and Line Grenier

During a long period, sociology of art has been divided mainly between two major directions. Both show art as a social reality but they do so from quite different points of view. One is frontally critical and aims at revealing the social determination of art behind any pretended autonomy (be it the autonomy of the works, following the objectivist aesthetics, or the autonomy of the taste for them, following an aesthetics of subjectivity). The other is more pragmatic and, without pretending to make statements about the works or aesthetic experience, proceeds through a minute reconstitution of the “collective action” necessary to produce and consume art. Against a purely internal and hagiographic aesthetical commentary of art works, sociology has thus filled back an “art world” which formerly included only very few chefs-d’œuvre and geniuses. Mainstream productions and copies, conventions and material constraints, professions and academies, organizations and markets, codes and rites of social consumption have been pushed to the front of the scene.

If the role of many intermediaries has been put under scrutiny, sociologists have mainly focused their attention on the human components of the art production system (professions, market, institutions). The dilemma now faced by sociologists is how to incorporate the material character of works produced and devices used, without reverting to autonomous aesthetic comments, which in the past treated works of art as extractions removed from their social context. The work of re-socialization of art also needs to come closer to art lovers’ tastes and practices, without contenting oneself with an external acknowledgment of the value given to art by members of an art world as if art was a belief, and not also an experience of pleasure, expression and emotion collectively lived by subjects and bodies through specific objects and procedures. Asking questions on the political, ethnic and sexual value of art has been a way of showing how art does construct identities, bodies and subjectivities.

Over-rationalizing a general movement in the sociology of art, which is undoubtedly more “Brownian” and less clearly oriented in reality, we will organize the display of recent evolutions in the social studies of arts around the notion of
mediation. If the concept remains ambiguous, it clearly points out a strong new trend shared by very diverse approaches: a focus on objects and devices, on local situations, on reflexive and politically critical analyses of the social and artistic values, all this requiring to pay more attention to the materiality of intermediaries, to acknowledge their opacity regarding social determinations or aesthetic effects, to analyse the active role they play in the definition of art works and tastes.

A. Sociology versus Creation

From more than one century now, the preposition “of” in “the sociology of art” has been a site of tension rather than smooth coordination. Social readings and hermeneutical interpretations of art (see Bryson 1990 for a recent essay in that genre, already “overlooked” — as he puts it himself about still life paintings) have always been readily accepted, but systematic sociological inquiries have often been greeted with a strong resistance in various intellectual milieus. Studies designed to explain artistic values by means of sociological factors have been criticized for being reductionist (see Adorno, 1967, 1976; for a classical Marxist survey of art history see Hauser, 1982; and for a Marxian critique of this reductionism, see Wolff, 1975), while investigations into the ways in which art is produced, diffused and received have been attacked symmetrically on the grounds that, given their refusal to address “art itself”, they cannot acknowledge its specificity. This has been described by Zolberg (1990: Chapters 3 and 4) as an opposition between “studying the art object sociologically” and “the art object as a social process.”

The latter research trend, which we will refer to as critical sociology — be it global or local, systemic or constructivist — has proved more fruitful than the former. It has significantly improved our understanding of art by providing comprehensive accounts of its diverse and changing contexts of production, diffusion and reception. By contrast with direct, immanent readings of the “social meaning” of art works, or with Marxist analyses that address art as a mere reflection of social classes or economic structures, empirical and historical studies of patronage, milieus of amateurs, taste cultures, or markets and prices, for instance, have begun to fill the gap between internal and external approaches. They have done so by providing a grounded and conjunctural understanding of the complex interplays between art and society — an issue which philosophers and aestheticians tend to address in extremely general, and highly speculative terms. We can trace back these orientations through several classical readers on the state of the art in the sociology of art, including the work of Albrecht and his colleagues (1970); Moulin’s (1986) issue of La Revue francaise de Sociologie on “Sociologie de l’art et de la littérature”; and the study by Foster and Blau (1989). For more recent orientations see Zolberg (1990); Menger and Passeron (1994); and Crane (1994) who provides a comprehensive bibliography on the sociology of culture.

It is important to acknowledge the analytical and theoretical advances made possible by critical sociology, which has provided an antidote to the unconditional celebration of the glories of the great masterpieces — still, by far, the most common discourse that stems from taking art literally. But it is as important to bear in mind
the limitations of the critical framework, particularly in light of the dominant position it has come to occupy in the field of sociology of art today. It has become especially important in this regard to put into question its hegemonic stance on art, deemed an issue just like many others, and hence, the generalized disinterest in both the work of art and the aesthetic experience, dismissed by critical sociology as either the mere stakes of an identity game — an illusion as Bourdieu (1984b, 1990) calls it — or the purely conventional products of a collective activity (Becker, 1974, 1982).

B. The Critical Approach: Art as “Illusio” or “Construction”

In fact, this disinterest has not been a conflictual but rather a consensual issue among a majority of researchers. Most sociologists of art today are still likely to agree that creative processes and art works per se fall outside the realm of relevance and legitimacy of the sociology of art — and so would do any analytical attempt to acknowledge the specificity of art practices and products. We find in Witkin (1995) a recent problematization of this self-evident disregard, and a frame for a social analysis of art works reminiscent of Weber’s (1958) famous essay on music. A classical rejection of the right of sociology to look at the works themselves, is presented by Silbermann (1963) and Supicic (1988). Their widely held view is coherent with what classical sociology regards as the key concern of any sociological analysis of art, which is not creation, genius, and works proper, but that which makes them appear as such — this is the case, for instance, with European critical theory (Bourdieu, 1984a), or American interactionism applied to the “art worlds” in order to treat art “as any other occupation” (Becker, 1982), or even new forms of constructivism aiming at deconstructing genius (DeNora, 1995a). It just follows that for most analysts, rejecting subjectivism, the cult of the genius and the artist’s self-glorifying discourse is but the precondition of any sociology at all. In that view sociology only starts when, typically, researchers focus on the constraints through which both artistic objects and subjects are determined, albeit unknowingly; on the conventions which rule over how artists and amateurs recognize and create their world; and on the norms which underly the social construction of genius and masterpieces. Accordingly, making art “social” implies pointing behind it, to the mechanisms of production of a discourse which places it at the center of a special world like that of art — as Bourdieu’s (1984b) question “But who created the ‘creators’?” clearly illustrates. Bourdieu, who has pushed the critical line of reasoning the furthest, substitutes artistic creation, as such, for its “magical” effectiveness, that is, for the effects that its name alone is said to produce — even if they are nevertheless very “real” effects, as Durkheim’s (1912) analysis of totems has shown.

The key to the critical approach is the theory of belief which, from Durkheim to Bourdieu or Becker (which is indeed a lot of sociology!), has been mobilized continuously. For critical theorists, to analyse from a “social” point of view the objects which the actors handle, produce, create or admire, amounts to considering them as objects of belief, in both meanings of the word. In one sense, with powerful theoretical efficacy, they can be viewed as such for the purpose of shedding light on the institutions and collective mechanisms which produce and influence our
values and feelings — even and especially those like aesthetic emotions which we consider our most personal and intimate ones. In another, however, these objects become confused with objects of belief proper as they are reduced to mere tokens or signs deprived of any other value or raison d’être than that of being mediums for our social games of identity and difference. Any account of artistic experience in terms of beauty, sensation, emotion or aesthetic feeling is thus considered misleading as it presumably reflects the actors’ illusions about their own beliefs. Moreover, art works are not effective on their own; they “do” nothing since, like Durkheim’s totems, they are “nothing but” the materialization of our self-production of “ourselves” as a collective entity.

From this perspective, the irrevocable task of social theory is the ‘revelation’ of an unproductive game. In that game, members of every social group or community, identify a number of features deemed distinctive and then naturalize them, hence striving to give them the power which, according to sociological wisdom, believers grant to any object of belief. A highly pervasive assumption is at work here: an assumption which, after being considered outrageous when it was originally formulated, has become self-evident for most sociologists working from within the constructivist tradition (as well as for many cultural actors, influenced by sociology). That assumption is that whosoever wants to account for the social dimension of works of art has no choice but to show that the value of art objects derives not from the objects themselves, but rather, in keeping with the religious metaphor abundantly mobilized by art lovers themselves, from the priests who organize the cult surrounding them — apostles of taste, prophets of art, churches and sects which cultivate the belief in these objects (and above all, in art itself). In our view, this assumption and the arguments it supports are far from being flawless. Insofar as they are readily associated with any of the repetitive and interchangeable mechanisms involved in the manipulation of belief (which Bourdieu for instance mobilizes in exactly the same way when addressing politics, public opinion, education or television), the activities carried out to produce a compound reality such as art, and the processes involved in its appreciation, lose their specificity or uniqueness (Frith, 1996) whereas as the products of art, works and tastes are returned to the arbitrariness (a key-word in any analysis in terms of belief) of a collective election based on a presumably social, non-artistic principle (merely concealed by aesthetic jargon), and become meaningless in and of themselves.

Without reverting to essentialist arguments, is it possible to acknowledge the singularity of these products as events which are irreducible to either their origins or their effects? Doesn’t this disqualification also entail that social identity is posited as the basis for any solidarity of evaluation (and disagreement, considered as a priori evidence of belonging to a different social group)? If it is the case — if the argument is indeed circular — aren’t sociologists ill-equipped to account for the equally valued yet contrasting art forms which co-exist within any given social group or for the overlapping of tastes across social groups which Peterson (1997) labels “omnivorousness” (on cultural practices see Blau et al., 1985; DiMaggio, 1987; and Lamont and Fournier, 1992) whereas such phenomena are becoming increasingly frequent in a world where the boundaries of social groups or communities are porous and where most people belong to different communities
simultaneously (Frow, 1995)? Of course, this forces one to take the works more seriously — they “do” something, they do “matter”. But after all, if taking works of art seriously, if taking an interest in aesthetic judgements for their own sake, necessarily means unduly falling for belief — that is, participating in the members’ naturalized “art world” (to use Becker’s expression) and the illusion upon which it rests — then, what does such a transfer of the issues of normativity from the researcher to the subject/object under study entail with regards to the privileged status of sociologists as social actors, and of sociological inquiry as a powerful institutionalized form of production of knowledge? A detailed critical survey of this question, central to cultural studies, is offered by Grossberg (1992).

C. A Sociology of Art, Not Against Art

This is where we are: in what can be viewed as a post-critical era, sociologists are faced with the challenge of developing a sociology of art which is not, a priori and from the outset, hostile to art — in other words, a sociology which does not automatically revert to belief, which does not reduce issues of value to issues of group distinction or identification/differentiation, which has freed itself from a highly pervasive “false consciousness” syndrome, and which is capable of problematizing social identity rather than accepting it as the self-evident cause of any solidarity in aesthetic evaluation/belief. The challenge might be clear, it remains difficult to take up: is it feasible, in the face of a discourse which makes the work of art the miraculous, “increated,” product of the solitary genius, to acknowledge that which the work of art “does” without, at the same time, scorning the attainments of critical sociology? That is, to fully accept (rather than merely paying lip service to, as aesthetics often does when it is forced to) the collective dimension of artistic production, the instituted, over-coded nature of artistic languages, the necessary learning that both artistic production and appreciation call for, as well as the cultural determination of the competences they respectively require?

Most of modern sociology of art is produced under this banner, once the principal intermediary topics of interest have been defined. These topics are: (1) the sociology of artists and their careers, which is the most developed area, as in the case of the sociology of professions (Moulin, 1983; Freidson, 1986; Preston, 1992). (2) The “réseau” of internal relationships between artists and their milieu of critiques and “first users” (Becker, 1982), exemplified in the social construction of a genre like jazz in France (Fabiani, 1986); the Avant-Garde in New-York (Crane, 1987); the historical role of critics in France (Wrigley, 1993); and new “outsider” artists (Cherbo and Zolberg, 1997). (3) Organization of production itself which, after Becker’s “collective action” (Becker, 1974) and Peterson’s “production of culture perspective” (Peterson, ed. 1976), has often been developed on the case of music, e.g. on the quasi-ethnomethodological apprenticeship of rock musicians in an amateur group (Bennett, 1980; see an analogous case about drummers in Curran 1996), or orchestra musicians (Kamerman and Martorella, 1983), or the special issue on “Musique et musiciens” in *Actes de la recherche* (1996), or the production of popular or TV music (Faulkner, 1983). (4) Academies and teaching institutions as discussed in
Yates’s famous work (1947), and by Heinich (1993) and Segré (1993). (5) The patronage and support for the arts, public and private, as analyzed by Lytle and Orgel (1981) and Martorella (1990); and the very specific French cultural policy discussed by Urfalino (1989), Négrier (1996) and Poulot (1997). (6) The art markets, the general economy of the system, the production of aesthetical and economic value, and the process of institutionalization. Illustrations of these themes are the Whites’ founding essay (1965) linking changes in painters’ carriers and aesthetic evaluations to critics, academies and salons; Montias’s (1982) history of art markets; discussions on painters, curators and collectors (Moulin, 1992, 1995); on galleries and traders (Crane, 1987; Moulin, 1992); on the unfair competition made to contemporary composers by the dead ones (Menger, 1983); on popular music (Negus, 1995; Klaes, 1997).

Even though too wide, or vague, the concept of mediation may be a convenient word to sum up the efforts made from these bases towards another, alternative sociology of art and taste, from very diverse points of view. On the one hand, unlike the notion of creation which is, above all, a call for reverence, the term of mediation does not lock analysts into the kind of position of admiration denounced by critical sociology. It does allow sociology to fully recognize the social nature of art. It does not imply an appearance of the work *ex nihilo*; on the contrary, the notion suggests the active role of all that which ensues from the implemented dispositions, actions, material objects, procedures, devices and arrangements which inform and surround art — and even from the works themselves (but always indirectly: through a work, precisely).

On the other hand — unlike critique this time — speaking of mediation is acknowledging that something effectively “happens” in this process, which transforms the ways things were before; an “event” occurs which has a positivity of its own that cannot be limited to its origins and determinants, no more than to its effects. In keeping with the acquired knowledge produced by critical sociology, and having in mind the first advances made by Iser’s (1978) and Jauss’s (1982) sociology of reception to address the work of art and the collective production of tastes as a mediation means to study the work and its performance and consumption in detail, from the point of view of the various gestures, bodies, habits, materials, spaces, languages, and institutions it requires to exist. It also means, however, to accept (rather than reject) the very moment of the work of art in its specific, irrevocable, and performative character, as well as to take into account (rather than dismiss) the highly diversified ways in which actors, whether artists, amateurs, or art lovers, describe and experience their aesthetic pleasures.

D. From Mediation as a Critical Tool...

Maybe we need to further specify our usage of the concept of mediation, especially since it may, at first, appear perfectly coherent with the critical sociological framework it is meant to amend.

Let us revert to the model of visual arts from which the notion of mediation is derived in order to show how it has indeed been used as an analytical support for
the “revelation” process in which critical sociologists are engaged. A statue: a solid, lasting object which is there, eternal. Facing it, a subject which finds it beautiful. And in the shadows, no less eternal than the statue itself, is his/her anonymous admiration. To a large extent, it is possible to summarize modern Western philosophy by means of this very arrangement — that is, the face-to-face between an object overlaid with qualities, and a subject which constructs her gaze by looking at it, with the two poles of this relationship deemed the only legitimate concern of an analysis which never examines that which links them. What has been critical sociology’s answer to the problem of art formulated in these terms? It has consisted in saying something like: “Be careful! You may think that everything originates in the work of art, or in the admirer who contemplates it and who becomes aware of his own aesthetic competence, his ability, as human subject, to perceive beauty. But sociology can show you that you are wrong, that rather than deriving from either the work or yourself, everything stems from the intermediary mechanisms which enable this work of art to exist, to stand before you.” There is a wide range of such mechanisms, including systems of the most physical, local nature (such as the frame, the pedestal, the lighting, the venue of the exhibition) and devices of a more general, if not institutional character (such as the catalogue or the museum), as well as collective frames of appreciation (such as the discourse of critics, the selective inclusion of certain objects within art history, and the very acknowledgment of the existence of an independent domain called art: this has been brilliantly demonstrated by Haskell and Penny (1981) on the case of antique Roman statues. Charles Lalo’s (1908) claim, that “We do not admire the Venus de Milo because it is beautiful; it is beautiful because we admire it,” not only provides a succinct answer but it also clearly points out the sociological inversion upon which the critical approach rests.

The concept of mediation is thus in continuity with critical sociology insofar as it urges the analyst to focus on the various devices from which the work emerges, moving from more local to more general ones: for instance, next to the work and its frame are other works which give the former its meaning; there is a museum which, as a result of a complex historical process, people have been taught to attend in order to admire art works; and there are social constructions which organize what it means to admire and appreciate art. We see the workings of these unobtrusive mediations better when their unusual absence reveals their ordinary necessity: put a five-year old facing the Venus de Milo, he will laugh and wonder where the woman’s arms are! A certain amount of learning is required to be able to look at a work of art and to see it as such.

The analysis of the diverse mechanisms which reveal the properties (beauty, transcendence, seduction, originality, etc.) of art works (or sets of works) to art lovers who are themselves progressively defined through this process, has been the shared task undertaken by critical philosophy, and later on, the sociology of art. Both disciplines have brought to light a whole set of new mediations — galleries, merchants, frames, painting schools, styles, grammar, systems of taste, etc. — without which there can be no beautiful works of art. Given that we are secured in our ability to appreciate art, we may well skim too quickly over all of the conditions that enable us to say of any particular work: “I think it’s beautiful.”
It is by taking into account the full implications of this simple phrase that the critical approach can best be formulated.

E. ... to Mediation as Actual Production

Patrons, sponsors, markets, academies: from the first undertakings of the social history of art to sociology of culture, mediations have indeed played a crucial role in social analyses which, by contrast with aestheticism, considered works and tastes to be socially constructed and determined. The notion of mediation can, however, serve other purposes.

As critical sociology has rightly argued, it can indeed be used to challenge essentialist claims by placing in full view all of the screens, means, mediums and frames through which any work of art is produced. But in contrast with critical sociology’s common sense discourse, once intermediaries have been identified, they do not have to be played against the work, the tastes, the artists or the art lovers — as if the latter had an autonomous existence (imagine a concert with a single listener in the hall: there is no music, for it all relies on the collective performance of the musicians and the public). This is what music can show better (Hennion, 1993): it is possible to do a positive analysis of the human and material mediators of the “performance” and “consumption” of art (scores, instruments, gestures and bodies, stages and mediums). The mediations are neither mere means of the work, nor substitutes which dissolve its reality, and their revelation is not an act of unveiling which leaves the king naked. The performer knows better than anyone, the moment he places a score on his music stand, what the ambiguity of the object is. He plays music, to be sure, but that music is just as much the very fact of playing: unlike a cause or an effect, it does not break loose from its object; it is not the “object” of an action which might be external, instrumental, to him. One has to learn scales and use breath and bodies. And then, at certain moments, on top of it all — that is to say, in addition to this set of mediations — something might happen. Something may emerge from this mix and that may be “the work of the work” of art.

We can conclude by giving several examples of this shift, that is, of what we could abusively call a “mediation turn” in analyses of institutional, material, human intermediaries.

Let’s begin with a return of politics: an indirect effect of the duality works-tastes has been to push out of the scene political analyses of art, a former crucial touchstone between Marxist and non-Marxist historians of art; but politics now does not mean passive reflection of social groupings, but active and reflexive self-production of values, e.g. (Leppert and McClary, 1987; Bennett, et al., 1993; Darré, 1996); this leads to more wider questions arisen by cultural studies, about nationality and ethnicity or center and peripheries, see on Hungarian rock (Racz and Zetenyi, 1994; Grenier, 1997), on conjunto music (Valdez and Halley, 1996), and on racial and sexual identities (van den Toorn, 1991), (Solie, 1993; Middleton, 1995), or to a reformulation of the question of modernity and Avant-garde (Burger, 1984; Born, 1995). A social historian of music, J. F. Fulcher (1987), has revisited
French “bourgeois” opera with the same regard, i.e. as a tentative political production of its own legitimacy by the restored royal power, as being national and popular. But pioneers are more often to be found among rock and popular culture researchers, either on the definition of the high/low cultures (Mukerji and Schudson, 1991; Shusterman, 1991; Grossberg, 1992; Hall, 1992); or directly à propos the complex cultural and political definition of rock (Willis, 1972; Street, 1986; Frith, 1988; Ross and Rose, 1994; Frith, 1996); or recently of Country-music, seen as an “invention of a tradition” (Peterson, 1997). If we move the camera back towards popular arts or ethnic music, as well as towards TV, cartoons, rock or jazz, the emphasis is placed far more on the collective production of art.

An earlier case is patronage which comes from the social history of art. Since Haskell’s study (1963), patronage has been the focus of a very interesting polemical inquiry, characteristically starting with reductionist views setting the patron, himself but a spokesperson of his class, as the real master of artists, and little by little producing a much more subtle and paradoxical image of himself, and of his advisers, as the co-producer, with and against the artist himself, of the artist’s liberty (Warnke, 1989). But, as I have tried to show (Hennion, 1989), the important point here is in the methodology progressively defined by historians of art to integrate in a seamless web elements of reputation, physical features and materials of works, habits of merchants or priests, intellectual or political designs of the elites; in that sense, they have been pioneers in mediation, and one can fruitfully transpose onto the sociological agenda the work done by the best of them (Baxandall, 1972; Haskell, 1976; Haskell and Penny, 1981).

A third approach can be characterized as an application of the notion of “careers” to works, after Appadurai’s concept of “biography of things” (Appadurai, 1986; Lang and Lang, 1990; Weber, 1992; Hennion 1993; Regev 1994), or Bourdieu on Flaubert’s literary career (Bourdieu, 1992). Instead of clearly distinguishing objects and their context, works and their appreciation, all these studies lead to finely follow the precise “careers” followed by objects, themselves strictly depending on the norms, procedures and criteria used to define them as aesthetic objects; the role of techniques and instruments is seen anew (Kraft, 1994; Marontate, 1995). New studies on museums and exhibitions (Stocking, 1985; Pearce, 1992; McClellan, 1994; Poulot, 1997) have developed in this fruitful direction: transportation, selection, financial evaluation and insurance, destruction and restoration become concrete trials putting into question the very nature of things — and often deciding their physical destiny — as Gamboni (1997) shows in his study of “The Destruction of Art” (Gamboni, 1997).

Last example, on the other side of mediations: about tastes and amateurs. A radical lack of concern for the works had characterized most of the studies made in sociology of culture on art consumption; art private collectors and opera amateurs were among the rare exceptions, e.g. on collections and objects (Pearce, 1992), on opera (Martorella, 1982), on the baroque revival (Hennion, 1997a), on jazz (Berliner, 1994); taking the formation of tastes as an active production through mediations requires another type of observation and attention, namely to the production of specific abilities and postures, little by little developed in
order to “practise” art appreciation; this turns classical stratification analysis of
determined tastes for determined categories into a new ethnography of amateurs’
practices, keeping with Weber’s study of real concert attendances in the 19th
Century (Weber, 1975); other works have been initiated, often from popular art
practices, e.g. on French “PMU” (horse bettings) (Yonnet, 1985), on musical
rituals (White, 1987), on rock, drugs and sex (Willis, 1992), on new forms of
amateurism (Donnat, 1996). How do we learn that we must contemplate, estimate,
compare, decontextualise works, how do we feel obliged to produce a judgment,
to over-examine one’s own taste for something, to participate to highly ritual
ceremonies, or to add “social” or political interpretations to a former apolitical
evaluation of works and situations? Pushing the question further, and inspired
by Merleau-Ponty’s (1945) phenomenology, some authors instead of opposing
corporeal aspects of sensation to the social forms of learning aesthetic pleasure,
propose to follow the path from the feeling body to the appreciating mind (Bessy
and Chateauraynaud, 1995; DeNora, 1995b), and study the precise devices of
“expertise” (Moulin and Quemin, 1993).

These diverse studies all care for a concrete “pragmatics” of the works and
tastes, through a common attention to the role of the multiple devices, material
settings, means of transportation or recording (exhibits, concerts, medias, video,
recordings), which take in charge an important part of requirements made by the
aesthetic posture, and of properties attributed to the works; often in a silent way,
they carry the inscription of these aesthetic objects, subjects or situations into
other logics (market, politics, social or sexual critique). Mediations have to be
recognized in their own right, thus enabling the analyst to better understand how
something new has come out of various contingent combinations of heterogeneous
instruments, temporal and spatial dispositifs, procedures and techniques;
something else than what caused it, which has its own specific historical
trajectory; something which, like a rock concert or a sculpture exhibition, is
constituted by the different forms of action, investment, or involvement rendered
possible by such combinations; something which does not bring together already
existing objects, subjects and social groupings — rather, it is something through
which the particular objects, subjects, and social groupings relevant to this
conjunctural event are co-produced and whose specific attributes and properties
are defined.

Too often used only for deconstruction purposes, the notion of mediation can
provide a starting point to more positive analyses of tastes and works. Mediations
are of a pragmatic status: they are the art which they bring forth, and they cannot
be distinguished from the appreciation they generate. They can thus help us better
understand the contingent ways in which particular intermediaries, entities and
processes, participate in the progressive emergence of a particular artistic work,
as well as the complex and changing ways in which specific value judgments or
appreciations become linked to specific art works. By doing so, the notion opens
up new analytical spaces left unexplored as a result of the work-taste duality
around which social studies of art have traditionally been organized. The
problematic defined enables us to link the appreciation to the work, instead of
playing off the one against the other.
F. Return to the Work?

On the one hand, an analysis in these terms does not postulate the existence of some general underlying social mechanisms responsible for the presumably stable and necessary relationship between self-enclosed works and pre-existing tastes. Rather, it is based on the twofold assumption that the links between works and tastes are contingent, conjunctural and hence, changing; and they result from specific yet changing combinations of specific intermediaries, considered not as the neutral channels through which pre-determined social relations operate, but as productive entities which have effectivities of their own.

On the other hand, the notion of mediation enables sociologists to problematize creation differently. In order to acknowledge its social and historical nature, sociologists do not have to “take away” creation from the great artists, and hand it to society or, more precisely, to consumers (as some Avant-garde theorists have suggested, in a half-leftist, half-marketing oriented version of the critical approach). What they can do, however, is to acknowledge that creation is not the sole prized possession of the creator. There is such a thing as creation in the strict sense of the word, that is, the specialized work of professionals who adopt the trade name of creators. But there is more to creation than this. To acknowledge the effectiveness of mediations means to challenge the predominant Western view that everything can be attributed to a single creator, and to recognize that creation is far more widely distributed, as it takes place in all of the interstices between the multiple intermediaries involved in producing and appreciating art. It is not although there is the creator, but so that there can be a creator, that all our collective creative work is required. This is why, as one of us has tried to show (Hennion, 1995), N. Elias (1993) for instance, is taken in a “double bind” when he speaks of Mozart as a “socially unrecognized” genius, an obvious pleonasm: its pretended “unrecognition” is but a central figure of the social production of “genius” (Heinich, 1991; Copland, 1995; DeNora, 1995a; Hennion, 1997b). As literary theorists have clearly argued (in keeping with Foucault’s 1969 founding lecture “What is an author?”), we end up attributing authority/authorship to individual creators even though it takes a whole collectivity’s love and involvement not only to define and produce art, but also to define and produce creators. Creation can be viewed as something which occurs in a moment, always made out of other creations, but without ever being able only to “consume” one without remaking it: in any act of consumption or reception, heterogeneous elements are brought together which transform, alter the so-called original work and hence turn it — albeit slightly — into something else.

This is perhaps how sociology can better understand the work of the work of art, that is, to use the expression coined by Genette (1994), “l’œuvre de l’art” (the work of the art) and not only “l’œuvre d’art” (the work of art).
References


The question of “how to define leisure” is a perennial one in the sociology of leisure. Neither Durkheim nor Weber really addressed this issue, to take the example of those founding fathers. Thorstein Veblen, in the last century, is an exception. For the sociology of leisure is almost entirely a sub-discipline rooted in the history of this twentieth century, mainly starting from the period between the wars in the Western countries. So, the above question can be stated as follows: why did some sociologists finally come to pay attention to leisure, how did they proceed, and what kind of sociological frame of reference did they utilise?

There are no simple answers to these questions, of course: they can be raised for almost any of the sub-disciplines in sociology, such as the sociology of communication, of family, of youth, etc. From a sociological standpoint, “the interests of knowledge” are always strongly related to the history of social change. According to the sociology of science, there is a strong relationship between what sociologists are looking for, about any particular phenomenon, and the social changes taking place in our societies.

That is precisely the case for the notion of the “society of leisure”, or the “civilisation of leisure”, even for the very notion of “leisure” itself. Such concepts are rooted in the social representations of our societies, specifically in terms of models of development and change. Some leisure writings were influenced by a model that can be qualified as “technicist” that stresses the crucial role of technical changes in the evolution of societies. Another more global model, often inspired by the works of Daniel Bell, is based on a definition of society as post-industrial society based on scientific and technical information among other factors.

However, an important notion is that of “civilisation of leisure” aroused out of a reflection on technical transformations taking place in contemporary societies during the 1960s and the 1970s. That notion was elaborated in the post-war period, mostly in the 1960s, when a series of major writings on “the industrial society” or post-industrial society were published. Many writers of that period focused on ‘futurology’ and prospective, and it is not by chance that the notion of leisure
civilisation soared at that period. Leisure was then presented in terms that one
could define as utopian. Leisure researchers have often acted as prophets of
happiness or of misfortune, focusing on terms such as new age of leisure, society
of wealth or drastic reduction in working time. We are forced to notice the
obsoleteness of this historical frame of reference.

Another prospectivist notion originates from the debris of the leisure society:
that of “the end of work” society. In some sense, sociologists of leisure could
interpret this ideology as the achievement of the society of leisure (“No work,
endless leisure!”). It would simply mean replacing an old myth by another.
Unfortunately, sociologists of leisure have not reacted significantly to this
astonishing debate. They could criticise the very elementary notions of time and
leisure in some publications (see Rifkin, 1995); and they could bring some
understanding about what happens when the social time is restructured to such an
extension.

I will briefly describe the dominant traditions or influences in the sociology
of leisure, a field often neglected in the history of sociology. Then I will discuss
what could be called the contribution of the sociology of leisure to the
understanding of contemporary Western societies, as well as some legacy of this
field to the development of the social sciences. I will conclude by assessing the
needed intellectual reconstruction of the sociology of leisure, taking into
consideration the possible collapse of what was earlier labelled ‘leisure’.

A. Some Dominant Influences in the Sociology of Leisure

It is more appropriate to speak of intellectual influences than of ‘traditions’ in
this field because the sociology of leisure only dates back from the 1950s. The
very first researchers of leisure were not sociologists, but anthropologists of
contemporary culture.

A.1. The American Influence

Elsewhere (Pronovost, 1983), I describe at length what I call the structure of
American thought on leisure in the United States, at its origin. In fact, I argue
that the essence of the study of leisure in the United States took its form and
structure in the years 1900–1930 approximately, mainly from the standpoint of
social reformers. This starting point was based on definitions of human nature
often inspired by the world of childhood. The notion of play is omnipresent. This
notion is presented as a fundamental trait of human nature and seen as a kind of
vital tendency allowing people to express their motor and intellectual abilities.
Consequently, attention was directed toward the education of mind and body and
to the institutionalisation of leisure as a university teaching subject in departments
or faculties of physical education.

The notion of civilisation was also present. Leisure was seen as an integral
part of the American democratic ideal of equality and personal fulfilment for all.
The American society of that time was perceived as at the pinnacle of Western civilisation. On the basis of these distinctions, free time appeared as the direct result of technological developments leading to a general movement towards reduction in working time leading not only to democratic freedom, but also to individual freedom as conveyed by leisure. It has been proposed that these historical movements led to the establishment of public and semi-public institutions such as parks, playgrounds for children, activity centres, cultural centres, local associations, and municipality-owned public structures. The concept defining this movement of institutionalised leisure is recreation. This term refers to an activity which has specific play characteristics and is progressively generalised through different institutions (Pronovost, 1983: 91). The notion of free time defines a historical and evolutionary frame of leisure, that of recreation, a movement towards public and semi-public institutions.

The sociology of leisure never really escaped from those historical American conceptions. Hence one of the most fundamental weaknesses of the sociological notions in the study of leisure: their close relationship to social and historical notions intended for American practitioners or for the purpose of social reforms.

Another major tradition in the analysis of modern leisure is the American anthropological tradition. An important example is the writings of Robert S. Lynd and Helen Merrell Lynd (1959 and 1965). In their first study of Middletown, the authors noted at the onset that one category of cultural anthropology is precisely leisure! Therefore it is expressly mentioned that using leisure in various forms of play, art, and so on constitutes one of the major fields of human activity (1959: 3–4) that must be addressed by anthropology. The relationship between work and leisure, traditional lifestyles, inventions re-making leisure, were induced by technological inventions (car, radio, movies), clubs and diverse associations and other factors. The authors also relied on classical categories of sociological analysis, the recall of differences according to the categories of age and sex, and by frequent observations of the differences in practice and in content according to social class.¹

The American anthropological approach is at the heart of an important stream of thought which emphasises leisure in its relationship to culture. It also influenced the notion of mass culture, from which researchers focused their attention to the phenomena of standardisation, passive leisure, poor quality mass leisure, not to mention the question of mass media that they have long been working on.²

Here again, even if the anthropological studies of Lynd underlined a generous and very open description of leisure in the American communities, some pejorative notions of mass culture and mass leisure contributed to keeping most sociologists from studying this modern phenomena. The result of this was that sociologists of leisure were usually not held in high esteem in the sociological community.

A.2. The British Tradition

In Britain, the question of leisure emerged from the British social studies undertaken between the two wars. It was presented in a more general framework,
that is to say, how to better the social and economic conditions of the British lower class. After 1945, what characterises the sociology of leisure in this country was consequently an increased attention to social policies, urban issues, delivery of local public services in light of a better environment, against poverty and for social justice. These socio-historic approaches are generally larger in scope than the American approach. For example there is an important tradition in British leisure history which focuses on popular culture or on studies of leisure in its relation to different institutions, in particular work and family. Kenneth Roberts (1978, 1981), for example, devoted specific chapters to social policies with respect to leisure, while writing in the context of industrial transformations of Western societies, and furthermore treated work and family questions in distinct chapters.

A.3. The French Tradition

A specific French tradition also marked the sociology of leisure. Once again, generalising for the purpose of this paper, we can say that what characterises the French intellectual tradition on leisure is the problem of popular education and that of historical struggles for the control of time outside of work. Aside the utopian thinkers of the nineteenth century (e.g. Lafargue, 1977), we owe much to George Friedmann (1957), one of the first French sociological analysts of leisure. His work essentially focused around a critique of “the anatomy of work” and its negative effects on work as well as on leisure. His perspective is on leisure as compensation for alienated work; leisure is not directly analysed, but derived from his thesis on work (1957).

The most important and most well-known representative French author of the sociology of leisure surely is Joffre Dumazedier. Again very schematically, Dumazedier struggled to develop an autonomous sociology of leisure, and attempted to find out the essential sociological characteristics of this social and cultural phenomenon. Such a perspective led him to identify four characteristics put forward as unique to leisure: liberated, disinterested, hedonistic and personal (1974: 95); as well as those of specific social functions: relaxation, entertainment and development. Dumazedier’s approach puts leisure into a wider perspective of ‘cultural development’, in which questions of values, continuing education and popular education are taken into consideration. More recently, he stressed the role of leisure as an autonomous sphere of production of new social values, as well as the importance of the educational dimensions conveyed by modern leisure.

Consequently, we can say that the making of the sociology of leisure, from the 1950s onward, is strongly related to the very notion of a “social problem”. The sociology of leisure did not arise from intellectual discussions, from intellectual debates, but from a clear aim at understanding social issues, mainly social, cultural and political. Sociologists of leisure usually had to fight to have their field recognised within the sociological community, they often stressed the inadequacy of many classical sociological concepts for understanding leisure. This
was not well received among the community of sociologists. Except in a few cases, the sociology of leisure was developed not in the departments of sociology, but in the departments of leisure studies. All that lead to some difficult historical relationships between the sociologists of leisure and the “academic sociologists”. The latter frequently raised severe criticisms about the sociology of leisure, which they saw as not “being sufficiently sociological”, or as being too descriptive instead of theoretical in their analyses.

B. Some Aspects of an Intellectual Heritage

Nowadays, the sociology of leisure can be characterised by some maturity (Rojek, 1995). One barely sees most of the former criticisms. Many introductory books have been published, which means, at least, that some comprehensive knowledge of leisure has been achieved. Many sociological journals have published partial or full issues on the subject of leisure. A true international cooperation is observed, and a couple of referred specialised journals are published regularly, with a worldwide distribution.

I will now attempt to illustrate how the sociological study of “leisure” has brought some genuine understanding of our contemporary societies, how it was pertinent and heuristic to look at society from the standpoint of leisure, and what possible knowledge has been added. I intend to briefly describe some aspects of this intellectual heritage.

Leisure studies have extensively documented that what is usually labelled as “leisure” refers to a complex reality, in no way reducible to some elementary common sense notions. Studying leisure means studying social time as well as social space. It involves taking into consideration almost all aspects of daily life. It refers to the diversity of the social meanings attached to the leisure pursuits, in terms of culture, sociability, self-expression. In studying leisure, one must take into account the educational aspects of many leisure activities (reading, watching news on the television, attending cultural events, etc.). It is sometimes a matter of democratisation of the arts. Studying leisure also means looking at the youth culture, at the specific aspirations of women and at the daily life of the retirees; on those gender and intergenerational topics, a considerable and growing amount of studies have recently been published. It means looking at the mass media, not only as cultural industries, but in terms of their social uses. As a matter of fact, the sociology of leisure has helped to describe and document the multi-dimensionality of this social phenomenon, its complexity and its diversity. It brings an open, generous, global notion of leisure to the researchers and the students in the universities, again, far beyond the very narrow notions some researchers still use to refer to.

Meanings of leisure cannot be reduced to mere escape from routine, or endless search for excitement. As already mentioned, we now know better how meanings and expectations about leisure are very diversified: search for information and culture, sociability, family relationships (e.g. Samuel, 1995), relaxation, health, entertainment, self-expression, nature based concerns, etc.
The study of “leisure activities” also reveals their complexity. Activities refer to a cluster of motivations, contexts, groups, natural settings, the outdoors, family, individuality, etc. Longitudinal studies have documented a true diversification and intensification of cultural practices, a significant rise in participating in many activities (cultural, sports, social, etc.), the widening of the participation to culture. Those who are sometimes called “amateurs” are engaged in scientific, technical, artistic activities in an unprecedented wide range: astronomy, bird watching, barber shopping, dance, music playing, etc. “Serious leisures” (Stebbins, 1992) bring distinctive attributes such as motivations, information, diffusion of knowledge, personal efforts, development of skills. Many leisure practices indicate a strong aspiration towards knowledge, science and culture.

In the same vein, volunteering cannot exist without leisure. Participating in associations means a non-profit activity, voluntary chosen, intended towards helping others and oneself, during leisure time. No leisure, no volunteers. In European Nordic countries, rates of participation reach a large majority of the adult population (while it is in the range of 30–40% in the USA).

Studying leisure helps us to better understand the processes of learning habits, social norms and values. Leisure is an important locus for disseminating cultural tastes, value-judgements, even notions of life, time and the conceptions of the future. Those learnings may compete with educational values, or complement them. Some studies show that what youth think of as important in their lives is learned not at school, but within peer-groups activities and family relationships.6 In part because of the role of the media and peer-group, leisure can constitute an educative and informative milieu as strong as the school.

The sociologists of leisure have extensively looked at the complex relationships between work and leisure. Sociologists of work rarely take into account the leisure side, while the reverse is true for the sociologists of leisure. One of the conclusions, put forward a long time ago, is the relative importance of the work place in the life interest of the workers. Unfortunately, some sociologists of leisure tried to develop some triumphant leisure studies from considering only the negative aspects of social changes taking place at work. Most of the surveys now document the search for a flexible life time schedule, aspirations toward “chosen time”, a better balance between family, leisure and work. I am convinced that the sociology of leisure has contributed to a better understanding of the relative meanings of work in its relationships with other spheres of life.

Talking about work also implies talking about time. I do not hesitate to say that we owe to the sociology of leisure a renewed interest in the study of social time, and that the some recent significant publications on the sociology of time come from sociologists of leisure.7 One of the reasons may be the time perspective implicit in the current notions of leisure, that progressively lead to the consideration of the many temporalities of social life, including leisure time as related to other categories of social time.

There has been less emphasis on publication about the dark side of leisure. Usually, sociologists of leisure have tended to see the positive aspects of it. Of course, they repeatedly underlined the role of leisure in the social and economic stratification, particularly in the consumption field and in matters of cultural tastes.
But critics of the consumption society did not usually come from the sociologists of leisure. Rather they documented the social and cultural inequalities in leisure, and the extension of the process of stratification outside the sphere of work and standards of life. In addition to this, even if it is more recent, sociologists of leisure have shown how male and female stereotypes take an unprecedented extension within the leisure pursuits, particularly in the reading habits, in the choices of cultural activities and in the selection of sport and physical activities. Feminist perspectives on leisure are very recent, the critique of the gender inequalities is just coming in (e.g., Henderson et al., 1996); much more also has been added on specific constraints and gender experiences of leisure.

So, one can conclude that the sociology of leisure could bring some understanding of social processes, some improved knowledge of certain sectors of social life. It has focused on the social and cultural changes taking place in contemporary societies. It has also documented some structural changes, like changes in the relationships between work and leisure. It has helped to describe changes in the value systems and directed attention to the “influence” of leisure values over other institutions.

C. The Collapse of Leisure

In fact, the sociology of leisure developed so well that we can observe, nowadays a well-known process of fragmentation of knowledge. One researcher may be specialised in tourism, the other one on leisure and youth, and another one on the relationships between family and leisure, and so on. More than that, sociologists of leisure speak almost uniquely to themselves, as do sociologists of work, of the arts, etc. Within the leisure studies, the fragmentation of knowledge goes along the disciplinary approaches: psychology, management, sociology, and the like.

The sociology of leisure holds a double historical relationship with leisure: it comes from the historical awareness of leisure in society; it is also made up of internal developments coming from the history of sociology itself. Two main difficulties have arisen, these being the changing nature of leisure and what we call the “fatigue” of sociological concepts of leisure.

C.1. The Changing Nature of “Leisure”

One can easily conclude that some of the very notions brought about by the sociology of leisure tend to become more and more obsolete. Since the sociology of leisure is rooted in the awareness of leisure, in historical and social notions of leisure, when the field changes, so new developments must take place. We no longer trust such classical notions as the society of leisure or the play elements in leisure, etc. “Interests of knowledge”, perspectives and concerns, have changed because of our changing societies. As I said above, the sociology of leisure is somewhat a sociology of a “social problem”. Maybe what we call “leisure” is...
no longer the right term to pinpoint different new realities. Has leisure collapsed, meaning that the sociology of leisure is on the verge of extinction?

It could be suggested that this situation applies to other fields as well as to the sociology of leisure. If one considers, for example, the sociology of work, or the sociology of family, one can conclude that good old Marxist concepts are somewhat obsolete, or that sociologists should bring in different notions to take into account emergent realities in family and work. A new sociology of work, a new sociology of family then emerged. It could be the case for the sociology of leisure. The sociology of work will not end because of the myth of the end of work, nor will the sociology of family disappear because of the changing nature of the phenomenon. The same can be true for the sociology of leisure.

C.2. The “Fatigue” of Some Sociological Concepts?

I have an inescapable sense of “turning around the bush” in the sociology of leisure, of some limits to the current concepts, of some real difficulty in overriding the “fatigue” of the sociological concepts if not the sociologists! My interpretation is that it is mainly due to the current changing nature of leisure which cannot be apprehended by a simple lifting of current concepts of leisure. Undoubtedly, sociologists of leisure could bring fresh understanding of some social and cultural processes taking place in Western societies; to do so, they focused on what they labelled “leisure”. Can this good old notion be still of help for the next century? Again, maybe the sociology of leisure needs some “conceptual revolution” as can be seen actually in other fields of sociological study, such as family and gender issues, the study of work or the mass media.

D. Re-building the Sociology of Leisure

The history of social sciences shows that because leisure has acquired a certain “value” in the Weberian sense of the word, thus reviving a new interest in our knowledge, it is now the object of diversified works and analysis. It is mainly a matter of the direction of our attention at a given moment in history, as Max Weber reminded us a long time ago. The significance of what should be understood as “leisure”, and the nature and the range of leisure studies, are in part determined by historical categories of knowledge, founded on the value and the importance that we give to the phenomenon in question, and on the dimensions that each culture considers significant.

One of the very first tasks, in my mind, is to directly address the issue of the true contribution of the sociology of leisure to the understanding of societies, and the development of the social sciences. Sociologists of leisure show some difficulty in coping with these issues. But we should be able to do the following: (a) to introduce a more historical and critical perspective about the usual sociological notions of leisure; (b) to be able to document further the intellectual heritage sociology of leisure brings to sociology in general; (c) to override the
current fragmentation of knowledge, within the sub-fields of sociology and within the sociology of leisure itself; (d) to take critical distance from Western-centred concepts of leisure, too often presented as universal.

A second and purely institutional approach is to re-introduce the sociology of leisure within the departments of sociology. A third way surely could be to enlarge the cooperation with other sub-fields of sociology. I am convinced, for example, that both sides will gain from exchanges between the sociology of education and that of leisure, between the sociological study of leisure and communication, of family and leisure, etc. Some consideration of the “non-work side” of work is needed. In fact, the sociology of leisure must be, at the same time, a sociology of time, of education, of gender and family, of communication, of cultural policies. Which means: looking at leisure outside the traditional leisure field, and looking at leisure not by itself, but in its relationship with other social phenomenon.

E. Conclusion

The sociology of leisure brings some undeniable heritage to the understanding of our societies. Maybe this heritage deals less with extensive descriptive studies of activities than with adding knowledge on social processes taking place in our societies: changing values, changing relationships between social time, the widening of the participation to culture, etc. But what was looked at as “leisure” is changing dramatically. The sociology of leisure is experiencing some difficulty in forming new questions about its old object. The very nature of leisure has changed, so a simple “lifting” of old concepts is not sufficient. The sociology of leisure must override its fragmentation. It must contribute to debates about current social issues, for example about the debate on the end of work, the reduction of the workweek, changes in the youth culture, emerging trends in the cultural tastes, the social uses of the multimedia during free time.

We face an enormous task. For we have to answer to this question: how can sociology of leisure bring significant understanding of current social changes or social processes by still referring to them as leisure? How can the sociology of leisure contribute to current hot debates, such as the alleged “end of work”, about the globalisation of the economy and the cultural industries, about the changing frontiers of education and information? How can we contribute to a better understanding of social changes? Do we have new and pertinent concepts to bring to the social sciences at the end of the century for a critique of modern societies? The sociology of leisure will be alive so long as we will be able to document that the study of leisure is not only a specialised field of study, but brings some relevant understanding to key issues of our society.
References


Endnotes

1. We here refer to pp. 100–102 of our book (1983) where we sketched out the main categories of analysis in Lynd’s writings (1959, 1965).
2. See for example Larrabee and Meyersohn (1958).
3. Richard Hoggart (1957) can be closely linked with such a trend.
5. See for example Roberts (1985) and Henderson et al. (1996) not to mention full issues of journals.
7. Such as the most recent book by Grossin (1996).
18 Theoretical Advances in the Sociological Treatment of Tourism

Graham Dann

Although there has been some debate as to the origins of tourism or proto-tourism (cf. Nash, 1979; 1981), the majority view is that tourism is a comparatively late phenomenon coinciding with the industrial age of rationalism and modernity. The academic study of tourism is even more recent, originating, as it did, in the 1930s (von Wiese, 1930), but not gathering momentum until it began to be treated by such well-known figures as Barthes, Baudrillard, Enzensberger, Knebel, Krapf, Morin and Riesman.

With the exception of a special issue of the French journal Communications in 1967, featuring contributors such as Burgelin, Gritti and Laurent, studies of two to three decades ago were quite tentative in nature, (e.g., Forster, 1964; Sutton, 1967), and this hesitancy is reflected in some of their titles. Pioneering authors, such as Cohen (1972) and Dumazedier (1958; cf. 1962) spoke of moving “towards a sociology of tourism”, but so for that matter did later writers (e.g., Apostolopoulos, 1996; Dann and Cohen, 1991). Similarly, most academics preferred to employ the indefinite article in referring to “a”, rather than “the”, sociology of tourism (e.g., Apostolopoulos, 1996; Cohen, 1972, 1974; Dann and Cohen, 1991; Dumazedier, 1958; Woolcock, 1991) — a sure sign that the field was still in its theoretical infancy (Dann and Cohen, 1991: 158).

There are four principal reasons for this initial lack of development. First, there was some uncertainty as to which mainstream sociological domain tourism should attach itself. Whereas some (e.g., Alcock, 1990; Nash, 1981) argued that leisure was the appropriate field, others (e.g., Cohen, 1984) maintained that the travel dimension of tourism indicated a location within the sphere of migration, and still others have looked to such realms as religion for their inspiration. Subsequently, many have begun to appreciate that a domain approach does not necessarily signify mutual exclusivity and that tourism can borrow from several or none in seeking to establish its respective dependency or autonomy.

Second, the multi-faceted nature of tourism logically required a multidisciplinary treatment. Consequently, with several overlaps in the disciplines of economics,
anthropology, psychology, history, human geography and political science, sociologists who tried, (with hindsight, in vain), to carve out a separate niche for themselves faced all the difficulties associated with unilateralism (Theuns, 1984). It was only later that they came to realize that sociology did not have a monopoly on truth, but rather a contribution to make to this rich kaleidoscope of multidisciplinary insights. (Hence, the frequent referencing in this account to anthropological work, that discipline most closely associated with sociology in the academic study of tourism.)

Third, sociologists were spoilt for choice in deciding which of their own perspectives was the most theoretically viable for underpinning their research. Some advocated the evolutionary approach of Organicism. Others opted for Marxism, Formalism, Social Action Theory, Symbolic Interactionism, Functionalism, Phenomenology, Postmodernism, and even Ethnomethodology. Again, only later did sociologists of tourism understand that they could adopt a more eclectic stance, taking the most fruitful ideas from more than one perspective at a time (cf. Cohen, 1979a; Dann and Cohen, 1991: 167).

Fourth, the early stages of tourism “studies” were characterized more for their ideological posturing than their theoretical perception. Jafari (1989), who has outlined the process in some detail, refers to the first stage as the “advocacy platform”, one which placed an undue emphasis on tourism’s positive effects — a position readily adopted by several economists, the United Nations and its many agencies. A critical backlash was not long in arriving — one that solely stressed the negative sociocultural consequences of tourism (e.g., Turner and Ash, 1975; Young, 1973), a position tactfully described by Jafari (1989) as the “cautionary platform”. Subsequently, a third group appeared on the scene (the “adaptancy platform”), which tried to straddle the fence in both deriving the benefits from, and minimizing the costs of, tourism, largely through the promotion of its more benign, environmentally friendly, alternative forms. Yet, it was only when a “knowledge based platform” emerged to fill the intellectual void left by the previous three platforms that any coherent sociological theorizing on tourism began to occur (Dann, 1997a).

By relying on a number of state-of-the-art reviews (Apostolopoulos, 1996; Cohen, 1984; Crick, 1989; Dann and Cohen, 1991; Graburn, 1983; Jafari, 1989; Selwyn, 1994; Sharpley, 1994) for their identification of initial lines of inquiry, by adding a category of its own, and by tracing subsequent developments, this presentation attempts to trace the principal theoretical advances that have taken place since the appearance of this “knowledge based platform”.

It does so under the following six “before and after” headings: (1) From typological description to motivational understanding and explanation; (2) From a focus on the tourist to issues of authenticity, nostalgia and semiotic representation; (3) From host-guest interaction to questions of alterity and gender; (4) From the tourism system to the processes of globalization and commoditization; (5) From impact studies to social change in general; and (6) From anthropological to sociological concerns with observer identity.

Even so, gauging theoretical advance is a delicate exercise in value judgement, since it presumes both a working consensus as to the nature of theory and an agreement that what has occurred is an improvement on what has previously taken
place. In order to facilitate this rather ambitious undertaking, “theory” is simply defined as a conceptual framework for understanding, explanation and prediction (Dann, et al., 1988), while “advance” is taken to mean the synthetic outcome of a dialectical exchange of ideas.3

A. From Typological Description to Motivational Understanding and Explanation

As Durkheim (1938) pointed out so clearly in his *Rules of the Sociological Method*, the first stage in studying a phenomenon is the act of classification. In relation to tourism, certainly the greatest sociological contributor to categorizing the tourist was Erik Cohen (1972, 1974, 1979a, 1979b), and it is possible to detect evolutionary progress in his work as he moved from one typology to another. Nevertheless, and in spite of the realization that Cohen’s analyses were securely grounded in the writings of Schutz (1944) and Simmel (1950) on strangerhood, as well as Eliade (1969, 1971) and Turner (1969, 1974) on religion, it was only when he went beneath and beyond the typologies that the level of understanding was heightened.

Other taxonomies followed, principally in the disciplines of anthropology (e.g., Smith, 1977 (1989)) and psychology (e.g., Pearce, 1982), focusing, as did Cohen, on the role of the tourist, the extent to which it was organized, and how this status converged or differed with that of the traveller. Even so, these typologies were mainly descriptive. They responded to the “how?” question.

Theoretical progress was made when analysts turned their attention to the “why?” question — that level of inquiry which, according to Max Weber (1968), led to understanding and explanation. Just as motivation lay at the core of sociological investigation in general, so too did the question “why do people travel?” demand a motivational response from the tourist if the sociological treatment of tourism was to advance.

In the beginning, Dann (1977), in agreement with Lundberg (1972), sought to show that tourist motivation comprised two principal components: “push factors” and “pull factors”. The former, which were logically and temporally prior to the latter, reflected the social conditions in the home society of the tourist-to-be, situations bordering on the oppressive which were ripe for travelling elsewhere — places in which fantasy could be enacted and the illusion of freedom could be pursued. Pull factors, on the other hand, referred to attractions of the destination (e.g., friendly people, sunshine) which, in many ways, responded to and built on the socio-psychological demand of potential tourists. Especially salient among the push factors were the dimensions of anomie and ego-enhancement, respectively deriving from the insights of Durkheim and Veblen, whereby travel provided the opportunities for breaking out of normlessness and meaninglessness, as well as the means for achieving status other than via occupation.

Crompton (1979) subsequently expanded this scheme to include such additional Maslovian need features as escape from a perceived mundane environment, exploration and evaluation of self, relaxation, prestige, regression, enhancement of kinship relationships, facilitation of social interaction, novelty and education.
Later, Krippendorf (1987), while admitting that tourists often echoed motives which had been moulded by tourism advertising (a point taken up by Urbain (1989)), tried to advance the level of inquiry by examining eight theoretical properties of travel as recuperation/regeneration, compensation/social integration, escape, communication, broadening of the mind, freedom/self-determination, self-realization and happiness.

Sharpley (1994) continued the discussion by exploring in greater detail various social influences (e.g., the family, reference groups, social class, the structure of the workplace) which conditioned the desire to travel. According to him, these influences could either act by way of compensation (travel supplying the excitement that was missing from everyday life) or through spillover effect (the continued pursuit of domestic interests while on holiday).

Pearce (1982), by way of complement, introduced a more explicit and complementary psychological element to the analysis by emphasizing the important distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and the allied notions of self-actualization, attribution and achievement. Pearce (1993) later developed these ideas by outlining a multi-level career ladder of tourist motivation wherein he demonstrated its advantages over alternative models provided by Plog (1987) and Iso-Ahola (1980).

As a synthesis, Parrinello (1993) furthered the theoretical advance by stressing the importance of the anticipation stage in the motivational process, thereby allowing her to extend the analysis to insights supplied by cognitive psychology, while at the same time exploring elements of a postmodern ethos which was said to contextualize the majority of tourism generating societies.

B. From a Focus on the Tourist to Issues of Authenticity, Nostalgia and Semiotic Representation

One of the chief critics of tourism, associated with Jafari’s “cautionary platform” was Daniel Boorstin (1964 (1987)). In lamenting “the lost art of travel”, he maintained that the tourist was a cultural dope, taken in by pseudo events created by the tourism industry and the media. Whereas travel of yesteryear was an individual, painstaking and educational experience of the classes, tourism of today was little more than sheer hedonism pursued by the duped masses.

In response, and as the first exponent of the “knowledge-based platform”, MacCannell (1973, 1976 (1989a)) maintained that Boorstin was surely wrong in depicting the contemporary tourist as a superficial nitwit. Instead, continued MacCannell, the modern tourist was engaged in a search for authenticity, seeking identity in the Other by journeying to somewhere different from the home environment. Unfortunately, the tourism establishment catered to this frustrated quest by staging authenticity in a number of contrived events and attractions.

By way of synthesis, Cohen (1979b) argued that both Boorstin and MacCannell had erred, since they had assumed (incorrectly) that all tourists behaved in the manner that they had been unilaterally portrayed and that they were all taken in by the machinations of the tourism industry. Against their positions, Cohen pointed
out that some tourists were not only aware that they were being fooled; they actually enjoyed this playful staging of reality. He additionally produced a taxonomy of five different modes of tourist experiences, ranging from recreational and diversionary to experimental, experiential and existential, of which only the first and third varieties respectively corresponded to Boorstin’s and MacCannell’s tourists. This “phenomenology of tourist experiences” in itself was a theoretical step forward.

Subsequently, there have been attempts to refine the concept of authenticity (Wickens, 1994), to test it empirically (Moscardo and Pearce, 1986), and even to reformulate it entirely anew (Bruner, 1994; Selwyn, 1994, 1996), to the point where the touristic search for the authentic produces culturally hybrid behaviour (Ryan, 1991) in destination people who, in catering to the presumed tastes of visitors, modify their own way of life (Wickens and Harrison, 1996). Arguably, at each stage of the authenticity debate, sociological knowledge of the tourist has been theoretically enhanced.

Another way whereby academics essayed an understanding of the tourist was via analogy, whose application in the first instance was frequently to tourism in general. Thus tourism, in borrowing from earlier anthropological theorizing (e.g., Huizinga, 1949; Norbeck, 1974; Turner, 1974), was considered as play (e.g., Cohen, 1985; Foster, 1986; Lett, 1983) and, by corollary, the tourist was treated as a ludic figure engaging in “as if” experiences (Cohen, 1995). Similarly, tourism was considered as pilgrimage (e.g., Graburn 1977 (1989)) and its adherents regarded as sacred travellers. Even history-distorting theme parks such as Disney World (Fjellman, 1992; Hollinshead, 1997) were viewed as contemporary secular equivalents of traditional centres of faith, where the icons of civil religion were ritually worshipped and consumed (Moore, 1980).

One particular analogical treatment — that of the tourist as child (Amirou, 1994, 1995; Dann, 1989, 1996; Selwyn, 1993) has had the added advantage of being able to link with the psychoanalytic theories of Freud, Jung and Lacan, as well as those of more popular transactional analysis (e.g., Harris, 1967), thereby facilitating the examination of such related identity themes as regression (e.g., Cazes, 1976; Dichter, 1981; Dufour, 1978; Squire, 1994; Tresse, 1990; Urbain, 1993; Wackermann, 1985) and rebirth (e.g., Dichter, 1967; Dufour, 1978; Teas, 1988; Vogt, 1978).

An allied line of inquiry has re-focused on the motivation of the tourist (see section A). This important dimension has been given a new twist by concentrating on the romantic Foucauldian gaze (Hollinshead, 1994; Urry, 1990) and, more specifically, on the role of nostalgia as a significant push factor in contemporary tourism (Costa, 1994; Dann, 1996; Graburn, 1995, 1999; Lowenthal, 1985).

Basically, the appeal of nostalgia — “(that) positively toned evocation of a lived past in the context of some negative feeling toward present or impending circumstance” (Davis, 1979: vii) — helps preserve the Self amidst surrounding adverse change and thoughts of a dreaded future by temporally relocating “home” to the selective memory of yesteryear. Spatially, too, and this is where tourism is also particularly appropriate, places can be offered (e.g. time-warped developing countries) or created (e.g. themed heritage) which conjure up warm feelings associated with days gone by.
However, capitalization on the past by tourism is not limited just to real or imaginary sights (e.g., Colonial Williamsburg and the Jorvik Viking Centre at York). It is also frequently extended to hotels, types of transportation (especially steam locomotives), tours of sewage works, morgues, abattoirs and factories (what MacCannell (1976 (1989a: 51–57)) terms displays of “alienated leisure”, and what Urry (1990) sees as part of the de-industrialization process), even to spas and health resorts (which Graburn, 2000, describes as a nostalgic yearning for a youthful body of yesteryear). Through a symbolic reversal of present justice, inglorious personalities of the past and the locales with which they are associated can also be promoted by the tourism industry (Dann, 1994) in a discourse of “ol’ talk” (Dann, 1996). Sites of murder, mayhem and reminders of mortality can thus be nostalgically exploited as “fatal attractions” (Rojek, 1990: 136) and as forms of “dark tourism” (Foley and Lennon, 1996) or “thanatourism” (Seaton, 1996). It is not surprising that much of the theorizing about representing the past has turned to postmodernism and semiology for its inspiration (cf. Hollinshead, 1997; MacCannell, 1992).

Similarly, just as the age of the image has seen developments from MacCannell’s (1973, 1976 (1989a)) preliminary investigation of symbolic markers to excursions into hyper-reality (Eco, 1986), so too has there been an increasing emphasis on semiotics (e.g., Barthes, 1984; Culler, 1981; MacCannell, 1989b; Urbain, 1989) and sociolinguistics in the analysis of the tourist, a topic which has been treated in considerable detail elsewhere (Dann, 1996). For the purposes of this presentation, however, it simply needs to be noted that there has been a steady and growing paradigmatic convergence among protagonists of quite different theoretical persuasions to analyses of discourse (e.g., Said, 1978 (1991)), rhetoric (e.g., Hollinshead, 1993) and narrative (e.g., Katriel, 1993), as they are variously applied to the tourist at all stages of the trip by “the language of tourism” (Bruner, 1991; Dann, 1996; Moeran, 1983; Parrinello, 1994). Some would maintain that to reach such a theoretical watershed is itself a remarkable accomplishment in the sociological treatment of tourism, and, a fortiori of tourism itself. In the words of Moeran (1983: 107): “If the language of tourism is the same as the language of other aspects of consumerism in industrial society ... then it is clear that a study of such language can provide us with a clue to the ‘structure of modernity’”.

C. From Host-Guest Interaction to Questions of Alterity and Gender

In the past, anthropologists, political scientists (and some sociologists) were justifiably concerned with the host-guest dimension of tourism, particularly where, as in the case of developing countries, such tourist-resident relationships were often asymmetrical and based on the differential power associated with disparities of wealth. More recently, however, such interaction has been fruitfully investigated along two additional sociological avenues — those of alterity and gender.

Introduction of the notion of the “Other”, of course, is not really new, since it is fairly clear in the tourism writings of MacCannell, Cohen and Graburn, and long before them was quite evident in Rousseau’s concept of the “noble savage”.
However, what perhaps is more sociologically novel in tourism studies is the treatment of alterity as an aspect of ethnicity. Here the pioneer sociologist is unquestionably van den Berghe (1980, 1994), although there have recently been some additional interesting insights supplied by Lanfant et al. (1995) and Hollinshead (forthcoming). There are also related developments in other disciplines, notably a study of the lost native voices of Sri Lanka by Crick (1994), an examination of the roles of advertising and photography in portraying the Other (O’Barr, 1994), and a collection edited by Hinch and Butler (1996). The consensus seems to be that tourism, not only promotes otherness as a facet of the attractiveness of difference, but that it celebrates alterity in selectively portraying destination people as decontextualized exotica.

Tourism interaction conceived as gender relations is also a thematic area which, although not innovatory in many other areas of applied sociology, is a fairly recent development in tourism studies (e.g., Kinnaird, et al., 1994; Veijola and Jokinen, 1994). According to Swain (1995), tourism, as a vehicle both of development and of representation, is ripe for gender analysis. Tourism processes derive from gendered societies, they are informed by interconnected economic, political and environmental dimensions, and address related issues of power, control and equality. Women and men, whether hosts or guests, are variously involved in the construction and consumption of tourism; they have different motives and experiences. However, just as important a consideration is the differential, and often stereotypical imagery, by which men and women are portrayed as active or passive participants in tourism, reflecting as they do the sexual division of labour at home and in the destination. Hence the androcentric bias in tourism promotion (MacCannell, 1976 (1989a: xvii)) and the corresponding absence of the female voice in predominantly male studies of the tourist (Veijola and Jokinen, 1994; Wickens and Harrison, 1996).

D. From the Tourism System to the Processes of Globalization and Commoditization

As the above heading implies, many of the early accounts of the tourism system tended to be rather Functionalist in outlook, a perspective which in sociology, as well as in the sociological treatment of tourism, has rather fallen from grace in recent times. Even so, there are still many influential works authored by the likes of Butler (1980), Doxey (1976), Jafari (1985) and Leiper (1995), (all admittedly non-sociologists), that are still highly regarded today, and which, tracing both the evolution of resorts and the attitudes of destination people, show how the interdependent parts of the tourism system, from point of generation, via intermediaries to reception, are related.

Today, however, in the case of anthropologists, the emphasis has turned more in the direction of political economy (cf. Crick, 1989; Selwyn, 1994) and, as far as sociologists are concerned, towards globalization. Regarding the latter, Lanfant (1980, 1989, 1990, 1993, 1995) is widely acknowledged as the leading authority, and in some detail she has charted the growing process of internationalization. The theoretical basis for her describing tourism as an “international fact” and as
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a “total social phenomenon” is respectively grounded in such mainstream thinkers as Durkheim and Mauss.

According to her, international tourism cannot be explained solely by a univocal and reductive Western ethnocentric framework, in terms of increased leisure time or escape from urban pressures. Tourism has now reached a point where it is a supranational, global force that disregards the boundaries of sovereign states and transforms host cultures into a tourist product. International tourism sets destination societies in motion. It shapes their institutions. It affects all visible and invisible sectors of life, even the very conversations and fantasies of diverse peoples. For receiving societies, especially lesser developed countries, international tourism, aided and abetted by such powerful agencies as the United Nations, the International Labour Organization, UNESCO, and the International Monetary Fund, is ideologically defined as a significant part of the North-South dialogue and the New World Economic Order. Thereafter, multinational corporations take over, matching supply with demand via ever sophisticated technology. As far as tourism generating societies are concerned, their citizens increasingly come under new forms of social control, in much the same way as Durkheim’s “social facts” were regarded as external constraints overriding individuality. The stage is thus soon reached where the question of personal identity, a hackneyed theme in the social sciences of the 1980s, can be given a new interpretation. Now attention focuses on communication — how marketers, planners, promoters, academics, tourists and the people they visit, transmit messages to each other:

Tourism draws together social groups with contrasting modes of social discourse: developed countries and developing countries; urban populations and rural populations; technological societies and traditional societies; hot societies and cold societies. (Lanfant, 1995: 30)

Seen in this light, the accent today falls on how cultures represent themselves to others, or, more precisely, how their places, skills, monuments and heritage are imaged for them by supranational organizations in order to meet projected demand. Destinational identity thus becomes replaced by a sign or brand image and international tourism overcomes the distinction between tradition and modernity at a stroke.

Others, (e.g., Parrinello, 1994), reach a similar conclusion, albeit with recourse to postmodern theory. According to them, the blurring of boundaries is symptomatic of the surrounding ethos of First World de-differentiation (in contrast to the former modernist divisions based on sex, class, group and grid), a lack of difference which Dann and Potter (1994) also find evident in Third World societies, not only on account of the growing presence of tourists in their midst, but also due to their cultural penetration by the mass media and advertising of developed countries.

Postmodern theory has also informed the analyses of those who have focused on the commoditization of tourism. Originating in the ethnography of Greenwood (1972, 1977 (1989)), where an indigenous Basque festival was said to have degenerated into a burlesque show for tourists retailing “culture by the pound”, and having been subsequently examined by Cohen in 1988, commodification has
been recently further explored by Selwyn (1994, 1996). The latter contextualizes contemporary tourism in relation to what he sees as the increased individualism of the Western world, which is still the point of origin for the majority of today’s tourists. Parrinello (1993) additionally suggests that, in the current age of the simulacrum, the advertising of tourism with luxury products often goes hand in hand — a topic that has been recently explored by Dann (1997b).

E. From Impact Studies to Social Change in General

The sociocultural consequences of tourism have been the subject of research for quite some time (Noronha, 1977). Although the field tends to be dominated by anthropologists (e.g., Graburn, 1976; Greenwood, 1972, 1977 (1989); Pi-Sunyer, 1973; Smith, 1977 (1989)), there are examples of related work by sociologists (e.g., Buck, 1978; de Kadt, 1979; Forster, 1964; Harrison, 1992; Tsartas, 1989, 1992). Sharpley (1994), while pointing out that the social and cultural domains frequently overlap (cf. Murphy, 1985), nevertheless analytically distinguishes their respective impacts. The former, he says, relate to such effects on the quality of life of both tourists and host communities as health, moral behaviour, the family, gender roles, crime and religion. The latter comprise values, beliefs and practices, and include such features as dress, food and artefacts. Various acculturation and dependency theories (cf. Erisman, 1983) are used to analyse these impacts, especially the so-called “demonstration effect” (McElroy and de Albuquerque, 1986). Factors influencing these types of change are said to include level of social development, types and number of tourists, the importance of tourism in the local economy, the magnitude of the tourism industry and its rate of growth. However, it is important to disentangle the effects of tourism on a destination community from other coterminous agents of social change, such as television, industrialization and urbanization (Mathieson and Wall, 1982; Ryan, 1991).

One of the most detailed reviews of the sociocultural impacts of tourism has been provided by Doğanı (1989). He notes that, whereas most studies tend to focus on its negative consequences (e.g. materialism, crime and social conflict), there are some which highlight positive benefits (e.g. employment and race relations). Doğan additionally supplies a useful theoretical framework for classifying indigenous forms of adjustment to the changes wrought by tourism. These strategies range from resistance and retreatism to boundary maintenance and revitalization (in the shape of adoption). Of these social mechanisms, perhaps boundary maintenance is the most interesting since it addresses situations where the privacy of host communities can be protected from the prying eyes of tourists. With destination people supplying replicas of their living spaces to tourists, the latter can receive the impression that they are enjoying authentic experiences. A good example of this type of self-preservation can be seen among the New Order Amish of Pennsylvania (Buck, 1978).

One landmark event which demonstrated that sociologists were beginning to treat the epistemological issues connected with the sociocultural impacts of tourism seriously was a round table discussion involving 33 leading experts. The symposium
was held at Marly-le-Roi, France in 1986, and its deliberations were made known to a wider audience via the journal *Problems of Tourism* (Lanfant, 1987a, 1987b).

Another indication of sociological concern is provided by Jafari (1989), in his introduction to an ambitious study (Bystrzanowski, 1989) that attempted a massive comparative analysis of the sociocultural effects of tourism in ten different countries. What is particularly interesting about the work of the Vienna Centre was its willingness to examine several varieties of accompanying sociological theory, an undertaking which self-confessedly met with considerable difficulty. Nevertheless, the fact that the effort was made, and that it experienced some success, is surely a sign of progress.

Even so, the somewhat restrictive focus on sociocultural change has today been broadened to encompass social change in general, (e.g. Aisner and Pluss, 1983; Boissevain, 1996; Lanfant, 1995; Meyer, 1988; Rozenberg, 1990), especially in destination societies such as Bali, which are said to have embraced a "tourist culture" (Picard, 1995). Greater attention than hitherto is also now directed towards attributing change to forces of modernization other than tourism. Such a diversified emphasis leads towards a critical evaluation of the promotional claim that tourists are more likely to undergo radical transformations in their lives as a result of travel than the supposedly timeless people they visit (Bruner, 1991).

F. From Anthropological to Sociological Concerns with Observer Identity

Even though it has inspired some recent anthropological debate (e.g. Bruner, 1995; Crick, 1985, 1995; Errington and Gewertz, 1989), self-analysis has not been a central issue for most sociologists of tourism. Nevertheless, it is an important topic and represents a significant addition to the foregoing themes. Moreover, as the rapport between sociologists and anthropologists of tourism increases, one can expect sociologists of tourism to become more introspective as they begin to differentiate themselves more clearly from the people they study.

Roche (1996) is a timely example of a sociologist who has begun exploring this vexing question of selfhood. He observes, for instance, that Robbie Burns’ prayer ‘O Good Lord the Giftie Give Us to See Ourselves as Others See Us’ can now be ultimately recast as ‘to see ourselves as tourists see us’. For Roche, we have now entered a phase where we are all tourists in every aspect of our lives, and even what we call “home” may need to be otherwise designated. In his words:

The critical problems for the touristic civilization which is emerging in the 1990s and early twenty-first century will not be how to heed the poet’s advice, but rather how not to. That is, in spite of touristic culture, how are we to retain (and transmit to future generations) an original and uncompromised grasp of our history, community and identity? We moderns love to travel, but we still take for granted that we can come ‘home’ and leave the world of tourism behind. Yet touristic civilization will increasingly make ‘home’ (locality, community, tradition) into a touristic construct.
Evidently in the future we will face the classically modern problems of our individual and collective alienation and anomie in disturbing new ways. As tourists we know well enough what ‘they’ are like and where ‘they’ belong. But what are we like and where do we belong? We had better remember (or discover) before the ‘heritage’ and ‘conservation’ industries remember (or reinvent) it all for us. (Roche, 1996: 342)

If that turn of events does transpire, it will not simply be a question of returning to the status quo ante. Rather it will be a new situation, mirroring advance in the sociological understanding of tourism, yet, paradoxically reflecting the circular and tautological qualities of tourism itself.

G. Conclusion

This presentation has tried to go beyond traditional state-of-the-art reviews by charting six developments in the sociological treatment of tourism, changes that may be considered advances as they progress from various termini a quo of the past to termini ad quem of the present. However, it is unlikely that these transitions will ever represent permanent trends since progress also implies ongoing process. Just as paradigms are constantly shifting and being broken out of, so too should the theories they contain be open to the challenges ahead.

Elsewhere (Dann, 1997b), it has been shown that, if tourism is to respond proactively to ever more rapid technological innovation, there must also be concomitant developments in anticipatory theory. One future oriented approach, as evident in the works of Alvin Toffler, for instance, would seem to lie in theoretically matching the empirical findings of tourism Delphi studies. Another type of progress may paradoxically reside in a form of regress — in adopting a Simmelian position, whereby the perennial, (and hence also future), features of tourism are tackled more thoroughly than before. A third path of promise may be discovered in systematically assembling and prioritizing those items designated “areas of further investigation” that all too often are only ritually paraded at the conclusion of a tourism study. By transforming this unfinished business into viable theoretical agenda, “a” sociology of tourism can ensure that it continues to move “towards” its rightful place within mainstream sociology itself.

References


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**Endnotes**

1. Marxist approaches have more strictly been applied to the sphere of leisure as, for instance, by Lefebvre (1967) and Naville (1967). For a fuller treatment, see Lanfant (1972: 37–50). However, the theme of alienation does feature in the works of such tourism writers as Cohen and MacCannell, and an interesting class analysis of the discourse of tourism advertising has been undertaken by Thurot and Thurot (1983).

2. This over-simple definition has its limitations (see Hollinshead, 1996). Critical theorists and constructivists (e.g., Bruner, 1994), for instance, would prefer to emphasize only the understanding component of theory, arguing, as they do, that interpretation overrides a
more neo-positivist preoccupation with causality (the elements of explanation, prediction and, for some, falsifiability). Others might wish to replace the word “theory” with that of “paradigm”. The latter, comprising two or more theories in a shifting, open-ended, conceptual framework, seeks to capture the world of meaning of the subject under investigation. The only debate to have taken place on paradigms in tourism research was a seminar held under that title in Jyvaskyla, Finland, in the summer of 1996. Discussants were mainly drawn from the ISA’s research committee on international tourism.

3. Roche (1996: 339–340) relatedly observes that the dialectical approach is appropriate wherever reality is sociologically considered as simultaneously operating pairs of opposites (e.g., unity in diversity, action and structure, continuity and change, consciousness and material conditions, macro- and micro-). Thus, such a stance is eminently suitable for the mythically structured phenomenon of tourism (Selwyn, 1996) which offers Eros-Modernity as the dialectical alternative to Logos-Modernity (Wang, 1996), as well as grasping its perennial features (Dann, 1997b), as in Simmel (1950). That theoretical development is dialectical in nature, and that advances in the sociological treatment of tourism may be similarly gauged can also be seen in Roche’s (1996: 328) comment that “the sociology of tourism is best seen as one kind of intellectual response to the existential challenges posed by the touristic culture of modernity ... that needs to be conceptualized in dialectical terms.”
PART VII

On Social Problems
19 Unravelling Alienation: From an Omen of Doom to a Celebration of Diversity

Devorah Kalekin-Fishman

Although the term is not novel (Schweitzer and Geyer, 1989), the topic of alienation has been on the sociological agenda for the better part of the second half of the twentieth century. Since the close of the Second World War, when “the quest for community” seemed hopeless though imperative (Nisbet, 1966), concern with our living in an “alienated society” has been rampant in the literature of the social sciences, and has often overflowed into the language of everyday life (Ludz, 1973). Events of the 1960s confirmed the conception that the disquiet of youth, which could be attributed to alienation, might present a comprehensive threat to the tide of convention. On the basis of this interpretation, sociologists and psychologists were enlisted in a sweeping effort to prevent the threatened crumbling of society (see Blauner, 1964; Erikson, 1968; Fromm, 1965; Keniston, 1967; Marcuse, 1958). Underlying most of this work was the assumption that if tools could be devised for conducting personal and social life with suitable rationality, problems of alienation would be eliminated. Recent work dealing with alienation takes a view which is at once more cynical and more charitable. Thus, there are studies which focus on evidence of what we may call ‘local’ alienation — phenomena which are ostensibly ‘curable’ (see, for example, references in this paper to research on drop-outs in education and studies on alienation in the field of social work); while theoretical analyses tend to deal with issues which are thoroughly entrenched and embedded in what we know as the only possible surround.

At the same time, there are still traditional debates about the philosophical underpinnings of alienation, its evolution over time, and its applicability to contemporary problems. Recent collections (Geyer, 1996; Geyer and Heinz, 1992) include discussions of alienation as a theory and refined insights into its connections with the thought of Hegel, Nietzsche, as well as that of Habermas and Beck (see papers by Ahponen, 1996; Nagl, 1992; Schacht, 1996). In sociology there is continual interest in systemic alienation which is ambiguous in detail, and recurrently demands clarification. The field is also enriched by theoretical
analyses of alienation and anomie which account for different aspects of social phenomena and are linked to different domains of social reality (see among others, Schweitzer, 1992; Wexler, 1998).

In the following discussion, I will point out how the study of alienation has been dismantled into diversity — in the varieties of questions which researchers ask, in the miscellany of outcomes sought in research, and in differentiated premises about its theoretical foundations. The first section relates to classic approaches to the general question of whether people are or are not alienated. The next section surveys how conceptualizations of alienation serve researchers and practitioners in different disciplines. After that, I survey theoretical approaches to alienation with a special emphasis on the work of social psychologists and sociologists. After pointing out some of the tensions between theory and research, the final section outlines conclusions on the character of alienation and on trends toward diversity palpable at the start of the third millennium.

A. Theoretical Distinctions and Turning Points in Research

The systematic study of alienation in the social sciences derives from Marx’s complex presentation of the human condition as shaped by capitalism. But it is safe to say that in contemporary sociology the impetus for studies of alienation came from the milestone paper in which Seeman (1959) pinpointed and tagged conditions which mold individuals as they were set out in the works of Marx, Durkheim, and Toennies, among others. Seeman developed summarizing concepts by merging distinctions among theories of alienation, anomie, and Gesellschaft/Gemeinschaft. In practice, his formulations of the dimensions of alienation (emphatically not a syndrome): powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, social isolation, and self-estrangement, defined benchmarks for theoretical explorations of the construct as well as for empirical investigations. Even social scientists who criticize the social psychological orientation and the homogenization of social values implied by Seeman’s analyses, have felt constrained to relate to his terms. From the start, empiricist researchers found them convenient for operationalization as welcome additions to available repertoires of research tools.

In re-examining theoretical foundations to explain the turmoil of the 1960s, Lukes (1973; 1978) reviewed the constituent theories and re-established distinctions between alienation and anomie by examining the different footing for the validation of each construct. Lukes emphasized crucial differences between Durkheim and Marx in their implicit and explicit value judgments about human goals. Durkheim, who was certain of the existence of a conscience collective in every society as a whole, emphasized the value of solidarity and the maintenance of community as the supreme social goal. On this basis, it was clear that the state of anomie, not sharing in the notions of a collective, being at a loss to understand its norms, was a form of pathology. Marx, on the other hand, thought of ‘true’ community as an apocalyptic vision under capitalism. The differentiation of capitalist society into classes with necessarily different interests prevented equity
as well as efficient coping with environmental challenges (see also Schweitzer, 1996). Hence, solidarity is an aspect of false consciousness, a mode of reasoning which prevents people from recognizing the true state of things. Because such an awareness is integral to the perpetuation of capitalist dominance, alienation is inevitable (natural) in a capitalistic social order.

These distinctions raised the empirical question of how to know whether or not people are actually alienated. Assuming that alienation was perpetuated through micro-manifestations of class and power in face to face interaction, Archibald (1976) inquired into on-going relations in the work place. He pointed out the deliberate alienating mechanisms of everyday life. Lower-class workers endure implicit threat in interpersonal exchanges with people who are of higher status and more powerful. His theorization of processes of micro-stratification generalized beyond places of work, but did not clearly apply to what he called “informal status structures,” where alienation could perhaps be evaded. At about the same time, studies carried out by Seeman (1967) himself and by Willis (1977) challenged traditional interpretations by investigating alienation or its absence in informal groups.

Seeking to carry out empirical tests of the blanket assertion that alienation was inevitable under a capitalistic factory system, Seeman conducted a study of subjective appraisals of alienation among factory workers in Sweden. The research instrument was a questionnaire which focused on ‘powerlessness,’ the feeling that one is incapable of carrying out actions that one considers necessary; ‘meaninglessness,’ the feeling that one cannot predict the outcomes of one’s actions with any degree of accuracy; and ‘social estrangement,’ the feeling that one is cut off from others in one’s social sphere. In apparent defiance of theory, the Swedish factory workers studied did not offer evidence of strong feelings of alienation. Instead, as Seeman (1967: 284) notes, they “simply come to terms, more easily than our theories imply, with the only work life they know and can reasonably expect for themselves.”

Seeman’s conclusion received oblique support from ethnographic research in schools. According to statistics, it was clear that although opportunities for advanced education were increasing, children born into the working class continue to “get working class jobs.” Through the compilation and analysis of situations, conversations, and everyday events, Willis (1977) demonstrated how class membership was validated and ratified in schools. Willis observed the behavior of pupils in the lower streams of a comprehensive secondary school, and talked to them. He traced the ways in which boys formed cliques which pedantically imitated the behaviors of adult factory workers. Among the ‘lads’ he studied, pastimes and the types of fun they preferred, the emblems they adopted, the language they used, their attitudes toward girls and women, and their stance toward their peers, all bespoke their identification with forms of popularity and success modeled in the working-class culture of the neighborhood.

At school and out of it, the lads did not regret their involvement in activities which effectively got in the way of studying. The potential for school-related accomplishments was far from alluring, and future rewards were vague. Like the Swedish workers, they, too, managed to create “an acceptable life of the moment
by creating occasions ... for humor, sociality, decision-making, competition, argument, etc.” (Seeman, 1967: 284). Whereas Seeman was confident that these moments were “at once trivial and remarkable” (1967), Willis shows that these are exactly the events which constitute the customary substance of school life. Not at all trivial, they are the very factors in the experience of school which ensured that the careers of the pupils would not lead to meaningful changes in life patterns or help them to overcome the economic and social constraints of the milieu.

In many ways, these studies marked a turning point in inquiry into alienation. By querying factory workers, Seeman was not only testing assumptions about whether the socio-economic system tends to alienate workers and if so, how, but also proposing that people who are alienated are cognizant of their life situation. From the finding that the workers were apparently not aware of alienation, he concludes that the theory is wanting. Willis’ research derives from initial assumptions on the function of schooling and the future orientations of all young people. Willis assumed not only that schools were designed to contribute to de-alienation, but that working-class youngsters would naturally strive to escape the circumstances which destined them for rather dreary factory work. In both cases, the researchers found that the people were dealing with their surroundings by extracting maximum satisfaction from conditions which are not easily overcome. And there is a connection. It is exactly because factory workers manage to “create occasions ... for humor and sociality ...” that working-class children can allow themselves effectively to reject the offerings of schooling, and are satisfied to accomplish imitations of such occasions in their own peer groups.

The geographical distance between the populations of the two studies and the discrepancy in their ages adds to the persuasiveness of the convergent findings. Additional significance derives from the fact that the studies were conducted with different research methods. Whereas Seeman chose a quantitative approach, using a closed questionnaire in his investigation; Willis approached his task with tools of qualitative research, accessing information as it presented itself in a natural setting.

The issues highlighted in these milestone pieces of research underlie our concerns in the survey of inquiry in the field of alienation which follows. The framework for the analysis will be the substantive issues and their roots in academic disciplines. The review will illustrate the disjuncture between most of the empirical work and the theorization of alienation.

B. Alienation Research and the Exigencies of Professional Practice

This section is devoted to a review of how conceptualizations of alienation in various guises have emerged to serve researchers and practitioners in disciplines hallowed by association with institutions of higher education. In institutions which train practitioners, alienation is examined by reference to concrete professional interests. For the most part, alienation is taken for granted as the generic label for imbalance, discontent, deviance, disintegration, etc., as appropriate to the terminology of a particular field of endeavor. The sociological concern with
theoretical implications is far from the practitioner’s horizon; but as we shall see the practical concern with alienation in everyday life does have significance for mapping the agenda of sociological theory.

I will begin by sketching significant developments in relevant fields of practice: education, social work, psychology and psychiatry; and go on to point out typical theses prominent among researchers associated with interdisciplinary fields such as gender and family studies, as well as the study of culture. In each field the substantive focus and the methodological approach chosen will be illustrated by selected research. Although they are not usually spelled out, theoretical elaborations of alienation as a sociological, psychological, and economic construct are the foundation of these studies. Through these lenses it will be possible to appraise implied goals and values, and their encounter with sociological theory.

B.1. Education

In research connected with the professions, educational research is most clearly committed to studies of alienation when assessed by sheer quantity. Researchers in education interpret alienation as sets of conditions open to conscious and voluntary control. There is extensive use of quantitative and qualitative measures in which dimensions of powerlessness or disempowerment, social and cultural isolation, and self-estrangement, are related to aspects of an educational system. Because of the large number of studies, it will be best to present material by focusing separately on alienation as related to students, curriculum, and staff.

B.1.a. Students

Although there are a few researches which deal with feelings of alienation as a general phenomenon (Atsumi et al., 1989), most of the current research exploring alienation among students is related to a highly practical problem, that of ‘drop-outs.’ The perception that those who leave school before completing the official term of study suffer from a serious flaw stems from the now widespread expectation that secondary education is an existential necessity (Dorn, 1993). In this connection the very act of not completing an institutionalized program is an indicator of alienation and drop-outs are taken to be in need of remediation (Geddes and Golbetz, 1992).

Usage of the term ‘drop-out’ is surprisingly broad however; the phenomenon is identified among pupils in elementary or middle schools, students of universities, even among those enrolled in doctoral studies, among adult learners in professional courses, and those involved in distance learning (Black and Sim, 1990; Brown, 1996; Golde, 1994; Romanik and Blazer, 1990). The issue in most of the studies is, then, what independent variable predicts alienation, that is, dropping out. Researchers examine predictors such as ethnicity, physical handicaps, and learning difficulties (Brady, 1996; Cohen, 1991; Lichtenstein, 1993; Nightingale, 1993). It is hypothesized that students who are ‘at high risk’ for drop-out are probably to
be found among the ‘disadvantaged,’ an euphemism for students born into large families or into families of foreign extraction; for students of low S-E-S living in the ‘inner-city,’ that is to say, the poor (Kleese and D’Onofrio, 1994; York et al., 1993). Personality traits as independent variables which cause students to drop out have also been promulgated (see, for example: Kangas et al., 1991; Trusty and Dooley-Dickey, 1993; Von-Wald, 1992).

A growing sub-field of the literature on drop-outs is comprised of research into school failure and dropping-out among minority children and the children of immigrants. Bronfenbrenner’s (1992, 1979) view of the school as an alienating setting by contrast with the child’s primary developmental context, sheds light on the estrangement and suffering of Native American children placed in foster care in non-Indian families and sent to ‘regular’ schools, of Aboriginal children who are mainstreamed, of Indonesian children in families who have immigrated to the United States and of African American and Latino students (Avina, 1993; Calabrese and Poe, 1991; Kaplan and Eckerman, 1996; Root, 1995; Trueba et al., 1990). Fastening on perceived outcomes of schooling, Nightingale (1993) explains alienation (dropping out) among poor Black children by their discovery at quite an early age that their dreams are incommensurable with social opportunities.

Methodologically these studies are varied. Some researchers make use of closed questionnaires in order to measure what they call attitudes of alienation (see, for example, McCaul et al., 1992; Romanik and Blazer, 1990). But a steadily growing number of studies derive their descriptions of alienation from open interviews (among others, Black and Sim, 1990; Martinez et al., 1994) or even from observation of non-reactive elements in the environment (Scheibel, 1994).

Interested first and foremost in finding remedies for the increase in dropping out (alienation), educational researchers warn that there is a likelihood of negative consequences on mental health in adulthood (Kaplan et al., 1994) and on future economic status (Elder, 1991). Recommendations are to bring the consequences of dropping out to the attention of pupils (McCaul et al., 1992). There is, in fact, evidence that awareness, social bonding, and family support have helped even students ‘at high risk’ to persevere in their schooling (Barnett, 1995; Rosenthal, 1994). In a relatively small number of studies researchers propose improvements in schools and suggest community action (Bekuis, 1995; Burns, 1994; Glatthorn, 1995; Travis, 1995).

B.1.b. Curriculum

Concerted attempts to remedy alienation by repairing elements in the curriculum center on the assumption that alienation can be overcome by exercising judicious choice in learning materials. Discussions of alienation and the curriculum are, therefore, openly prescriptive.

Researchers who rely on surveys of students’ attitudes conclude that among the sources of student alienation are: inadequate honoring of minority languages in the school curriculum (Gonzales, 1993; Mar-Molinero, 1994), insufficient attention to culturally determined styles of learning (Hanley, 1995; Kiang, 1992),
and generational differences between teachers and pupils (Sidlik and Piburn, 1993; Spencer and Barth, 1991). Incorporation of studies oriented to the cultural traditions of non-majority groups is proposed as a means to prevent alienation (Escamilla, 1996; Gayle-Evans, 1993; Leder, 1992; Van-Hamme, 1996). Topics in social studies also figure in initiatives designed to promote de-alienation (Beauchamp, 1995; Nakayama, 1996). Some investigations look at elements in the hidden curriculum which are likely to contribute to students’ alienation (Kalekin-Fishman, 1996a; 1996b), and even to persistent violence in schools (Hunter, 1993; Toby, 1994). Despite the varied allusions, basically the methodological strategy for examining elements of alienation in the curriculum is uniform — qualitative content analysis.

B.1.c. Staff

During the last several years, staff alienation has been measured with the aid of scales of job satisfaction (in Germany) and verified with scales measuring loneliness (in Canada) (Van Buer et al., 1995; Dussault, 1995; Dussault and Thibodeau, 1996). Among student teachers, questionnaires have disclosed an inverse relationship between ‘hardiness,’ the capacity to cope with professional trials, and alienation (Thomson and Wendt, 1995).

In a qualitative mode, Jones (1993) sought out staff members whose life conditions were evidence of socially structured alienation. He explored feelings of alienation among professionals in college education who “deviated” from their departments’ norms in ethnic origin, physical traits, or gender. The interviews with “five African Americans, two Hispanics, one Native American, one Asian, two physically handicapped, and one female vocational education instructor” disclosed a range of alienated perceptions of American society with strong feelings of isolation and loneliness.

In general, there is extensive agreement with the claim that alienation is inevitable given the modes of teacher education and the structuring of pedagogy in most systems. The recommended remedies usually involve action on the part of the teachers themselves. Suggested correctives range from encouragement to develop ‘self-trust’ (Krupp, 1993); enhancing student ‘empowerment’ in teacher education (Vavrus, 1989); and developing a consciousness of the close affiliation of teaching and the generation of knowledge through research (Kalekin-Fishman, 1997; 1998). Recommendations for improvements in schools and in the structuring of careers are often postulated as solutions, too (see, for example, Little and McLaughlin, 1993, and their extensive references).

B.2. Social Work

The study of alienation is integral to the ameliorative raison d’etre of social work. The professional agenda of the social worker is implicitly based on Merton’s (1957) theory that alienation is evidenced in the inter-play of an espousal of normative
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or non-normative means and the accomplishment of normative or non-normative goals. Researchers who focus on issues in social work study non-normative behaviors, such as violence, including violence to self through suicide, or through the abuse of alcohol and drugs, and violence in interaction, i.e. crime and delinquency. Another central topic is that of how institutional structures exacerbate alienation among the elderly (Bethel, 1992; Dudley and Hillery, 1977), among already alienated young people who are in need of residential treatment (Noshpitz, 1992; see also Coughlin, 1977), and among prisoners (Bonner and Rich, 1992). The questions that confront researchers, therefore, are what causes alienation, on the one hand, and what behaviors require the intervention of social workers, on the other.

It has been found that abused youngsters are likely to develop alienating patterns of attachment in maturity and may demonstrate violent behavior (Cartwright, 1993; Lisak, 1994). Exposure to violence and crime have a similar impact (Thompson and Norris, 1992). Lack of social support has also been found to be associated ultimately with behavioral evidence of alienation (Watkins, Ward, Southard and Fisher, 1992); as has the neglect and evasion of respect for cultural difference (Van Tran, 1985; Van Tran, Wright and Mindel, 1987). In all of these studies, alienation is defined by quantitative measures — projective tests and closed questionnaires. Different aspects of alienation, i.e., high scores on appropriate tests, are correlated with syndromes of aberrant behaviors, among them gambling (Frey, 1984), drug abuse (Shedler and Block, 1991; Singleton, 1989; Sterk-Elifson and Elifson, 1992), and homelessness (Sosin, 1992). Researchers also draw conclusions about pathological conditions. A syndrome of marital alienation has been described as a cause of clinical depression (Ettinger, Fuls, Macri, Comissio, Lamb and Soucar, 1992). Alienation from community and family is salient among young people at risk for suicide (Grossman, Milligan and Deyo, 1991; Hunter, 1993; Skegg, Cox, and Broughton, 1995); while some theorize an “expendable child” syndrome as a direct cause of the inclination to self-destruction evidenced in anti-social subcultures, such as those of the skinhead movements, Satanism, and street gangs (Clark, 1992; Woznica and Shapiro, 1990).

As research in social work perceives reality, underlying mechanisms of alienation are described overall as ‘catastrophic learning,’ an unintended result of enculturation which heightens the tensions between the individual personality and the social structure (Cornelis, 1989). Events perceived to be stressful are often associated with such learning (Larose et al., 1993). Thus, in-service social workers are likely to suffer from resentment and alienation as a result of job stress and as a result of the stress entailed by exposure to the intimate problems of others (Lyon, 1993; Shinn, Rosario and Morch, 1984).

Despite recognition of the variety in the etiology of alienation, it is a condition perceived by researchers in social work to be tractable. Proposals include designs for organized programs which will change reality in social work practice with individuals (Frolich-Gildhoff, 1995; Rose, 1990) and in the community (Halpern, 1993). Professional training designed to educate radical social workers, equipping students with a historical view of social work and its accomplishments is, it is
believed, a way to improve the lot of social workers by fostering activism (Hunter and Saleeby, 1977; Lee, 1992; Levine and Levine, 1992). Thus, the model of social work as a professional road to empowerment, can be applied not only to clients but also to the members of the profession. In sum, it is the broadening authority of the social workers which holds the key to deliverance from alienation for the professionals and for their clients.

B.3. Psychiatry

Alienation as a specifically social concept has also been adopted into psychiatry, for psychiatrists are currently “seeking new ways to integrate biological, psychological, and environmental hypotheses of mental disorders” (Wenegrat, 1990; see also, Kolb, 1993; Mender, 1994). The trend follows on debates prominent in the profession since the nineteenth century (Forgas and Innes, 1989; Pichot, 1994). Today, measures of alienation are frequently combined with medical diagnoses in descriptions of mental health. Thus, researchers concentrate on tracing the interaction of personality, attitudes, and specific medical interventions, correlating different measures of the severity of psycho-pathological phenomena with alienation interpreted as ‘depersonalization’ (see, for example, Coulter, 1990; Jacobs and Bovasso, 1993; Levinthal, 1988).

The idea of buttressing psychiatry with ‘softer’ tools, enhancing the medical model with instrumentation from the social sciences, is necessarily making a significant difference in research and in treatment (Sokhey, Vasudev and Kumar, 1990). The combination has been of use in clarifying complexities of the (alienated) states of veterans who returned from Vietnam (Thompson, Thornby and Boeringa, 1995; see also, Figley and Leventman, 1990 [1980]). Measures of alienation have been found helpful in discriminating the mind sets and attachment behavior of people with borderline personality disorders from those of (normal) controls. They are also used to discern causes of diagnosed super-sensitivity in psychosis (Malcolm, 1992), and causes of perceived health among elderly coronary patients (Hildingh and Fridlund, 1992). Above all, the notion that alienation is entwined with evidence of mental (ill-) health has led to new approaches to treatment and counseling for adults with problems in sexual adjustment and for locating young people who are at risk for crime and suicide (Berman and Jobes, 1992; Mann-Feder, 1996; Hunter, 1995; New York Governor’s Advisory Committee for Black Affairs, 1988; Sirkin and Reuveni, 1992; Stokes and Damon, 1995; Wicks, Parsons and Capps, 1993).

In psychiatry, it is assumed that no other professionals, and certainly no laypersons, or patients, can handle alienation on their own. Remediation is cloaked in mystery; it is the exclusive prerogative of the medical practitioner, a domain to be penetrated only by certified psychiatrists.

As we have seen, the construct of alienation is currently playing a central role in research designed to clarify issues related to practice in education, social work, and psychiatry. On the whole, the approaches derive from a view of alienation
as a psychological phenomenon. We will now go on to look at studies which are part and parcel of the realm of sociology.

C. Alienation Research in the Realm of Sociology

In sociological studies of work, politics, gender and the family, researchers seek explanations for alienation which are relevant to social structure and to the individual.

C.I. Work

Recent research in the domain of work takes a gamut of approaches in regard to alienation. Some of the research derives directly from psychological presuppositions. Work-related alienation has been defined as an independent variable, an element in the structure of personality. Now classic studies of this kind include the work of Kohn who derived a view of alienation from investigations of stratification and its connections with values (Kohn, 1989; Slomczynski, Miller and Kohn, 1981). This perception is still prevalent. Post-office employees in Canada, for example, were judged to be derelict during an industrial crisis because they were alienated, i.e., were of a personality type which prevented requisite commitment to work (see Dent-Read and Zukov-Goldring, 1997). Among minority group professionals, the readiness to accept retirement was presumed to be meaningfully correlated with levels of alienation determined by pen and paper personality tests (Richardson and Kilty, 1992). Records of teachers’ strikes have also been taken to be evidence that members of the teaching profession are likely to suffer from the personality disorder of alienation (West and Palsson, 1988).

Most of the sociological studies in the field of work, however, derive from Marx’s formulation of alienation as the signal on-going outcome of a basic feature of the capitalist order, the class struggle. Whereas work as such is a natural activity in which human beings can express their interests and their talents; the organization of work under capitalism cuts people off from self-realization by depriving them of opportunities to decide what to do, how to do it, and why (Marx, 1964). Research such as Seeman’s (1967, cited above) constitutes a flat denial that alienation is inevitable under capitalism; and many activist sociologists take a similar view, searching for ways to effect de-alienation in ordinary places of work.

Alienation at work, therefore, is sometimes seen as a variable dependent on particular conditions. There are, for example, claims that it is possible to design the flow of work so as to create an “enabling” rather than an “alienating” organization (Adler and Buie, 1996). Rosner and Putterman (1992) found that with the introduction of “less alienating technologies,” it is possible to increase work satisfaction, and to ensure a process of de-alienation. Although he does not entirely accept the idea that alienation can be dodged, Morawski (1992) acknowledges that even if concessions to workers are not necessarily indicators
of true de-alienation, the fact that people perceive the concessions as beneficial can, in the long run, lead to systemic change. On the assumption that alienating perceptions arise when people do not have opportunities for self-fulfillment at work, Super, Sverko and Super (1995) present diversified evidence to the effect that connections between workers’ value systems and the prospect that (by realizing their personal goals and values) they could avoid alienation.

Other researchers, however, insist that the class struggle has not disappeared. In her research into the garment industry in Los Angeles, Bonacich (1992) found that the class struggle has simply taken on new forms and that “alienated social relations of capitalism are prevalent at all levels” (Bonacich, 1992: 166). Inter-group struggle is evident in many work environments. Unemployment — even temporary joblessness - has been defined as a sign of objective alienating conditions which lead to low self-esteem (Goldsmith and Blakely, 1992). A related explanation of alienation may be insecurity in employment such as the instability experienced by clerical workers who are called upon to fill temporary jobs (Goldsmith, 1989). Alienation may also be the lot of minorities and of specific professional groups. Yang (1995), for example, found alienation growing among Asian Americans because of stereotypical attitudes of co-workers; while police personnel become alienated because of their constant need to struggle against discriminatory and threatening practices which they encounter on the job (Hewitt, Poole and Regoli, 1985).

C.2. Politics

Recent research on alienation in politics relates to popular rationality, on the one hand, and affect, on the other. In order to understand voting behavior among older Americans of different ethnic origins, levels of alienation have been assessed on the basis of measures of internal or external locus of control (Cox, 1980; Peterson and Somit, 1992). When alienation is defined as affect, the levels of alienation are grasped as reasons for the acceptance or non-acceptance of the logic of politics, of new political initiatives (e.g., perestroika), and the tendency toward participation or non-participation (Carter, 1991; Jrnazyan, 1990; Muller, Crandell and Christianson, 1991; Sears, 1992). With the aid of a retrospective questionnaire, Korzeniowski (1994) found that alienation, i.e. frustration with the Polish government caused many Poles to forgo voting.

There are also studies which examine the relation between macro-trends and the alienation of individuals. Political independence and economic reconstruction in the former Communist states of eastern Europe have been shown to shape conditions which are alienating for a relatively high proportion of the population. In turn, widespread alienation perpetuates tensions in civil society (Kutsar, 1998; Trumm, 1996). Attempts to establish liberal democracy in post-Peron Argentina, on the other hand, can be seen to have been undermined by already pervasive alienation (Gimenez, 1992). On the basis of her analysis, Gimenez (1992: 191) points out that “alienation from the conditions of social reproduction [is] an important and potentially destabilizing set of structural and subjective conditions”
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(Gimenez, 1992: 191). By contrast, Orkin (1992) shows that the African National Congress became increasingly effective in South Africa during the 1980s because of an ideology which called for what he calls ‘agentiveness’ and ‘contranomia’ — activism and resistance antipodal to the apathy and alienation recognized as possible in the beliefs expounded by other Black groups.

C.3. Gender and the Family

Alienation is an important focus in the fields of gender and family studies, and can in fact be seen as a life pattern in many cases (Simsarian, 1988; Zanardi, 1990). In general, problems of gender studied from historical and biographical perspectives lend themselves to explication in terms of alienation (Griffin, 1994; Lawrence, Benedikt and Valsiner, 1992; Wood, 1994). The construct of alienation is useful as a tool for analyzing the effects of the skewed gender distribution in the professions (Bagilhole, 1993; Coll and Rice, 1993; Gallos, 1992; Vianello et al., 1990). In framing a view of gender and sexual identities, constructs of alienation are deployed to measure and explain the situation of gays and lesbians (Benjamin, 1990; Lampela, 1996; Lee, 1994; Walling, 1993). An analysis of the alienating conditions of urban life, including social disorganization, unemployment, and economic inequality have been shown to interact with sexism as a functional explanation of the differential rate of rape in different states in the United States of America (Baron and Strauss, 1989).

While studies of alienation related to education or to social work emphasize the restorative potential of family for preventing and even for curing alienation; many sociologically oriented studies show that family life may actually foster alienation. In milieus where women are pressed into traditional gender molds, alienation is experienced among women regardless of class (Campos, 1998). Moreover, women who have migrated from their homelands learn that relations with their spouse, like relations with their extended family may be just as alienating as are the conditions of social adaptation to their new lands (Abraham, 1998; Ralston, 1998).

D. Theoretical Conceptualizations of Alienation

Conceptualizations of alienation have been formulated by theoreticians in economics and in psychology as well as in sociology. The images of alienation in each area indicate manifold approaches to explications of underlying theory.

D.1. Alienation in Economic Thought

Current writing on the history of economic thought demonstrates the significance of alienation for economists. Theoreticians in economics ignore social psychological dimensions of alienation and anomie for the most part.
Economists who relate to alienation are concerned with revising interpretations of the place of alienation in Marxian political economy and with explaining the increase of economic exploitation today in terms of structures (Archibald, 1992; Elster, 1986; Fitzgibbons, 1995; Gordon, 1994; Guidi, 1993; Henderson, 1986; Rothbard, 1995; Sherman, 1987; Smith, 1994; Stanfield, 1979; West and Hafer, 1979). Alienation is also highlighted as the motive underlying tactics adopted to perpetuate ownership and as an outcome of the denial of rights to property (Bell, 1995; Kinsey, 1992; Lundahl and Ndela, 1992; Plumley, 1992). The crossroads of economics and work — intellectual production and volunteer work — also enable a clarification of alienation in the wider societal context (Bocock, 1993; Hamrin, 1992; Stabile, 1996; Thompson and Bono, 1993; Tobin, 1992).

D.2. Alienation in Psychological Theory

In the course of the last quarter century, there have been important proposals for theorizing alienation in psychological terms. Stokols (1975) advanced a comprehensive developmental theory of alienation with an explanation of its persistence. His theory is based on a view of ongoing relationships (dyadic or group) in which the experience of being thwarted causes alienation. The interplay between the extent of deterioration in the relationships and the salience of alternatives induces different types of behavior. Hacker (1994) follows up on the developmental theory of Piaget, and proposes that alienation is an outcome of conflicts which arise when a person is at the stage of honing her capacities for abstract thought. In the sphere of psycho-analysis, Meissner (1974) interpreted alienation in the conventional terms of his field as an outcome of the devaluation of the father and his social world. The depression, narcissism, and aggression which are derivatives of disillusionment, turn into the roots of undesirable developments of alienation in society. Lacan (1986/1977), on the other hand, explains alienation as part of the language processes which structure how the subject signifies for the Other, separating out into individuality.

Historical studies of psychology have extended theoretical understandings of alienation while facilitating revisions of overarching approaches to psychological theory (Kuhns, 1993; Lewes, 1988; Rendon, 1991; Sexton and Vande-Kemp, 1991; Stern, 1993; Wertz, 1989). An inter-weaving of ideas about alienation with theories of adolescent psychology has led to an elaboration of engagement theory and attachment theory, and hence to a broader theoretical understanding of gang violence (Aberbach, 1995; Mathews, 1992; Roth and Damico, 1994; Sack et al, 1996). Theoretical explorations of alienation continue to enhance studies of culture, among them research on youth culture (Arnett, 1991; Rordam, 1992) and theories of alienation are deployed to describe the differences between the ‘high’ and the ‘low’ cultures of music and literature (Gorman, 1990; Pressley, 1992). Graham and Stephens (1994) have elaborated a theory of ‘philosophical psycho-pathology’ by analyzing how introspective alienation (self-estrangement) is caused and how it affects human development.
The theorization of alienation in psychology is, in short, encased in the frameworks of psychological models. In these perspectives, alienation and anomie are combined with no special attention to the differences in their terms of reference or to possible variations in behavioral outcomes. Even when a psychologist declares that he is exploring the sociological implications of a deviant state, as does Mitchell (1988), he is content to list alienation and anomie together as a single type of incompetence which limits the “flow experience.”

Some researchers in the field of social work attribute the spread of alienation and anomie to social trends, especially to religious orientations which emphasize individualism (Gianetti, 1979; Roberts, 1991). But these are not the only social conditions which are considered to cause alienation. Unrecognized feelings of shame and rage are likely to develop from threats to what Scheff (1994) calls “the social bond.” He explains how unacknowledged feelings of rage lead to alienation, and provide the roots for prolonged conflict, even to outright war.

D.3. Theorizing Alienation in Sociology

As noted above, sociological theorizing on alienation has expanded in several directions, much of it in response to Seeman’s (1959) summarizing concepts. For one thing the assumption that normlessness (anomie) could be linked in tandem with the dimensions of alienation defined by Marx (powerlessness, meaninglessness, and self-estrangement) has aroused fruitful debates since Lukes’ work on the distinction between the two overarching constructs. In regard to alienation, theoreticians have articulated several orientations to the construct, developing among them, an interpretation in line with a neo-liberal approach to alienation, a systems analysis approach, a post-modernist and ‘new age’ view of alienation, as well as an exploration of alienation in critical theory. Throughout there is an attempt to distinguish alienation from anomie. I will start from this point.

E. Alienation and Anomie

Sociologists have cautiously specified the many-faceted distinctions between the two theoretical constructs of alienation and anomie. Orru (1989) traces the concept of anomie and its uses from ancient times, demonstrating that anomie has taken on different meanings during different historical periods. Displaying the variability of its uses, he draws conclusions about ethical considerations and normative assumptions underlying contemporary literature on anomie. Investigating the meeting-ground of the individual and society as expressed by suicide, as well as by militarism and crime, Powell (1988) examines anomie in terms of experience and orientations toward reality. Taking as his point of departure the understanding that both anomie and alienation represent conditions that should be overcome, Schweitzer (1991; Schweitzer and Geyer, 1989) describes the differences between the two by contrasting what is required for ‘dis-anomie’ and what is required for
de-alienation. Because the concept of anomie as developed by Durkheim is infused with a view of human nature as debased and a view of the collective as a force for the good; social constraint on freedom and on spontaneity is the determining factor in effecting a release from anomie. By contrast, the Marxian view of alienation encourages probing for individual autonomy (see also, Orkin, 1992).

E.1. Approaches to Theorizing Alienation in Schools of Sociology

Theoretical analyses of alienation have diverse political agendas. I will discuss four of these agendas.

E.1.a. Neo-liberalism and Alienation

An important stream of theoretical analysis harmonizes conceptualizations of alienation with a democratic ideology and implicitly with the ideology espoused by Durkheim. Oldenquist (1992) opposes the pressure to overcome alienation by an excessive emphasis on autonomy. A democratic ethos recognizes that political freedom must be “consistent with community.” In his view, autonomy may be interpreted to mean “freedom from social shaping and conditioning.” When this happens autonomy paradoxically becomes “a primary cause of alienation” (Oldenquist, 1992: 59). Defending sociology against dogma, Horowitz (1996) praises the ‘pragmatic utility’ of alienation conceived of as a relational concept parallel to, and not necessarily opposed to integration. Ahponen (1996) questions the possibility of ensuring civil rights based as she says on the majority principle, as minorities learn to press for concrete evidence of de-alienation through political equity. Equally interested in democracy, Orkin (1996) also develops a theoretical approach to cognizing and assessing the potential for democracy and an activist civil society by applying criteria of citizenship and commitment.

E.1.b. Systems Theory and Alienation

Various conceptualizations of the world as system lead to different approaches to the question of alienation. As a partisan of ‘second-order cybernetics,’ Geyer (1996) positions sociology among the sciences of complexity identified by Prigogine and Stenger (1984). Theorized gaps among the different systemic levels provide a dynamic description and explanation of the kinds of processes that characterize post-modernity. Geyer shows, furthermore, that it is possible to grasp the different dimensions of alienation described by Seeman (1959) in terms of the processes of ‘complexification’ and the interweaving of different levels of systems, which are constantly in a state of transition. With a slightly different perception of the implications of systems theory, Misheva (1998)
advances a model of systemic causes of totalitarianism, intended to be applicable universally. She is able to show that conditions for producing political evils are not restricted to modernity, were known in ancient times as well, and can, given the nature of social systems, arise again.

E.1.c. Post-modernism and the ‘New Age’ View of Alienation

Among sociologists who define themselves as post-modernists, alienation is theorized as the inevitable human condition in contemporary, uniquely fragmented society. The program of post-modernism: to experiment in art, to philosophize multiplicity, and to look upon the social bond as being tested in a satirized politics, is a thorough-going definition of the dominion of alienation (Lyotard, 1989: 193). From their reading of theory and of cultural reality, theoreticians of post-modernism conclude that a view of alienation as a structured phenomenon which is remediable (even conceptually) has no verisimilitude and is not viable (Crook, Pakulski and Waters, 1992; Schacht, 1996). Gergen (1991) has described the ultimate in alienation in his vision of the ‘saturated self,’ the individual constantly in jeopardy because of a surfeit of information. Exposed to the mass media, with constant access to computers, we are easily shown to be “awash with symbolic representations” (Woolley, 1992: 246) and alienated from the inner self as well as from the intimate surround.

It is only to be expected that pessimistic acceptance of alienation (disguised as harsh facetiousness) which is integral to post-modernism should arouse counter-theorizing. Directly related to a post-modernist interpretation of alienation theory because it presents polar opposition to it, is the “New Age” conceptualization of de-alienation. According to this framework, alienation must be overcome by individual regeneration through the renewed encounter with religious values. On the grounds that post-modernism cannot blot out the interest in and need for overcoming alienation, Wexler (1996a; 1996b; 1998) seeks out bridges between sacred and secular solutions to alienation. His argument is that de-alienation can be achieved (by individuals) through a resacralization of culture and a resacralization of the self. This approach to alienation is shared in the large by theorists such as Castoriadis (1990–1991) who relates to the crisis of identification, Lewis (1980) who proposes ‘culture building’ as a means for strengthening community, and the psychologists Kerr and Apter (1991), who propose a psychology of reversal which seems to promise a retreat from alienation (see, too, Brown, 1985).

E.1.d Critical Theory and Alienation

Another response to post-modernism is the development of a theorization of alienation in the framework of critical theory. Taking issue with the playful indifference implied by post-modernist theorizing, O’Neill (1995: 195) insists, “Life-worlds cannot be subject to remorseless parody or to an unremitting gaze
of alienation without this impulse turning against itself and poisoning its original desire to show how things and relations between people might have been.” Gottdiener goes back to critique the “static and unidimensional state connoted by Habermas’s Lebenswelt” which, to his mind, underlies post-modernist orientations. He reads everyday life as a “dialectical tension between alienation and self-liberation” (Gottdiener, 1996: 144). The point is that it is necessary to assess social change in terms of behavior and interaction rather than in the abstract terms of textuality and rules of discourse. Concurring with this view, Schweitzer (1996) shows that through the passive acceptance of what is, the science of sociology is implicated in the non-humanistic, even anti-humanistic practices that are easily derived from empiricistic reifications of alienation. In making a case for humanism, Langman and Scatamburlo (1996) depart from the writings of Marx and Gramsci, and defend a similar stand by reference to political urgency in a world where oppressed groups are struggling for emancipation.

Among the sociologists who theorize alienation in neo-Marxist terms, there is a pervasive concern with the fate of individuals in this world of “post” everything which verges on positivism (Markovic, 1989; Vandenberghe, 1996). This type of theorization links up with different arenas of life. In the domain of work, Archibald, (1996) is interested in postulating the conditions which make it possible for alienated workers to rebel. In the domain of socialization, Kalekin-Fishman (1981; 1991) shows how alienation is passed on from generation to generation. Macey (1996) theorizes alienation as scapegoating, marginalization, and the social exclusion of minority groups, and these cause uncertainty and insecurity, among members of majority groups throughout the world. She concludes that the displacement of alienation leads to inequality and oppression. In analyzing alienated selfhood, Langman (1992; 1998) looks at loneliness in the shopping mall, and at the negation of joy through the virtual carnivals of television and computer entertainment.

F. Problems in Connecting Theory and Research

In this overview of how alienation is currently figuring in research and theory, we have encountered a wide range of accomplishments. From research connected with several disciplines apart from sociology, theoretical studies of alienation which are serious explorations of meaningful issues have emerged. Yet, when all is said and done, the very diffusion presents a puzzle. In what follows I will sketch some difficulties that the many studies have not solved.

A curious paradox strikes us when we look at research in which alienation is an important factor. The more diverse the uses, the less flexible and responsive the research is and the less theoretically informed. It is worthwhile to recall that nineteenth century research on alienation (and on anomie) was distinguished by a global approach. Characteristics of the human condition were discerned and described theoretically, and they were examined obliquely on a societal scale. Marx defined macro-economic processes and analyzed them in accordance with his theoretical grasp of the problems which they shaped, including the problem of
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alienation. Durkheim similarly worked out a view of society and of a science of society; and then implemented a methodology to discover and explain social facts, the data pertinent to an understanding of society as a whole. In both cases the situation of the individual was understood to be a counterpart to social structures and processes. Alienation studies today show a curious detachment of method from theory.

As Schweitzer (1996) points out, empirical methods have taken a turn to uniformity. Across the various domains in which alienation is investigated, there is a remarkable consistency in the methods deployed, and concomitantly a deliberate evasion of conceptual distinctions. A complex human condition with implications for practice in all areas of life is translated into clusters of variables and correlations. Methodologically there has been a decline in the sophistication of statistical analyses of the macro-society and in the triangulation of macro- and micro-data in order to demonstrate mechanisms effects of which people may not be aware. The dimensions of alienation proposed by Seeman (1959) have turned into mechanical assessments.

In the interest of presumably precise rationality, a majority of researchers rely on aggregations of individuals’ responses to pen and pencil tests of anomie/anomia (Srole, 1956) and alienation (see Seeman, 1991) interchangeably. Test scores are routinely correlated with measures of psychological constructs such as self-esteem, stress, state/trait anxiety, and so on without regard for distinctions among levels of analysis (Belkin, Greene, Rodrigue and Boggs, 1994; De Man, 1990; Hoge and Hoge, 1989; Moore, Thompson-Pope and Whited, 1996; Peck and Klemmack, 1980). The issue of how probable it is that people could have a clear awareness of alienation is evaded when respondents are simply asked to describe what they feel either by means of a closed questionnaire, or in highly structured interviews (Tobacyk and Pirttila-Backman, 1992; Travis, 1993). All these techniques fit easily into the positivistic penchant for deploying neat reductive instrumentation. Such research serves a political agenda of ordering social groups on continua of deficiencies. We can judge the political implications of the trend by recalling who, in sum, the alienated are.

Relegation to the ranks of the alienated carries with it the stigma of outcast status in relation to some measure of cultural value. By noting the samples studied and the qualities to which the blemish of alienation is attached, we can detect conventional biases in social grouping. Whether fixed in the assumptions or in hypotheses and findings of the studies noted above, the ‘alienated’ are regularly the poor, the non-whites, those adjudged mentally ill, those who for whatever reason do not comply with institutional requirements. These include populations of the perennially troublesome younger generation, and of course the delinquents. But these ranks also include activists in the sphere of work, and in the realm of gender. Because of their almost exclusive focus on the deprived and on those who are declared different, an overwhelming proportion of alienation research points an accusing finger at groups which surface as those who are upsetting social standards and preventing the world from conducting itself on an even keel.

The distinctions spelled out by Kaplan (1964) between hierarchical theories and concatenated theories, between monadic theories and field theories; and
between theories according to the difference in their scope — contribute to an explanation of why researchers who have tried to characterize alienation unambiguously have often opted for thin description and meager elucidation. In research practice subtleties have been sacrificed, and formulaic solutions have been contrived to sidestep fundamental issues. Among these are the issues of agency and its limits, of the scope of possible relations between agency and structure, interchanges among different levels of structure, and the systematicity of everyday life. All of these are issues related to the intricacies of language and the consequentiality of meaning — arenas in which theoreticians are at work. But theoreticians of alienation are not providing the kind of support which can lead to methodological enlightenment or to the repair of research orientations. In a very real sense, the theoreticians have neglected their basic responsibility, that of pointing the way to theoretically inform-able practice — practice as research in the domain of social science and practice as action in the world.

In alienation theorizing there is much writing which is resonant and well-intentioned, but most of it is sadly sterile in the sense that theorization is disconnected from clear directives for what is involved in research. Ironically, despite the wide differences in the avowed goals of theoreticians of alienation, the multiplicity of orientations and the (let us say it) rather smug self-enclosure in a world of theory, are leading the study of alienation into a passage without egress. Still, as we have shown, alienation is indeed flourishing in research and in sectorial theory. Despite the pervasive negative grasp of alienation as a social phenomenon, the tenor of the cumulated approaches is a fulfillment of the post-modern phantasm — a total fall into alienation. Is there then even a semblance of hope? The last section proposes that slightly different conclusions are at least possible.

G. By Way of Conclusion: Living as Alienation

In the theoretical writings of the 1990s, the impact of theorists of all stripes who relate to experiences salient in real life, can be epitomized as the unabashed specification of political projects. Gergen (1996), who refuses to give in to the deconstruction of alienation, still insists that there are options for creating relationships in communities which can be designed to overcome alienation. The hope of drawing boundaries about a location where one can foster altruistic relationships grows out of the image of contemporary society as beset by endless variety, by competitiveness, and by permanent exposure to risks (Beck, 1992). These theoretical analyses lead us to a perception of alienation as a condition which, rather than undermining the capacity of people to deal with a complex world, makes it possible for them to find the niches in which they can flourish.

A detailed attack on the view that alienation is an unmitigated danger is that of Coser (1991) who demonstrates that the multiplicity of roles that people are called upon to play in modern society can be seen as a source of emotional health, potency, and creativity rather than as a cumulative project of fragmentation. Although she elaborates on the difficulties that women encounter in the struggle
for filling satisfying roles, she shows that it is not modernity or post-modernity, but rather the persistence of traditionalism which prevents half the human race, women, from coming into their own.

As we drift into a new millennium, when, as Gergen (1991; 1994), Kellner (1988; 1989; 1990; 1995), and Gotttdiener (1996), among others, insist, we are overwhelmed by the availability of information, by the accessibility of media; by relationships with people at a distance whether indexed by stratum or mileage; the behaviors that converge to the practice of alienation can be recognized as sets of flexible repertoires for encountering and coping with dissimilar and often incompatible challenges.

An indicator of the successful cross between alienation and novel situations is the strength of what is called Generation X, and their capacity for “playing their strengths” against many odds (Hall, 1995). When we look back on the researches of Seeman (1967) and Willis (1977) we can see that the Generation X have done no more than re-invent a well-known form of life. The tools of post-modernity are well-known and constitute a re-connection with experienced reality. Coping with the apperception of excess structure and content is actually another way of designating the kinds of parrying that people have been doing for a very long time in places of work, in families, in schools, in leisure activities, and calling them 'life.' It would seem that with the recognition of the ways in which it becomes possible to deal with a fragmented identity in times of post-modernity, academic circles have finally caught on to the maneuvers which the socially, economically, and politically deprived have been deploying in privacy and, to some extent, in secrecy. Instead of thinking of alienation as a state which can be wiped away, we can now grasp it as a means for exploring the wealth of diversity in human existence. The many-layered revelation of alienation has in a sense metamorphosed from an omen of doom into a venture geared for celebration. In sociology this celebration should take on the challenge of reconnecting theory with specific disciplinary practice.

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Endnotes

1. One of the difficulties encountered in defining alienation theoretically can be attributed to narrow interpretations of how theory is/should be constructed in the social sciences and of what theory implies for method. In his text on *The conduct of inquiry* Kaplan (1964) furnishes a framework that is helpful. Citing specific theories in physics as well as in the social sciences, he points out that scientific theories in whatever discipline are not all members of the same ‘family’ (Wittgenstein, 1965 [1958]). Kaplan distinguishes among theories according to their structure, the range of phenomena they are capable of explaining, and the scope of explanation they offer. The two broad structural types of theory are hierarchical theories, with “component laws ... presented as deductions from a small set of basic principles”; and concatenated theories with “component laws [which] enter into a network of relations so as to constitute an identifiable configuration or pattern” (Kaplan, 1964, p. 298). Distinctions made on the basis of the range of phenomena with which a theory deals — in Kaplan’s terms, its explanatory shell — can encompass any range of phenomena from large-scale (macro-) phenomena, to micro-phenomena of the minutest scale. The scope of explanation proffered by different theories may differ as well. While field theories assume that relations are fundamental and explain elements by reference to their connections; monadic theories take elements as the basic components of any given phenomenon, and undertake to explain relations by reference to discrete factors (Kaplan, 1964, pp. 300–301). These refinements make it possible for us to look at alienation as a complex summary term for a configuration of phenomena rather than as a singular theory designed to describe and explain a circumscribed set of events. Within the configuration there are, moreover, sub-formations patterned diversely in different regions — which require
explanatory shells of varied ‘perimeters.’ All told, the foundation of alienation as a construct is in a field of relations, but there are areas of interest in which a monadic approach does provide needed information. To sum up, alienation is not a single theory, but a concatenated set of theories. Within this set, there are sub-theories which themselves represent concatenated patterning, but there are also hierarchical sub-theories which point to isolable indicators. In either case explanations may be formulated in terms of discrete elements or in terms of a comprehensive field, for the conceptualization of alienation may apply to different ranges of phenomena. All told, therefore, the theories of alienation combine into a mind-set, an approach to explicating the human condition in all its variety. This is a heavy load of duty, and we may well understand why theoreticians are likely to restrict themselves to a given area of exploration, and why researchers are not likely on their own to find indisputable ways of describing alienation, or ways of presenting unequivocal explanations.
Medical Sociology at the Millennium

William C. Cockerham

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the global state of medical or health sociology at the end of the 20th century. This is an especially important time for this field of specialization as major social, economic, and political transformations in the wider society are affecting health policy, social welfare systems, the health of populations, and the work of medical sociologists.

This transformation is caused by postmodern social change which is bringing about a new social order in the 21st century. While there is considerable debate in the literature about the nature of postmodernity and the degree to which its fundamental premise about the deconstruction of modern society can be supported, it is nonetheless clear that modern social conditions are changing. Postmodernity refers to the oncoming social and political era that is currently evolving, in a historical sense, out of the recent and current modern period; thus, the term “postmodern” represents what George Ritzer (1997: 6) conceptualizes as “a new historical epoch, new cultural products, and a new type of theorizing about the social world.” This perspective is based upon the observation that something new is indeed occurring in modern society and replacing or modifying the social realities created by the industrial age. As Barry Smart (1993: 39) explains: “The idea of postmodernity indicates a modification or change in the way(s) in which we experience and relate to modern thought, modern conditions, and modern forms of life, in short to modernity.”

Given the fact that we are experiencing the onset of new social conditions as society moves beyond the 20th century, the close relationship between health and society is likely to undergo change as well. Consequently, medical sociologists need to anticipate and adjust to the new realities associated with postmodern change. The focus of this chapter will be on tracing the historical development of medical sociology worldwide and assessing its position relative to changing social conditions in the final decade of the 20th century. Medical sociology is the study of the social causes and consequences of health and illness (Cockerham and Ritchey, 1997). Some practitioners prefer the use of the term “health sociology” since the field of specialization’s interests extend beyond the medical environment,
but “medical sociology” will be used here since it is the traditional name of the field. Medical sociologists investigate the social aspects of health and disease, the social functions of health organizations and institutions, the relationship of health care delivery systems to other social systems, the social behavior of health care providers and people who are consumers of such care, and the patterns of health services established by society. Medical sociology has evolved into a mature subdiscipline; its practitioners now number in the thousands, have established teaching and research roles in academic and health institutions, find employment opportunities within and outside of academia, and conduct work supported by an extensive body of literature developed over the last fifty years.

Today, medical sociology comprises one of the largest and most active sociological specialties in the developed world and the subdiscipline is expanding in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the formerly socialist countries of Europe (Cockerham and Ritchey, 1997; Ostrowska, 1996; Sonoda, 1988). This is an enviable position for a field which did not fully emerge until after World War II. However, as the 21st century approaches, there is both optimism and concern for its future. Optimism results from the subdiscipline’s growth, successes, quality of work, and capability to answer important questions about the powerful relationship between health and society. Overall, it can be concluded that medical sociology has become a global discipline and ranks high in popularity and usefulness at the turn-of-the-century. There are, however, important areas of concern related to funding, competition from other fields, and ties to general sociology (Pescosolido and Kronenfeld, 1995). Yet this paper will argue that the major challenge confronting medical sociology is the new reality of postmodern social change. In order to determine where medical sociology is today, it is useful to know where it has been. We will therefore begin with a review of the origins of the field of specialization (1897–1955), its golden age (1956–1970), and period of maturity (1971–1989). The challenges and advances of medical sociology in the 1990s will then be discussed and a determination made of the state of the field at the turn-of-the-century.

A. Origins of Medical Sociology (1897–1955)

A major factor in medical sociology’s development is that it began with a different orientation than many of sociology’s core specialties. Areas like theory, social stratification, urbanization, social change, and religion had direct roots in 19th century European social thought. Medical sociology, however, appeared in strength only in the mid-20th century as an applied field in which sociologists could produce knowledge useful in treating disease and developing public policy in health matters. Medical sociology evolved largely because of government efforts in Western countries to improve social conditions and promote health in the aftermath of World War II. Medical sociology was the prototype social science funded by governments for coping with the problems of the Welfare State and industrial society at mid-century (Cockerham, 1983). The intent was to use medical sociology as a tool for identifying and helping solve social problems causing poor health, and to improve
patient care. Ample funding in both the United States and Western Europe not only encouraged such research but stimulated sociologists and health practitioners to change their fields and adopt medical sociology as their specialty (Johnson, 1975). Medical sociology thus came into existence because there was money and jobs. Some participants had no training in medical sociology or even a course in sociology (Claus, 1982; Illsley, 1975).

The earliest work and possibly the only one among the classical social theorists that can be linked to modern-day medical sociology is Emile Durkheim’s (1951) famous study of suicide in 1897. Durkheim’s notion of social integration anticipated current concepts of social support in stress research and his study established a precedent for sociological investigations of health problems (Pescosolido and Kronenfeld, 1995). Yet Durkheim’s interest was not in health or suicide per se, but in demonstrating that sociology was an independent science and capable of explaining such phenomenon as differences in suicide rates. Consequently, the work did not lead to the establishment of medical sociology.

Physicians, not sociologists, published the first two works entitled Medical Sociology. Both were collections of essays on medicine and society, one written by Elizabeth Blackwell in 1902 and the other by James Warbasse in 1909. Blackwell is perhaps better known as the first woman to graduate from an American medical school (Geneva Medical College in New York). A more influential treatise was the 1935 article by biologist-physician Lawrence Henderson of Harvard University on “The Physician and Patient as a Social System” which appeared in the New England Journal of Medicine. Henderson introduced a number of ideas, such as the doctor-patient role relationship and the notion of equilibrium in social relationships, which were major influences on Talcott Parson when he was a Harvard student (Gerhardt, 1989).

Although physicians were showing interest in medical sociology in the early 20th century, sociologists focused their attention elsewhere. Much of sociology had been developed in opposition to biological theories and social Darwinist concepts explaining differences in human behavior and group life on the basis of innate biological or genetic characteristics. Durkheim, in particular, rejected biology as the sole explanation of social interaction. Rather, he believed that social behavior had to be explained from the standpoint of factors that are distinctly sociological, namely, norms, values, and status differences. Medicine was also ignored by sociology’s founding fathers because it was not an institution shaping the structure and nature of society to the same extent as class distinctions, modes of economic production, religion, and other basic social processes. What motivated sociologists to recognize medical sociology as an “official” area of sociological inquiry was (1) the realization that medical practice represented a unique and interesting segment of society with its own institutions, roles, occupations, and behavioral settings which needed study and (2), as noted, the substantial financial support available after World War II to study the social causes of health and illness (Hollingshead, 1973; Johnson, 1975; Parsons, 1951). Medicine, in turn, was showing increasing interest in medical sociology because of the prevalence of chronic diseases in modern societies and their connection to social behavior, along with the link between social problems and poor health.
Particularly significant was the establishment of the National Institute of Mental Health in the United States in the late 1940s that was instrumental in encouraging and funding joint sociological and medical projects. Also, in 1949, the Russell Sage Foundation funded a new program to improve the utilization of social science research in medical practice. One result of this program was the publication of *Social Science in Medicine* (Simmons and Wolf, 1954), followed a few years later by *Sociology and the Field of Public Health* (Suchman, 1963). Both of these books discussed the practical aspects of medical sociology. At the point (late 1940s) that large-scale funding initially became available, medical sociology was an applied field.

However, a major event occurred in 1951 that oriented the subdiscipline in a theoretical direction as well. This was the publication of Parsons' widely anticipated book *The Social System*. Included in his complex structural-functionalist model of society linking social systems to corresponding systems of culture and personality, this book contained Parsons' concept of the sick role. This concept still provides the most systematic account of the behavior of sick persons in developed societies and ranks as one of the most important theoretical contributions to medical sociology. Having a theorist of Parsons' stature render the first major theory in medical sociology brought intellectual recognition to the field of specialization that it needed in its early development (Cockerham, 1983, 1998; Pescosolido and Kronenfeld, 1995). By bringing a concept of health and medicine into his general scheme of society, Parsons was the first major theorist to demonstrate the role of medicine in macro-level social systems. And he did so within the parameters of classical social theory by drawing on the work of Durkheim and Max Weber to support his analysis. Although extensive criticism was to subsequently lessen the acceptance of his ideas generally, this outcome does not negate the significant impact Parsons had on helping medical sociology become academically respectable (Cockerham, 1998; Cockerham and Ritchey, 1997).


Beginning in the mid-1950s, medical sociology became a major area of sociological inquiry and research in the United States. Following Parsons, other leading scholars in American sociology, such as Robert Merton, Howard Becker, and Irving Goffman conducted studies in the field. Merton and his colleagues in *The Student Physician* (1957) extended the functionalist mode of analysis to the socialization of medical students, with Renée Fox’s paper on training for uncertainty ranking as a particularly important contribution. A highly significant book by August Hollingshead and Fredrick Redlich, entitled *Social Class and Mental Illness: A Community Study*, followed in 1958. This landmark research produced important evidence that social class could be correlated with different types of mental disorders and the psychiatric care people receive. This study attracted international attention and is the foundation for a considerable body of literature on the powerful relationship between class position and the extent and
types of mental disorder in a population. The book was also important in influencing the establishment of community mental health centers in the United States in the 1960s.

A short time later, Howard Becker, Anselm Strauss, and their associates published *Boys in White: Student Culture in Medical School* (1961), a study of medical school socialization conducted from a symbolic interactionist perspective. This book, which became a sociological classic, was important for both its theoretical and methodological context. The techniques in participation observation employed in *Boys in White* proved to be the basis for subsequent innovations in theory and methods developed by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss in *The Discovery of Grounded Theory* (1967). These books and other significant work on death and dying, chronic illness, and health professions established Strauss as a major figure in medical sociology. In addition to Strauss, Hollingshead, and Fox, other American sociologists produced important work that established medical sociology as a respected field in the United States and elsewhere. Included among these scholars are Ronald Anderson, Odin Anderson, Samuel Bloom, John Clausen, Rodney Coe, Fred Davis, Howard Freeman, Eliot Freidson, Eugene Gallagher, James House, Sol Levine, John McKinley, David Mechanic, Virginia Olesen, Leonard Pearlin, Leo Reeder, Richard Scott, Stephen Shortell, Rosemary Stevens, Edward Suchman, Irving Zola, and others.

The introduction of symbolic interactionist research into a field of specialization previously dominated by functionalism caused medical sociology to become a battlefield between two of sociology’s major theoretical schools. A virtual flood of publications appeared in the 1960s with symbolic interaction dominating a significant portion of the literature. One feature of this domination was the numerous studies conducted with reference to labeling theory and the controversy it provoked. Although labeling theory pertained to deviant behavior generally, the focal point of discussion was the mental patient experience (Scheff, 1966). Other research focused on stigma, stress, and the ability of families to cope with mental disorder. For example, Goffman’s *Asylums* (1961), a study of life in a mental hospital, featured his concept of “total institutions” and the book as a whole was a major influence in the deinstitutionalization of mental patients in the 1960s. The numerous studies published during this period on mental health resulted in this research category becoming a major subfield within medical sociology with an extensive literature of its own (Cockerham, 1996).

Three other areas of research were also important at this time. First, was health services utilization involving comparisons of various social groups in the help-seeking process. Major studies included Freidson’s (1960) concept of the lay-referral system, Suchman’s study on beliefs and the acceptance of modern medicine among ethnic groups in New York City (1965a) and stages of the illness experience (1965b), and Zola’s (1966) research on ethnic differences in coping with illness among hospital patients. Second, was death and dying, where Glaser and Strauss (1965, 1968) produced significant studies of the dying process in hospitals. And third, was the study of medicine as a profession. The leading work was by Freidson, whose two books, *Profession of Medicine* (1970a) and *Professional Dominance* (1970b), set the standard for subsequent research on this topic. A related subject
was doctor-patient relations with Bloom’s book, *The Doctor and His Patient* (1963), an important work.

Other developments included the appearance of the first textbook in the field, *Medical Sociology*, by Norman Hawkins, published in 1958. Freeman, Levine, and Reeder edited the first of four prominent editions of the *Handbook of Medical Sociology* in 1963, while Coe (1970) and Mechanic (1968) published major textbooks. Additionally, the Medical Sociology Section of the American Sociological Association was established in 1962 and grew to become one of the largest sections (Bloom, 1986). The *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, founded in 1960, became an official publication of the American Sociological Association (ASA) in 1966, making medical sociology one of the few sociological subdisciplines to publish a journal under ASA sponsorship.

In the period under review (1956-1970), medical sociology had prospered in the United States. But Robert Straus (1957) observed a division in the field between sociologists working in medicine (who produced applied research primarily motivated by a medical problem) and sociologists of medicine (who studied the medical environment from a sociological perspective). The first group generally worked in medical schools and other health organizations, while the latter was typically employed in sociology departments in universities. A certain amount of tension developed between the two groups over whose work was the most important, with sociologists in medicine helping to solve medical problems and those in sociology departments conducting more theoretical studies within the context of mainstream sociology. Although the schism still exists, the tension has lessened as funding sources required applied work and studies in medical settings were increasingly guided by sociological perspectives, moreover, so many medical sociologists now perform their craft outside sociology departments that the distinction is further declining.

This situation has not evolved to any great degree outside of the United States because most medical sociologists in other countries are not found in sociology faculties but in medical and health organizations, and research institutes, or government agencies, performing teaching and/or research in applied settings. Great Britain was the first country after the United States to organize medical sociology as a specialty. Sociologists working in medicine held their first professional meeting in 1956 and formed the Medical Sociology Group of the British Sociological Association in 1964. The first British textbook was *Sociology in Medicine* (1962) by Mervyn Susser and William Watson. An important journal was founded in 1967, *Social Science and Medicine*, which serves a global audience of social scientists in several health fields and hosts a conference in Europe every two years. Among the British scholars who helped develop the field were Raymond Illsley, Mildred Blaxter, George Brown, Michael Bury, Anne Cartwright, Robert Dingwall, David Hughes, Margot Jefferys, and Graham Scambler.

In Germany, the beginning of medical sociology is often credited to a 1958 lecture given in Cologne by August Hollingshead at the invitation of René König (Claus, 1982; Siegrist and Rohde, 1976). Earlier, however, in 1953 and 1954, a set of studies in the journal *Soziale Welt*, addressed topics in medical sociology. Special supplements to the *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozial-
psychologie, West Germany’s leading sociology journal, were published on medical sociology in 1958 and 1970. Other noteworthy publications were Jürgen Rohde’s (1961) book on the sociology of the hospital and Manfred Pflanz’s (1962) monograph on the relationship between disease and social change. Prior to 1965 there were no full professor positions in medical sociology in West Germany. However, in 1970, a strong effort, completely unmatched in the development of any other West German academic discipline, was made to establish medical sociology. The impetus behind this action was a federal regulation that required medical sociology to be incorporated into the curriculum of medical schools, but courses were also added to the sociology curriculum in universities. In 1970 there were only six courses available in medical sociology in West Germany and West Berlin; by 1975, 80 courses had been established.

As 1970 drew to a close, medical sociology was more developed in the United States than elsewhere in the world. In many ways, especially in research and leading publications, the field was dominated by Americans. Yet a strong foundation existed in Great Britain and German medical sociology was very active. Medical sociology was also emerging in other countries and regions during this period, as seen in developments in Europe, Israel, Japan, and Latin America (Claus, 1982; Cockerham, 1983; Illsley, 1975; Johnson, 1975; Nunes, 1998; Ostrowska, 1996; Sonoda, 1988). Consequently, the International Sociological Association established Research Committee 15 on Medical Sociology in 1966 (renamed “Sociology of Health” in 1986).

Whereas the field in the United States was grounded in both academic and health centers, in Europe it was largely an applied field and connected more to social medicine and public health than general sociology. Links to the mother discipline in Europe were established only after medical sociology had developed in health institutions (Claus, 1982). The role of government funding, the growth of European universities, the development of general sociology, and a critical political climate in the late 1960s hoping to sensitize physicians to social problems favored the development of medical sociology in Western Europe. But barriers also existed — namely, the rigidity of many universities in accepting a new field of specialization, the characterization of the field by some in the medical profession as “radical” and “left wing” because of critical analyses, and the powers of rival disciplines like social medicine and public health in competing with medical sociology over professional boundaries and resources (Claus, 1982).

C. Period of Maturity (1971–1989)

During medical sociology’s next phase of maturity (1971–1989), it confronted a major crisis: the charge that the subdiscipline was handicapped as both a scholarly and a policy science by a subordinate relationship to medicine (Gold, 1977). Although the potential for medicine to dominate sociological work on health problems was a real possibility in the early years, this situation had become less of a reality over time and the notion of “crisis” was not sustained. The subdiscipline had not evolved as a field which merely provided technical skills
and research services in support of medicine and topics physicians defined as important.

While some medical sociologists perform those tasks, others studied health problems sociologists define as important and were critical of the medical profession when warranted. This situation was seen in studies dealing with barriers to quality medical care faced by the poor (Dutton, 1978), the medical profession’s weak control over incompetent doctors and the correction of medical mistakes (Bosk, 1979; Freidson, 1975), opposition by the medical profession to health reform in the public interest (Starr, 1982), and inequalities associated with capitalist medicine (Navarro, 1976, 1986; Waitzkin, 1983). With maturity, medical sociology was establishing an independent professional position in relation to medicine with its own literature and scientific methods.

The 1980s were a period of tremendous activity and growth. Several textbooks were produced during this period with William Cockerham’s Medical Sociology appearing in 1978 and continuing today (1998) through seven editions. Another book which has stood the test of time is Peter Conrad and Rochelle Kern’s edited book of readings, The Sociology of Health and Illness: Critical Perspectives, which was first published in 1981 and is now in its fifth edition (1997). Research conducted in American medical sociology at this time tended to reflect changes in both the interests of medical sociologists and the delivery of health services in the United States. Some of this research centered on measuring the organizational characteristics and effectiveness of hospitals and clinics (Flood and Fennell, 1995). Studies dealing with stress, especially occupational stress and the impact of life events on physical and mental health, also attracted numerous researchers and became a major area of investigation (House, 1981; Lin and Ensel, 1989; Mirowsky and Ross, 1989; Pearlin, 1989; Thoits, 1995). Papers on stress-related topics, in fact, were often the principal subject of the majority of articles published in the Journal of Health and Social Behavior. Additionally, medical sociologists played key roles in the development of the Health Belief Model (Becker, 1974) and the Behavioral Model of Health Services Use (Andersen, 1995; Aday and Andersen, 1975).

Two important and relatively new areas of research that gained prominence during this period were (1) women’s health and (2) the deprofessionalization process affecting American physicians. Studies on women’s health not only detailed the health differences between men and women but the social causes of such differences (Lennon, 1987; Mirowsky, 1985; Rosenfield, 1989; Verbrugge, 1985, 1989). The inequality of women in patient relationships with male doctors, signifying a traditional pattern of social control by men over women, was investigated as well (Fisher, 1984). Growing numbers of women physicians also forecasted conflict in the medical profession over sexist barriers to career opportunities for women doctors (Lorber, 1984).

Perhaps the most significant publication in the 1980s was Paul Starr’s Pulitzer Prize winning book, The Social Transformation of American Medicine (1982). This book generated considerable publicity and influenced numerous studies on the changing professional status of physicians. Starr described how the rise of large corporate profit-making health care delivery systems and increasing
government regulation of medical practice was undermining the professional autonomy and power of doctors. Starr’s book was followed by an important paper by George Ritzer and David Walczak (1988) on the deprofessionalization of physicians. Deprofessionalization was defined as a decline in a profession’s autonomy and control over clients. Analyzing this development in the context of Weberian theory, Ritzer and Walczak argued that government policies designed to regulate health care and the rise of the profit orientation in American medicine identified a trend in medical practice away from substantive rationality (stressing ideals like serving the patient) toward greater formal rationality (stressing rules, regulations, and efficiency). The result was increased government and corporate control of medical work. Other areas of research developing in the 1980s included studies of doctor-patient discourse, such as Howard Waitzkin’s (1989) finding that the personal problems patients bring to doctors are often shaped by macro-level social structures and the social aspects of AIDS, such as the manner in which AIDS functions as a “master status,” overriding the importance of other statuses in social interaction (Weitz, 1989).

In the meantime, in Europe, the European Society for Medical Sociology (ESMS) was formed in 1983. The ESMS changed its name to the European Society for Health and Medical Sociology in 1994 and hosts a conference biannually bringing together medical sociologists throughout Europe to present papers and discuss issues. In Great Britain, during the 1970s and 1980s, there was a tremendous increase in the number of medical sociologists and the extent of their activities. The Medical Sociology Group of the British Sociological Association (BSA) became the largest section and, in 1976, the annual meeting of the BSA was devoted to the sociology of health.

British medical sociologists particularly excelled in studies of (1) social inequality and health, (2) micro-level studies of medical care, (3) lay beliefs, (4) qualitative studies of the illness experience, and (5) feminist studies of reproductive health (Bury, 1997a). Prior to the 1980s, it was widely assumed in Britain that society was becoming more egalitarian and class difference were lessening because of the growth of welfare services (Wilkinson, 1986). But this assumption was shattered in 1980 with the publication of the Black Report which not only found large differences in mortality rates between social classes but also that these differences were not declining. British workers in lower status occupations were not living as long as those at the top of the occupational scale and this gap continued despite equal access to health care. Other research followed by medical sociologists which expanded knowledge about social inequality in health in Britain (Macintyre, 1986; Wilkinson, 1986) and elsewhere in Europe (Fox, 1989).

British medical sociologists were especially adept at micro-level studies of interaction in medical settings, especially analysis of everyday medical practice and the experience of illness. From this growing tradition in British medical sociology has emerged a series of studies analyzing clinical work from the viewpoints of the participants within a relatively broad symbolic interactionist and ethnomethodological framework (Calnan, 1987; Dingwall, 1976; Fitzpatrick et al., 1984). These studies provide accounts of day-to-day interaction between
patients, practitioners, and others in the provision of health care, along with accounts of lay definitions of health and patterns of seeking care.

Among the new textbooks was Margaret Stacey’s *The Sociology of Health and Healing* (1988) and a selective view of medical sociology by Bryan Turner, *Medical Power and Social Knowledge* (1987) that utilized sociological theory in a critique of medicine. Turner, during an earlier stay in Australia, produced *The Body and Society* (1984), which initiated much of today’s sociological discussion on the topic. Turner based much of his insight on the earlier work of the French theorist Michel Foucault (1973), who examined the ways in which medical knowledge was used to socially control the human body and repress sexuality and emotions. Scambler edited a groundbreaking book entitled *Sociological Theory and Medical Sociology* (1987) that brought together a number of theoretical perspectives in health and medicine. Additionally, a new journal, *The Sociology of Health and Illness*, was established in 1979.

In Germany, the first textbook written exclusively on medical sociology, *Lehrbuch der Medizinischen Soziologie*, was authored by Johannes Siegrist in 1974. The Medical Sociology Section of the German Sociological Association was formed in 1972 and shortly thereafter had the largest membership of any section. Also in 1972, the German Society for Medical Sociology was formed and its membership in the late 1980s was one-fifth that of the entire German Sociological Association (Gerhardt, 1989). Among the works attracting international attention were Alexander Schuller and American medical sociologist Donald Light’s edited book on Germany’s health care delivery system, *Political Values and Health Care: The German Experience* (1986) and Uta Gerhardt’s extensive theoretical discussion — taking a decade to complete — entitled *Ideas about Illness: An Intellectual and Political History of Medical Sociology* (1989). Two journals, *Mensch Medizin Gesellschaft* and *Medizinische Soziologie*, published medical sociological work.

Medical sociology, however, never really developed to any great extent in France, although three French sociologists, Alphonse d’Houtaud (d’Houtaud and Field, 1984), Claudine Herzlich, and Janine Pierrre (Herzlich and Pierrre, 1987) were prominent in the field. According to Herzlich (Claus, 1982), French sociologists were not especially interested in the subdiscipline, government funding for research was lacking, and few signs of dissatisfaction existed with the health care system. In Western Europe, outside of Britain and Germany, medical sociology’s development reached its highest levels in the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries, especially Denmark and Finland. The *Scandinavian Journal of Social Medicine* is a major journal for medical sociologists in that region.

In Eastern Europe, a fledging medical sociology existed in the few countries (Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia) where the general discipline of sociology was allowed to exist by communist governments. The subdiscipline was most developed in Poland under the leadership of Magdalena Sokolowska (Ostrowska, 1996). Her accomplishments included numerous publications and conference activities, including organizing an important international meeting on the sociology of medicine in 1973 sponsored by the Polish Academy of Sciences.
This conference helped establish future forms of cooperation between medical sociologists in the eastern and western countries of Europe and produced a book on social factors in health (Sokolowska, Holowka, and Ostrowska, 1976). Many publications in Eastern Europe during this period simply highlighted the achievement of communist health care; since Marxism with its emphasis on conflict, could not be applied to socialist countries, the most popular theoretical perspective was functionalism with its notions of consensus, cooperation, and functional processes (Ostrowska, 1996). Paradoxically, states Antonina Ostrowska (1996: 103), “in the East there were very few medical sociology studies, which could be derived from the traditions of Marxist sociological theory.”


Interest, research, and publications on medical sociology were also appearing in developing countries, as seen, for example, in China (Cai, 1987), Hong Kong (Lee, 1975), India (Venkataratnam, 1979), Singapore (Quah, 1989), Thailand (Sermsri, 1989), and South Africa (Rensburg and Mans, 1982). In Israel, research by Aaron Antonovsky (1979) on stress and Judith Shuval (1970) on the medical profession were major contributions to the field. As the 1980s came to an end, medical sociology was a global field; however, its greatest presence was in developed countries having the financial resources, strong traditions in sociology, and advanced medical systems to sustain its growth. Since the origins of the field were in the United States and the language of the subdiscipline, as well as sociology in general, is English, it is not surprising the medical sociology’s development was greatest in Anglo-American countries (Claus, 1982).

**D. The 1990s**

As medical sociology entered the 1990s, it was subjected to currents of social change affecting all social sciences. First, was the emergence of a new world order brought about by the collapse of communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during 1989–1991. Second, were other social processes like the multiculturalization of Europe and North America, cultural and sexual politics, changing patterns of social stratification and mobility, and the rise of ethnic nationalism. All of these developments were relevant for health. The collapse of communism accelerated the long-term process of health deterioration and rising adult mortality in the former Soviet bloc, while ethnic civil war caused significant loss of life in much of the former Yugoslavia and some of the non-Russian areas of the former Soviet Union. Multiculturalization in the states of North America
and Western Europe, as well as cultural and sexual politics, brought increased
demands for equality on the part of ethnic minorities and women for social justice
and the benefits, including the social right of health care, accorded by the welfare
state. Hispanics, for example, will become the largest ethnic minority in the United
States early in the 21st century, yet have significantly less health insurance than
any racial/ethnic group in American society (Angel and Angel, 1996). Furthermore,
changing patterns of social stratification and mobility have resulted in
greater social, economic, and health adversity for the poor, accompanied by
increases in the population of the underclass and the homeless (Ritchey, LaGory
and Mullis, 1991; Wilkinson, 1996). To date, liberal societies have not fully
delivered the progressive reforms inherent in the philosophy of the enlightenment.
This means medical sociology needs to develop explanations for worsening health
and inequities in health care, the need for culturally appropriate treatment for
patients, and greater gender and racial diversity in the medical profession.

Consequently, both medical sociology and the wider society, as Bernice
Pescosolido and Jennie Kronenfeld (1995) point out, now stands at a transition
between social forms. Regardless of whether we call the current phase of
modernity, late modern, high modern or postmodern, the fact remains that
contemporary society is moving out of its postindustrial stage to the next era of
social conditions (Bauman, 1992; Beck, 1992; Smart, 1993). Much of the
sociological relevance of postmodernity lies in its destabilization of accepted
meanings and efforts to adjust to changing social conditions. This is exactly the
major challenge facing medical sociology at the millennium. According to
Pescosolido and Kronenfeld (1995: 9): “The society that created the opportunity
for the rise of a dominant profession of medicine, for a new discipline of sociology,
and for a spinoff of the subfield medical sociology, is undergoing major change.”
As the larger society adjusts to rapid social change, established concepts and
solutions are no longer able to explain the new realities.

For example, common assumptions that the medical profession is all-powerful,
the gap in health and life expectancy between social classes is closing in the welfare
states of the West, and that health for most people is improving are not true. The
medical profession is losing status and autonomy in the developed world (Hafferty
and Light, 1995; Hafferty and McKinley, 1993), class differences in health persist
world-wide (Wilkinson, 1996), and the health of low-income African-American
males and middle-age male manual workers in most of the former Soviet bloc is
decreasing instead of improving (Cockerham, 1997, 1998). Therefore, the principal
challenge facing medical sociology in the 1990s and beyond is to accurately
account for the health effects of postmodern social change. This requires
intellectual flexibility and a willingness to extend the sociological imagination
beyond its present borders. It will be necessary for medical sociologists to ask
and answer important questions that inform the subdiscipline, its medical clients,
policymakers, general sociology, and other interested parties.

A recent selective review of American medical sociology finds grounds for
both pessimism and optimism about the future (Pescosolido and Kronenfeld, 1995).
Pessimism stems from reduced funding opportunities for research from government
agencies and private foundations, competition from other fields like medical
psychology, medical economics, and health services research, and a sense of disconnection from the larger discipline. Yet there is also optimism as modern medicine increasingly recognizes the importance of social factors in disease and the current federal administration has taken medical sociology seriously by including its practitioners in efforts at health reform. It can also be argued that medical sociology still attracts significant funding, competition from other fields can be met by using distinctly sociological perspectives and interpretations in researching important — not trivial — questions, and there are signs of growing attachment to general sociology through the increased utilization of common concepts and theories.

The major areas of research in American medical sociology in the 1990s included the continuing construction of a large body of literature on stress-related topics (Thoits, 1995), AIDS (Rushing, 1995), aging and the health of the elderly (Haug, 1994; House et al., 1994), mental health (Cook and Wright, 1995; Turner and Marino, 1994), women’s health and gender issues (Auerbach and Figert, 1995; Lennon and Rosenfield, 1992; McKinley, 1996; Ross and Bird, 1994), health disadvantages of African-Americans (Braithwaite and Taylor, 1992; Ferraro and Farmer, 1996) and Hispanics (Angel and Angel, 1996), health services utilization (Pescosolido, 1992; Pescosolido and Kronenfeld, 1995), health occupations and professions (Hafferty and Light, 1995; Hafferty and McKinley, 1993), health organizations (Flood and Fennell, 1995), and health policy, health reform, and cost containment (Grey and Phillips, 1995; Mechanic, 1993; Starr, 1994). In addition, the American Journal of Sociology had a special issue on medical sociology in 1992 and the first dictionary of medical sociology (Cockerham and Ritchey, 1997) appeared in 1997. The Journal of Health and Social Behavior continued to focus on stress-related health problems in the 1990s, with lesser concentrations on mental health, women’s health and gender differences, substance abuse, and AIDS. A special issue appeared in 1995 on the state of the discipline in several selected areas.

Many of the current studies reflect problems or developments associated with postmodern social change, such as stress; the rise in sexually-transmitted diseases; the increase in the proportion of the elderly; greater participation of women in the labor force; growing poverty among some minorities; more self-care and use of alternative medicine, along with class-based differences in physician utilization; greater equality in the doctor-patient relationship and lessened control by physicians over the medical marketplace; the emergence of corporate medicine, HMOs, and managed care strategies; the rising cost of health care; and the growing number of persons without health insurance.

These studies do not generally portray disagreements and dispute within the subdiscipline concerning the interpretation of particular social phenomenon; rather, they are typically efforts by medical sociologists to account for the effects of changing social conditions in a variety of areas. Critiques are generally directed toward the medical profession and the federal government for failures in providing universal care and ending inequities. In this sense, one could argue that there is a unity of effort within the field, although the potential for debate and disagreement remain strong — especially in regard to controversial topics like
gender and racial discrimination, health policy, health reform, and sociological theory. Whereas one might argue that American medical sociology is meeting the challenge of postmodern social change, the situation is far from resolved. Too many social problems in health remain and there is considerable uncertainty about the parameters of the next phase of modernity. Consequently, some medical sociologists may feel the subdiscipline is in a state of “crisis” and that some of its concepts and frameworks for analysis are outdated; yet the ultimate cause of the discontent is primarily lodged in the transition taking place in the wider society.

Relatively new areas of research linked to social change are also emerging, such as health lifestyles and international comparative studies. Health lifestyles are defined as collective patterns of health-related behavior based on choices from options available to people according to their life chances (Cockerham and Ritchey, 1997; Cockerham, Rüttten, and Abel, 1997). Health lifestyles may include forms of interaction with physicians for physical examinations and other types of preventive care, but the majority of activities take place outside of the health care delivery system. These activities typically consist of practices involving food consumption, exercise, coping with stress, smoking, alcohol and drug use, risk of accidents, and physical appearance. In the social conditions of high or postmodernity, health lifestyles play the decisive role in determining an individual’s health status and life expectancy — especially in relation to chronic ailments like heart disease and cancer. Research attempting to define the theoretical parameters of health lifestyles (Cockerham, Abel and Lüschen, 1993; Cockerham, Rüttten and Abel, 1997), assess gender differences (Ross and Bird, 1994), and specify the powerful role of education in lifestyle selection (Ross and Wu, 1995) represent the leading studies to date.

While international or transnational comparisons of health and health care delivery systems are not new, the 1990s and the globalization tendencies existing in the world today brought new emphasis and interest to such studies in the United States. New books on comparative health problems and systems of health delivery were published (Gallagher and Subedi, 1995; Lassey, Lassey and Jinks, 1997; Subedi and Gallagher, 1996), along with papers investigating the poor health conditions in Russia and Eastern Europe (Cockerham, 1997; Field, 1995) and gender and health differences in Asia (Fuller et al., 1993). Research on health lifestyles and international comparisons are likely to attract greater attention from scholars in the 21st century. As people live longer, their lifestyles increasingly become the cause of or the solution to preventing the onset of many chronic diseases and controlling those diseases once they occur. And as the world becomes more global in its orientation and systems of trade, politics, and technology, as well as shared health problems, converge — work in international medical sociology is going to undoubtedly expand. The next new area of investigation, which is actually the return of an old problem, is infectious disease as old and new viruses — many with social connections — appear again to make people sick and kill them without respect to national boundaries.

Stronger links to general sociology are also developing, as seen in the increasing use of common research methods, concepts, and theories in medical
sociology. The field of specialization, like the general discipline, does not have one dominant theoretical orientation. Functionalist theory in American medical sociology has been generally abandoned, while symbolic interaction remains important in qualitative studies but new developments in the theory itself have not been forthcoming. Conflict theory could be considered the leading paradigm, especially in studies of health reform, policy, organization, professions, and political interest groups, but the collapse of communism seriously impaired the potential of Marxist explanations and conflict theory is not effective in explaining health situations that are unrelated to conflict. Among the classical theorists, Max Weber remains important, particularly in relation to his ideas about lifestyles, authority, bureaucracy, and formal rationality. Among contemporary theorists, the work of French scholars like Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu are influential. But, to date, as noted, there is no single or optimal theoretical approach in medical sociology.

Turning to Canada, medical sociology has become increasingly stronger. Canadians have their own medical sociology textbooks (Bolaria and Dickinson, 1994; Clarke, 1996) and medical sociologists contributed to important work on stress and the social gradient in life expectancy theory (Evans, Barer and Marmor, 1994). A journal, *Health and Canadian Society*, was begun in 1993. There is also an English-French division in Canadian medical sociology as there is in the larger society. French-Canadian medical sociologists tend to focus on Quebec, as seen in Carole Damiani’s (1995) book on dual medicine (alternative and professional), and are influenced by French sociology. Their English-speaking counterparts seem to ignore work in the French language and are influenced by American and British medical sociology.

In Britain, the 1990s were witness to continued research on class differences in health (Arber, 1997; Macintyre, 1997), with Richard Wilkinson’s book, *Unhealthy Societies: The Afflictions of Inequality* (1996), ranking as an important contribution. Mildred Blaxter (1990) conducted a major survey of health lifestyles, while Sarah Nettleton (1995) and Ellen Annandale (1998) produced new textbooks. Additionally, Paul Atkinson (1995) wrote a leading book on medical talk and Michael Bury (1997b) examined the impact of social change on health and illness. As for theory, British medical sociologists are an eclectic group. A major feature of their subdiscipline is qualitative research so symbolic interaction, particularly Goffman, is important, but conflict theory and poststructuralism, especially the work of Foucault, dominates much of their work as well.

As for journals, outgoing *Social Science and Medicine* editor Peter McEwan (1997: vii) observed that the main pattern of change over 30 years of his editorship was “explosion of the AIDS problem, greater willingness to accept the validity of qualitative articles, and a stronger urge to implement change with less concern over theoretical grounding.” In the 1990s, the sociological pages of *Social Science and Medicine* were largely filled by research on AIDS, women’s health, health care utilization, and health in developing countries. There were also special issues on health inequities in Europe (1990) and modern societies (1997). *The Sociology of Health and Illness* focuses primarily on qualitative studies on health occupations and professions, discourse in medical settings, chronic illness, and the experience
of illness, as well as theoretical papers. A new journal, *Health*, was started in 1997. Moreover, the themes for the annual meeting of the British Sociological Association in 1990 were on health and society and in 1998 on the sociology of the body. British medical sociology remains robust.

In Germany, however, the situation is not so positive. Where cutbacks in funding have hit physicians harder than medical sociologists in Britain, the opposite has occurred in Germany where budget reductions have hit medical sociologists, not physicians. The journals *Medizinische Soziologie* and *Mensch Medizin Gesellschaft* ceased publication, and chairs in medical sociology at Münster and Marburg were filled by physicians instead of sociologists. Siegrist published the most recent edition (5th) of his textbook in 1995, but no major German studies in medical sociology have appeared in the 1990s, with the exception of Gerhardt’s (1991) book on the relationship of health and society and Siegrist’s (1996) study of heart disease among blue-collar workers. Especially welcome would be studies on health topics related to German reunification, but few sociological publications exist in this area with work by Günther Lüschen and his colleagues (1997a, 1997b) a notable exception. Lüschen also was senior author of an international study entitled *Health Systems in the European Union* (Lüschen et al., 1995). Outside of Germany, developments in medical sociology on the European continent are promising as the field of specialization emerges in the formerly socialist states and high levels of activity continue in Scandinavia, especially Finland. Finnish work includes studies of gender and the health professions (Riska and Wegar, 1993) and health inequities (Lahelma and Valkonen, 1990).

Elsewhere, in Japan, books by Margaret Powell and Masahira Anesaki (1990) on Japanese health care and Tsunetsugu Munakata (1994) on AIDS rank as important works. Beginning in 1990, an *Annual Review of Japanese Health and Medical Sociology* has been published by the Japanese Society of Health and Medical Sociology with studies dealing largely with nursing, self-care, the elderly, and family support. Medical sociologists have also become especially active in Australia, with the publication of the second edition of Turner’s *Medical Power and Social Knowledge* (1995) and *The Body and Society* (1996), books by Devorah Lupton on health imperatives (1995) and medicine as culture (1994), and a reader on the sociology of health and illness (Lupton and Najman, 1995). In South Africa, a major work, entitled *Health Care in South Africa* (Rensburg, Fourie and Pretorius, 1992), provides an important sociological analysis of the evolution of health care from an apartheid to integrated system. In India, medical sociology continues to develop as seen in recent work on gender and health (Marthur and Sharma, 1995). Also, in 1997, the fourth Latin American Congress on the Social Sciences and Medicine was held in Mexico, which serves as evidence of the growth of the field of specialization in that region. There are now two journals publishing medical sociology in Latin America, *Salud y Sociedad* and *Ciências Sociais e Saúde*. Much of the current research in the region is concerned with social politics and health (Nunes, 1998). Overall, medical sociology has evolved into a global subdiscipline; however, the field is only some fifty years old and the full globalization of the subdiscipline — taking it well beyond its American origins — awaits in the 21st century.
This paper presented a global overview of the state of medical sociology at the millennium. While it has not been possible to account for all developments in the field worldwide, the most important trends have hopefully been identified. This review forecasts the following: (1) greater convergence with general sociology; (2) overcoming competition from other fields by reliance on the sociological imagination and sociological perspectives, theories and methods — factors that make sociology unique; (3) increasing emphasis on solving practical problems in order to meet the requirements of funding agencies; (4) greater efforts to link theory to the analysis of practical or applied problems; (5) the emergence of more studies that ask “big” questions that are important to policymakers and the general public, than work on “small” and relatively insignificant questions that do little but address minor concerns; and, finally, (6) the expansion of the subdiscipline from beyond not only its American origins, but also its European roots — resulting in greater contributions from Asia, Latin America, and Africa. The capability to accomplish all of the above, however, rests on the ability of medical sociology to accurately anticipate, explain, and predict the health-related effects of postmodern social change.

Today, it can be said that medical sociology produces literature intended to inform medicine and be useful in medical practice and policy decisions, but research in the field is increasingly grounded in sociological perspectives. Consequently, medical sociology no longer functions as a field whose ties to the mother discipline are tenuous. Furthermore, medical sociology has not evolved as an enterprise subject to medical control, but now works most often with medicine as more of a partner and, if needed, an objective critic. It should not be presumed, however, that medical sociology evolved in conflict with medicine. Quite the contrary, medical sociology owes more to medicine than sociology for its origin and subsequent support. Even though there are those in medicine who denigrate the social sciences, medicine and other health-related fields, not sociology, provided the early recognition, funds, and jobs for medical sociologists that were not forthcoming elsewhere. Substantial support from medicine continues today.

While it might be argued that medical sociology has achieved more equal status with medicine as medicine’s professional power has waned, the relationship is spurious. Medicine’s deprofessionalization had nothing to do with medical sociology and everything to do with changes in the wider society and the medical marketplace. Medical sociology, in turn, simply matured with an important body of literature promoting its upward mobility among the professions. If medical sociology continues on its present course, it is likely to become one of sociology’s core specialties as health and the pursuit of health increasingly become a major factor in the conduct of everyday social life.
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21 Mental Health and Illness Research: Millennium and Beyond

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In the study of mental health and illness, social scientists have pursued a better understanding of the societal and micro-environmental factors that influence the development, treatment, and outcome of mental health and psychiatric disorders. In 1994 a review of developments in the field of mental health and illness research was submitted to the World Health Organization (Price, et al., 1994). That review covered conceptual and historical issues. This chapter focuses on applications and discusses contributions of social science perspectives to the areas of mental health and illness research that are expected to become increasingly salient toward the Millennium and beyond. Three such areas involve cross-cultural and international research, child and adolescent mental health and illness, and mental health care utilization. We conclude with an assessment of the potential value of future social science research in general, and in the three areas, in particular.

A. Introduction

A.1. Previous Work

Our 1994 review identified historical tensions that exist between medical and social science understandings of the etiology of mental health problems and psychiatric illness. We also argued that there is a discrepancy between theoretical developments and the mission of mental health researchers to provide knowledge that leads to tangible solutions for mental health problems (Price, et al., 1995a). These tensions may be attributable to the fact that a majority of mental health practitioners — psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, psychiatric social workers, psychiatric nurses, and occupational therapists — treat and counsel patients and, to a lesser extent, teach students of these professions. Their contributions have generally been clinical,
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while social scientists have contributed primarily through their research activities. Social scientists bring their perspectives and research to bear on mental health problems, provide consultation and training to mental health professionals, and engage in analyses of the process and outcomes of mental health services provision.

Social scientists must excel in innovative research activities because their major contributions are research-oriented. This task is difficult to accomplish in the face of dwindling research-related resources in most developed countries. We contended that social scientists in the field of mental health and illness research will need to target efforts in areas which can benefit most from a social science perspective. Extending this position, the current paper selected three areas: cross-cultural and international perspective as an epistemological and methodological framework suited for research in the age of globalization of science; and two topical areas in which social science perspective is salient for several reasons.

A.2. Globalization of Research

Research pertaining to mental health and illness is affected by the forces behind the shifting of research methodologies and agenda in all social sciences. With rapid advances in transportation, communication and information technology, the rate of globalization seems forever accelerating. Indeed, as implied by its theme, “Contested Boundaries,” the concept of globalization was at the center of the International Sociological Association’s World Congress in 1994. The notion of globalization characterizes a major impetus for social change currently and in the near future and thus it is useful for studying the impact of change on mental health and illness, for example, the impact of migration and immigration on child and adolescent mental health (as elaborated below).

Furthermore, research enterprise itself is no longer constrained much by geopolitical boundaries. Research is becoming increasingly global, a trend which is clearly seen in the field of mental health and illness and is expected to continue for some time. With these expectations, globalization as a major trend of current social change, on one hand, and globalization of research, on the other, we attempt to promote the cross-cultural and international perspective as an epistemological and methodological orientation, which should guide our emphasis areas of research into the future (Price, et al., 1995b). We believe that cross-cultural research, while far from having a place on the mainstream research agenda, will become more important as the demography continues to shift globally over the next several decades.

A characteristic of mental health and illness research, which has traditionally been less pronounced in other fields of social sciences, relates to the multidisciplinary nature of research enterprise. Traditional disciplines engaged in mental health and illness research include psychiatry, psychology, social work, public health, public policy and anthropology, in addition to sociology. Such diversity reflects the complexity of questions studied, as well as the multi-faceted methodologies used to study the phenomena in depth. The multidisciplinary
approach creates tension, inefficiency, and territorial disputes over findings, which can hinder smooth progress in science. Nonetheless, this trend is expected to grow, in particular in large-scale studies, because no one discipline can provide sufficient expertise to provide answers to the complex forces affecting mental illness and services utilization. Cross-cultural and international research, where multidisciplinary approach is a common place, reflects advantages and disadvantages of multidisciplinary research.

A.3. Two Emphasis Areas

In this chapter, two emphasis areas, child and adolescent mental health, and mental health services utilization, are chosen. Although many other areas of research are equally important, these two areas, in the light of our cross-cultural and international perspective, can be considered as representing new “frontiers” in the mental health and illness research. There is an increasing concern, at least in the United States, about the future of children and adolescents. The public perceives the need to understand mental health of children and adolescents because they are the generation of the future, a fact that we have become increasingly aware of with the decline of baby boomers’ productivity. From a public health viewpoint, prevention for children and youth is more cost-effective than intervention for the affected adults. Yet, research on classification, etiology and course of children and adolescents has not accumulated to the same level of knowledge as available for mental health and illness in adult populations. This also seems to be the case for mental health utilization on children and adolescents, even though thousands of articles exist in this area.

In the wake of current health care reform efforts in the U.S., interest in parity for mental health care, and the results of utilization of that care, is higher than ever before. In developing countries, research demands for mental health services utilization are expected to grow, as economic wealth becomes more stabilized and people’s preoccupations move beyond those with natural disasters, human warfare and infectious diseases. Social scientists are valuable to the consumers of mental health services, because of critical social and environmental perspectives they are able to integrate into the complex models of the course of mental illness and factors affecting mental health utilization. Such research results can make their way into the hands of consumers, such as the National Alliance of Mental Illness and consumer scorecards for health plans.

People who have mental health problems, especially young people and minorities, are often the most vulnerable segments of society. One of the challenges in conducting research in these areas is that our existing paradigms may need substantial modifications if we are to have an in-depth understanding of the populations most likely be involved in the research. As we will see, the sociocultural approach which employs qualitative or exploratory research is a unique asset of social sciences, that could aid our effort in this direction, in particular in cross-cultural and international research.
The need for substantial modification in the existing paradigms also arises because much of mental health research accepts the medical model approach with little question. Social scientists are in a position to provide significant contributions to the development of a new paradigm or modification of the existing ones, because they take a critical stance to this medical model (Brown, 1995). In short, by exploring the needed areas of research in the two topical areas, this chapter will also address the need for, and a potential direction toward, a new paradigm in mental health and illness research.

B. Cross-Cultural and International Studies

Cross-cultural investigation has grown out of the current dominant modes of mental health research, by replicating, refining and modifying the findings from Western societies. Additionally, cross-cultural investigation has informed areas of inquiry neglected in Western research. In this light, we will first discuss two commonly held positions or paradigms of cross-cultural or international research, followed by a discussion on the converging trend. The focus on epistemological and methodological issues is intended to provide an analytical understanding of some “one sided” efforts shown in the current research.

B.1. Approaches to Cross-Cultural Psychiatry

Comparative psychiatric and mental health research has existed for some time. However, the emergence of cross-cultural studies as part of mainstream mental health research went parallel to the development of social psychiatry or psychiatric epidemiology in North America and Europe. The period from the late 1970s through the 1980s marked the flowering of psychiatric epidemiology, a hybrid of survey research, epidemiology and clinical psychiatry designed to estimate the incidence and prevalence of psychiatric disorders and to identify their risk factors (Regier, et al., 1984). The emphasis was placed on the use of precise and uniform case definitions of psychiatric disorder with standardized psychiatric assessment and application of biostatistical analysis methods (Eaton and Kessler, 1985).

Extending these efforts, major large-scale cross-national studies were initiated by the World Health Organization (WHO). The U.S. National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) also took an initiative in developing standardized diagnostic instruments that can be applied cross-culturally and cross-nationally (Robins, et al., 1988). Such major initiatives by the “universalists” met with strong ideological opposition in the early 1980s from “new cross-cultural psychiatry,” championed by cultural anthropologists and cultural psychiatrists (Kleinman, 1987).

B.1.a. The Universalist Approach

The universalist approach is built on the premise that uniform methodologies are key to understanding cross-cultural differences in mental disorders, and universalists
view cultural differences in these disorders as differences in content but not differences in form (Jablensky, 1989). At the universalist core lies the use of standardized instruments to produce nearly-identical assessments across societies. This belief in standardized assessment stems from the medical model in which the use of diagnostic tools on individuals across many different environmental situations is an essential component of accurate disease identification.

The most well-known universalist studies include studies on schizophrenia (Sartorius, et al., 1986), pathways to care (Gater, et al., 1991), and mental illness in primary care (Üstün and Sartorius, 1995). Concurrent massive instrumentation efforts, such as the development of the Composite International Diagnostic Interview (WHO, 1994; Takeuchi, et al., 1995), represent an attempt to establish a “common language” that would ensure a high degree of comparability across studies of different societies. A problem, however, is that psychiatric studies, unlike medical ones, cannot be conducted in a strict laboratory setting and consequently must rely on patient reports of symptoms. Since societies differ in their perception of both problems and symptoms, it may not be possible to use standardized assessment tools to understand differences in different populations.

B.1.b. The Culturalist Approach

Contrary to the universalist approach, some cultural anthropologists, or the so-called “new” cross-cultural psychiatry school (Littlewood, 1990), insisted that such a uniform assessment leads to a “categorical fallacy” in which a construct developed in one society is applied to indicators of a different construct, which nevertheless have similar expressions of the construct of the first society. Kleinman (Obeyesekere, 1985; Kleinman, 1987) provides an example of a South Asian psychiatrist studying semen loss syndrome in North America. He argues that “[categorical fallacy] occurs routinely, but [usually] the other way around by imposition of Western categories in societies for which they lack coherence and validity.”

The culturalist approach emphasizes the importance of understanding culturally specific manifestations of psychiatric disorders. Researchers need to see the disorder and symptoms as part of a culturally-specific system of beliefs and practices. From the viewpoint of the culturalists, the disorder cannot be teased out without understanding the whole system, although biological factors are not to be discarded.

B.2. Converging Trends

Issues in cross-cultural and international research are complex. Conceptual issues include whether or not the underlying construct exists across societies, and if so, the degree to which the construct overlaps across multiple societies and whether or not the assessment measures for the underlying concept are comparable (Flaherty, et al., 1988). Sometimes, the methodological issues involve topics that are beyond measurement capabilities in specific settings. For example, the type of general-population sampling methodology employed in American psychiatry may
not be the most informative nor efficient approach for cross-cultural or international research. Parametric statistics tend to ignore a moderate but detectable effect unless sample size is very large, and qualitative differences in a cross-cultural setting may be better articulated by means of ethnographic studies (Price, et al., 1995b).

Polemic arguments by the universalists and the new cross-cultural school proponents are extreme. At one extreme are clear cases of categorical fallacy where the constructs in comparison are of different entities, although observed measures seem comparable without in-depth knowledge of both societies (Figure 21.1). At the other extreme are studies in which measures are limited to only those present across multiple societies; therefore, measures that are good indicators of the construct in the society compared are omitted, and unique cultural aspects will not be observed. Significant results tend to gravitate toward establishing cross-cultural similarities. There is cross-cultural comparability, yet results are biased (Price, 1997).

Between the two extremes, there exists a situation in which, while underlying constructs are conceptually equivalent, measures expressed do not overlap perfectly because of unique customs and expressions (Price, 1997). For example, mothers failing to fix breakfast for children is a sign of a lack of parental monitoring in Japan. For U.S. children, it is normal to fix their own bowls of cereal, but the number of hours parents spend with children for extracurricular activities (e.g., soccer) may actually be a measure of parental monitoring equivalent to the Japanese’s. Semantic comparability is compromised and the validity of the concept cannot absolutely be assured. Nevertheless, results may still be more informative and perhaps more useful to the general public than in either the universalist or culturalist situations, because there is an agreement that the construct exists across societies and that we have knowledge of how expressions are similar or different. Unfortunately, we don’t have a splendid method for testing the construct validity. If one were to accept this position, the notion of current scientific standards of validity may need reconsideration.

![Figure 21.1 Validity and Comparability in Cross-Cultural Research](image)
C. Child and Adolescent Mental Health

The issues salient in the cross-cultural perspective is pertinent whenever researchers are unfamiliar with values, brief systems and customs of the population under inquiry. Although studying our children and adolescents is not quite like studying aborigines in a Pacific island, it is nevertheless important to recognize that studying children and adolescents present situations unique to them.

C.1. Problems Unique to Children and Adolescents

The mental health problems of children and adolescents are not simply variations on adult mental health problems, but carry unique signifiers and require unique solutions. Children and adolescents are affected by the same kinds of societal problems as adults, but may manifest those effects in different ways because of their cognitive, emotional, linguistic and physical differences (Garbarino and Kostelny, 1996). Furthermore, untreated mental health problems in children and adolescents compound as they develop into adults, increasing the burden to self and society. Also, children have a legal status different from adults so that solutions to their mental health problems may be drastically different from those for adults. Our research protocols are also different due to their legal status.

It seems increasingly evident that more children suffer from mental health problems than previously realized. Estimates in the United States alone suggest that as many as 11 to 14 million children under the age of 18 suffer from some sort of mental disorder (LeCroy and Ashford, 1992). This figure represents 22 percent of all children and, high as it is, fails to illustrate the multiplicative effect of child and adolescent mental illness on families, communities, and the larger society.

Of those children with mental health disorders, only half receive the services they need and those services are often inappropriate (LeCroy and Ashford, 1992). According to both the Epidemiologic Catchment Area and the National Comorbidity Studies, mental health needs are consistently undermet among adults, and the available data suggest that the problems are even more pronounced in children and adolescents (Proctor and Stiffman, in press). Mentally-ill youth are more likely to receive services through non-specialty sectors, in part due to the fact that so few services are designed specifically for them. Furthermore, mental health services for youth are often contextualized within the framework of adult services, making it difficult to properly diagnose and treat illnesses specific to children and adolescents.

C.2. Global Trends

Worldwide, two global trends appear having important effects on the mental health of children and adolescents. The first is a pattern of migration and
immigration that results in familial disruption, while the second is a trend toward increasing urbanization and Westernization in developing countries.

C.2.a. Migration and Immigration

Migration, which is often the result of war, political unrest, or social upheaval, involves women and children far more often than it involves men. At any given point in time, over half the refugees in the world are under age 18 (Westermeyer and Wahmanholm, 1996). In some instances, youth migrate to neighboring countries for the sake of familiarity with language and custom, while in others, they are dispatched to countries with which they have historical and political ties (Westermeyer and Wahmanholm, 1996). The mental health consequences of such moves can be significant, in particular, those who arrive under circumstances where they have no resources often exhibit a variety of trauma-related illnesses (Ahmad, 1992).

A recent study of Central American refugee children found that they suffered the same elevated psychological symptoms as a comparison group of Mexican children who had been exposed to domestic violence (McCloskey, et al., 1995). Clinical researchers in Germany report that the changes in sociocultural identity brought on by migration can destabilize ego identity and, in children, impede normal personality development (Kohte-Meyer, 1994). Immigrant children often feel isolated and rejected in school due to cultural conflict (London, 1990). Adaptation problems encountered by immigrant children include delayed development, school failure, and school dropout (Jacques, 1989). In a review of the literature on refugee children, Rousseau (1995) includes insomnia, introversion, depressive symptoms, behavioral difficulties, and anorexia among the mental health problems suffered by immigrant children.

In a global report on mental health worldwide, the refugee experience was divided into four phases: pre-flight, flight and separation, asylum, and resettlement (Desjarlais, et al., 1995). Because traditional research has focused on the individual psychopathology involved, there is relatively little information on different types of flight and separation situations or the impact of these situations on children’s ability to successfully resettle (Rousseau, et al., 1997). Even less is known about the link between pre-flight situation and post-flight resettlement, although it seems that the country of origin (Rousseau, et al., 1997) and pre- and post-migration family and community environments (Rousseau, 1995) are important determinants of post-migration mental health problems.

C.2.b. Urbanization and Westernization

United Nations figures show that 45 percent of the world’s population are urban dwellers, with that number expected to increase to at least 50 percent by the year 2005 (UNPD, 1994). Densely populated city living breeds high levels of poverty and low standards of living (Cadman and Payne, 1997) that can lead directly and
indirectly to mental health problems for children and adolescents. Urbanization has been found to have a negative impact on family systems in Nigeria (Obayan, 1995) and India (Lacpsysis, 1989); to correlate with hypertension (Somova, et al, 1995), eating disorders in the Netherlands (Hock, et al., 1995), and juvenile delinquency in Hong Kong (Oi-Bing, 1995); and to affect cognitive development among Santhal children (Sinha, 1990).

Westernization can bring about a clash with a society’s indigenous culture, forming a hybrid culture where conflict between cultural roots and present sociocultural location can produce tension (Bibeau, 1997). In the adult population, Westernization has been linked to an increase in alcohol abuse in Taiwan (Colon and Wuollet, 1994), and to schizophrenia in Japan (Ohta, et al., 1992). In the child and adolescent population, Westernization has been linked to antisocial behavior and substance abuse (Desjarlais, et al., 1995). Nevertheless, the links between Westernization and mental disorders by and large remain tenuous.

Westernization should not be confused with modernization, although the two have been equated throughout much of the 20th century (Buntrock, 1996). Huntington (1996) maintains that the power of the West is declining relative to the power of non-Western societies in a multicivilizational world, but that the changing power balance does not preclude Westernization in non-Western worlds such as Japan, Singapore, and Saudi Arabia. Many Asian scholars insist that adherence to tradition does not interfere with modernization and that the Western model will not fit all modernizing nations (Marsella and Choi, 1993). Perhaps a key to promoting mental health of children in developing countries may rest in preserving traditions in the face of rapid modernization.

C.3. Child and Adolescent Mental Health Research Areas in Need of Increased Attention

C.3.a. Violence and Clinical Disorders

Most research on psychological trauma in children and adolescents has been conducted using paradigms developed among adult populations that do not account for major variations in the responses of children and adolescents under such circumstances (Arroyo and Eth, 1996). There have been positive developments in this area, and children can now be diagnosed through the use of a set of criteria modified from the DSM-IV criteria for adult post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), criteria which are less reliant on verbalization, more reliant on behavior, and geared to developmental issues (Zeanah and Scheeringa, 1997). Despite these improvements, the prevalence of PTSD in children and adolescents is difficult to determine due to the wide methodological variance in collecting data. Additionally, since the cultural relevance of PTSD symptoms has been raised in the past, it is important for researchers to learn symptomatic variations affected by cultural differences. Cultural equivalencies must be established so that assessment tools can be culturally targeted to capture the PTSD experiences of children and adolescents in an increasing number of multicultural societies.
Traumas that result in identity fragmentation affect children differently than adults, because children tend to have fewer psychological resources and are more vulnerable to disruption (Marans and Adelman, 1997). Learning to cope with trauma can lead children to maladaptive behaviors and accommodating developmental adjustments (Garbarino and Kostelny, 1996). In the United States, inner-city children have been found to experience a range of post-traumatic stress symptoms, including sleep disturbances, emotional numbing, and biochemical alterations that might reduce their ability to move into productive adulthood (Osofsky, 1995).

C.3.b. Comorbid Substance Use and Abuse

Pioneering work done variously by Brunswick (1979), Kandel (1975), Jessors and Jessors (1977), among others, showed that pathways to substance abuse in adolescence are different than those in adulthood, that high-risk behaviors are interrelated with substance abuse, and that experimenting with substances is often a right-of-passage during childhood and early adolescence. These findings are now well established.

The annual National Monitoring the Future Survey (e.g., O’Malley, et al., 1995) is a current major source of national data in the U.S. regarding adolescent drug use. These nationwide surveys prove to be a stable source of trend data, but incomplete with regard to prevalence because they do not collect data from school dropouts or truants, the group at a higher risk for substance abuse (Kaminer, 1994). The National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 1997) tracks children age 12 to 17, but does not include homeless or runaway youths. There is no national data on children younger than 10 who use or abuse drugs, and the prevalence among this group is usually an estimate based on extrapolation from various state and local sources (Dryfoos, 1990).

Research in the area of comorbid substance use and abuse has traditionally focused on adults. One large epidemiological study of adult mental health problems found that 37 percent of adults with substance abuse problems had comorbid psychiatric disorders. There is dearth of comparable studies of adolescents and children, and existing studies of substance abuse comorbidity in children and adolescents have methodological problems which preclude generalizability (Bukstein, 1995). Although significant improvements have been made, a problem lies in the lack of operationalized definitions for many of the common comorbid psychiatric disorders, which are distinctive to different age groups of children and adolescents (Kaminer, 1994). The Institute of Medicine recently recommended expanding epidemiological research to include “the nature and extent of co-occurring drug abuse and psychiatric disorders; and improvement in the reliability and validity of the methods for collecting and analyzing data” (Institute of Medicine, 1996). Developing valid terminology specific to this population with substance abuse and related problems is necessary before such expansion can take place.

Although Kaminer (1994) reports that the substance abuse diagnostic instruments commonly used in child and adolescent psychiatry are “reasonably capable of differentiating users from abusers,” research has traditionally focused on the genesis
of drug use, with almost no attention given to mediating influences that may account for the differences between users and abusers (Mas and Parga, 1995). Another distinction that needs to be made is between vulnerability to drug use and the causal pathways to that use, with hypothesis-tested research and prospective longitudinal studies conducted to distinguish between drug-related factors and broader contextual factors (Institute of Medicine, 1996).

C.3.c. Risk and Resilience

The social sciences have a long tradition of identifying risk factors for mental illness and substance abuse among the adult population. We know less about risk factors of this type among children, although there is agreement on the most common variables associated with putting children and adolescents at risk for substance abuse. They can be divided into biological, psychosocial, and environmental factors, and include genetic and physiological vulnerability, metabolic variations, personality traits, familial and peer groups, and socioeconomic status (Thomas and Hsiu, 1993; Webster, et al., 1994; Adrados, 1995). Of particular interest is the fact that children and adolescents living with chronic violence accumulate more risks than they can reasonably be expected to handle (Garbarino and Kostelny, 1996).

Unfortunately, risk factors are most often defined through post hoc evaluation, after factors have combined to produce a negative outcome (Fraser, 1997). Also, not all risks are causally related to outcome (Kirby and Fraser, 1997), in part because of mitigating protective factors. Compared to the research on risk factors research that promotes resilience in children and adolescents is relatively scarce. Luthar (1991) stresses the protective effects of personality in enabling young children to handle the stress associated with inner-city living. Benard (1993) lists social competence, problem-solving skills, autonomy, and a sense of purpose as measures of resilience in children. Family, community, and personal coping skills are thought to moderate the effects of stress and operate to protect against adverse outcomes (Barbarin, 1993).

In addition to the lack of information regarding resilience in children and adolescents, there is also a scarcity of information regarding the mechanism by which risk and protective factors interact. Longitudinal data collection of risk factors and identification of protective factors against adverse outcomes is needed to fill the gap in knowledge (Nash and Fraser, 1997). Many longitudinal studies of children exist from various Western nations (e.g., Hagan and Wheaton, 1993). However, because protective factors are likely to be environmentally specific, studies on a wider variety of populations may prove beneficial (Price, et al., 1995c).

D. Utilization of Mental Health Services

Although clinicians were long interested in treatment efficacy and prognosis, knowledge on the patterns of services used at community or population levels were uniquely contributed by social sciences. The U.S. and other Western countries have
dominated research on most topics in this area until recently. Our review therefore is primarily based on those findings from U.S. and other Western countries.

**D.1. Trends in the Delivery of Services**

**D.1.a. Deinstitutionalization**

Sociological researchers have long examined the social policies surrounding deinstitutionalization, the transition from institutional to community-based care, including assessments of changes, evaluations of different aspects of local and national systems, and the effects of those systems on various patient outcomes. These studies, for example, include analyses of U.S. policy on provision of community mental health care, suggesting priorities (Mechanic, 1994a), identifying issues related to health insurance reform (Mechanic, 1993), and illuminating gaps and fragmentation in services (e.g., Mechanic, 1991a and 1991b).

Outside the United States, De Leonardis and Mauri (1992) studied deinstitutionalization in Italy, arguing that the Italian experience, unlike what happened in the U.S., has been beneficial to both patients and those who provide care for them. Hall (1988) examined New Zealand's policies, making suggestions for proper siting of community mental health facilities, and in a recent work focusing on Quebec, White (1996) described the incremental processes of deinstitutionalization, outlining the political context, public expectations and the successes and failures experienced throughout the transition. Prior (1991) studied the discourse of psychiatric nurses and psychiatrists in Northern Ireland, arguing that these key players are the source of many of the transformations which have taken place in the traditional roles played by psychiatric hospitals, while Stefanis and colleagues (1986) explored the history of treatment of the severely mentally ill in Greece.

Investigators have also explored the consequences of deinstitutionalization for the judicial system (Arvanitis, 1989; Meehan, 1995), and on patient outcomes. Herman and Smith (1989) used qualitative methodologies to study the experiences of ex-mental patients after deinstitutionalization in Canada, identifying problems arising from stigma, poverty and poor housing, lack of basic living skills and appropriate aftercare, and unemployment. In Germany, Kaiser, et al., (1996) found significant differences in the subjective quality of life of patients living in different settings, while in Britain, Dayson, et al., (1992) examined the causes of resettlement failures after the closure of two mental hospitals. O’Brien (1992) studied former long-stay mental hospital patients after they were released to the British Somerset Health District, finding that they were settled in stable situations, but lacked adequate structured day care, living space, work, and leisure activities.

**D.1.b. Case Management and Continuity of Care**

In the U.S., the process of deinstitutionalization is essentially complete. The focus of community-based treatment programs is now primarily on case management,
and various strategies have developed during the transition to community-based care. Additionally, as managed care has become increasingly an important provider of mental health care, case management has come to be viewed as a critical mechanism for cost containment and improving continuity of care for the chronic mentally ill.

Current research in this area includes many studies of case management systems and techniques in various settings (Bigelow and Young, 1991; Modrcin, et al., 1988; Rossler, et al., 1995; Ridgely, et al., 1996; Rubin, 1992; Sands and Cnaan, 1994; Surles, et al., 1992; Thornicroft and Breakey, 1991), with mixed but hopeful results, especially for intensive case management strategies. Others have worked to evaluate efforts to improve coordination and continuity of care for the severely mentally ill (Dorwart and Hoover, 1994; Mezzina and Vidoni, 1995; Torrey, 1986; White, 1992). Several significant demonstration projects have also been developed, implemented, and evaluated (Goldman, et al., 1994; Marshall, 1992; Rosenfield, et al., 1986; Shern, et al., 1986; Von Holden, 1993). In particular, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s project on chronic mental illness has been well-described and evaluated from multiple perspectives; those of the patients and their families, as well as the providers of care, and as a function of the fiscal outcomes of that care (Cleary, 1994).

D.1.c. Managed Care

As with physical health care, the trend is for mental health services to be provided through managed care systems (Mechanic, et al., 1995), with public hospitals continuing to play an important role in caring for uninsured psychiatric patients (Olfson and Mechanic, 1996). Many mental health care services are now supplied through integrated health care systems such as those found in group and staff model Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) (Durham, 1995), or through specialized systems which are free-standing or carved-out from systems providing physical health services. Payment is made frequently by capitation or discounted fee-schedules, whether financing is from government or private health insurance (Christianson, et al., 1992; Wells, et al., 1995).

D.1.d. Consumer Satisfaction Advocacy

In the U.S., highly active and increasingly powerful consumer groups have been at the forefront in demanding more equity in mental health coverage through both private insurance and government programs. For example, the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI) has become an increasingly powerful advocate for the mentally ill and their families (Sommer, 1990; Uttaro and Mechanic, 1994; Williams, et al., 1986). NAMI has been very successful in redefining mental illness as a biological problem and in gaining access to state and federal legislators. These efforts have sensitized legislators to the problems of those with mental illness (e.g., Domenici, 1993), and have resulted in legislation favorable to the
organization’s goal of increasing access to care for severe and chronic mental illnesses.

These and other efforts by consumers have led managed care and other systems that provide mental health services to become more sensitive to consumer and purchaser demands for quality and continuity of care. With the increasing consumerism movement, consumer representatives have come to be included in designing and evaluating mental health care systems and services, a feature of many community-based programs established and evaluated as demonstration projects (Kaufmann, et al., 1993; Sherman and Porter, 1991). Consumers are also working as service providers in self-help groups (Emerick, 1990); as key parts of community organizations (White and Mercier, 1991), and as case managers (Sherman and Porter, 1991).

D.2. Social Factors Influencing Mental Health Care Utilization

D.2.a. Attributes of Mental Health Service Utilizers

While epidemiological studies indicate that many people receive no treatment for their mental illnesses, the data is quite consistent with regard to the attributes of those who do receive care. For example, Greenley, et al. (1987) examined factors associated with seeking help for mental health problems and found that service users were younger, more likely to be separated or divorced, more psychologically distressed, and had more physical symptoms. Scheffler and Miller (1989) estimated the demand for mental health services among several ethnic subpopulations, finding large differences in demand for care by gender and ethnicity among individuals with the same insurance coverage. Takeuchi, et al. (1993) studied referrals to community mental health centers among minority adolescents and found that, compared to whites, African Americans were most likely to be referred by social services agencies and Mexican Americans via school sources.

Additionally, these authors found that poverty was the most important predictor of coercive referrals among adolescents. Portes, et al. (1992) looked at differential mental health service needs and use among Mariel Cuban and Haitian refugees in Florida, finding that Haitians’ needs were lower than those of Mariel Cubans, but that they were much less likely to be adequately treated. Overall, these and other studies suggest that minority and ethnic groups have both differing needs and access to mental health services.

Various researchers have studied the effects of gender on use of mental health services. Leaf and Bruce (1987) found that women were more likely to receive mental health services in primary care settings than men, but that there were no gender differences in specialty service use. Mechanic and colleagues (1991) found that women, younger, and more highly educated individuals used more psychiatric services. Cleary, et al. (1990) studied the effects of patient gender on identification of psychiatric illness in health care settings and found no gender differences after controlling for utilization and type of psychiatric illness. Koss-Chioino (1989)
studied beliefs and meanings of nervousness and anxiety among Puerto Rican women, their expression in medical settings, and subsequent diagnoses.

D.2.b. Stigma and Its Effects

Sociologists have a long standing interest in understanding the effects of stigma on people with mental health problems. Link and his associates have contributed greatly to our understanding of the pervasiveness and consequences of stigma in these populations (e.g., Link, 1987; Link, et al., 1989). Of particular interest is the outcome of Link, et al.’s (1991) study in which they evaluated strategies for coping with stigma and found that such efforts produced more harm than good among the patients they studied. Additionally, Lefley (1990) contributed to our understanding of ethnic and cultural differences in understanding and beliefs that may reduce stigma and improve prognosis among the chronically mentally ill. Researchers have also examined stigma-related process in a variety of non-Western cultures. Pearson and Phillips (1994) examined potential roles for social workers with the mentally ill and their families in China, elucidating how stigma-related beliefs and practices produce barriers to care. Kirmayer, et al. (1997) studied attitudes and mental illness-associated stigma among the Inuit in Quebec.

A number of stigma-related barriers to mental health care have been identified (Domenici, 1993; Smith and Buckwalter, 1993). Some have begun to focus on the portrayal of the mentally ill in the media (Wahl and Lefkowits, 1989; Williams and Taylor, 1995). A major policy-based campaign is underway in the U.S., spearheaded by NAMI, to further reduce the stigma associated with mental illness by redefining these illnesses as biological in origin.

D.2.c. Treatment and Its Outcomes

Pharmacological therapy, which has come to be the standard treatment for most patients with a chronic psychiatric disorder, is highly compatible with the shift from inpatient to outpatient treatment, but does not address other problems faced by those with severe and chronic mental disorders. A number of studies have attempted to address how social circumstances influence treatment and its outcomes. Mechanic and Davis (1990) studied how the patterns of inpatient care for patients with psychiatric diagnoses admitted to general hospitals were influenced by their social characteristics and referral sources. Benson (1986) studied patient characteristics and anti-psychotic medication prescribing practices of psychiatrists in state mental hospitals. Thara and Eaton (1996) described the effects of demographic, social, and clinical characteristics on long-term outcomes of schizophrenic patients in India. Boyer, et al. (1995) studied the treatment practices and the role of inpatient psychiatric care within the mental health care system. Haro, et al. (1994) examined social and clinical characteristics associated with risk of re-hospitalization for schizophrenia in Denmark.
D.3. Research Areas in Need of Increased Attention

There are a number of new trends in research on mental health utilization. We have selected a few which seem to warrant further attention: mental health care in primary care settings, special population studies, and effects of comorbidities. Not only has less knowledge been accumulated on these topics, but studies on these topics require understanding of unfamiliar settings, populations, or knowledge from different disciplines.

D.3.a. Mental Health Care in Primary Care Settings

There has recently been an emergence of increased interest in the milder forms of mental illness (Cleary, et al., 1987). In particular, mild to moderate depression has been recognized as a common morbidity that is often treated in the context of primary care visits. This enhanced awareness has prompted interest in providing guidelines to improve the quality of psychological treatment in primary care, and to evaluate treatment outcomes in a variety of settings (Broman, et al., 1994). For the sporadic or less severe mental illnesses, a limited form of psychotherapy, generically known as brief therapy, is replacing other longer-term insight-oriented therapies. Brief therapy has been demonstrated to be effective for some disorders (Crits-Christoph, 1992; Foa, et al., 1995; Goenjian, et al., 1997; Schramm and Berger, 1994; Tillett, 1996), and therefore complements the cost-containment objectives of managed care (Baker, 1994; Budman and Armstrong, 1994; Chubb and Evans, 1990). However, we do not fully understand the processes leading to the use of either pharmacological agents or brief therapy, or their attendant outcomes with specific populations. Additional research in these areas can help identify sectors in need of improvement and the types of care most effective for specific groups.

D.3.b. Mental Health Utilization among Specific Populations

Various investigators have begun to assess the utilization of mental health services among populations in different settings (e.g., Jackson, et al., 1995). Camino (1989) studied the experience of “nerves” among a group of low-income Black women and described how their distress led them to seek general medical help rather than mental health services; and McFarland, et al. (1996) examined patterns of medical and mental health service use, duration of enrollment, and costs of care in a group of severely mentally ill HMO members. With respect to comparative or international research, Eaton, et al. (1992a and b) and Ram, et al. (1992) used data from psychiatric case registers in Australia, the U.S., Denmark, and Great Britain to explore the long-term course of schizophrenia, and to examine patterns of hospitalization, risks for re-hospitalization, and the natural course of the disorder. Keatinge (1987) explored social factors that influenced utilization of psychiatric hospitalization in rural and urban Ireland.
Mental health utilization is expected to become a salient problem in developing countries for years to come; however, much remains to be known about how the mentally ill fare under vastly different mental health systems.

D.3.c. Comorbidities and the Utilization of Services

Introduced already for child and adolescent populations, a great deal of attention has been focused on problems of comorbidity of psychiatric problems and disorders with substance abuse. The research on the processes underlying conditions comorbid to mental health problems has been as varied as the comorbidities and the problems resulting from them. For example, Menezes, et al. (1996) described the substance abuse problems of severely mentally ill residents of South London. Jackson, et al. (1995) studied the patterns of medical care utilization by depressed patients who used alcohol, while Wittchen, et al. (1994) investigated the demographic and social factors associated with generalized anxiety disorder. Forthofer, et al. (1996) studied the effects of comorbid psychiatric disorders on the probability and timing of first marriages, while McLeod (1994) studied the effects of anxiety disorders and substance abuse on marital quality.

It has also become evident that significant comorbidity exists between psychiatric and medical illness. Kendrick (1996) explored cardiovascular and respiratory symptoms among primary care patients with long-term mental illness. Barsky et al. (1992) examined the effects of medical morbidity, psychiatric disorder, functional status, and hypochondriac attitudes on self-assessed health status, and later, Barsky and others (1994) investigated the prevalence of psychiatric disorders in patients presenting with palpitations. Susser, et al. (1996) researched the risk of HIV transmission among the homeless mentally ill who inject drugs.

Finally, in the policy arena, Mechanic (1994b) discussed issues of parity between mental health/substance abuse benefits and those provided for health care. Herrell, et al. (1996) tackled the issue of whether or not severely mentally ill patients with substance abuse problems should be excluded from residential alternatives to hospitalization. As the range of these studies indicate, comorbidity is a key issue in the delivery and outcome of mental health care services. Continued and expanded interests in these areas are critical for providing adequate care to those with mental illnesses and other conditions.

E. Conclusions

In this last section, we first revisit the notion of globalization and our proposal for increased attention to cross-cultural and international research. We conclude this chapter with our assessment of potential values of the social sciences in the field, and our hope for the development of a new paradigm in the future.
E.1. Issues in Cross-Cultural and International Studies: Programmatic or Paradigmatic?

Cross-cultural and international research on mental health and illness is still in its infancy. There are research “infrastructure” requirements needed to conduct research with reasonable vigor in this area, including stable political systems, availability of scientist manpower, technology advances, and the availability of other resources. Not many countries can meet all of these requirements. Therefore, a large-scale international study is often initiated by a Western organization (e.g., World Health Organization), or Western researchers who want data from less developed countries. However, such initiatives by Western research can lead to inequality in science. The negative effects of such “foreign aid,” unwitting and complex, have not been widely discussed. A ready example is the unquestioned expectation that non-Western researchers adopt Western concepts as a condition for successfully completing educational training.

Western research to date has often led to the belief that good science must be big science. Cross-national studies on mental illness are particularly vulnerable to becoming prey to this belief. Research does tend to become big when international sites are involved. In our opinion, informative cross-cultural and international studies do not need to be big in the number of participants or number of sites, but the size of input from different groups and different disciplines needs to be substantially large. In particular, participation by “indigenous” researchers is absolutely necessary (Price, et al., 1995b). Indigenously driven research should not necessarily conform to the standardized assessment protocols, and inequality in science brought about by Western control of research paradigms needs to be sorted out to avoid undue bias in scientific conclusions.

Researchers must remind themselves why they are doing a particular research project to begin with. Results that do not inform the particular society being studied, nor solve problems in that society, should not be pursued under the guise of science. In the realm of prevention and intervention, where direct returns from research investments can be most clearly seen, protocols must be culturally specific in order for people to understand and accept them. A fairly recent halt in Phase III HIV vaccine clinical trials in the United States (Cohen, 1994) serves to remind us that successful research efforts require community acceptance and support, both in terms of design and outcome. The search for generalizability is useful for those who “finance” research only insofar as its returns are tangible. The discovery of a gene responsible for bipolar disorder would be helpful for genetic engineering and for science as a whole in the long run. However, in the short run it would not help those suffering from the disorder whose episodes are so much affected by their immediate social environments. The utility of cross-cultural and international studies has to be assessed in terms of how the results can be applied to mental health problems in both societies. There are many examples of “tangible returns” in alternative medicine: for example, herbal medicine (Keung and Vallee, 1993) and acupuncture (Colquhoun, 1993). Also in the prevention area, examples exist such as importation of non-Western practices against coronary heart disease (Willett, 1994) and some forms of cancer...
(Henderson, et al., 1991). Linking etiological factors to prevention at the societal level, however, remains one of the greater challenges facing cross-cultural research in the mental health field.

E.2. Values of Social Science Perspectives

Social scientists work within a multidisciplinary environment long fostered in the field of mental health and illness research. Social science perspectives are particularly valuable in cross-cultural and international work since this research attempts to go beyond the universalistic belief in medical models. The development of a new research paradigm depends on an understanding of the way in which social forces differentially impact mental health and illness across a wide range of environments. Providing the basis for such understanding has always been the role of social scientists and will continue to be so in the future.

Cross-cultural and international research can provide tangible returns that may not be universal facts. Prevention and intervention in the mental health and illness field necessarily involves workable change in social environments, and the comparative framework inherent in cross-cultural and international research is particularly amenable to identifying protective factors that may not be apparent in high-prevalence societies (Price, et al., 1995c). Another challenge for social scientists is to understand the mechanism by which such protective factors actually affect behavior in a specific society because cultural transfer of preventive measures become possible with such an understanding. Social scientists are uniquely qualified, whether by training or upbringing, to gain the indigenous insights necessary for achieving this understanding.

As the foregoing analysis indicates, child and adolescent mental health and illness research in the 21st century will be affected by migration and immigration, global urbanization and Westernization. A comparative framework will be beneficial to identify protective factors (Zeanah and Scheeringa, 1997), since they are difficult to assess if a study focuses only on “cases.” Along with developing multicultural assessment tools, it is important to develop a multimodal and multisystemic approach to research with children and adolescents (Gopaul-McNiccol, 1997). Such an approach naturally lends itself to intellectual tradition of social sciences.

Social science disciplines have been important in advancing our understanding of the social processes that affect mental illness, its treatment and outcomes, and the ways in which different societies manage the afflicted (Cook and Wright, 1995; Killian and Killian, 1990). In the area of utilization studies, future studies are particularly needed for better understanding of mental health services in managed care. A greater attention to the social factors that influence the pathways to or away from mental health care in this changing environment (Pescosolido, 1992) will be very important to our understanding of the system, and to providing better care for those who need it. International differences and changes in the provision of mental health care are a variety of natural experiments that social scientists are uniquely qualified to examine.
E.3. Into the Millennium and Beyond

Contemporary mental health and illness research must pay greater attention to the salient problems of the time, and social scientists are in a unique position to provide solutions for contemporary problems related to mental health. Some of the reasons for our ability are historical, some are found in the nature of the discipline, and some are what we bring into the field from our own experiences. In this chapter, we have attempted to specify a few areas in which our expertise would be valuable. For example, because the social sciences have historically mediated between the medical establishment and vulnerable populations, we are particularly able to study mental health problems and comorbid illness among special populations such as children, adolescents, minority groups, and people in developing countries. We are in a unique position to study mental health utilization, because of our understanding of societal impacts on systems of care.

As social science researchers, nevertheless, we should be reminded that research frontiers for which we are particularly suited are to be served with care. The recent unfortunate closure of the U.S. NIMH-initiated Multisite Study of Mental Health Services Use, Need, Outcomes and Costs in Child and Adolescent Populations (UNOCAP) seems to point to an uneasiness with promoting a big science paradigm when resource allocation to science is limited. Big science may be perceived as even less valuable in the future, unless people who benefit from big science studies see tangible returns on their investment. While maintaining alliance with medicine is important, it is more important in the future to increase sensitivity to “partner” relationships with those segments of the population who benefit most from research findings. Our “subjects” are our customers, people who need new knowledge that helps them. Without understanding this fundamental force for new knowledge, social science perspectives in studying mental health and illness could instead be endangered in the twenty-first century.

References


Endnote

1. **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS** — The preparation of this chapter was supported in part by the Independent Scientist Award and a research grant (K02DA00221, R01DA010021) from the U.S. National Institute on Drug Abuse/National Institutes of Health (R.K.P); and a National Research Service Award (HS00069) from the U.S. Agency for Health Care Policy Research (C.A.G.). We also thank two anonymous reviewers. Their comments are incorporated where feasible.
“With production simplified and power utilized to fullest capacity, we could probably produce all we want in much less than six hours; and with distribution simplified we would have no trouble in securing the product for our own enjoyment.”

A. Advances

The term social engineering (SE) first found its modern sense in 1899 when New York welfare workers named a new journal *Social Engineering* (Jordan, 1996: 281). Typically, people thinking of SE visualize conscious, willing actors exerting socially coercive manipulation, a usually correct perception that has given the term extremely negative connotations, and a taboo against its use. One cannot brush such connotations aside, but note that manipulation occurs in all societies. Much of what goes on in day-to-day life qualifies as SE. One could view as SE such activities as child rearing, schooling or military indoctrination. Something akin may be involved in virtually any means of mobilizing bias. This makes serious the problem of properly limiting the range of inquiry (Alexander and Schmidt, 1996).

For millennia, people have practiced SE as an esoteric craft. In recent decades, one esoteric skill after another (e.g., martial arts, wood-frame construction, intelligence warfare) became available for public study — including SE. Study of attitude formation and change dynamics continually improves understanding of how SE works. However, the phenomena we study also change over time. In 1900, SE activities worked largely through natural, primordial institutions. In today’s artificially built social environment, SE can function far more impersonally. As this occurs, the relationship between theory and practice changes. Initially, theory and practice fuse; practice is unselfconscious. Disinterested, disenchanted science breaks this bond.
A.1. The Past: Conventional SE

About 1900, enthusiasm for SE began to blossom simultaneously in both democratic and authoritarian states. Then came utopian totalitarianism, where SE operated on a grand scale, used violent means, and exacted terrible costs. Large-scale SE projects caused enormous human suffering, yet many resulted in failure (Geller and Nekrich, 1986). While SE initially had a good name and a favorable image, over time this image became progressively tarnished. In 1947 the U.S. Social Science Research Council still claimed (Herring, 1947: 2, 5): “We need now more than ever before to perfect our tools for human engineering . . . [and train] skilled practitioners who can use social data for the cure of social ills.” Fifty years later the Council (Social Science Research Council, 1997: 2) reaffirmed this goal, but added: “we would not today speak of ‘social engineering’.” Why not? As Saul (1993: 64) reflected: “With this much hindsight, it is relatively easy to identify the long-term de-stabilizing effects of extreme social engineering.”

The blossoming of SE arose in intimate connection with the state’s expansion — into economic development, employment, welfare and social policy. State agencies used SE to pursue national interest and foreign policy strategy, and to improve social order and morality (see Bristow, 1996). The state expanded from collecting information, to fostering moral social trends in the “public interest,” and finally to determining specific behavioral standards in ever-wider areas of everyday life (Mindick, 1986; McClymer, 1980). SE helped imperial powers to control their colonies (May, 1980). Many Marxists became utopian social engineers bent upon radical social reconstruction.

The twentieth century’s leading social engineers who changed social facts on the largest scale were dictators: Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini, Mao and Ho were utopian social engineers par excellence. Large-scale efforts continued beyond mid-century — in Asia, mainly in China, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Singapore (Wilson, 1978), but also in the Middle East and Africa (Kiezun, 1994a). However, such efforts now arouse much less enthusiasm than before, due to widespread knowledge of many disastrous failures. By the late 1970s policy scientist Dror (1978: 35) was advising sociologists: “The term ‘social engineering’ is too brutal … to be acceptable in Western European countries.” By the 1990s, many former Communist states had abandoned conventional SE practice along with capitalist states. Advanced society had adopted a taboo. As Connolly (1993: 213) says:

The desire to expunge contestability from the terms of political inquiry expresses a wish to escape politics. It emerges either as a desire to rationalize public life, placing a set of ambiguities and contestable orientations under the control of a settled system of understandings and priorities, or as a quest to moralize public life thoroughly, bringing all citizens under the control of a consensus which makes politics marginal and unimportant.

As we shall see, both motives have been at play.
New forms of SE are taking place within advanced capitalist states, even at such middle levels as corporate advertising or single-interest group politics. Once the near-exclusive purview of state elites, SE spread broadly during the 1990s throughout democratic societies. One reason why these cultures proved so vulnerable was that they had firmly tabooed use of the term SE, discouraged study of its dynamics, and put the subject under a scornful stigmata. Within this stigmata, SE is positively thriving. The 1990s led us into a new world of innovative, largely subliminal SE based upon high technology and cognitive psychology. This world of salesmanship, sex and consumption fostered through organized irrationality confounds and refutes the social engineers’ early hopes of rational reform. Thus has SE taken three disparate main forms in the twentieth century. One was the brutal, utopian, modernizing impulse. The second was a brief period of Cold War intelligence dueling (see Collins, 1974). By the 1980s a third “liberal” form was predominant, leading us into the future by means of a cybernatized, eclectic and feather-light force that slips easily across religious, ethnic, linguistic and national boundaries (Alexander and Darby, 1986: 102).

The path to the 1990s is clear. In 1965 Boguslaw described a liberal utopian renaissance of the technological ethic that SE embodies. The new utopians include systems engineers, operations researchers, software designers, management professors and policy analysts. Although these specialists tend to operate at the micro-level, modern technological prostheses permit them to reach millions of individuals — as individuals. Their works slip virtually unnoticed around our defense mechanisms, and thus evade our individual and collective abilities to resist. No longer must social engineers tear social fabrics apart; an invisible airtight cage produces similar results. For example, put desired social change values into computer software programs such as Lotus 123™, WordPerfect™, or Doom™. Each person at home absorbs it invisibly, imperceptibly. To increase productive efficiency, teach people to perform several tasks simultaneously. Enter Windows 95–98™. Suddenly 100 million people worldwide are teaching themselves “multi-tasking” and carrying the lessons over into their everyday lives. Want to instill a mass scrooge-like attention to capitalist pecuniary matters? Enter Quicken™ and let the lessons begin. Want to increase social productivity through networking? Make the internet user-friendly with graphical browsers such as Netscape™ or Internet Explorer™. The internet’s sheer addictiveness will do the rest (Nguyen and Alexander, 1996). Gradually, quietly, a wholly new social order begins to emerge.

A.3. Social Engineering Dynamics

Today, we may define SE as the channeling of situational and social forces to create a high probability of generating effective collective action. Like engineers, linguistics scholars distinguish between surface phenomena available to immediate inspection, and the deep structures (Cattell, 1969: 143,151). Through transformational rules, deep structures generate many surface phenomena.
Chomsky, 1965). In SE too, one can sometimes discern deep structures. Effectively generated social action typically happens when deep structures that channel behavior are in a configuration that permits and virtually requires an action to occur. Creative writers intuitively recognize this; in narrative literature, it forms the basis for two literary forms, irony and tragedy. Scholars use such concepts to explain historical realities (e.g., Niebuhr, 1962). In practical affairs one can often distinguish between surface appearances and essential features. Social engineers though may fashion surface appearances as a smoke screen, camouflaging their intentions (Jamieson, 1992). They may mask or redirect attention away from essentials (Brown, 1975: 282–9). Studies of intelligence and electoral warfare (e.g., Bell and Whaley, 1991; Felknor, 1992) give many examples of disinformation. SE students try to peer beneath the surface of appearances to grasp essential underlying realities silently, even stealthily moulding history’s course.

Social reality’s natural dynamics may complicate the task of making valid distinctions. Everyday life occasionally generates SE potential — and sometimes its realization — through purely natural spontaneous processes, often without conscious intervention. People can unknowingly, unthinkingly — perhaps even unwillingly — create SE dynamics that may then spontaneously produce efficient social action. No one may want what happens, or even notice it coming to pass.

One of recent history’s more spectacular instances of spontaneous SE occurred in China. At a 1989 summit meeting, Chinese and Russians met in Beijing to normalize diplomatic relations. This event attracted some 1,200 foreign journalists who brought a capacity to send instantaneous satellite reports around the world. They produced an involved, engaged global audience. At that time there was in Beijing a small, nonviolent pro-democracy movement conducting a demonstration, which the concentration of mass media quickly transformed into a mass crusade. Television makes spectators feel like involved participants, as McLuhan said in Understanding Media (1964: 286):

People have long supposed that bulldog opacity, backed by firm disapproval, is adequate protection against any new experience. It is the theme of this book that not even the most lucid understanding of the peculiar force of a medium can head off the ordinary ‘closure’ of the senses that causes us to conform to the pattern of experience presented.

Two days before the Russians came, some 1,000 students began a hunger strike in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. Within days, this group swelled to more than a million protesters. Uncensored reporting soon inspired sympathetic protests in at least thirty-three cities. Protester Wang Saiwei told Newsweek (1989: 21): “Our action is decided by history and by the current situation not by some individuals.” For the Chinese, having an involved global audience was a new experience, one that generated brutal repression for all the world to see. A critical mass of media had set into motion a SE dynamic that no one planned and none could control.

With intentional SE, social engineers may write the script, but historical actors must still play out the human drama concretely in their own lives. Social action processes display flux, so their structural patterns only become apparent once the action has occurred. Whether participants in socially engineered situations were
aware of being participants, and if so how dimly or sharply aware they were, is often historically moot. As McLuhan (1964: 277) explains:

Everybody experiences far more than he understands. Yet it is experience, rather than understanding, that influences behavior, especially in collective matters of media and technology, where the individual is almost inevitably unaware of their effect upon him.

A.4. The Ideology of Technologized Social Engineering

Idealizing rationalized efficiency, the high-tech SE designers avoid specifically human problems. As Dahlberg (1973: 66) recounts, their ethic contains five main traits: rationalization, exploitative control, perfectionism, functional specialization, and the desirability of highly mobile standardized persons. Dror (1978: 32) observes that SE “assumes a semi-rational, ‘Civil Culture’ type, ideology which aims at improvement within basically accepted social institutions.” Kariel (1969) distinguishes between utopian urges for change and technologized SE’s anti-utopian effects. Admitting no value commitments, this renaissance accepts current reality as given. It tries to make current social processes more rationally controlled, logical and automatic. Toilers in this domain deny that they are political actors. They present as “reality” whatever their net of concepts catches. They operate by evoking and directing what from the outside appears as a seemingly autonomous historical process. Yet as representatives of paramount reality, their ethic continually leads them to act in politically significant ways by eliminating or suppressing potential alternative realities. Paramount reality is the reality of everyday life. Berger and Luckmann (1972: 35) say:

Its privileged position entitles it to the designation of paramount reality. The tension of consciousness is highest in everyday life, that is, the latter imposes itself upon consciousness in the most massive, urgent and intense manner. It is impossible to ignore, difficult even to weaken in its imperative presence.

Much of the reality of everyday life presents itself in a structured form, as given, imposed. This givenness is hard to challenge. It is how things are. Paramount reality’s overwhelming presence threatens to engulf us, submerging our separate identities, so we repeatedly escape into some form or other of alternative reality. The more massive paramount reality’s presence is, the more ingenious, complex and desperate will be the identity work through which people try to escape its clutches (Cohen and Taylor, 1976: 22). Interruptions or breaks in paramount reality often occur, but are usually brief. Paramount reality always seeks to force our return, as from an excursion. The new social engineers rely heavily upon this force to impose their solutions. Societal institutions had come to display fewer and fewer of the primordial, spontaneous characteristics they originally possessed. As this happened, they took on more and more arbitrarily constructed characteristics. Human beings had so radically modified our physical and social environment that we found it necessary
to modify our own selves to adapt. As this occurred, the process focused more and more within organizations. By the 1990s, capitalistic societies had achieved mass cultures whose stock in trade was self-consciousness, reflexivity and relativity — which promoted a sensed separateness from everyday life, a psychological distancing from paramount reality itself. When we experienced a world not completely our own, with arrangements not entirely ours, we were often reacting inchoately to SE’s increasing pervasiveness.

The SE ethic that came into its own in the 1990s embraces and elaborates institutions that the social sciences and humanities properly criticize. Today’s utopian social engineers ignore both the profound and the grotesque in social life. They discredit as foolish attempts to establish alternative realities or alternative identities, and so exert a profoundly conservative force. The new high-tech micro-social engineers treat human suffering or anxiety as reflecting merely the breaking down of particular technical systems. By excluding unrealized norms, this generation of social engineers produces political closure that implacably denies our still unrealized democratic possibilities. Although we cannot know all the costs, we do experience what Grant (1966) called “intimations of deprival.”

To overcome the human resistance that social engineers sometimes hit requires getting over, under, around or through people’s defenses. The new social engineers are coming to do this effectively. Lazarsfeld and Reitz (1975: 45) give the example of office workers complaining about slow elevators. An architect posed three options: install more elevators, or faster ones, or have existing elevators stop at different floors. The first two solutions were too expensive and when tried the third did not stop complaints. Then a consultant noticed that when the workers were wasting time in their offices they had no complaints. They only became frustrated when waiting for elevators. He proposed putting large mirrors outside the elevators. Given human nature, women would occupy themselves checking their appearances, and men could gaze at women without appearing too obviously to be doing so. Once the mirrors appeared, all complaints abruptly ceased. Such typically unnoticed environmental manipulation (like grocery store Muzak™) is hard to notice, much less guard against.

Today’s utopian social engineers prefer such a-human perspectives as game theory, systems theory and cybernetics (Berman, 1986). Yet without assuming freedom in human life, one can derive no human meaning from our activities. The democratic perspective clashes with cybernetic and systems viewpoints. Democratic theory asserts the primacy of human life in demanding incompleteness and lack of closure with respect to values and the future. This the new social engineers implicitly deny with their abstract computer-based problem definitions and programmed solutions. Boguslaw contends that they value structures above all else (1965: 25), and so routinely suppress questions about how people might detach themselves from the more life-destructive structures. Thus does high-tech SE in post-industrial societies produce anti-utopian consequences. As the twentieth century ended, the dangers that SE posed were increasing yearly. Social engineers had discovered knowledge no one can shove back into Pandora’s Box — how to bypass resistance by activating propensities
embedded in human nature. Social engineering is now not simply a manipulation tool or a state policy option; it is becoming our historical fate.

A.5. The Development of Sociotechnics

Although accounts of SE go back to ancient times (recall the Trojan horse), we trace its modern study to Polish legal scholar Leon Petrazycki (1867–1931), though he did not use the term SE. He first wrote in the 1890s on how to use law as an instrument to bring about efficient social change without having first to obtain attitude changes (Gorecki, 1975; Podgórecki, 1981; Palecki, 1984). In 1925 he set out a clear ideal formulation (Podgórecki, 1996: 24):

It concerns the gradual transformation of the human race through elimination of thousands of dissonances and disharmonies. It intends to do so by adjusting the transformation to a new rational basis. This should occur through the utilization of a scientific approach and with an understanding of causal relationships.

The modern study of this practical social science only began around the end of World War II. In-depth criticisms of totalitarian SE came in 1944 from von Hayek’s Road to Serfdom, and in 1947 from Popper’s Open Society and its Enemies. Orwell’s Animal Farm (1946) and Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949) both satirize socially engineered utopian collectivities. Arendt’s Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) called the concentration camp totalitarianism’s laboratory. In his Poverty of Historicism (1960), Popper distinguished utopian or all-embracing SE from the piecemeal variety. When Johnson (1983) described the twentieth century as the century of social engineering he meant what Popper called utopian SE. In the piecemeal form, the social engineer attains his goals by small steps, incessantly correcting each move. Such an approach politically offends many committed utopian activists. Advocates of utopian SE know in advance that a total social transformation is necessary. Piecemeal SE advocates proceed without determining in advance the reforms’ scope. The two kinds differ in their vastness of vision, projects and plans. For Popper, only the piecemeal kind is rational.

The practical social science of “sociotechnics” began in Poland, fathered by Adam Podgórecki (1925–1998; see Kojder and Kwasniewski, 1992). From 1966 to 1974, Podgórecki coined the term and authored, co-authored or edited five Polish books: Principles of Sociotechnics, Sociotechnics: Practical Applications for Sociology, Sociotechnics: How to Act Efficiently, Sociotechnics: Styles of Action, and Sociotechnics: Functionality and Disfunctionality of Institutions. In 1966, he formed a SE research committee within the Polish Sociological Association. It avoided the academic clash between Marxism and bourgeois or liberal social science. That is, it avoided ideological social reconstruction projects, but also rejected the bourgeois social science dogma that societies work best when left to purely spontaneous invisible hands.

Podgórecki started a think tank to serve the movement he had generated, and thus gathered around him an immediate group of some fifteen scholars. Their aim, to unmask hidden premises and intentions of those wielding
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totalitarian power, involved risks. Several scholars suffered punishment; two were certainly killed and another driven to suicide. Eventually Podgórecki found himself expelled from Poland under threat of death (Podgórecki, 1997b). Scholars around the world have learned much from studying communist experiences, recounted at such high costs.

Podgórecki’s intellectual movement eventually went global through the Research Committee 26 of the International Sociological Association. Its seminal 1973 meeting resulted in two books (Cherns, 1976; and Schmidt, 1975). Another early publication was an issue Podgórecki edited of Current Sociology (1976b). In these years, the primary scholarly task was to unmask governmental and Communist Party SE stratagems actually used to produce efficient social action (Podgórecki and Schmidt, 1977). Scholars did not hold all SE to be evil; some methods they espoused. This practical social science is thus not value-free. Podgórecki and Schmidt (1977: 8) indicated that sociotechnics “provides intended social aims and goals with elaborations of frames of references as well as effective ways and means for their realization, relying in its operation solely on verified or verifiable propositions that describe and explain relevant social behavior.” Although organized within sociology, sociotechnics is a multidisciplinary practical policy science intended to realize useful consequences (Podgórecki, 1976a, 1976b). It never succumbed to mainstream social sciences’ distaste for making practical contributions to public life.

Every social science needs to develop its own body of theory. In sociotechnics, theory at first developed as a wholly separate enterprise. As some students of sociotechnics became consultants to SE projects, eventually, the developing body of theory began to feed back into practice. Theoretical advances even helped determine the boundaries within which practice was thinkable for sociotechnicians. Many theoretical studies began to suggest the most promising tasks for practitioners to pursue. Thus the practical social science of sociotechnics began to acquire its own technology, much as psychology acquired psychiatry and psychotherapy. Until the 1990s though, sociotechnicians did not directly confront this development.

B. The 1990s

B.1. The “Crisis in the Work Force: Help Wanted” Campaigns

Of the many major SE initiatives undertaken in the 1990s we single out just two. One notable development in the 1990s was that increasingly the state was not the main actor. A second was SE’s internationalization. For example, in scores of countries, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund operated SE “privatization” schemes on behalf of the global capitalist trading system (see below). To show how the realm of SE itself was being privatized, let us first examine the U.S. exercise in political revitalization called the Help Wanted campaigns (Alexander and MacDonald, 1996).
This operation represents an advance in SE technique; its method proved irresistible in city after city across America. The purpose too was novel for a SE project: the Help Wanted campaigns sought to empower and revitalize democratic citizen involvement. The approach was to force people to re-examine consciously their values and beliefs. This less manipulative way to overcome resistance rests on a model of how to engage the public in policy deliberation. It came from work by two non-profit research groups. The Kettering Foundation and the Public Agenda Foundation were seeking ways to permit millions of people to participate in horizontal (rather than top-down) political forms. Scientific attention to controlling unconscious determinants of attitude formation and change resistance makes this model compelling. Here is what happened.

During the 1980s, U.S. business and political leaders felt a need for a new unifying device to replace the Cold War as a means to discipline the population. Business leaders also wanted to make government more responsive to business interests. Business chose the theme of “competitiveness,” invoking the image of a silent global trade war. By the 1990s though, U.S. political leaders’ ability to invoke mass mobilization had atrophied, due to a major gap in how elites and masses viewed political issues. The political parties had been largely shoved aside, and for-hire political manipulators had taken over the electoral process. As Bennett (1996: vi) lamented: “This is an age of independent voters choosing independent candidates based on electronic images created through marketing research.” Campaign strategists had turned people off from the electoral process because: “the fewer people voting, the easier it is to sell a candidate” (1996: ix). The challenge of electoral politics had come to be: “to persuade the target groups isolated by the marketers to go out and pull their [voting machine] levers in response to test-marketed images and slogans” (1996: x). Little wonder that elites and masses mistrusted each other.

Having learned to think of education and skills training as (taxpayer-provided) embedded capital, business leaders decided to “reform” the educational system to make it better and more directly serve their purposes. This would include massive tax breaks for in-house worker retraining. Politicians and the public, however, were not alarmed enough about economic conditions to support such measures. Business experts had produced more than 300 reports urging action, and had given endless congressional testimony — to no avail. Finally, the Business-Higher Education Forum hired the Public Agenda Foundation (PAF), to analyze this impasse.

Public Agenda Foundation Director, Daniel Yankelovich, had a novel theory on how to change the public’s views and get it involved again in political processes now largely abandoned to the experts. He would force the public to arrive at a well-reasoned public judgment on elite-selected issues through national campaigns that specified benefits, costs and tradeoffs. Yankelovich rejected the idea of appealing to ordinary public opinion — the accidental result of mass media’s public impacts. Instead, public judgment is (1991: 6): “the state of highly developed public opinion that exists once people have engaged an issue, considered it from all sides, understood the choices it leads to, and accepted the full consequences of the choices they make.” To produce this would require centrally coordinated, locally operated campaigns to change and mobilize public attitudes. Yankelovich uncovered a serious
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expert-public gap on the issues that explained the public resistance to the business stance. To overcome this would require the exercise of cognitive domination. That is, the campaign propaganda would control the citizens’ premises but leave them free to draw their own conclusions. The message would be that inadequate education and training had led to declining U.S. economic competitiveness and thus produced a lower standard of living.

Yankelovich developed this theme using a 400 person “citizen review panel,” a novel research tool he had pioneered that permitted pre-testing various appeals’ effectiveness. Thus the Public Agenda Foundation developed a campaign package, geared to current public understandings, for use by local campaign sponsors and media. This included a newspaper supplement, print advertisements, op-ed articles, a TV documentary and TV public service spot announcements. A newspaper-style brochure included ballots for citizens to cast at local Kroger and other grocery stores. These materials spelled out alternative policy proposals, their benefits, costs, consequences and tradeoffs. Each local revitalization campaign would run for six weeks.

Field operations began in 1991 targeting dozens of cities. Each campaign had some dramatic kick-off event. Local institutions such as TV and radio stations, newspapers, corporations, universities, schools, Lions Clubs, Boy Scouts, and other citizens groups carried on the campaigns. The key was intensive media coverage. Simple, alarmist slogans appealed nakedly to fear, e.g., “Second-rate skills mean a second-rate America; we’ve got a job to do.” The campaigns sought to establish an enduring public association between education and workforce skills training on the one hand, and on the other economic competitiveness and the national standard of living. Citizens voted in week 4. The Public Agenda Foundation conveyed an instant analysis of results to pertinent politicians and officials. A further round of meetings discussed the findings. The firm intention was to provoke actual policy changes.

The first target city was Nashville, quickly followed by Hartford, Indianapolis, Phoenix and Seattle. Then the “rollout” period targeted city after city: Austin, Buffalo, Columbus, Flint, Grand Rapids, Houston, Miami, New Orleans, Saginaw, St. Louis, Tallahassee, Tupelo, White Plains.... Each city’s sponsoring organizations had to line up media support and pay a $25,000 fee to the Public Agenda Foundation. Often media lined themselves up. The Hartford Courant’s Publisher wrote: “If you have the opportunity to become involved in the HELP WANTED campaign, grab it because it offers tremendous benefits to your institutions—a chance to be at the center of debate on a major public policy issue, to become a very real part of your community, and to build a deeper, and perhaps more positive, relationship with your local community” (Public Agenda Foundation-BHEF, 1992: 6).

The IBM corporation soon joined Union Carbide and J.C. Penny as national sponsors; many more followed. Each city and corporation constituted manoeuvres in a multi-year war. Soon state-wide campaigns treated Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Louisiana and Western North Carolina as single battlefields (Public Agenda Foundation, 1992a: 2). In 1992, the enterprise went nationwide. Some 250 ABC television network affiliates joined forces with the Network for Public Debate (28 major newspapers and 36 TV and radio networks and stations), the National Issues Forums (a consortium of some 1000 universities, libraries, and local groups),
and the Business Roundtable (Public Agenda Foundation, 1992b: 12; Network for Public Debate, 1992: 2). This revitalization movement soon reached tens of millions, and its effects on policy-makers, media, and opinion leaders were profound. In 1992, the Public Agenda Foundation’s initial evaluation (Public Agenda Foundation-BHEF 1992) judged the campaigns successful. Across America, people did consistently agree on how and why to improve schools. This encouraged the Public Agenda Foundation and its expanding circle of partners. It had solved the problem that had plagued business for a decade of how to generate and sustain public enthusiasm for corporate America’s own agenda.

The campaigns also helped rejuvenate and infuse energy into state and local politics. That the campaigns were having major consequences was undeniable. Results included increased public understanding of long-term threats to national prosperity. A consensus for change was arising; at least 75 per cent in every city accepted such elite proposals as a national literacy program, mandatory science and math starting in kindergarten, and high school exit exams (Iwasaki, 1992). People proved willing to pay the extra costs. The campaign won support for initially unpopular policy proposals, such as tax breaks to businesses for giving their own workers technical training. As post-tests showed, these results stayed firm over time. This change potential would thus long and handsomely repay business for its initial investment in SE political revitalization.

In its original conception, a revitalization movement is a cultural response to stress that requires charismatic leadership to harken back to past glory days (Barkow, 1996). With SE based upon “public affairs” methodologies pioneered by the Kettering and Public Agenda foundations, charismatic leadership is no longer necessary. A good plan backed by professionally produced mass media materials will do nicely. This movement continued into 1996. Upon reflection, some might think it ludicrous to describe an elite-initiated, elite-operated “public affairs” operation as a political revitalization movement. Given its superiority in producing desired results, we disagree. From now on America will probably never see any other kind. This methodology seems destined to sweep the world, just as it did the U.S. The Help Wanted campaigns displayed irresistible technological superiority. They solved the problem of overcoming human resistance to change. Social engineering had finally come of age.

### B.2. The Burundi National Reconciliation Campaign

Resistance to change goes to the root of how human beings learn and are socialized. Much of what we experience and know comes largely unconsciously, and therefore is hard for change agents to access. How we process and acquire information can generate dangers to social and political cohesion, as in the cases of violent conflict between nations or groups. During the 1990s, SE ceased to be almost wholly conducted by or constrained within states. Take the case of Burundi, a small, poor Catholic country in Central East Africa that became independent in 1962. With six million people whose 1991 average income was US$210, its main tribal groups are Tutsis (14%) and Hutus (84%). Hutus control the Church, but traditionally the
Tutsis have ruled politically. There have been repeated efforts to suppress the Church, but also repeated Hutu revolts against the Tutsis’ absolute power. Such revolts led in the early 1970s to government-organized, army-led genocide against Hutus, especially the most well educated. By 1973 genocide had claimed some 250,000 Hutus.

In 1979 the U.N. Department of Technical Cooperation for Development began a national reconciliation project explicitly based on Adam Podgórecki’s work (Kiezun, 1994b). This major SE project got a large boost in 1987 when a new Burundian President restored full religious freedom and promoted an in-depth process of democratization and reconciliation between Tutsis and Hutus. New sponsors included the Catholic Church and the World Bank. A main objective was to modernize and make the civil service more efficient, put it on a merit basis, and flatten its structures. The project also sought to abolish tribal, religious, wealth and sex-based discrimination, and to guarantee freedom of expression. The goal was to infuse the country with democratic values, and establish means of cooperation between the Tutsi and Hutu tribes.

These were ambitious tasks. There was no multiparty system, and the basis of governmental power was the army. Army officers were all Tutsis, many of whom had participated in crimes against humanity. To the other tasks, the World Bank added that of “structural adjustment,” including privatization, in return for substantial aid credits. The U.N. enlisted help from the president, the ruling party and the Catholic Church to operate a wide range of indoctrination activities to foster tolerance and democratic attitudes.

Project officers assumed that success would depend on changing attitudes, especially of leaders. In-depth studies showed that government personnel were poorly organized and had poor planning, imagination, creativity, writing and synthetic skills. They lacked punctuality, handled paperwork poorly, and worked short hours. U.N. consultants therefore began to teach modern administrative methods and procedures. With audio-visual aids, they conducted exercises and held role, game, computer and team workshops. They covered career and strategic planning, administrative synthesis, effective public speaking, and case study methods. Teachers encouraged “scientific” methods such as punctuality, precision, hierarchy, efficiency-oriented procedures, moral motivation, leadership, decentralization, delegation of power, and broadened participation in decision processes. Burundi’s main problem though was the deep structure of tribal hatred.

The two tribes shared traditions, religion and language, but they are physically much different. Their deep hatred due to the 1970s genocide produced serious resistance. Against this, consultants formulated a Charter of Unity calling for national reconciliation, an end to discrimination, social injustice, violence, extermination, and revenge. It affirmed the democratic ideal and the need to respect human rights. In 1990 the government proposed the Charter in a national referendum. Extensive Catholic help with the educational effort included a visit the Pope made to preach national reconciliation just before the vote. In the end, 89 percent of Burundi citizens approved the Charter of Unity. While this represented progress, the consensus did not include the army. The U.N. team had tried to fix a deep structural problem with surface-level solutions.
In 1992 Burundi created a multiparty system with strong Hutu representation. In a democratic election conducted without serious mishap in June 1993, the Hutu presidential candidate defeated the Tutsi president, who congratulated his opponent and gracefully stepped down. The new government consisted of 60 percent Hutus and 40 percent Tutsis. Unfortunately, the story did not end there. In October 1993 army officers murdered the new president in a coup d’etat. New tribal warfare soon killed some 30,000 people and produced some 300,000 refugees, many of whom fled to neighboring countries where death and suffering were enormous. Eventually the army retreated to its barracks and permitted the civilian government’s restoration. Soldiers of the Organization of African Unity helped reestablish order and stabilize the political situation.

In a later evaluation the U.N. project team judged the World Bank’s “shock” treatment to have been misguided. The transformation process had been too brief, altogether only 14 years, from 1979 to 1993. Worst of all, the U.N. had found no way to overcome the diehards’ resistance to national reconciliation: “One should not have hoped that the 11% who did not accept the National Unity Charter would succumb to a new structure of democratic administration where the fact of belonging to the Tutsi tribe would have no priority over authentic qualifications” (Kiezun, 1994a: 37–8). The reconciliation campaign had only lasted from 1987 to 1992. Kiezun concluded: “The transformation process in Burundi should have been directed by a uniform leadership that should have engaged in the attitude formation process during a long period of 10 to 15 years, with concrete indoctrination activities secured by appropriate military power” (1994a: 37). Unfortunately no such power had been available. Nonetheless, leading global organizations (the U.N., Catholic Church and World Bank) did try to reform a whole country — with methods taken straight from writings of Adam Podgórski and other Research Committee members. No unmasking was needed here.

From these cases we see that by the 1990s social engineers were practicing radically different means to produce effective social action. The prevailing form in advanced societies was still the insidious, manipulative form that by-passes the conscious mind and goes straight for the emotions or produces unconscious learning. There was, however, also the new consciousness raising form that tries to deal with change-resistance by fostering democratic, informed citizen participation. The practical social sciences were now impacting significantly upon the real world.

B.3. The Sociotechnical Paradigm

In 1962 Podgórski set out a sociotechnical paradigm, a methodology for producing efficient social action (see Podgórski, 1975). In the 1990s he decided to reconstruct and elaborate this paradigm. A paradigm is a specific set of generalizations, models, beliefs and procedures that define for a group of scholars how to proceed within a particular area of enquiry. In isolating taxonomies and classes of facts it generates: “that web of beliefs, expectations, and procedures from within which the scientific community works and by which it defines its world view” (Wiser, 1986: 57). As
the 1990s dawned no one else had produced a different sociotechnical paradigm or had elaborated on Podgórecki’s. Scholars had been defining their research problems too narrowly. Sociotechnics scholars had not agreed on whether to use an intellectually constructed ideal type model. On behalf of the Research Committee on Sociotechnics and Sociological Practice (Research Committee 26 of the International Sociological Association), Podgórecki et al. published a collective book, *Social Engineering* (1996), to correct this deficiency. What, it asked, is the relationship between the study of and the practice of SE? To help uncover a paradigm of effective social action, the book codified the knowledge that scholars had gained.

Podgórecki sampled, categorized and illustrated the technical capacities that lie potentially within the social engineer’s grasp. *Social Engineering* also reveals technical limits by uncovering factors commonly necessary for successful social action. These include audience characteristics, the situation’s immediate or long-term logic, the social engineer’s capabilities to achieve certain technical effects, or the inherent propensities that the activity settings display. Podgórecki’s paradigm sets out methodological requirements that resemble classical logic in how subsequent steps interlock. Only a proper sequence of steps will likely lead to the desired and expected end. This rigorous yet normative approach illustrates the uses of an ideal-type standard for testing how adequately human actors apply their strategies in historically concrete situations.

The paradigm distinguishes between professional and legitimate SE (“sociotechnics proper”), the self-made and pseudo varieties, and “dark” SE. It sets out principles for sociotechnical duelling, and defines the participants’ ideal-type roles in legitimate forms. Podgórecki laid out the legitimate forms SE could take at different levels of operation, and he compared and discussed the major models scholars have used to comprehend these phenomena. The paradigm also shows how pervasively and semi-subliminally SE has invaded social life. Various scholars also present illustrative case studies that directly addressed the Podgóreckian paradigm.

There have long been well developed concepts and methods to permit successful social interventions on the micro and meso-levels. Yet many scholars still doubt that one could reliably use sociotechnics to change larger social structures efficiently. Are there reliable ways to influence total societies? The collapse of the main communist bloc reminds us that most attempts to restructure societies have been utopian failures. As we saw in our mini-case studies, though, SE can constitute a strong strategy, and its methods are still developing rapidly. Social engineering can now operate efficiently on two levels: (1) the micro-level, inside of social reality built on face-to-face relations, and (2) the meso-level, among and between institutions, organizations, bureaucracy and administration. Podgórecki’s paradigm posits a unifying model, complete with morally committed social engineers and sociotechnicians playing crucial roles. The paradigm is a catalyst to help generate cumulative knowledge by including self-documenting and reflexive stages in the ideal typical model of planned social intervention. *Social Engineering* argues that scholars require broadly comparative knowledge on which to develop a valid, effective and critical discipline.
C. Future Challenges

Where is sociotechnics going, and where should it go? Podgórecki recently called for a new, more broadly comparative approach that will take systematically into account national, linguistic, religious and cultural differences. He says (1997a: 1):

A most important element determining sociotechnics’ effectiveness is the social setting in which social engineering occurs. The scarce, existing literature on this subject generally ignores this factor.... Nonetheless it is possible to treat the social setting as a problem open for investigation. We can analyze whether a particular setting belongs to a specific type of social reality, and if so, seek out what are their characteristics vis-à-vis sociotechnics.

Where should the study of SE be going? While treating Podgórecki’s socio-cultural space, we may also examine socio-cultural time. The argument is simple. During the Cold War capitalist nations had to avoid or attack the idea of economic democracy advocated — not practiced — by communist states. States that would lead the democratic revolution must stop equating demands for economic justice and equality with Marxism. The Cold War’s collapse permits politically democratic states to address the problem of economic democracy, a main issue for the new century. In the twentieth century SE came to thrive in the high tech era. Reflecting the long change from natural communities to technically organized collectivities, the onslaught of technological SE can only increase in depth and scope in the new century. However another epoch is potentially at hand, the era of unfolding economic democracy.

Can post-industrial states develop into economic democracies? Such a transformation would fit democracy’s historically dynamic expansion. Is economic democracy necessary? The late twentieth century experienced turmoil much like that of the late eighteenth century. Statesmen pondered updated versions of the debate between Edmund Burke’s plea for prudence and Thomas Paine’s revolutionary creed. Issues dividing the world today are surprisingly similar too. Rich nations and multinational institutions act much like kings and nobles. Imperialism stands above poor nations much as monarchs once stood above their subjects. Rich nations and their neo-imperial agencies (e.g., World Bank and International Monetary Fund) implore poor nations with themes of Burke, while economic democrats counter with rhetoric echoing the ringing challenges of Paine and Thomas Jefferson. At issue is whether eliminating despotism requires fundamental change in the economic order.

Economic democracy touches people’s everyday lives more than does political democracy. Under capitalism most people spend their working hours with few basic rights and little say within authoritarian economic institutions dedicated to private gain. Liberal democrats counter that limited government and constitutionalism are the only ways to ensure that economic progress will be rapid and widely shared, and that the historical drive toward equality will prosper. If not buttressed with stable political democracy, workplace democracy is subject to change at any time. For liberal democrats, political democracy’s importance far
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outweighs that of economic democracy. However, the global drive toward
democracy contains a political logic different from formal logic. Less precise and
having less inescapable conclusions, it suggests rather than dictates. Its practitioners
yield more readily to pressures than to unassailable argument. This deep structural
force continually seeks to extend democracy’s meaning and range. Democracy’s
inner political logic is a dynamic, expansionary force that has now strongly invaded
the economic realm.

C.1. Power of the Democratic Ideal

What has impelled democracy’s progressive expansion throughout modern
history? The answers lie in the democratic ideal’s political logic. Having unfolded
now for over 300 years, it has become a de facto model for world development.
Democracy’s expansion now confronts economic and political elites alike. The
drive toward industrialization contains a contrary inner logic. Ugly and inhumane,
industrialism always employed authoritarian methods, during each of its initial
stages. It once appeared that the more advanced the technological level, the
larger and more authoritarian must be industry’s organizational units. The twin
drives toward democracy and economic prosperity have pursued separate
unfoldings in mutual tension and conflict. As Mumford insists (1935), history
displays both democratic and authoritarian techniques, but as industrialism
matured, its anti-democratic momentum gradually declined, so much that we
may now put industrialization into its historical place beside or beneath
democracy’s still accelerating force.

Although Tocqueville (1945) identified the democratic impulse with a desire for
equality, all societies have permitted gross social inequalities on grounds of historical
necessity while they pursued the prior goal of rough equality of opportunity
(Heilbroner, 1975). Today, equal opportunity remains far from secure, but de jure
equality of opportunity is largely in place, or forces are working to put it in place.
Whatever the practical failings, its inner logic is accepted as though it had been
divinely revealed. History happens when the forces of change overpower those of
continuity. During such times, political institutions are not exempt. Democracy
expands by defeating authoritarianism, which involves sociotechnical “unmasking”
(Podgorecki, 1996). In post-industrial states, the force of the economic logic that
required sacrificing democracy to authoritarianism appears to be waning.

C.2. Economic Democracy’s Three Foundational Logics

According to developmental stages, democracy’s expression has changed; its inner
logic has endured. According to Wheeler (1970) it contains three propositions —
one scientific, one organizational and one philosophical — that generate its
revolutionary impulses. Proposition I applies to economics as well as politics:
science shows us that despotism has no basis in genetics. Genetics proposes that
the stock of common sense is distributed evenly throughout the human race. Just
as demands for sexual equality are scientifically valid for both workplace and forum, so is the revolt against hierarchy in institutions. In both, the democratic impulse accords with genetic science.

Proposition II is: the more society becomes complexly interdependent, the more intricate are its functions, and the harder it is to coordinate them by authoritarian or hierarchical means. Complex interdependence demands more horizontal communication than highly hierarchical organizations can sustain. If managers are those responsible for applying knowledge to improve performance, many workers are already de facto managers in this fundamental sense (Drucker, 1993: 44). This fact has begun to break down what Michels used to call the iron law of oligarchy.

In economics as in politics, institutions are only effective if they maintain motivation, consent and integration. Corporate authoritarianism fails to provide in our democratic age for necessary levels of worker motivation and consent. In many high-tech enterprises, ad hoc, democratically set up and consensually operating task forces have replaced much hierarchical structure. The movement against corporate hierarchy has long been seeking a transformation (Alexander, 1972). On the heels of science and technology, democratic forces are invading yet another realm. Traditional methods no longer suffice for advanced economic lead sectors; too many subordinate groups can thwart the now-delicacy whole operation by withdrawing consent or “working to rule.” Democracy is this problem’s only practical long-term solution. Proposition III is philosophical. Because humanity’s instinctual equipment now has great destructive potential, we must compensate by creating unifying values and purposes. As technological society develops, the pace of change and innovation escapes the confines of customary and traditional values. Where are the new values to come from, and where will they reside? We may evade this logic, but it continually slips back in on the passports of necessity. There are only two basic sources of social value — the elite or the governed, an oligarchy versus democracy. Ultimately both corporations and states must recognize the corporate citizens as possessing a rough equality in the process of creating collective values and purposes. When this occurs the stage is set for economic democracy.

Drucker explains (1993: 56):

Because modern organization is an organization of knowledge specialists, it has to be an organization of equals, of ‘colleagues,’ of ‘associates.’ No one knowledge ‘ranks’ higher than another. The position of each is determined by its contribution to the common task rather than by any inherent superiority or inferiority.

Proposition III, democracy’s basic postulate, insists there is no way to prove that some individuals or groups possess higher ethical values than others. Once enterprises accept that novel collective values must be quickly and continually generated, then the only valid source for them becomes the corporate citizenry as a whole.

Together, these three propositions show that democracy is a potent force, evoked by burgeoning environmental complexity. These scientific, organizational, and philosophical impulses continually regenerate deep structures of democratic vitality. Predictably, the old system will resist efforts to fight against authoritarian private power and privilege. We see this in corporate striving for even greater centralization.
We see it in the quest for even more unaccountable power through a global game of locational economic chess. At the century’s end the struggle against workers was intense, making this a time for unmasking reactionary forces through sociotechnical projects.

D. Conclusion

In the 1900s, SE plummeted into the purgatory where people send the despicable and the unclean; under euphemistic names, the practice continues virtually unnoticed yet ubiquitous. Sometimes SE has beneficial results, but the issue of unintended consequences lurks always in the background. Consider superhighways. Since most automobile accidents happen at intersections, an astute engineer recommended designing most intersections out of the grid — by using overpasses and underpasses, and merge and exit lanes. Though the accident rate dropped significantly, this solution had the unanticipated second order consequence of giving cars enough deep structural support to deform cities and warp societies. Quite a price. There is considerable danger in so ubiquitous a practice as SE being carried on under the shadow of a nearly absolute taboo, a sacred ban or prohibition, against naming SE acts and studying them as such. What we do not identify as SE may be much more effective for having been so effectively stigmatized. Those maintaining the SE taboo have not served us well. In refusing to permit study of this subject, they let the social engineers far too easily have their way.

The Modern Dictionary of Sociology (Theodorson and Theodorson, 1969: 388), says SE once meant simply: “The application of sociological principles to the solution of specific problems.” It adds: “The term, now largely abandoned by sociologists, had been variously used to include social reform, social planning, and applied sociology.” How many self-styled poets of industrial sociology, software development, policy analysis, systems engineering or management science would be astonished to discover that all their professional lives they have been willy nilly writing and speaking in socio-technical prose? It is ironic that SE also came under such strict stigmatization that this cardinal social fact of our age went virtually unrecognized, unremarked, unstudied — and unopposed. In struggling against this massive, self-induced historical blindness, the Research Committee on Sociotechnics has a lot of work to do.

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Futures research and sociology have only rarely been interconnected. Sociology has definitely a longer period of development and has hence been subject to a lengthy critical debate. In formal terms, the history of sociology can be traced to the end of the 19th century (although, as for many disciplines, its beginning and real initiators are a source of much interesting discussion) that of futures research to the end of the second world war. In this chapter I will stress the arbitrariness of this formal and acknowledged moment of birth, rightly considered by Wendell Bell to be highly controversial (Bell, 1997: 7) as there are many anticipatory indications and references to future thinking in the history of human thought and, indeed, in ancient history. It is thus important to have a much wider definition of futures thinking than futures research.¹

A. Futures Research and Sociology: A Historical Analysis and a Brief Debate on Definitions

According to John McHale (McHale and McHale, 1976), what may be referred to as futures studies, in fact encompasses all ways of looking, inventing, forecasting and predicting the future, ranging from utopia to projections although always with a time frame of some decades; whereas futures research refers exclusively to the knowledge and understanding of the future, something which many authors, including Bertrand de Jouvenel (1976),³ believe is not possible. There is no way we can know or understand the future, we can only conjecture it, says de Jouvenel, because there are many futures, in this being in agreement with John McHale and others, including myself (Barbieri Masini, 1993). This relates to the basic principle in futures studies by which different possible futures are a consequence of a variety of events and of different human choices.

What we can do is think of the various possible, probable and even desirable futures, though the latter rarely coincide with the probables. John McHale claimed that there are as many futures as there are human beings; hence the unlikelihood of
the possibles and probables also coinciding with the desirables. This same idea was expressed by Roy Amara (1981) in a famous article where he writes of possible, probable and preferable futures.

Bertrand de Jouvenel also used the term “futuribles” which has since been used to indicate different possible futures. In his opinion, this is an intellectual endeavour linked to conjecture as opposed to knowledge. The term “conjecture” was first used by Jacques Bernoulli in his “Ars Conjectandi” which caused a great stir when it was published after his death in 1713.

The French term “prospective” is another important concept, encompassed by the very general term futures studies and indeed connected to the many alternative futures. It was coined by Gaston Berger (1964) in the 1950s and rediscovered and used in France in the 1980s. In many countries it is used instead of “futures studies.” In this context we are exercising a prospective approach when we understand the past in terms of the part of human life that cannot be changed, and choose in the present a set of futures. This approach does not forecast or attempt to understand the future. Instead, on the basis of an understanding of the past, it chooses in the present a set of possible, probable and desirable futures (Godet, 1979). The prospective approach is then a way of influencing the future by clearly identifying the goals that guide present action.

In this chapter I focus on futures studies rather than futures research in the sense currently accepted by most futurists, in the hope of throwing some light on one of the most serious doubts of sociologists: that it is not possible to know the future because it cannot be experimented. Futures studies look not at one future but at different alternative futures as the many authors cited underline. Futures studies require clearly stated assumptions and rigorous methods of future-oriented analysis.

In this context it is also important to examine the relationship between the past, the present and the future and the often presupposed, univocal interpretation of the past and the present, with the future being conjectured only in terms of alternatives. As early as 1969, Yayoi Hayashi (1969), one of the first futurists in Japan, said that there are two ways of looking into the future: one is to know it, and the other is to conceive it. He argued that knowledge of the present cannot be univocal just as knowledge of the past (and especially the distant past) cannot be univocal. Present phenomena can be interpreted quite differently. Obviously the future presents an even wider range of possibilities. Sociologists are familiar with the difficulty and ambivalence of different interpretations of the past and the present. If the future is probabilistic — as Hayashi says — and undefined in terms of knowledge, it cannot be said to differ in this sense from the past and the present.

More recently, Graham H. May (1997) raised the issue of alternative futures being no different from different interpretations of the past or present. He wrote:

The English language is not alone in using the words past, present and future; each suggesting the singular. There was one past, history rather than histories, there is one present, not a series of presents, and there will be one future. If, however, we accept the existence of effective human choice, there must be the potential for different Futures (as in text) to occur. Easy as it is to explain, when we are used to think about the past and the present, it can still be difficult to accept that futures are multiple (...). But is it as different as that?
Another important point related to the existence of many futures, as well as to the role of human choice in determining those futures, is based on Edgar Morin’s (1977) discussion of complexity. Morin stresses the unitas multiplex which should be introduced in describing interrelations and forms of organization from a “polyrelational perspective”. This involves the conceptual element and the observer in a participatory process much debated by sociologists in the present (Wallerstein, 1995). This is certainly relevant to the thinking of futurists who are addressing this same issue and using a variety of methods, such as scenario building, to do so. Scenario building has as an important component the participation of the actors, the decision makers within the specific area under analysis, who have to contribute, together with the scenario builder, to the description of the emerging possible, probable and desirable futures. The role of the observed in relation to the observer is also becoming increasingly important and active in sociological analysis.

Interestingly enough, the two areas seem to be proceeding independently in this very important area of the epistemology of social analysis.

The other important area, which may bring the two areas closer, is the orientation towards future related action in the present which is the underlying hypothesis of futures studies. From a view of alternative futures spring the indications of actions in the present. I call this having a “project of action for the future” (Barbieri Masini, 1982). More sociologists will probably now acknowledge that an analytical approach to social interpretation and understanding is not sufficient without indications for ways of changing social reality.

B. The Contribution of Sociology to Futures Studies: An Often Neglected Area with some References to Social Sciences

As already indicated, sociology and futures studies have been two separate areas only coming into contact in certain moments of history thanks to the contribution of sociologists with a future orientation. As a consequence, it is not easy to trace the contribution of sociology to futures studies. I shall refer to recent contributions and not to past social thinking or to the great political doctrines of the 18th century, as those of Tocqueville, Marx, Proudon or Comte which in many ways had a future orientation. I discuss the writings of a number of contemporary authors and outline the history of Research Committee on Futures Research of the International Sociological Association.

The Committee was founded by Bertrand de Jouvenel. He was not a sociologist, but an economist by training and interested in political science as indicated by his various writings and manifestations. He repeatedly wrote that all sciences have to have a future orientation, especially the social sciences. He referred to H.G. Wells’ (de Jouvenel, 1967: 8) radio speech broadcast by the British Broadcasting Corporation in 1932, advocating a “science of the future” and the need not only for “professors of foresight” but also for “faculties and departments of foresight”.

In January 24 1902, H.G. Wells delivered a lecture, entitled “The Discovery of the Future”, to the Royal Institute in London subsequently published in the journal Nature (Wagar, 1996). Wells indicated how far into the future social sciences could
hope to peer. Over and beyond his visions of the future, this author and philosopher indicated a task for social scientists, which is still only at the very beginning for sociologists and, to some extent, for futurists. Wells’ dream is still in the making. Wendell Bell’s contribution (1997) has been particularly important concerning the links between the area of sociology and futures studies. Bell (1997: 7–10) stresses that several sociologists have made significant contributions both to futures studies, as they are today, and to the future thinking of sociologists.

One of those sociologists was William F. Ogburn who was appointed president of a Research Committee on Social Trends by the US President Herbert Hoover in 1929. Ogburn’s Committee produced a description of social change in American society up to that time, published as a report in 1933 with the title “Recent Social Trends in The United States”. After the election of US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1932, Ogburn became a member of the US National Resources Committee and contributed to its report published in 1937. Ogburn’s contribution was twofold. On the one hand, he made long-term projections (a few decades) on the basis of quantitatively described trends. On the other hand, he stressed the importance of invention, looking at its impact on changes in society and social institutions and, as a consequence, on people’s beliefs and attitudes.

This circular approach to explaining social change was developed in futures studies in the 1970s, without any acknowledgement of what such thinking owed to the sociologist Ogburn, although he is well known among futurists today. This aspect, namely the circular effect of change underlined by Ogburn — that is the impact on people’s attitudes and beliefs of social and institutional changes, also seen in relation to economic changes and to technological innovations — was almost completely ignored by futurists. Throughout the 1970s, and for the first part of the 1980s, futurists (with few exceptions) tended to concentrate on technological, economic or institutional change as separate entities and not in relation to each other.

Nathan Israeli also made a specific contribution to future thinking in his studies on social psychology in relation to time. This is an aspect that futurists have only recently re-discovered: the importance of attitudes towards time, and the perception of time and its influence on futures studies and decision making for the future.

Not to be forgotten, the sociologist John McHale, who has been fully recognized by futurists for his analysis of changing needs in societies, but maybe less so by sociologists. In my view, one of his most interesting contributions was the recognition in 1969 that “when we come to social futures (...) the need to introduce predictable parameters and concomitant action has become increasingly urgent” (McHale, 1969: 8). Here the sociologist’s view is clear, in terms of the search for parameters, and the futurist’s view (futurist with a ‘prospective’ conception) in terms of action. I would say that this second aspect has only been accepted by sociologists in recent years.

In the 1960s, when so much was going on at the social and intellectual level, sociologists made an extremely important contribution to future thinking through the Commission Toward the Year 2000 (Bell, 1967), established by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1966. The purpose of the Commission, chaired by Daniel Bell, was to consider hypothetical futures and reflect on methodological
approaches. In addition to the president, many members of the Commission were sociologists or social scientists. Among the sociologists we find David Riesman and Wilbert Moore. The latter at that time was involved in research on social indicators with the Russel Sage Foundation. In the context of the Commission 2000 he stressed the need to recognize the remarkable degrees of persistence of some components in society also in the future. Among the political scientists, we find Karl W. Deutsch, Samuel Huntington, Ithiel De Sola Pool; among the economists, Wassily Leontieff and the anthropologists, Margaret Mead. Hence the Commission had some excellent social scientists and sociologists.

Going back to some of the writings of this Commission, their contribution to professional futurists at the time and in the future was quite amazing. Daniel Bell started the report with the words: “Time, said St Augustine, is a threefold present: the present as we experience it, the past as a present memory, and the future as a present expectation” (Bell, 1967: 639). Further on we read: “Is it not now a fundamental responsibility for a society as interdependent as this one to try and engage in some form of systematic anticipation, some form of thinking about the future?” (Bell, 1967: 657). Here we have another important contribution to the time debate which Israeli and McHale, both sociologists, also discussed.

Other members of the Commission to the Year 2000 also made interesting contributions. The social scientist Fred Charles Iklé wrote an article entitled “Can Social Predictions be Evaluated?” (Iklé, 1967), stressing the distinction, already highlighted by Robert Merton (1973), between predictions which are self-realizing and predictions which are self-defeating, and the importance of controlling this effect in making predictions. Like many others at the time, Iklé uses the term ‘prediction’ rather than ‘forecast’ or ‘foresight’ which are more generally used in English at present. A very important contribution to self-altering predictions was made by the late Richard L. Henshel (1993) who gives many interesting examples of “feedback loops” in his writings. Iklé, a political scientist, insisted on the role of action in prediction. This is an interesting emphasis and a much debated issue in social sciences at the present time. Sociology in particular has had problems going beyond the present because of analysis-oriented rather than action-oriented approach. As previously indicated, the latter is a basic principle of futures studies. Another interesting point raised by Iklé is related to whether prediction is to be considered in favour or against social change. His answer is that we wish to look ahead in order to preserve our values, but at the same time we wish continuously to change and have new goals, like old-fashioned Faustians!

The importance of the Commission toward the Year 2000 is evident from these remarks by Daniel Bell (1967: 985):

The Commission has concentrated largely on problems of social change as they are linked to public policy. We have not dealt with the future of cultures, perhaps the most unpredictable of the dimensions of social consciousness (...) We have not dealt, and it is a neglect, with religion and man’s continuing effort to find transcendental meaning amid the contemporary disorientation wherein each individual knows that he can no longer walk in the traditional ways of his father and that his son will not walk his ways. And yet such needs remain.
Clearly the Commission toward the Year 2000 was important in terms of the relationship between sociology, social sciences and futures studies, offering a crucial example of the importance of sociology for futures studies and the importance of a future orientation for social sciences and sociology.

An important contribution to future thinking was made by the well-known social scientist, Harold D. Lasswell. From the 1930s, and for several decades, Lasswell worked for the development of futures studies at Yale University. This aspect of Lasswell’s work, as Wendell Bell tells us (1997: 47–56), is not as well known as his contribution to policy sciences. As W. Bell recalls, Lasswell indicates five tasks for Futures Studies (or, as he says, for the study of the future): (1) The clarification of goals and values; (2) the description of trends; (3) the explanation of conditions; (4) the projection of possible and probable futures if current policies continue; and (5) the invention, evaluation and selection of policy alternatives in order to achieve preferred goals.

These are indeed all the tasks of futures studies which it has taken years to define. Over and beyond identifying specific tasks, Lasswell thought globally and visualized the world as one community with great interdependencies. This is the view that developed in futures studies in the 1970s, starting from the Club of Rome’s report Limits to Growth (Meadows, 1972) and at present recognized as the identified characteristic of present and probably future society. Being so far ahead of his time, Lasswell’s ideas were probably not understood.

Many other sociologists had a future orientation. In 1971 Wendell Bell and James Mau wrote the book The Sociology of the Future (1971) which certainly opened the way to the possibility of the two areas being interconnected. Bell’s important recent publication, Foundations of Futures Studies, has been mentioned in this text in relation to several aspects of the links between futures studies and social sciences.

The sociologist Elise Boulding has also contributed to futures studies in many of her works. Among others, Boulding translated and enriched Fred Polak’s well-known The Image of the Future (1973). The French sociologist Yves Barrel of the University of Grenoble wrote extensively on “prospective sociale”, but unfortunately did not publish all his works as he died young. Another French sociologist, Victor Scardigli, worked on the future of life styles as director of research of CNRS (Centre National Recherche Sociale) in Paris. Among Scardigli’s writings I like to recall “L’Europe des modes de vie” (1987).

Much more could be said about the unacknowledged contribution of sociologists and social sciences at large to futures studies in terms of a future orientation of social analysis and of the need for indications of actions as a consequence of the choice of a future orientation. I will refer to the most recent contributions of sociologists and to those we may expect for the future later in this article.

C. The Contribution of Futures Studies to Sociological Work and to Social Sciences in General: Contributions from the North American and the European Schools

Once again I shall refer to futures studies mainly in the period after the Second World War, for this is when much of the analysis in the area started. I have already
mentioned that futures studies emerged virtually simultaneously in the US and France, but with a totally different approach (Barbieri Masini, 1993). In the United States the first studies were undertaken in the field of military aeronautics, which has no alternative but to be future oriented. The area of technological forecasting with its assumptions and methodologies therefore emerged first. These studies can be linked to “operational research” as Wendell Bell says (1997: 28), referring to activity in the British Army during the war to project and predict the moves of German bombers.

The first major US project was the creation of RAND (Research and Development) Corporation probably the most famous think-tanks out of many (e.g., the Battelle Institute, the Stanford Research Institute and others) that came into being in the 1950s and 1960s. Initially RAND concentrated on forecasting military technology and moved on to non military areas of technology in a second stage. Essentially, operational research used a systems analysis approach, or a holistic view (in social terms), and was developed by an interdisciplinary team. This is undoubtedly an area in which futures studies contributed to social sciences and sociology.

With the growing rapidity of change, including social change, areas become increasingly interrelated. In addressing issues related to change, there is therefore a growing need for an interdisciplinary or even transdisciplinary approach (Barbieri Masini, 1993:18). Using the latter approach, the various disciplines have to work to find common assumptions and use a combination of their various methods. The most widely used futures studies methods, namely the Delphi technique and scenario building, do just this. Delphi is based on the joint, and anonymous, contribution of experts on a given issue tending toward some degree of consensus through several rounds of questionnaires. In this case, statistics, mathematics, sociological analysis and psychological studies are combined in the effort to foresee possible and probable futures. Scenario building uses the results of many disciplines, adopting a sociological, political and economic approach, with the addition, in the final analysis, of mathematical tools, computer analysis, etc. A difficult endeavour indeed, but futures studies has been attempting it for many decades.

In this respect, Immanuel Wallerstein’s description of areas of study in the social sciences, as they developed in the United States in many universities, is crucial, as these area studies were essentially multidisciplinary (in the understanding of involving many disciplines) and a reaction to the artificial divisions in social sciences (Wallerstein, 1995: 44). The same type of efforts were made both in social sciences and futures studies. To some extent, futures studies went even further, as it also tried to involve natural scientists in the effort to forecast crucial issues, such as those related to the environment, which need the support of many disciplines, from geology to anthropology to history. Wallerstein also refers to the assumption of universality for any institutionalized discipline, although I believe universality will never be an assumption for futures studies, given the many possible outcomes of present events and trends. Wallerstein refers to three sets of problems for the nomothetic social sciences, in relation to their expectations in following the natural sciences model, namely prediction, management and, as a consequence,
quantifiable accuracy. These problems all apply to futures studies as well (in terms of expectations which create problems even to a higher level in futures studies than they do to the nomothetic social sciences).

Reference should be made to the contribution of natural scientists to futures studies, contribution which has been useful for social science analysis. The Nobel Prize winner Dennis Gabor (1969: 38–67), analyzed the 100 technical innovations identified by Herman Kahn and Anthony Wiener (1967). By analyzing these technological innovations in terms of their social effects, Gabor provided decision makers with an important instrument. His analysis is useful also for whoever is interested in social, economic or political analysis with important insights on the social consequences of such innovations (as indicated by Ogburn long before).

To illustrate: Gabor cites a major innovation, the desalinization of sea water, which is destined to have important social and political effects, given that in the future the resource water will inevitably be a major source of conflict and alliances. He also refers to innovations in the area of transport and the introduction of superfast trains by the year 2000, which, again, can be expected to have a major social impact on entire regions, as is already the case in Europe, France, Italy and Germany. Though a great scientist, Dennis Gabor can justifiably be considered a futurist both because of his interdisciplinary approach and his future- and action-oriented indications.

John Platt (1966), a scientist working in the area of natural sciences, also made an important contribution in social terms, and from a future-oriented point of view. Platt was a biophysicist and a well known general systems analyst at the Chicago and Michigan universities. He worked on discontinuities in history and believed that current developments can be tentatively compared to “evolutionary jumps”. For the first time in history, many of these evolutionary jumps are occurring simultaneously, thus creating a completely new era, which is absolutely unprecedented in terms of discontinuity. Platt tries to compare jumps in the present with those in the past and foresee their impact. For example, the evolutionary jumps related to the discovery of DNA will, he believes, have an incredible effect on human life and hence on social structures and societies.

Having looked at the North American school of futures studies, we can now go to the other side of the Atlantic and take a closer look at the French school, also important and, from the start, closer to social sciences. It is easy to understand why: France, like the rest of Europe, had been hard hit by the war and the social consequences were dramatic. A social and politically-oriented approach was a natural reaction.

There are three founders of the French school: Gaston Berger (1964), Pierre Massé (1967), and Bertrand de Jouvenel. Over and beyond the theoretical basis and the use of terms which were (and still are) definitely different at the conceptual level from the North American school, the use of the French studies was very much related to planning at the national and regional levels. The Commissariat Général du Plan was set up as early as 1946 and the Datar (Délegation d’aménagement du territoire) to operate at the local level. Although these two bodies have lost some of their former power, a culture of managing the territory in a future-oriented way, and with an interdisciplinary approach, has indeed remained in France.
It can be said that not only did such studies develop in close relation to social sciences, but that they were (and are) used for different purposes at the public and private level, with the utilization of different disciplines, social and natural, and therefore definitely with an interdisciplinary approach.

The French studies have had a strong impact on other European countries and interestingly on central and eastern European countries. This emerged clearly in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the 1970s and 1980s, and is still so mainly in Hungary. In these cases, social scientists were mainly involved, as futures studies was a way of looking at social alternatives, especially for the many in disagreement with the system.

The contribution of futures studies in terms of criticizing the system in power can also be seen in different historical moments in Latin America. In fact the only global model from a non-developed country, the so-called Bariloche model (Herrera, 1976), was built at the end of the 1970s in Latin America, in counterposition to other global models built in North America and Europe. It had the contribution of many social scientists, in addition to that of mathematicians and systems analysts. The result was a set of possible and probable futures for the main regions of the world, Latin America, Africa and Asia, with a highly normative content.

Thus futures studies has offered social scientists both an interdisciplinary and a critical approach in different historical moments. It is no coincidence that after the notorious events in Beijing in 1989, all books on futures studies were burned in China. In India, futures studies by social scientists has often been critical of the country’s economic and political system. In both cases the contribution of futures studies to social analysis can be said to be highly critical in terms of present choices related to future consequences.

D. The Consequences of the Neglect or the Attention by Futures Studies of Social Sciences and Specifically Sociology

In the period between the second world war and the end of the 1970s, with the exception of the excellent authors cited in relation to the Commission Towards the Year 2000 and a few others, futurists tended to neglect social analysis and focus on more quantitative approaches, such as systems analysis. This is the period of global models, of the Limits to Growth report to the Club of Rome by D. Meadows and colleagues (Meadows et al., 1972), which had the great merit of attracting the attention of decision makers all over the world to the fact that the earth’s capacity to sustain humanity was not unlimited, but in no way considered social change. In other global models, for example those by Mike Mesarovic and Eduard Pestel (1974), there was some reference to social aspects, whereas the model by Wassily Leontieff (Leontieff, Carter and Petri, 1977) was mainly an input-output model. In this same period countries produced analyses of their future in mainly quantitative terms.

In this period futures studies, with the exceptions mentioned previously, was mainly from the developed world and reinforced the parochial view mentioned by Wallerstein with respect to social sciences (Wallerstein, 1995: 55–67).
At the end of the 1970s, futures studies started to develop in what at the time were called “third world” countries and in the newly industrializing countries. In many cases these studies were based on the approach of Western futurists, especially from North America. The work of Herman Kahn (Kahn and Wiener, 1967) of the Rand corporation had an impact in Latin America, but was quite the opposite to the critical approach previously mentioned. In this set of studies social sciences and sociology were hardly present, and what was therefore lacking was an analysis of the social context. This, coupled with reliance on the Western approach, explains why such studies were often discovered to be a failure.

By the end of the 1970s, social sciences started to assume an increasingly important role in the context of futures studies, as is evident from Jib Fowles’ excellent *Handbook of Future Research*, (1978), where many contributors were from the area of social science and based their analysis also on the social context. Yet, if we scan the *Encyclopaedia of the Future* (Kurian and Molitor, 1996), there is still little sign of analysis of the social context, despite a very valid interdisciplinary approach. Futurists are still not giving sufficient importance to the social context. Volumes, such as the one developed by Futuribles in France on “The Changing Values in Europe” are a good example of what can be done with futures studies when the social context is taken into account (Futuribles, 1995).

### E. Consequences of the Neglect of, or Interest in, Futures Studies by Social Sciences

Social sciences, and sociology certainly, have tended to split into many fields of specialization with the emergence of the study areas referred to by I. Wallerstein. Although we are currently witnessing a trend toward more contact between disciplines, something futures studies had been tending toward for some time, if we look at university curricula, it is evident that fragmentation is still very much the norm, even within the area of sociology. There are still therefore obstacles to the holistic view which has become essential in a time of constant and rapid change, which enhances the interrelatedness of areas. It is obvious that to look at the future development of a given technology, without considering the social context, is dangerous. It is equally dangerous not to look at the future consequences of a specific change in value hierarchies in a given society. It is also dangerous to look at those changing values from the perspective of one particular branch of sociological analysis (for example rural sociology) without looking at changing values in another context. For example, the urban context in a developing country with migratory flows from rural to urban areas, or to other countries. The failure to look at the whole social system, in considering the consequences of deep changes in many countries involved in conflict and unrest, has undoubtedly weakened the social sciences and prevented them from at least giving warning of potential conflicts.

Some efforts in this direction have been made within the social sciences and I would like to mention the publication *Exploring the Future* (International Social Sciences Journal, 1993), based on a set of papers originally presented at the
International Sociological Association World Congress of Sociology in Madrid in 1990. UNESCO has also developed some studies in this direction - for example, the Futures of Cultures (Barbieri Masini, 1994) in which I have looked at the “futures of cultures” from an anthropological perspective, within the framework of Asia, Latin America and Africa.

F. Recent Examples and Hopes of Greater Cooperation Between Futures Studies and Social Sciences with Special Reference to Sociology

Evidence of the emergence of a new approach to the issue of cooperation between futures studies and sociology is to be found in several interesting texts published recently, and in my personal experience in two universities.

The first text I would like to cite is one by Wendell Bell (1997), which in my view best expresses the difficulties of the past and the present but also the possibility of theoretical cooperation. Bell presents a theory of knowledge and explores the foundations of futures studies. In his view, futurists organize knowledge and “encourage people (...) to be more conscious of the consequences of their own actions and to be more deliberate and responsible in their decision making” (1997: 316). Bell believes that, although futures studies can be considered both an art and a science, they share with science the obligation to search for the truth. He adds that futures studies are interdisciplinary and a social science. This last observation may be debatable but is, I think, a step at least in the right direction of mutual recognition of futures studies and social sciences in general, and sociology in particular. He proposes a theory of knowledge for futures studies: critical realism, which goes beyond positivism and includes some of its aspects, but at the same time introducing a critical discourse. There is an external reality independent of the human mind that can be known objectively, but there is also a conjectural knowledge. The external reality responds to the past and the present and this is where we need sociology. On the basis of that, we can then attempt conjectural knowledge, which is described by many as alternative futures.

In my view, the challenge of cooperation comes mainly from the actual context in which social sciences and futures studies operate. This means that challenges come from the problems of developing countries, the economic discrepancies between rich and poor, the disadvantaged human resources, such as indigenous populations, youth, women and children at the global and national level. These challenges require all our intellectual energy and the complete elimination of any kind of competition and parochialism. The boundaries of each discipline are being challenged.

In the context of efforts to face such challenges in futures studies, Richard Slaughter (1996: 799–813), involved in futures studies and education, has developed what he calls the knowledge base of futures studies, calling to its support many futurists from all over the world. Slaughter advocates the view that futurists facilitate the development and application of the individual, organizational and collective capacity of what he calls foresight, thus recalling
the term used many years ago by H.G. Wells. He suggests that social foresight
can emerge through many distinctive layers of capability ranging from language,
concepts, theories, images, literature, organizations, networks, practitioners,
methodologies, to social movements and innovations. In this case a
transdisciplinary approach is accompanied by a whole range of different
approaches. It is a new way of looking at futures studies which, in my view,
needs further analysis and the rigorous involvement of the various layers.

Moreover there could be ample space for debate in considering a reflection
by futures studies on the important writings of many sociologists of our time.
For example, Anthony Giddens (1991) considers “modernity” a specific historical
period which has reached its limits. Much of this position is also present in
futures studies, but Giddens goes much beyond the physical limits and considers
modernity as “a risk culture”. This position is shared by many futurists, although
reached from totally different approaches, such as technological forecasting or
systems analysis. Post-modernity, hence, is an historically emerging stage and,
as Zygmunt Bauman, writes: “a post-modern perspective (...) means above all the
tearing off of the mask of illusions; the recognition of certain pretences as
false and certain objectives as neither attainable nor, for that matter, desirable”
(1993: 3). This approach has the support of some young futurists and may be
another possibility of interchange between in-depth social analysis from
sociology and the tracing of possible, probable, desirable and undesirable
alternative futures.

What can be said at this point is that, on one side, in sociology there are
growing quests for what has in many ways already been developed (though not
always achieved) in futures studies: the need for interdisciplinarity, and even
transdisciplinarity; the need for the participation of anyone involved in social
research; the need to strive for an action-oriented attitude. Futures studies has
long been developing the character of interdisciplinarity; more recently it has
been working for transdisciplinarity. Sporadically, and more recently, it has been
struggling the need for the participation of those choosing and building the various
futures. This has emerged as an ethical need. Futures studies has always been
action-oriented, for what is the point of looking ahead, if not to make a difference
and a change?

Sociology has always contained a critical component (I could refer to many
writers). Because of the rapidity of change, futures studies emphasizes this need
in particular. Moreover it has to go even further, for thinking about the future
is acknowledged to be value loaded. Although this may be a difficulty for
sociologists, a change may be possible because critical social analysis is also
inevitably value loaded, albeit not future-oriented. This latter point stresses
certainly the responsibility of futurists, but may also be an area of reflection
for sociologists. Sociology on the other hand has much to offer in terms of social
theory and social analysis.

These are some of the points that, if open to debate, may bring sociologists
and social scientists at large closer to futurists to the advantage of both. This
may indeed be the future of these two areas which are both interested in society
and its changes.
G. Some Efforts in the Direction of Bringing Sociology and Futures Studies Closer: a Personal Experience

In my personal experience teaching in the Faculty of Social Sciences at the Gregorian University and the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Trieste’s School of International Studies, I have been able to combine sociological analysis and futures studies, especially through empirical work in scenario building. In scenario building it is crucial to have a good analysis (in sociological and social science, with a transdisciplinary contribution in some cases extending even beyond social sciences) of the past and the present of the subject involved, in order to be able to build alternative societal scenarios, which are possible, maybe probable and maybe feasible. This involves a lengthy process of data collection and checking, but it is rewarding in that it offers the possibility of clarifying the present in function of the futures.

In my view this is one good approach. To use the best tools of sociological analysis on which to base possible and probable scenarios, using the most rigorous methods available to futures studies. After twenty years of scenario building in universities and developing countries, in areas such as education, or in specific geographic areas — for example European Union, the Balkans — over and beyond transdisciplinarity, the availability of reliable data, and an intercultural approach, I think it is clear that the most important characteristic is the participation of the people who in some way will be in the position to realize some of these scenarios. These may be decision makers, students or political leaders, but they must accept the role of builders of the future, on the basis of the best available sociological understanding of the specific area.

H. Conclusion

The rapidity of change and the interrelation of trends and events forces us academics to search for new ways of understanding social reality, and to make conjectures for the future, which in any case are alternative. We need all our capacities and joint knowledge as well as a willingness to experiment in our search for rigorous and reliable ways to conjecture the alternative futures, even at the risk of being criticized by our academic colleagues. What is at stake is the future of those who will be following us in the history of humankind and of the societies we are so earnestly trying to understand as sociologists and social scientists at large. The responsibility of such an endeavour is with us today.
References


Endnotes

1. As proposed by the International Sociological Association’s Research Committee on Futures Research (ISA Research Committee 07) created in 1970.
2. Bertrand de Jouvenel was the founder of ISA Research Committee 07 “Futures Research”.
3. There are earlier examples but they are exceptions: in India, Romesh Thapar (Thapar, 1978) and Rahjni Kothari (Kothari, 1974), a sociologist.
4. Indirectly Immanuel Wallerstein proposes another course in his presidential letter No. 5, suggesting that the challenges to sociology be discussed at the ISA 1998 meeting.
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